As Officer in Charge of the Defence Forces Public Relations Section, it is both a privilege and a pleasure to present the Defence Forces Review for 2013. This is a momentous occasion for all associated with this important Defence Forces publication as it marks the twentieth anniversary of the concept's initial launch. Back in 1993, the compilation of articles succeeded in stimulating widespread discussion amongst its readers and fostering an already hungry appetite to broaden horizons and garner fresh opinion on a wide range of military topics. As the years progressed, the Review evolved to embrace subject matter across a broader military spectrum comprising welcome contributions from colleagues in the academic, corporate and diplomatic arenas. Currently, it serves as a forum to provide for and support continued intellectual expression, growth and debate across the wider Defence Community.

May I take this opportunity to express my appreciation to the authors who contributed to this year's Review and compliment them on their commitment and enthusiasm to their chosen topics. We live in a world where “Down Time” has never been more precious or scarce and our contributors selflessly dedicated their efforts towards the successful completion and submission of their work in the most altruistic of manners. I would like to use this occasion to congratulate the Review's Editor, Lt Col Mark Hearns, on his masterful synthesis of topical and interesting articles. This is his fourth year as Editor and despite the increased workload associated with his daily responsibilities, he continued to commit himself to his editing role with customary flair and enthusiasm. Special mention of gratitude must also go to Comdt Dave O’Neill, his staff in the Defence Forces Printing Press and Capt Bernard Behan and his Staff in the Defence Forces Information Office for their excellent efforts in ensuring that the 2013 Review is presented efficiently to our readers. Further copies of the Review are available from the Defence Forces Public Relations Section at info@military.ie or online at http://www.military.ie/info-centre/publications/defence-forces-review

Michael P. Dawson
Lieutenant Colonel
Officer in Charge Defence Forces Public Relations Section

The material contained in these articles are the views of the authors and do not purport to represent the official views of the Defence Forces.
The Defence Forces embarked on a reorganisation in November 2012 and a Green Paper has been issued by government in advance of the publication of a new Defence White Paper in 2014. The 2013 Review offers plenty of food for thought for these transformative processes. This year's contributions can be gathered in to four categories. The first category concerns the makeup, organisation and employment of our Defence Forces. Comdt Billy Campbell (retd) kicks off, marking the centenary of the founding of Oglaigh na hEireann with a historical piece that examines the forces that shaped the early development of the Volunteers. Comdt John Prendergast continues with a study of Irish Civil – military relations in the early years of the state and the long term impact of decisions made during this period. Comdt Owen McNally follows identifying the key variables impacting on strategy formulation and realisation and evaluates their impact on the strategic process within the Defence Forces. In the final piece in this first category, Lt Comdr Pat Burke outlines the importance of developing a common maritime picture through improved information sharing, cooperation and innovation and how this is key to overall maritime security.

The next category deals with contemporary activities overseas. In the first article, James O'Shea follows up on his article from the 2012 Defence Forces Review which covered aspects of Ireland's 2012 Chairmanship of the OSCE. In this article he outlines the work conducted by the Department of Foreign Affairs in the disputes between Georgia and its separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Next Lt Col Tony Cudmore outlines how Ireland has influenced developments in the area of Common Security and Defence Policy during the EU Presidency in the first half of 2013. In the final piece in this category, Comdt Ronan Corcoran offers some insight into the force generation and training processes of the EU Battle Group, based on his experience as a staff officer at the HQ of EU BattleGroup (BG) 2012/II.

The third category examines organisational processes and how they impact on the Defence Forces. In the first article Capt Barry Byrne and Professor Frank Bannister examine the concept of Knowledge Management and outline the details of an extensive study conducted in military organisations throughout 20 countries and offers a number of recommendations to improve the implementation of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) enabled information and knowledge management initiatives in defence. Capt Martin Duffy (retd) proposes an alternative way to conceptualise organisational meetings to create a collective organisational resource. Dr Anne O'Brien follows with a reframing of the scope of the discussion of the Defence Forces and social media to move it beyond merely ‘enduring the timeline’ to a ‘culture of embracement’ of the opportunities offered by this dynamic media phenomenon. Capt Andrew Barry continues with a historical review of the relationship between the military and traditional media and stresses the importance for the Defence Forces of maintaining healthy relationships with media organisations. This category concludes with an examination of humility as a component of Leadership by Lt Col Howard Berney who asserts that when authentic
humility is applied by leaders within relationships, the growth in mutual trust inspires
greater loyalty and collaborative effort within organisations.

The final category is general in nature and begins with a piece by Lt Col Stephen Ryan
examining the situation of the frequently overlooked Christian populations in the Middle
East and argues that their presence in the region matters. Their declining populations
should therefore be a matter of concern to all. Comdt Conor Bates follows with an analysis
of security sector reform in Kosovo based on his experiences there and outlines the
challenges caused by differing expectations regarding the development of the process.
Lt Donal Mitchell follows with a study of insurgency and counterinsurgency theory and
practice based on two critical incidents in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s. Comdt
Helen Heneghan continues with an analysis of the low retention rates for senior female
officers in the Defence Forces diagnosing a series of 'push' and 'pull' factors which
influence their decision to retire relatively early. Finally your editor discusses the issues
impacting on relationships between the military and NGOs in crisis situations and offers
some food for thought with regards to establishing and maintaining mutually productive
relationships.

Overall in this year's publication many important aspects of the dynamic defence
environment are addressed and it is hoped that they can inform the planners and
implementers of the changes that the Defence Forces are currently undergoing.

The Review concludes with the abstracts from the Theses of the MA in Leadership
Management and Defence Studies completed by the students of the latest (68th) Senior
Command and Staff Course. If you are interested in reading a complete version of any
of these research papers please contact the Defence Forces Library in the DFTC at
dftclibrary@gmail.com

Finally I would like to thank Comdt Neil Nolan for his assistance in editing this years' Review.

Mark Hearns
Lt Colonel
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Uneasy Bedfellows: Politics, Politicians and the Irish Volunteers

_I have met them at close of day
Coming with vivid faces
From counter or desk among grey
Eighteenth-century houses._

Easter, 1916 – W. B. Yeats

**ABSTRACT**

Tensions developed between the political and military groupings within the revolutionary movement in Ireland from the founding of the Volunteers in 1913. These continued in the aftermath of the Rising and during the War of Independence that followed, where attempts to bring the army under political control were unsuccessful. The failure to reach political consensus on the Treaty meant the position of the Volunteers would become critical. The army however also divided on the issue and both sides of the Civil War split became dominated by the military prerogative. The period was not simply a struggle with the British for independence, but became one for ultimate power between the political and military elites within the revolutionary movement.

The founding of the Irish Volunteers, on 25 November 1913, gave public expression to a militancy that had been secretly fostered by a resurgent Irish Republican Brotherhood (I.R.B.). It was also an indication of the frustrations felt by many with the politics of Home Rule. A pamphlet advertising the inaugural meeting of the movement states: 'The purpose of the Irish Volunteers will be to secure and maintain the rights and liberties common to all the people of Ireland.' This vague aspiration demonstrates the absence of a common political ideology among those who enlisted. Beyond informing organisations with ‘national aims’ of its establishment, the movement did not set out to form an alliance with any political party. Many who enlisted were suspicious of the intrigues and compromises of the leaders of the Irish Parliamentary Party and had grown weary of waiting for Home Rule, a wait that would increase dramatically less than a year later when John Redmond, the party leader, agreed to postpone its enactment for the duration of the Great War. The Irish Parliamentary Party had succeeded in having a Home Rule Bill passed by the British House of Commons in 1912 (this would eventually become the Government of Ireland Act 1914) and was committed to gaining its ends by political rather than military means. As a result its leaders were deeply suspicious of this new organisation, and in particular

2 National Library of Ireland, MS 8286(2), Notice issued by the Irish Volunteers, Nov 1913.
3 Government of Ireland Act 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5 c. 90 (18 Sep 1914).
on how it would impact on their aspirations. Redmond was a pure constitutionalist and did not see the necessity for an unconstitutional body such as the Volunteers to support the demands of nationalists.

The tensions that the founding of the Volunteers generated with the Irish Parliamentary Party helped set the tone for the relations between the political and military wings of the separatist movement throughout the revolutionary period that followed. Although the I.R.B. actively encouraged the Volunteers, it was itself, as its name suggests, a revolutionary fraternal organisation and its republicanism was defined more by its determination to act as an instrument of popular militancy than by a political ambition to achieve an Irish Republic. Whereas the I.R.B. was far more radical than the Volunteers, neither organisation was aligned to a political party. Essentially, the establishment of the Volunteers allowed the I.R.B. to assume the role of a dynamic nucleus at the heart of a militant nationalist movement to be used if an opportunity for insurrection arose.

The volunteer movement captured the public imagination and within a short time numbered some 160,000 members. Redmond's suspicions of the organisation were such that he demanded twenty-five of his nominees should be co-opted onto the Volunteer Provisional Committee. He threatened that unless this was conceded he would have the organisation dismantled. The committee bowed to this ultimatum thus giving Redmond effective control over the movement. At the outbreak of war between the United Kingdom and Germany, in August 1914, Redmond precipitated a crisis within the organisation when he pledged the Volunteers would serve 'wherever the firing line extended.' Although this led to what has been looked on by most historians as a split within the movement, the original founders maintained that Redmond had excluded himself from their military organisation and his nominees were therefore no longer entitled to their positions within it. The Provisional Committee summoned a convention of the Volunteers for Wednesday, 25 November 1914, the first anniversary of their inaugural meeting, to re-affirm the manifesto passed a year earlier. At this convention the committee repudiated the authority of the British government to dilute in any way the Government of Ireland Act of 1914 and in particular to partition Ireland under the pretence Ulster could not be coerced. Whereas this was an overtly political stance, it was one taken by a military organisation that had yet to develop a political alliance. Although the Irish Volunteers’ strength had been reduced dramatically by the departure of those who heeded Redmond's call to enlist in the British army, the I.R.B. now held a commanding position within the organisation. As evidence of this, five of the seven signatories of the 1916 Proclamation (the exceptions are Clarke and Connolly) now sat on the Volunteer Provisional Committee. The I.R.B.'s opportunity had arrived; all it needed was the right moment.

The seven-man I.R.B. Military Council that planned the 1916 Rising did so in an effort to radicalise nationalist Ireland and to create an opportunity out of the Great War, then in its

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5 University College Dublin Archives, McNeill papers, LA/H/1, Rev Cannon Mahon to Col Fitzroy Hemphill, Chief Assistant to the Inspector General of the National Volunteers, 1 Mar 1915.
10 University College Dublin Archives, MacNeill papers, LA1/H/II, Notification from the Provisional Committee of the Irish Volunteers to the Irish Volunteers, 24 Oct 1914.
second year. They set out to break British rule in Ireland, and in particular to change the political mindset of the Irish people. They were convinced matters could only be brought to a head by a rising and hoped this would result in a resurgence of what they regarded as the true spirit of nationalism in Ireland. Having deceived their own Chief of Staff, Eoin MacNeill, Pearse and his fellow conspirators proclaimed the establishment of the Irish Republic from the steps of the General Post Office in Dublin and signaled the start of the Rising. The 1916 Proclamation is a message from the Provisional Government to the people of Ireland. However, from its very beginning, where it: ‘summons her children to her flag and strikes for her freedom’ and on to declaring that: ‘Until our arms have brought the opportune moment for the establishment of a permanent national government’, its tone and language leaves the reader in little doubt that this is a military rather than a political document. The proclamation further asserts that in the interim the Provisional Government will administer the civil and military affairs of the Republic in trust for the people. There were no politicians in the General Post Office, the seat of government, when the Proclamation was publicly read. The Provisional Government was made up of soldiers and the absence of any distinct political dimension to the Rising shows that in 1916, almost three years after they were founded, the Volunteers remained suspicious of politics and in particular of politicians.

The Rising was initially unpopular and unwanted and the insurgents held out for less than a week. The Volunteers however fought with discipline, courage and determination. Following the surrender the drawn out nature of the executions of their leaders began to change public opinion. There was now growing disenchantment with the politics represented by the Irish Parliamentary Party. This was brought about in particular by its continued support for a war that appeared to have no prospect of ending and was producing unimagined casualties. The party had placed itself in the dilemma of supporting the war while at the same time trying to remain an active and regular opposition. The decline in its support was also heralded by the prospect of a new Home Rule Bill designed to satisfy the demands of Ulster Unionists and which would involve the partition of Ireland. As a result the party's grip on Irish politics was now challenged by Sinn Féin, a political party wrongly associated with the Rising, but one in search of a broader appeal and which was now quite happy to claim affinity with the militant dead of Easter Week. Arthur Griffith’s original party emphasised peaceful protest and non-cooperation as a way of challenging British rule in Ireland. Sinn Féin now began to change as radical republicans entered its ranks and established themselves. The election of Éamon de Valera, one of the surviving leaders of the Rising, as its president in October 1917 was evidence of this change. In the British general election of December 1918, Sinn Féin won seventy-three of the 105 Irish seats. Twenty-eight of the newly-elected Sinn Féin representatives met in the Round Room of the Mansion House on the afternoon of 21 January 1919 and constituted themselves as the first Dáil Éireann. The Declaration of Independence passed at that first sitting acknowledges it was the Volunteers who had proclaimed the Irish Republic on Easter Monday, 1916. It goes on to state that the Irish electorate, in the General Election of December 1918, declared by an overwhelming majority its allegiance

13 Government of Ireland Act 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5 c. 67 (23 Dec 1920).
to the Republic and on this basis the Dáil ratified its establishment in the name of the Irish nation.\textsuperscript{15} The 1916 Proclamation declared that the Provisional Government, represented by the Volunteers, would administer the Republic until the establishment of a national government. Now that Sinn Féin had established a government, it could claim that power over the destiny of the revolution had passed to it from the Volunteers.\textsuperscript{16}

The Volunteers were deeply suspicious of this development. It was they who had led the way and in particular it was they who had made the sacrifices for the Republic in 1916. They now saw their position being usurped by the emergence of a new political elite. Dan Breen in his autobiography argues they were in danger of becoming a political appendage to the Sinn Féin organisation.\textsuperscript{17} On the morning of the day the first Dáil met, Breen and members of 3 Tipperary Brigade attacked a Royal Irish Constabulary (R.I.C.) explosives escort at Soloheadbeg and shot dead two policemen. This action is generally accepted as being the opening event of the War of Independence. There is also general acceptance among historians, J. P. Duggan and Tim Pat Coogan being just two examples, that both events were coincidental and unconnected.\textsuperscript{18} The fact that Breen maintains the ambush party was in position for five days waiting for the escort could be seen to support this conclusion.\textsuperscript{19} It can be equally argued however that by this action the Volunteers were sending a message, not just to the British authorities, but also to the Dáil and in particular to Sinn Féin. Whereas General Headquarters (G.H.Q.) had not specifically sanctioned the operation, it did not expressly forbid raids on the R.I.C.\textsuperscript{20} While the Chief of Staff of the Volunteers, Richard Mulcahy, wanted to proceed cautiously and maintained bloodshed had been unnecessary at Soloheadbeg, Breen and his associates reflected the feelings of many of their number throughout the country who had become highly suspicious of the motives of republican politicians now taking power.

In his 1924 autobiography Breen maintains the policemen resisted and it was a matter of kill or be killed.\textsuperscript{21} However, in his witness statement to the Bureau of Military History, written thirty-four years later in 1958 and only released in 2003, by which time all participants had died, he asserts that he and his associates set out to start a war and the killings had been quite deliberate. His only regret was that just two policemen had been present instead of the expected six.\textsuperscript{22} Breen’s mistrust of politicians is also expressed in a much stronger manner in his statement to the Bureau than in his autobiography. Here he states that he felt the Volunteer movement was degenerating into a purely political body and the action at Soloheadbeg was designed to get it back to its original purpose. Breen’s comments are a pointed criticism of Sinn Féin and a reflection of the attitude he and men like him had towards it. In the aftermath of the ambush \textit{An t-Óglach}, the journal of the Irish Volunteers and presumably representing the official army line on the matter, argued the formation of Dáil Éireann provided justification to the Volunteers in

21 Breen, Dan. (2010). Op Cit, p.34.
treating the armed forces of the invader, whether soldiers or policemen, in the same way any nation's army would treat the members of an invading army.\textsuperscript{23} This could be seen as an exercise by G.H.Q. in providing both legitimacy as well as its retrospective approval for Soloheadbeg. No mention of the ambush was made at the inaugural Dáil sittings of the 21 and 22 January, or indeed during the next sittings held in April.\textsuperscript{24} That such an operation, carried out by the army of the Republic, should be ignored by its parliament is perhaps another indication of underlying tensions. Soloheadbeg can be seen therefore as more than just an unconnected coincidence. It was in essence a statement by the Volunteers to Sinn Féin and a reflection of the growing tensions between them on the direction the revolution was taking.

In theory control of the Volunteers, now more commonly called the Irish Republican Army (I.R.A.), rested with Cathal Brugha, Minister for Defence in the cabinet formed by de Valera in 1919. However, the relationship between the Minister and the Chief of Staff, Mulcahy, who was also Assistant Minister for Defence, was an informal and undefined one. Mulcahy briefed Brugha only in very general terms on the conduct of I.R.A. operations during the War of Independence. In reality Michael Collins, who was both Minister for Finance and Director of Intelligence, provided the direct link between the government and the army and his forceful personality averted the need to establish a more formal relationship.\textsuperscript{25} One of the reasons the government had problems in establishing control lay in the fact that many of its ministers operated on a part-time basis and the Dáil itself met infrequently. The policy of abstentionism reduced the profile and authority of Sinn Féin; and so while the political cause began to fade, the military operations undertaken by the I.R.A. began to command public attention. As a result the Volunteers displayed an increasing lack of respect for politicians as the war progressed. In May 1919, Collins, although a member of Sinn Féin and of the government, criticised the party for losing its militancy and pointed to the tendency among all revolutionary movements of dividing into their component parts.\textsuperscript{26} This is an indication of where his loyalties, and indeed the loyalties of many of the revolutionary elite who were directing the military campaign, lay.

The Minister for Defence placed the thorny issue of civil/military relations before the Dáil on 20 August 1919 when he proposed that the Volunteers swear allegiance to the Irish Republic and to the Dáil.\textsuperscript{27} While Brugha claimed this was a reasonable requirement, it was criticised by the Volunteer executive who feared the intrusion of politics and politicians into the war effort. As a result Volunteers took the oath as individuals in a haphazard manner rather than as a unified body. Despite the oath the Volunteers remained autonomous and outside the control of the Minister for Defence throughout the War of Independence. Although Mulcahy and his G.H.Q. contended they were subordinate to the Dáil, the Volunteers on the ground would probably not have agreed.\textsuperscript{28} The relationship

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{23} An t-Óglach (Jan. 1919), i, no. 10.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Houses of the Oireachtas, Dáil Éireann index, 1919, Jan, accessed at http://debates.oireachtas.ie/dail/1919/01/index.asp on 19 Feb 2013.
\item \textsuperscript{25} Valiulis, Maryann Gialanella. (Nov 1983). ‘The army mutiny of 1924 and the assertion of civilian authority in independent Ireland’ Irish Historical Studies, xxiii, no. 120, pp. 354-66.
\item \textsuperscript{26} Hopkinson, Michael. (2004). Green against Green: The Irish Civil War, Dublin, pp. 6-8.
\item \textsuperscript{28} Valiulis, Maryann Gialanella. (1992). Op Cit, pp. 41-2.
\end{itemize}
between army and government throughout the War of Independence can be described therefore as being one of close association at best. The lack of direction and control of the war effort by the government is reflected in the fact that it took until 11 March 1921, over two years after the War of Independence had begun and just four months before a truce came into effect, for the Dáil to formally accept that a state of war with England existed.\(^\text{29}\)

While the war itself was prosecuted in an uneven and sometimes haphazard manner, the experience of revolutionary violence radicalised the fighting men. It was they who held most vehemently to the ideal of a republic. Nevertheless the Truce period did provide an opportunity for the centralisation and consolidation of power, and control over the army should have passed from G.H.Q. to the government.\(^\text{30}\) However, because considerable reliance had been placed on local leadership during the war, the stronger fighting areas resisted any attempt at the imposition of civil control and the weaker areas, riven with internal jealousies, could be just as defiant.\(^\text{31}\) The Volunteers had fought for the Republic and in their opinion no one had the right to negotiate it away. They saw the struggle for independence from a purely military perspective and remained intensely suspicious of the politicians in Dublin. As a result most would go anti-Treaty.\(^\text{32}\)

An t-Óglach admitted the Truce period added to the problems of indiscipline and control in the army: ‘The conditions produced by a prolonged period of truce in Ireland undoubtedly involve serious disadvantages in the case of an army such as ours.’\(^\text{33}\) Although training camps were set up, the organisation remained localised and part-time. The tensions between the military and political leadership came to a head during September 1921 when de Valera attempted to reorganise the army and, for the second time in two years, impose cabinet control over it. He did so without consulting G.H.Q. and while Collins was in London for the Treaty negotiations.\(^\text{34}\) Brugha’s memorandum to Mulcahy on the decision states: ‘in order to put the Army in an unequivocal position as the legal defence force of the Nation under the control of the Civil Government the Cabinet have decided to issue fresh commissions to officers.’\(^\text{35}\) The government decision brought G.H.Q. and the operational areas together in opposition to it and marked a final display of military unity prior to the upheavals that followed. In rejecting his new commission Liam Lynch, Officer Commanding 1 Southern Division and later Chief of Staff of the anti-Treaty forces, stated: ‘the Commander-in-Chief and his Staff cannot do their duty when they are not placed in a position to do so.’\(^\text{36}\) Although the initiative was in keeping with the establishment of formal political control over the army, some historians have portrayed it as an attempt by de Valera to wrest power away from G.H.Q. and in particular from Collins and the I.R.B.\(^\text{37}\) Just why de Valera undertook such a risky and divisive strategy at a critical point in the Treaty negotiations is still a matter of debate. Tim Pat Coogan and Maryann Valiulis suggest it was an effort by him to strengthen his personal standing by

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\(^{33}\) An t-Óglach (11 Nov 1921). ii, no. 34.


\(^{35}\) University College Dublin Archives, Mulcahy papers, P7a/2, Cathal Brugha to Richard Mulcahy, 16 Nov 1921.

\(^{36}\) University College Dublin Archives, Mulcahy papers, P7a/5, Liam Lynch to Cathal Brugha, 6 Dec 1921.


Each of the nationalist institutions: the cabinet, the Dáil, Sinn Féin, the Volunteers and the I.R.B., split on the issue of the Treaty. Its signing was the decisive event that led to civil war. Collins and Mulcahy accepted it on the premise that a military victory could not be achieved. Anti-Treaty exponents such as Mary MacSwiney on the political side and Rory O’Connor on the military, pointed to the fact that an oath had been taken to the Republic and there could be no compromise on this. This dogmatic approach was ill suited to the give-and-take of the parliamentary system with the result that the compromises placed before the Dáil during the Treaty debates were brushed aside. It was clear the Dáil could no longer act as a unifying influence and the failure to preserve political consensus meant the attitude of the Volunteers towards the Treaty now became critical. At the cabinet meeting that followed its signing de Valera stated the army was the instrument of the government and must obey the decision of the Dáil.\footnote{Hopkinson, Michael. (2004). Op Cit, pp. 34-43.} Despite this the contributions from I.R.A. T.D.s during the Treaty debates emphasised their independence from and suspicion of political influence. Séamus Robinson stated: “The Volunteers demand a veto on the change of our country’s constitution. We are not a national army in the ordinary sense; we are not a machine pure and simple; we have political views as soldiers.”\footnote{Houses of the Oireachtas, Dáil Éireann Debates, Fri 6 Jan 1922, debate on treaty resumed, accessed at http://debates.oireachtas.ie/dail/1922/01/06/00004.asp on 27 Mar 2013.} Seán Moylan stressed he was responsible simply as a soldier: ‘Like the Minister for Finance (Michael Collins) I am a plain man and I don’t know anything about formulas and forms of words, but even if I did I would vote against this Treaty.’\footnote{Houses of the Oireachtas, Dáil Éireann Debates, Sat 17 Dec 1921, prelude to debate on treaty, accessed at http://debates.oireachtas.ie/dail/1921/12/17/00002.asp on 29 Mar 2013.}

The bulk of the I.R.A. effectively mutinied against the Dáil and the Provisional Government in March 1922.\footnote{Garvin, Tom. (2005). Op Cit, p. 121.} Senior anti-Treaty officers had met on 10 January to decide their position. They stated that the army had given its allegiance to the Dáil under the condition the Republic was upheld. To them the acceptance of a Free State by the Dáil was a subversion of the Republic and relieved the army from any allegiance to it. They also demanded that an army convention meet. The government feared the strength of the anti-Treaty I.R.A. at the convention would lead to a declaration of army independence. As a result Griffith issued an order banning it and stated that any effort to remove the army from the control of the government, elected by the people, was illegal and tantamount to an attempt to establish a military dictatorship. Rory O’Connor now appointed himself leader of the anti-Treaty military cause and claimed to represent eighty percent of the army. On 22 March he held a press conference where he declared the army would forcibly prevent an election. Despite Griffith’s banning order, the convention met, reaffirmed the republican status of the army and agreed to bring it under the control of its own executive
rather than that of the Dáil. The convention also demonstrated that the army was no longer a unified body as tensions heightened between the pro-Treaty and anti-Treaty elements within it. This resulted in confrontations over the occupation of barracks, and an increase in bank raids and commandeering by the anti-Treaty I.R.A.43

During the early months of 1922 the anti-Treaty I.R.A. held the balance of military power, but was reluctant to take action against former comrades. De Valera had deep reservations about the Army Executive’s independent line and O’Connor admitted the Four Courts had been taken on 13 April without informing him. It had decided to act independently of the politicians who voted against the Treaty and was convinced only it could deal with the situation.44 As a result de Valera was forced to admit he had no control over the army: ‘As I said before, we are in a very different position from that of the Executive. The Army has taken up an independent position in this matter.’45 The anti-Treaty militants were dismissive of electoral results as the deciding factor in national affairs. Until the Republic was achieved the will of the people did not matter because, they argued, the people were not in a position to make the right choices. This left de Valera in a particularly ambiguous position. Although he maintained that majority rule was the corner stone of democracy, he had now aligned himself to a grouping that had no time for this fundamental principle.46 The I.R.A., while nominally vesting authority in the people, was quite prepared to remove this authority if the people took an unwelcome stance.47

On 14 April Mellows sent a dispatch to the Dáil on behalf of the anti-Treaty controlled Army Executive. This demanded that elections should not be held while the threat of war with Britain existed and that the Civic Guard should be disbanded. He warned that these terms were the last hope for the Dáil to save the country from civil war by taking control from a government that had abandoned the Republic.48 Moves towards army unity now began under the auspices of the I.R.B. The impetus for this came in a statement by senior field officers on 1 May that warned of the consequences of civil war. They suggested the Treaty be accepted as a basis for military unity, that a non-contested election be held and a coalition government formed from among those elected. The initiative demonstrated the failure within the anti-Treaty I.R.A. to establish centralised command and control. The statement was published without reference to the Army Executive who immediately denounced it. The army unity talks foundered when the British vetoed a compromise republican-type constitution and threatened military intervention unless the Treaty was fully implemented.49 The failure of the talks also meant that any opportunity de Valera had of exerting political influence within the anti-Treaty side had passed for now and despite the ‘wade through Irish blood’ speeches made by him during the lead up to the Civil War, his position remained marginal.50

The Civil War was a miserable and confused affair. The pro-Treaty side was fortunate its performance was less chaotic than its opponent’s. It did however have a firm dynamic

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44 Ibid, p. 70.
government installed in Dublin. The republicans on the other hand appeared resolved on establishing a military dictatorship and, as they possessed no coherent political strategy to drive their campaign, the I.R.A. dominated their cause from the outset. The Civil War completed the decline of the anti-Treaty wing of Sinn Féin.\(^{51}\) Opposition to the Treaty was now based on purely military considerations. Republican T.D.s abstained from the Dáil and, while suffering the same hardships endured by the fighting men, remained politically isolated and without influence. As a result relations between the republican political and military leadership was extremely poor throughout the war. Liam Lynch, the republican Chief of Staff, was a fierce opponent of what he regarded as political interference in its conduct.\(^{52}\)

On the pro-Treaty side there was a similar lack of empathy between soldiers and politicians. In July 1922 Collins wrote to Griffith demanding that: ‘It would be well, I think, if the Government issued a sort of official instruction to me nominating the War Council of three, and appointing me to act by special order of the Government as Commander-in-Chief during the period of hostilities.’\(^{53}\) This war council would consist of Collins, Mulcahy and O’Duffy. Griffith obtained approval within twenty-four hours and his reply reads as if it had been dictated to him by Collins: ‘The Government have decided to create a War Council to direct the military operations and have appointed you by special order to act as Commander-in-Chief during the period of hostilities.’\(^{54}\) Collins never provided any details on what the relationship between his war council and the government would be. From the beginning of the war there were tensions between the government and the army with the cabinet showing increasing impatience at the lack of information available to it on its progress. The Third Dáil was elected in June 1922, at the beginning of the Civil War, but did not convene until September. As a result a political forum where the conduct of the military campaign could be debated remained unavailable for three critical months.\(^{55}\) Nevertheless, despite its many shortcomings in organisation, training, equipment and leadership, the National Army did at least operate under the nominal control of the civil authority.

By September opinion within sections of the republican side looked to the establishment of a government. Whereas de Valera was in favour of this, he feared the anti-Treaty I.R.A. would dominate it. Despite these reservations a republican government was formed by October.\(^{56}\) The reality of the military position meant it was never going to have the opportunity of functioning and its dominance by the army meant the old tensions remained. Following the death of Liam Lynch a joint meeting of the republican Army Executive and government directed the new Chief of Staff, Frank Aiken, to order the suspension of operations and authorised de Valera to issue terms on which they were prepared to negotiate. There was, however, no prospect the pro-Treaty side would agree to anything proposed by him and in any event he had no authority to order the army to surrender its arms. The dire circumstances the anti-Treaty I.R.A. found itself in had forced it to give de Valera a temporary and superficially important position within its cause. Although he successfully urged participation in the general election of August 1923,

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\(^{53}\) University College Dublin Archives, MacEoin Papers, P151/106, Michael Collins to Arthur Griffith, 14 July 1922.
\(^{54}\) University College Dublin Archives, MacEoin Papers, P151/106, Arthur Griffith to Michael Collins, 15 July 1922.
he knew he could only achieve his ambitions by entering the Dáil and engaging with the political process. In order to do so he would have to break with the abstentionist policy of Sinn Féin and cut his ties with the I.R.A.\textsuperscript{57}

As the war drifted towards its inconclusive ending, a similar power struggle was fought out between the military and civil power bases within the pro-Treaty side. Here there was growing emphasis on the need to establish government control over the army. The Department of Home Affairs (later Justice) claimed its work was being restricted by the army's inability to restore law and order. The antipathy the respective ministers, Kevin O'Higgins and Richard Mulcahy, felt towards one another added to these tensions. Mulcahy was first and foremost a soldier and, although also a politician, still clung to a soldier's natural distrust and suspicion of his cabinet colleagues.\textsuperscript{58} O'Higgins's prejudices were strengthened by the colourful monthly police reports submitted by the Garda Commissioner, Eoin O'Duffy, who invariably pointed to the army as the main reason for the lack of law and order throughout the country.\textsuperscript{59} O'Duffy's self-serving reports allowed O'Higgins to convince his cabinet colleagues that the army had become a national scandal.\textsuperscript{60} There was now growing disenchantment with the militarism that marked the revolutionary period. The enthusiasm for blood sacrifice had waned in Ireland as it had throughout Europe. The war had shattered the ideal of a patriotic struggle and militarism was now associated with moral collapse and economic ruin. Spurred on by O'Higgins the government turned its back on the revolutionary past represented by the Volunteers and moved towards a definition of its politics that had no place for this. Hard work and balanced budgets became the marks of patriotism.

The Civil War in Ireland was more than just a conflict between the military forces of those who supported and opposed the Treaty. It was, in reality, a struggle between the militarists within the greater revolutionary movement and those who demanded the supremacy of civil control. In its aftermath the pro-Treaty government was resolved that militancy would not alone be defeated, but would never again overshadow the democratic institutions of the state. During the war the political element, represented by the members of the government and in particular Kevin O'Higgins, emerged as a separate and distinct group to that of the military, with Collins at its centre.\textsuperscript{61} In its aftermath O'Higgins would take advantage of the convulsions brought about by the Army Crisis of 1924 to demonstrate a resolve and a degree of ruthlessness in establishing government control that outweighed anything the militarists could produce. On the anti-Treaty side, de Valera would act with similar single mindedness against the 'Legion of the Rearguard' when his opportunity came.

There is going to be a pretty ugly aftermath to this whole business.\

Kevin O'Higgins\textsuperscript{62}

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid, pp. 125-6. 
“History Is Not Was; History Is.”
The Role of the National Army in the Early Years of the Irish Free State

ABSTRACT
This paper examines the role and purpose of the National Army in the early years of the Irish Free State in order to outline the long-term implications of decisions taken on defence policy in the early years of the state. The legacy left by partition and the Civil War led to the government focusing the efforts of the Defence Forces on internal rather than external threats. This paper suggests that these decisions continue to influence contemporary defence policy. The primary use of the Defence Forces domestically continues to be as a constabulary force in aid to the civil power. The military, therefore, has relied on its inherent professionalism as a means to develop military competencies. Arising from these findings the paper recommends that a widespread debate is required, both internally and externally, on the true purpose of our Defence Forces. This debate should focus on both internal and external threats to Irish society and Ireland's national interests.

The armed forces have three massive political advantages over civilian organizations: a marked superiority in organisation, a highly emotionalised symbolic status, and a monopoly of arms... The wonder, therefore, is not why they rebel against their civilian masters, but why they ever obey them.

SE Finer

Introduction
In May 1923 the National Army was arguably the most powerful institution within the newly formed Irish Free State. It had successfully defeated a violent insurgency, ensured the survival of the elected government and set Ireland on the road towards a democratic future. Within ten years all had changed. By the 1930s the Army had been greatly reduced in size and was struggling to find relevance within the newly formed state – in 1936 “the state may be said to be not relatively but absolutely disarmed.”

Despite this perceived defencelessness, Ireland has survived, and occasionally thrived, as a state. Any threats that have evolved in the past 80 years have primarily been from internal forces. As a state, Ireland has overcome these threats and maintained a long history of stable government. Ireland, unlike other former British Colonies, has also managed to avoid military intervention in political affairs.

The purpose of this article is to assess the role of the National Army in the early years of the Irish Free State. This article will also examine what, if any, were the long-term implications of decisions taken on defence policy in the early years of this state.

1 Fundamental Factors Affecting Saorstat Defence, G2 Section, 1936. [Attributed to Comdt Bryan, D]. Pg 17.
Literature Review

In preparation for this article I researched two concepts, civil-military relations and the experiences of militaries in newly independent states. In relation to the first concept, I examined Samuel Huntington’s theories on Civil Military Relations, as outlined in *The Soldier & The State* and the works of Morris Janowitz in this field. While Huntington has clarified the distinct roles of government and military in the formulation of defence policy, Janowitz has argued that it is a fallacy to believe that the military can be divorced from a political role. In relation to newly independent states Janowitz has identified that a new nation is confronted with the issue of whether the population at large accept its political leadership as legitimate. The act of national liberation establishes a pragmatic basis for a lawful government. In Ireland’s case the National Army helped establish this legitimacy by defeating anti-Treaty forces during the Civil War. The Military, with its symbols of authority and force, must then become part of the apparatus of this legitimate government. New governments are therefore faced with one immediate problem: how do they ensure civilian control over the military, the primary institution that secured independence?

The second aspect of my research focused on this question. International experience would indicate that there is no single cause for military intervention in political affairs in newly independent states. Contributing factors to intervention include the absence of an external defence purpose for the military, coupled with weak civil governance and a military directly involved in internal security affairs gives rise to the opportunity for military intervention. As Finer stated in the *Man on Horseback* – the weaker the political institutions the more likely the military are to intervene.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE IRISH FREE STATE

“They fired the wrong people for the right reasons.”

Risteard Mulcahy

Background

In the early years of the Free State relations between the Army and Government were partly defined by the nature of each institution’s foundation. As Valiulis has argued, the Irish Volunteers, antecedents of the National Army, were founded in response to the Home Rule crisis of 1912. As a result the army predated the other institutions of the state. The IRA operated independently of Dáil Éireann control for most of the War of Independence.

They [the IRA] were from their inception a politicised, independent force, under their own executive and owing allegiance solely to their own governing body.
The IRA also believed that they were a moral elite, who through their sacrifice had earned the right to govern Ireland. They were from a different social caste, urban lower-middle class, to most members of Irish society and owed little allegiance to Dáil Éireann.

In the period 1919-1922 the Dáil was unable to redress this situation and both the government and military developed separately to one another. This difference was further crystallised by the Civil War where the newly formed National Government faced an existential threat and was dependant on the newly formed Army for its survival – a dependency that exacerbated the tension that would normally exist between the military and civilian authorities. Personal friction was also evident and was epitomised by the poor professional relations between Kevin O’Higgins, Minister for Home Affairs and Gen Richard Mulcahy, The Minister of Defence.

By May 1923 the National Army was, in effect, the most powerful institution within the State. It had a strength of 55,000 (3,000 Officers and 52,000 Other Ranks) and accounted for nearly a third of Government expenditure, almost £11 million. The institution itself was created in a time of crisis, had no defined establishment and mirrored the British Army more out of necessity and familiarity than as a result of a complex staff study. It was also unclear if the Army had fought out of a sense of loyalty to local military leaders or out of belief in democratic majority rule.

In order to manage this unwieldy institution the Government had the difficult task of reducing numbers to a more sustainable figure whilst not alienating those former gunmen who knew no other way of life, in a time of severe austerity. In essence the Government had to establish control over an institution that, arguably, saw itself as being the primary guarantor of Irish sovereignty.

The Army Crisis 1924

Rapid demobilisation did initially occur. Strength fell to 16,400 within a year. In addition, the Army Council, under the guidance of Mulcahy, attempted to turn the Army into a professional and disciplined body subject to civilian control. Mulcahy, as early as 1918, had expressed the conviction that it was essential to establish civil control over the military in a newly independent Ireland. The reduction in numbers did not occur unopposed however. Former supporters of Michael Collins within the Military reacted unfavourably to this modernisation and challenged the authority of the Army Council – an event that marked the first real challenge from within to the legitimacy of the Government and its agents since the Civil War. At first the Executive Council procrastinated, caught between the need to exert civilian control and the desire to mollify former comrades from the War of Independence. The matter culminated when the Army Council ordered the...
arrest of the potential mutineers in March 1924. In response the Government demanded
the resignation of the Army Council on the grounds that they acted precipitously without
cabinet approval. The Army Council, after some deliberation, resigned. Mulcahy also
resigned in protest at the treatment of the council. In one sense the Government acted
unfairly towards the Army Council – there was a potential mutiny and the council acted
quickly to quell it. Nevertheless the twin actions of the Government demanding the
resignation of the Council and the Council actually resigning represented a key step in
establishing civilian control over the military. As Valiulis points out the decision by the
Army Council to resign helped free the Irish State from the threat of domestic Military
intervention.\textsuperscript{19} By accepting the will of the government, Mulcahy and the members
of the council helped ensure civilian supremacy over the military. They did not agree with
the government’s decision, but still abided by it. As Mulcahy’s son Risteárd noted, the
government may have fired the wrong people when they dismissed the Army Council,
they nevertheless achieved the right results by ensuring civilian control over the military.\textsuperscript{20}

The documents reviewed indicate that the mutiny itself, and the Government’s reaction
to it, helped define civil-military relations throughout the early years of the state. The
Government’s report on the crisis found that the “conspirators did not regard the Army
as a non-political servant of the state”, and that the mutineers “proposed using the army
for the purpose of imposing their views upon the civil government.”\textsuperscript{21} To civilian eyes the
purported mutiny represented the second attempt by the military to impose their will on
the newly created state – the rebellion by the majority of the IRA against the Treaty in
1922 being the first.\textsuperscript{22} The government came to regard elements within the army with
suspicion. As O’Halpin notes, the primary purpose of the state [in civil-military relations]
now focused on how to ensure civil control of the military.\textsuperscript{23} This focus had a significant
influence on the development of an appropriate defence policy for the state and helped
exclude any military involvement in the development of policy.

**HUNTINGTON & JANOWITZ – MODELS FOR SUCCESS?**

**Who Develops Policy?**

Huntington believed that the civilian Government were responsible for defining Defence
Policy.\textsuperscript{24} The literature available indicates that the Executive Council failed to do so in
the early years of the Irish Free State. The *Army Organisation Board* of 1925 noted
that its work was “seriously handicapped by the fact that we had no clear definition of
Government policy regarding national defence.”\textsuperscript{25} Following significant prompting from
the military the Government did issue a memorandum on defence in July 1925. The
document stated that the strength of the Army should not exceed 10-12,000 all ranks.
The document went on to identify that the force;

\textsuperscript{19} Valiulis (1998), op cit.
\textsuperscript{20} Mulcahy (2012), op cit.
\textsuperscript{21} Report of the Army Enquiry Committee, 1924. Pg 5.
\textsuperscript{22} Valiulis (1998), op cit.
\textsuperscript{23} O’Halpin (2012), op cit.
\textsuperscript{24} Op Cit.
\textsuperscript{25} The Army Reorganisation Board, Report 1925. Pg 3.
Must be an independent national Force capable of assuming responsibility for the defence of the territory of Saorstat Éireann against invasion, or internal disruptive agencies; but it must also be so organised as to render it capable... of full and complete coordination with the forces of the British Government in the defence of Saorstat territory whether against actual hostilities or against violation of neutrality on the part of a common enemy.  

The Government then failed to provide the resources necessary to fund this policy. Defence expenditure and personnel consistently fell during this period. By 1930 the Army numbered below 7,000 with an annual expenditure of less that £1 million. Whilst recognising the need to cooperate with the British state in the area of defence, the state made no formal efforts to develop official ties in this area. At a meeting in advance of the Conference on the Operation of Dominion Legislation in 1929, government representatives noted that no attempt had been made by the state to implement a detailed policy on defence relations with the British Empire. The advice from the Attorney General was that if this issue arose then the delegates could promise to cooperate in general terms. Comdt Bryan, a military delegate at the meeting, noted that this promise would prove to be unsatisfactory as the state had been making the same promises for the past six to seven years.

Cleary argues that the nature of the relationship between Britain and Ireland helped shape defence policy. The army was focused on developing capabilities to deal with an external invasion. The government, on the other hand, were concerned with a prospective incursion by British forces as a result of ongoing IRA activity. The government therefore focused on removing the grounds for a potential invasion by using the army to assist the civil police in minimizing IRA activity. In this instance the army was ascribed an internal security role to prevent an external invasion. This policy was continued by subsequent administrations.

**Objective Military Control**

Huntington’s objective civilian control model theory notes that in order for civil–military relations to function the military needs to develop a professional officer body that remains separate from the political sphere – the higher the military’s level of professionalism the better the civil–military relationship. In the National Army’s case strenuous efforts were made to create a professional officer body. This emphasis emerged from a realisation that the military polity had not performed credibly during the Civil War and that the National Army had been created in a time of crisis and was not ideal for purpose. Mulcahy and his successors also had an aim that military should be at a remove from the body politic and subject to civilian control. This represented a radical departure for former members.

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26 Memorandum on National Defence Policy, 1925. Pg 1. This is the only policy document on Defence in the Free State that I could find following an extensive trawl through both Military and National Archives.


28 Conference held in London on how to amend Commonwealth law for use in British Dominions.

29 Extracts from a memorandum, with covering notes, by the Department of Defence on the Conference on the Operation of Dominion Legislation (2/20102), 1929.

30 Minutes on meeting on Extracts from a memorandum, with covering notes, by the Department of Defence on the Conference on the Operation of Dominion Legislation (2/20102), 1929.

31 Interview with Professor Joe Cleary, NUIM, 25 Apr 13.


33 Valiulis (1998), Op Cit.
of the IRA who fought in a politicised guerrilla war. Although fewer than 4,000 IRA members joined the National Army during the Civil War, the leadership and direction of the organisation was given by men schooled in irregular warfare. Efforts were made to improve the educational standard of the officer body. Missions were dispatched to St Cyr and Fort Leavenworth in order to better understand the military profession. Small numbers of officers were sent on technical courses to Britain. As a result of these experiences abroad the Irish Military College was established. The mission to America also led to the establishment of the Temporary Plans Division (TPD). This division, in a number of memoranda, set out its vision for the future of the National Army. Their planning, however, focused on conventional defence against an external aggressor. As a professional army, the military elite believed that they should focus planning on conventional operations - The internal threat posed by the remnants of the IRA should therefore not be the main focus of the Military.

I would contend that the Army became overly professional in its outlook during this period. By focusing on a conventional role it lost sight of Government defence policy. The Government wanted a small standing army of 10-12,000 capable of both internal security functions and external defence. Plans submitted from the military almost exclusively on the conventional threat. The Army Reorganisation Board identified the need to create a small professional army capable of being expanded through the use of reserves to three divisions in time of war. The Board noted that the “suppression of internal disorder can be regarded as the third function of the Regular Army.” By 1932 the Chief of Staff was recommending a Wartime establishment of 75,000 (regular and militia), organised in three divisions and well equipped with tanks, artillery and Aircraft. In real terms numbers fell from a regular force of 16,400 to 5,300 (excluding officers) during this period, with little attempt to create a functional reserve. In relation to possible external threats the military leadership were also at odds with the political establishment. In its planning, the TPD regarded Britain as a potential adversary; the Government of the time on the other hand viewed her as a definite ally. The focus of the government was on the internal threat. The Executive Council therefore required a small docile Army, sufficient in size to intimidate the republican threat. The rationale behind the government’s focus on internal rather than external threats is analysed later in this article.

The dominant wish to professionalise also moved the Army away from its origins in irregular warfare. Officers trained abroad returned with the doctrine of regular warfare. Discussion within the organisation almost exclusively focused on the conventional. In its five years of publication an tOglach, the unofficial monthly magazine of the Army, published two articles on irregular warfare. The Command & Staff School syllabus devoted three hours

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35 French Military Academy.
36 American Command & General Staff School.
37 The Military College was established in 1931.
38 The purpose of the Temporary Plans Division was to develop a suitable theory of war on which the defence of the Free State should be based.
39 Preparation for War, Temporary Plans Division, 1928.
40 The Army Reorganisation Board, Report 1925, Pg 5. The Army Reorganisation Board, Report 1925
41 a body of citizens enrolled for military service, and called out periodically for drill but serving full time only in emergencies
42 Farrell (2002), op cit.
43 O’Halpin (1999), op cit.
44 Preparation for War, Temporary Plans Division, 1928. Memorandum on National Defence Policy, 1925.
out of 361 hours to this topic (in contrast 18 hours of lectures focused on chemical warfare - a capability that the army did not possess). The Irish officer body believed that professional armies did not indulge in guerrilla warfare. There were also pragmatic reasons for this move away from irregular warfare. Bryan noted that any future guerrilla war in Ireland would likely result in massive reprisals from the occupying force greatly in excess of those experienced during the Anglo-Irish War 1919-1921. As a result the support of the local population could not be depended on. The move to professionalise the army had therefore potential positive consequences for the civil population. The army would prefer to fight conventionally and avoid possible reprisals against civilians.

Civic Republican Theory and the National Army

Janowitz's civic republican theory also does not adequately explain civil-military relations in the Irish State during this period. The state appears, like most newly independent countries, to have feared the potential power that a large army could wield. As noted earlier, the primacy of civilian control became paramount and arguably retarded the integration of civil-military institutions. Officers were actively discouraged from commenting on matters of defence policy. Legislation was also drawn up to limit the term of office of members of the General Staff. The creation of an active reserve, in order to better integrate the army with other citizens of the state, was implemented but never adequately funded. Military planners realised at an early stage that the financial situation in Ireland did not allow for the creation of a large standing army. They therefore proposed the creation of a small regular army that could be expanded in times of crisis. The Army Organisation Board calculated that by 1940 a regular force of 5,000 supported by an active reserve of 45,000 would be in place to defend the state. Attempts to create a reserve, however, were never fully realised.

Various schemes to create a reserve element culminated in the establishment of the Volunteer Force in 1934. This force appears to have been established, however, for mainly political purposes. The government appeared to have been fearful that a large reserve would lead to the militarisation of the state. As a result of these misgivings the state was left with a standing army that was too small and underequipped to defend the state, supported by a reserve force that lacked the training and resources to augment the regular force.

From the evidence reviewed it is clear that the National Army did not evolve in accordance with either the Janowitz or Huntington model. The government arguably did not develop an appropriate policy for the defence of the state. The National Army was therefore unsure of its purpose within the state. Similarly, the government failed to engage the army in the political process. By failing to develop an adequate reserve, contrary to official policy, the government missed the opportunity to develop the citizen soldier. They therefore missed the opportunity to utilise the army, a branch of state apparatus, to help develop confidence in the state.

46 Bryan noted that all sides during World War 1 executed any belligerent caught armed, and out of uniform.
47 Fundamental Factors Affecting Saorstat Defence, G2 Section, 1936.
48 O’Halpin (1999), op cit.
49 This force was an attempt by the new Fianna Fail government to integrate anti-treaty elements with the largely pro-treaty regular army.
50 O’Halpin (1999), op cit.
NATIONAL ARMY – REGULAR DEFENCE FORCE OR COLONIAL CONSTABULARY?

The literature reviewed in preparation for this article identified that most newly independent states develop military forces that are primarily focused on internal threats. Both Desch and Frazer also identified that militaries with a more defined external defence role are less likely to directly intervene in state affairs. In the case of the Irish Free State the military had an ascribed internal and external defence role. As noted earlier the Memorandum on Defence Policy of 1925 called for the establishment of a small standing Army capable of assuming responsibility for the defence of the state against invasion and internal aggression. As argued earlier the government did little to increase the army's capabilities, did not adequately provide for a reserve or develop a policy of cooperation on defence issues with the British state.

The government however did use the army extensively in the internal security role and utilised military forces for a variety of tasks. The Special Infantry Corps were involved in the enforcement of court orders relating to land disputes. A Military Customs Brigade operated in border areas until a civilian custom service was established. Army intelligence focused on the domestic threat to internal security, even developing a capacity to deal with armed robberies. For a number of years after the Civil War thousands of troops were billeted around the state deployed on essentially police duties. In later years the government resorted to the use of military means when faced with an increase in political violence. In 1931 the government introduced the Public Safety Act in response to an upswing in IRA activity. This act created military courts to try political offences – a move that was at odds with normal democratic practice. In later years the De Valera Government created the Special Criminal Court, staffed by military officers, to deal with IRA activity during The Emergency. To this day the military are still involved in routine police tasks such as providing armed security for Cash in Transit.

From the documents reviewed it would appear that the government regarded the internal threat as being the main existential risk to the state. They therefore allocated their limited resources accordingly. Forces were deployed in small packets on a territorial basis in order to be better able to respond to domestic instability. When forces were not actively involved in police actions, they were utilised as part of an internal information operations campaign. Soldiers were deployed to support local gymkhanas, fairs and other public events. Army bands provided the background music to many people's memories of the Horse Shows, international sports events and other such activities. The purpose for these public displays appear to stem from government wishes to show the army in a positive light. By demonstrating the positive attributes of the military the government hoped to dissuade young men from joining the IRA.

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52 O’Halpin (1999), op cit.
53 Constitutional Amendment, 1931 (No 37).
54 Duggan (1991), op cit.
55 Offences against the State Act, 1939 (No 13).
56 The role of the military is to provide armed protection for the Garda accompanying the convoy and the civilian personnel driving the cash vehicle.
57 Information operations are designed to influence a target audience to behave in a certain manner.
58 O’Halpin (2012), op cit.
The Army, on the other hand, regarded external threats as being the gravest for the security of the state. As noted earlier military planners focused primarily on creating a professional army supported by extensive reserves capable of defending the state against invasion. The internal threat was only of tertiary concern. In the eyes of many within the military the focus on horse shows, band concerts and internal security was distracting the army from its primary purpose, the protection of the state and national defence. The establishment of the Temporary Plans Division, with its focus on preparing all aspects of the state including economic means for war, supports this analysis. The state had effectively created a professional officer body that had a divergent view on security policy.

Although apparently counter-intuitive, it appears that this divergence of opinion helped prevent military interference in the affairs of the state. Already overtly apolitical since the army crisis of 1924 the military did not wish for its primary security role to be internally focused. Its professional officer body favoured a conventional role over internal security. As a body it looked externally for its purpose even when its primary focus in government eyes was internal. This outlook, combined with government determination to ensure civil control of the military at all costs, helped shape an organisation that had little interest in the political affairs of the Free State. As a result of this shaping, the army did not react when power was transferred from Cumann na nGaedheal to Fianna Fail in 1932.

Conclusions
Ireland was atypical in its development of armed forces when compared with other European states. The development of the National Army had more in common with the experiences of other former colonies than with a modern state. The government favoured a constabulary role for the military; the army a more conventional defence role. I would contend that this paradox helped prevent military intervention in domestic politics.

The other significant factor that helped shape military opinion was the absolute insistence by government of civilian control over military policy. While the concept of civilian control over military policy is the normative behaviour in most modern states, the total exclusion of military planners from the formulation of such policy prior to The Emergency is unusual. My research indicates that the initial exclusion of military planners from policy making in the 1920s hindered the Defence Forces ability to adequately define its purpose to the state.

The implications of these initial government decisions on defence policy continue to resonate today. The Defence Forces continue to be deployed in a constabulary role in aid to the civil power. With the stabilisation of the security situation within this state, the role and purpose of the Defence Forces has been called into question. In preparation for the forthcoming Green and White Papers on Defence, and to progress as an organisation, there needs to be a debate, both internally and externally, on the true purpose of our Defence Forces. Only after such a debate is it possible to move from an interim defence strategy, designed in haste following a Civil War, and of its time, to a policy that is more suitable for a modern European state.

59 O’Halpin (1999), op cit.
60 The military oath in which members swear that they will not become members of a political party or secret society was a direct response to this crisis.
61 The leadership of Fianna Fail consisted of a core of anti-treaty supporters. Most of the incoming ministers in the new cabinet had fought on the anti-treaty side during the Civil War. The leadership of the National Army had fought on the pro-treaty side.
The Strategy Obstacle Course in the Irish Defence Organisation

ABSTRACT
The ongoing economic crisis means resources are becoming increasingly scarce, at a time when the Irish public are increasingly sceptical of central government and the public sector. Therefore, the effective strategic management and employment of allocated resources is ever more important. Although formulating a strategy is challenging for the senior management of any organisation, implementing that strategy throughout an organisation is even more difficult due to the multitude of variables that can potentially affect the process of realising strategy. The purpose of this paper is to identify and generate a deeper understanding of some of the key variables that frequently materialise as potential obstacles to Defence Organisation strategy. This is achieved through an examination of some of the theories of strategy formulation and implementation, and the challenges of strategic management within the public sector. Key variables are identified and then evaluated in terms of their impact on the strategy process within the Defence Organisation.

Introduction
In Ireland, the provision of core public services such as health, education, welfare and security is a part of everyday life. For most Irish citizens, the public management of these services is primarily focused on their delivery. The difficulty for public service managers is that the delivery of their services seldom earns any praise or plaudits; whereas delays, inefficiencies or overspends draw immediate criticism.1 Today, governments provide an array of public services but of these, Defence, within any society, fulfils a unique role, as it forms the basis for national security and ultimately safeguards society: “[i]t is a function that can consume significant resources, including human life.”2 Therefore, the management of Defence is a vital undertaking whether it is at the military strategic level or within a given military unit. Nonetheless, the management task is not so very different in the Defence sector, than elsewhere in the public service.3

The effectiveness of any organisation today depends on its ability to adapt to its environment, which is in turn influenced by its strategic management.4 Within an organisation strategic management is concerned with the decisions and actions which result in the formulation

3 Ibid.
and implementation of strategies designed to achieve organisational goals. However, numerous factors can potentially affect the process by which plans are turned into organisational action. Moreover, the selection of the means for implementing strategy is also of the utmost importance because if an organisation cannot implement a strategy successfully, the repercussions can be enormous. Apart from the financial and time loss, failed implementation creates a negative precedence within the organisation such as lower morale and loss of confidence in management.6

“As the boundaries and delineation between the military, political and diplomatic arenas become less distinct, it is essential that all senior officers have a command of the tools necessary for the understanding and critique of these spheres.”7 In addition, the recent reforms within the DF, set against the backdrop of the current economic crisis, mean that it is essential that military officers understand that;

meaningful application of strategic management principles and concepts involves far more than simply changing structures, employing consultants or producing glossy documents that speak of vision statements and awards of civilian standards of excellence.8

This paper identifies and generates an appreciation and deeper understanding of the primary variables that frequently materialise as potential obstacles to strategy within the Defence Organisation.9 It draws on the experience of senior management, both military and civilian, in formulating and implementing strategy within the defence and public sector environment, in an endeavour to identify and evaluate these potential obstacles

The Strategic Management Process
At its most fundamental, the study of strategic management is concerned with the relationship between an organisation and its environment in order to be successful.10 Furthermore, due to the dynamism of both the organisation and the environment, the ability of an organisation to adapt becomes even more important to the relationship.11 The strategic management process commences with a strategy analysis. This consists of the advance work that must be completed in order to effectively formulate and implement strategies. Many strategies fail because managers formulate and implement strategies without a careful analysis of the overarching goals of the organisation, and without a thorough analysis of the external and internal environment.12 Once this analysis has taken place, a strategy can then be formulated to put the organisation in a strong position to take advantage of the internal assets and opportunities in the environment.13

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9 The term “Defence Organisation” refers to the civil (Dept of Defence) and the military organisation; the “Defence Forces” refers to the military organisation only; “Defence” is used to refer in a broad sense to defence provision;
implementation occurs next: this is the process whereby managers translate strategies into action, for without implementation the best planned strategies are worthless.\textsuperscript{14} However, it is important to recognise that the strategy process is not a linear but a dynamic process, and it is necessary to continuously revisit all elements of the process to ensure alignment.

Within academic literature it is a “widely held belief that more than 80 per cent of strategies fail and that the failure is due primarily in the implementation.”\textsuperscript{15} Figure 1 (a) highlights how the creation of the strategic plan can often be the focal point for strategy formulation while this focus is frequently lost during the implementation stage. In an ideal scenario, (b), there is a requirement for creative thinking in the formulation process followed by a high degree of focus on the execution of strategy.

\textbf{Figure 1: Strategy Formulation and Implementation}\textsuperscript{16}

In organisations strategy formulation interacts between three forces: a changing environment; the organisational structure and environment; and, the leadership role to intercede between the two forces.\textsuperscript{17} This perspective places great emphasis on the leader's ability to be able to formulate strategies and then implement these strategies successfully. This in turn raises the question: do leaders/managers consider in advance actual or likely changes in situations when formulating strategy?

Once a strategy is formulated, it is not inevitable that this specific strategy will be implemented. Mintzberg and Walters investigated the strategy formulation process within organisations, by exploring the relationship between intended, deliberate, emergent and realised strategies.\textsuperscript{18} They contend that understanding the distinctions between these strategies improves one's understanding of the development of strategy; Figure 2 shows these relationships. Intended strategies refer to the strategy formulation process

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{15} Neal, Op Cit. p. 129.
\item \textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
\end{itemize}

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while realised strategies refer to the implementation process. Managers may find, that although their original intentions are realised, additional strategies might have emerged during the strategic process. Ultimately, a process which allows strategies to emerge enables organisations to react more effectively to changes in their environment.

![Figure 2: Types of Strategy](image)

**Approaches to Strategy Implementation**

After a strategy is formulated, it must then be implemented. There are two distinct elements to the approach an organisation will adopt to implementation: the extent to which responsibility is centralised or decentralised and, whether formulation and implementation are distinct and sequential activities, or are intertwined. Numerous models suggest that there are a range of approaches that may exist within an organisation, but each differs in the variables they consider and the terms they use. Thompson synthesised these models by grouping implementation approaches along a spectrum, with rational/command at one end and incremental/generative at the other.

“A rational implementation style is characterised by centralised control, the use of formal means to secure compliance, and the separation of formulation and implementation.”

A key element of this approach is that strategy is formulated first and only then is it implemented. Rational implementers are likely to define activities clearly, through formal methods such as business plans or strategy statements that identify tasks with objectives. Management control has been identified by Nobel as being central to the implementation process and this is achieved in rational approaches through techniques such as action plans and monitoring. Much of the available evidence on implementation approaches

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19 Ibid.
suggests that implementation styles that are closer to the rational approach end of the spectrum are more effective and enhance performance. 28

Although the strategy process has traditionally been dominated by the rational approach, a significant body of literature has highlighted the value of the incremental approach.29 Organisations employing the incremental approach decentralise responsibility and have a much looser distinction between formulation and implementation. Mintzberg supporting this view argues that separation of formulation and implementation, as prescribed by the rational approach, is a key reason for implementation failure, while connecting these two processes permits an organisation to learn more effectively and respond to changes in the environment.30 Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that the incremental approach is associated with improved implementation and organisational performance, if somewhat less than that associated with the rational approach.31

Nevertheless, one factor that may mediate the effectiveness of the implementation approach is the actual strategy of the organisation. Adopting Miles and Snow’s mode32 and also utilising Boyne and Walker’s research,33 Andrews et al highlight three possible types of ideal strategy in the public service.34 However, in reality, a mix of these strategies is more likely to be pursued simultaneously:

   a. Prospects – often seek to expand budgets and pioneer the development of new products.
   b. Defenders – likely to focus on low risk strategies designed to enhance the efficiency of their existing service.
   c. Reactors – lack a strategy of their own but wait to be coerced by external forces.

Andrews et al hypothesise that organisations with a defender orientation are likely to be positively related to the rational approach to implementation.35 Alternatively, an incremental implementation approach is likely to be positively associated with an organisation that has a prospector orientation. While organisations with no clear approach to implementation reinforce the negative effect of the reactor orientation.

Another important factor which must be considered is whether the internal organisation environment will be fully supportive of a particular strategy and its requirements. The McKinsey 7 ‘S’ framework has been proposed as a means of achieving an organisation’s fit with its strategy, commonly referred to as achieving a “strategic fit”.36 More recently

29 Andrews et al, Op Cit.
34 Andrews et al, Op Cit.
Higgins, proposed the 8'S’s of strategy execution as a revision of McKinsey’s 7’S’s.\(^{37}\) This framework of strategy implementation includes: strategy and purposes, structure, resources\(^{38}\), shared values, style, staff, systems and processes, and strategic performance. This framework is important, as it allows for the identification of potential strategic obstacles in regard to an organisation’s internal alignment. By examining each variable, senior management can assess whether it will support the intended strategy, and if not, can the variable be altered to support the organisation’s alignment? Senior management can then begin to develop interventions to overcome the obstacles identified and if possible remove them altogether. Therefore, one would expect that the very nature of the Defence Organisation, with two very distinct and culturally different elements, to challenge the organisation’s ability to achieve an effective strategic fit.

While strategy formulation requires the ability to conceptualise, analyse and judge, the implementation involves working with and through other people, and instituting change.\(^{39}\) Implementation entails a number of factors some of which can be changed directly and others which can only be changed indirectly by the strategic leader. Implementation, therefore, poses the more difficult management/leadership challenge. Nevertheless, one essential contribution the strategic leader makes is to provide and share a clear vision, direction and purpose for the organisation.\(^{40}\) He or she must ensure long-term objectives and strategies have been determined and that they are understood and supported by managers within the organisation who will be responsible for implementing them.

**Obstacles to Effective Strategy**

Authors of strategic fit stress the importance of the interaction between different organisational variables in achieving an organisation’s goals.\(^{41}\) This is because, if the variables which are important to implementation do not interact or behave as expected, then the implementation of strategies will be affected and these variables become obstacles. A number of authors have attempted to determine and define the nature of these obstacles to implementation. Yet despite the numerous studies there does not appear to be a theoretical consensus on the horizon with regard to the key obstacles organisations face in formulating and implementing strategy. Okumus\(^{42}\) identifies ten common variables which are potential obstacles; alternatively, Li, Guohui and Eppler\(^{43}\) identify nine crucial variables. Even within these two sets of variables there is a lack of consensus. This paper restricts detailed consideration of how all these variables can manifest as potential obstacles. However, some variables are common to both, such as strategy formulation, which has been previously discussed. Therefore, I intend to only focus on two variables, organisation structure and communication, which are also common to both these studies and numerous others. Using these variables as an initial starting point we can further develop our appreciation of the range of strategic obstacles that may affect an organisation.

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\(^{38}\) Higgins has deleted skills from the McKinsey framework and replaced it with resources; he has also included strategic performance as an additional element.


\(^{41}\) Scholz, C. op cit; Waterman, op cit.


Organisational Structure

Organisational structure is referred to by numerous authors as an important organisational variable affecting strategy.⁴⁴ All organisation structures have advantages and disadvantages; ultimately, there is no one best way to organise⁴⁵, however, structure is one variable that managers can adapt to ensure the organisation achieves its goals and objectives. Indeed, Galbraith and Kazanjian suggest that implementation of a new strategy within the organisation may prompt changes to the organisational structure for the strategy to be successful.⁴⁶

However, matching organisational structure to strategy centres on making strategy-critical activities the primary building blocks for the organisation. The organisation must find “effective ways to bridge organisational lines of authority, co-ordinate the related efforts of separate internal units or individuals, and effectively networking the efforts of internal units and external collaborative partners.”⁴⁷ Another major consideration is to consider what decisions to centralise and what decisions to decentralise. For example, if an organisation has a hierarchical structure, implementing a strategy that empowers lower level managers with strategic decision making, may not be appropriate. Nutt believes that different levels of management within an organisation apply different approaches to implementation.⁴⁸ Therefore, an organisation’s structure can possibly affect the success of the implementation process if different levels of the organisation have different perspectives on strategy. This presents further challenges for the way in which the separate elements of the Defence Organisation develop and implement a single strategy and which decisions, if any, are centralised and decentralised with regard to strategy. Inevitably, implementation will take “different shapes and forms in different cultures and institutional settings”.⁴⁹

Communication

One way of achieving a consistent strategy throughout an organisation is through effective communication.⁵⁰ The content of such communication includes clearly explaining what new responsibilities, tasks and duties need to be performed by the affected employees. Organisations where employees have easy access to management, through open and supportive communication climates, tend to outperform those with more restrictive communication environments.⁵¹ In addition, communication with employees encourages an exchange of viewpoints and provides opportunities for feedback, which in turn provides information to amend the strategy if required.

Organisational communication plays an important role in training, knowledge dissemination and learning during the process of strategy implementation, in fact it

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⁴⁷ Thompson, A. and Strickland, A., op cit.
⁵⁰ Li et al, op cit.
is pervasive in every aspect of strategy implementation.\textsuperscript{52} Schaap’s research findings reinforce that frequent vertical communication in an organisation enhances strategic consensus through the fostering of shared attitudes and values.\textsuperscript{53} However, effective communication within an organisation takes time and effort; it is something that requires commitment from managers in order for it to work successfully. Therefore, does the nature of the Defence Organisation, with its two separate entities, create a significant communications obstacle to strategy? Heide, Gronhaug, and Johannessen suggest that communication obstacles are reported more frequently than any other type of implementation obstacle.\textsuperscript{54} Furthermore, communication has been identified as a major responsibility of the strategic leader, as this enables managers throughout the organisation to be strategically aware, and also ensures that the strategic leader is updated on developments.\textsuperscript{55}

**Strategic Management in the Public Sector**

In order to develop a framework to assist in understanding the obstacles to strategy in the Defence Organisation, we must appreciate the context within which it operates. On one level the DF operates as a military force, on another, it operates as an element of the Irish public sector, this latter level has been described to as the “military business space”,\textsuperscript{56} consequently, it is necessary to examine what unique challenges the public sector faces during the strategy process.

Within the public sector strategic management faces constraints which are relatively unique when compared to the private sector. The introduction of the Strategic Management Initiative (SMI) in Ireland in 1994 led to the adoption of strategic management within the Irish public service.\textsuperscript{57} Nonetheless, within most governments the general management functions are, usually, constitutionally spread out. The purpose of this is not to promote efficiency but rather to prevent the arbitrary exercise of power.\textsuperscript{58} This separation leads to ambiguity in policy and objectives which must be strategically managed. Ring and Perry contend that clear, unambiguous articulation of strategy can produce at least two counter-productive consequences.\textsuperscript{59} First, clearly articulated strategy may potentially act as a focal point around which political opposition to a strategy can rally. Second, a clear policy statement could mean that public managers during implementation may feel there is less need to exercise judgement, caution and discretion, or as Mintzberg concluded from his analysis of strategy formulation during the Vietnam War, it may “permit the ‘bureaucracy’ to run like an elephant”.\textsuperscript{60} This situation is not desirable for senior management “given the autonomy of employees in civil service systems and the sensitive societal mission


\textsuperscript{56} Neal, op cit. p. 130.

\textsuperscript{57} SMI later became part of Delivering Better Government in 1996


\textsuperscript{59} Ring, P. and Perry, J., op cit.

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid, p. 279
of most public organisations. Ultimately, the primary objective of the public manager is to maximise benefits for the public while minimising costs. Therefore, if public goals are not clearly defined the public manager must help discover these goals by putting forward interim goals and gauging the reaction, what Behn terms “management by groping along”.

In Ireland today citizens and politicians are far more demanding of their public sector than was formerly the case. The influence of the media has led to what Murray calls “audience democracy”, whereby debate and decision making are pushed into a very public arena in which the media control the landscape. Consequently, politicians are drawn into a very public and instant process of deliberation and decision making, thus, strategic management is driven out by instant tactical reaction. In addition, public managers are also subject to a more direct and sustained influence from a greater number of stakeholders in contrast to the private sector. These stakeholders often have conflicting demands, which can change considerably within a short space of time, as can their relative influence. Nevertheless, due to the large number of public stakeholders and the requirement for coalition building, involving diverse interests in strategy formulation, public managers must endeavour to keep all interests satisfied during the implementation phase. However, in Ireland there is little understanding “of how the context and environment in which the Irish public service operates facilitates, or constrains, the exercise of leadership.”

In response to these challenges, successful public managers resort to processes and employ skills that often differ from those employed at the strategic management level in the private sector. Ring and Perry observe that the strategy process within public organisations tends to be emergent and more open to outside influences. As a result, flexibility and adaptability are traits required of public managers. Moreover, successful adaptive behaviour tends to be associated with the ability to act quickly, to interpret the law “creatively” and to reduce the necessity for multiple clearances during implementation.

**Evaluating the Obstacles**

This section presents the findings of the author’s research for the MA LMDS. The Irish Defence Organisation has two distinct elements within its structure, the Department of Defence (DoD) and the Defence Forces (DF). The DoD supports the Minister as Head of the Department by providing policy advice and support on defence matters. This includes assistance with policy formulation and the implementation of policy as directed by the Minister. The primary role of the DoD Secretary General (SG) is to act as the Minister’s principal defence policy adviser, while the primary role of the DF Chief of Staff (COS) is to act as the Minister’s principal military adviser. The second element of the Defence

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61 Ibid, p. 279
64 Murray, op cit, p. 4.
65 Ibid.
66 Freeman (1984) defines stakeholders as any individuals or groups who can affect or are affected by the achievement of the organisations objectives. Stakeholders can have a positive, negative or neutral effect on an organisation.
67 Alford, op cit.
69 Ring and Perry, op cit.
Organisation is the Defence Forces. Like all military organisations, it operates on a traditional, top-down, rigid hierarchy of management, with strict organisational charts and lines of communication. It is organised on conventional military lines providing a flexible structure to accomplish all the roles assigned by Government. Presently, the established strength of the DF is 9,500.

The Defence Organisation has demonstrated an ability to conceptualise, analyse and think creatively in its development of strategy. The formulation of the organisation’s first joint strategy statement in 2008 moved it away from the very prescriptive type strategy statements of previous years. During the development of these strategy statements the organisation was, and remains, aware that it experiences emergent strategy. It facilitates emergent strategy by establishing broad objectives, which permit flexibility in absorbing and guarding against strategic shocks, such as unforeseen litigation, or decreased resources. Within the Defence Organisation there are elements, and perhaps aspirations, of it adopting a more prospector type strategy as outlined by Andrews et al. However, the current reality, in particular with regard to available resources, is that the organisation is leaning very much towards a defender type strategy for very practical reasons.

The research highlighted that that the presence of two very distinct organisations under the one umbrella can lead, at times, to a contested space at the strategic level with regard to each organisation’s respective role, and this in turn can sometimes diminish the unity of effort with regard to strategy formulation and implementation. However, Alison’s research suggests that, within the public sector, this contested space is not unique to the Defence Organisation. Nevertheless, from a strategic management perspective the establishment of the Strategic Management Committee (SMC) has increased the capacity of the organisation to engage in the strategy process and has proved to be extremely beneficial for the organisation’s strategic decision making process, by providing a forum for overcoming potential obstacles. The first item discussed at each SMC meeting is the Strategic Risk Register, any areas of concern on this register are addressed at the meeting; therefore, in many respects this influences the agenda for the meeting. Essentially, the SMC very much centralises the discussion of strategic issues and ensures that the organisation, as a whole, remains focused on implementation throughout the strategy process.

The Defence sector has experienced an increased level of uncertainty in recent years, particularly over resources. However, the Comprehensive Review of Expenditure in 2011 has provided some degree of certainty, but even this has been chipped away with regard to the requirements of the new Public Service Agreements. When this uncertainty over resources is coupled with an increasing level of control over Defence

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72 Ibid.
73 This figure is for the Permanent Defence Forces and does not include the establishment for the Reserve Defence Forces
74 Andrews et al, op cit.
75 Alison, op cit.
76 The Strategic Management Committee (SMC) is a joint civil-military committee that deals with major policy issues. The SMC members are the Secretary General, the Chief of Staff, the two Deputy Chiefs of Staff and the two Assistant Secretaries of the Department. The General Officer Commanding the Air Corps and the Flag Officer Commanding the Naval Service attend in respect of matters affecting their services.
77 In 2011 the Government launched a Comprehensive Review of Expenditure. This was a root-and-branch examination of every area of public spending, to identify major savings and efficiencies in order to reduce the State’s expenditure levels. The savings generated go towards meeting the Governments overall targets for fiscal consolidation over the coming years. For Defence, the outcome of the Government’s Comprehensive Review of Expenditure outlined the resource envelope that is available to Defence in the coming years. Arising from the review, the Government stabilised the strength ceiling of the Permanent Defence Force at 9,500 personnel.
and other government departments by central government, in the form of the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform (D PER), new obstacles to strategy emerge which must be negotiated. This uncertainty and loss of autonomy has led to senior Defence management adjusting strategy by putting forward interim plans and goals, and gauging the reaction of D PER, what Behn might term “management by groping along”.78

As strategy is not usually implemented over a short time frame, the frequency with which the DF rotates its middle management personnel, particularly at Defence Forces Headquarters (DFHQ), can prove to be a significant challenge for both the DF and the DoD. This staff turnover is particularly noticeable at the Commandant and Lieutenant Colonel rank, where such officers are usually not in appointments long enough to establish a relationship with their civilian counterparts, or, to develop an extended “corporate memory” of their subject area. This presents an obstacle in terms of the organisation’s strategic fit and can be frustrating for both the DF and the DoD.

The research indicated that the implementation of strategy is very much orchestrated from the top-down, and the approach adopted is similar at all management levels, within the respective organisations (DF and DoD). This would appear to contradict Nutt’s assertion that different levels of management within an organisation apply different approaches to strategy.79 Nonetheless, when one considers the Defence Organisation as a whole, Nutts' arguments hold true. Despite sharing a common strategy and objectives, the DF and DoD frequently apply different methods to achieve these objectives. This creates further challenges for the organisation in achieving its strategic fit and is compounded by the difference in culture and values between the two organisations. At times in the past, the cultural attachments of the DF to its institutions and traditions have resulted in it being slow to embrace change, whereas the civil service staffed DoD has no such attachments, and can therefore adopt a more dispassionate view of the strategy process. Within the Defence Organisation, stakeholders have a considerable impact on the organisation’s strategy and can place significant demands on its resources. Most common amongst these stakeholders are the Dept of an Taoiseach, D PER, Dept of Finance, Dept of Foreign Affairs, Dept of Justice and the Health Service Executive (HSE). It is therefore essential for the organisation to identify, classify (according to their power and influence) and finally decide how to relate to these stakeholders.

Communication within the Defence Organisation plays a critical role in overcoming any obstacles to the strategy that may be encountered. The DF places significant emphasis on the communication process throughout its organisation and are proactive in ensuring that any communication gaps are identified and rectified. Moreover, the DF view communication as an important tool in overcoming obstacles to strategy and facilitating feedback, thus ensuring that the strategy process remains dynamic and management maintain their strategic awareness. On the other hand, the research suggests that the DoD do not place the same emphasis on communicating strategy beyond management level, this potentially limits feedback and, thus, may limit the development and improvement opportunities for strategy.

78 Behn, op cit.
79 Nutt, op cit.
For the organisation as a whole the implementation of strategy is the most challenging aspect of the strategy process as it is during this phase that the Defence outputs are produced. Nevertheless, during the management and leadership training for both organisations, the emphasis is on strategy formulation and planning at the expense of implementation. The development of the skills and knowledge required for implementation, for both the DF and DoD, appears to be gained through experience in appointments. This in turn, places the DF at a disadvantage in attempting to gain the required experience due to the relatively short time its personnel spend in staff appointments in DFHQ.

Overall the Defence Organisation favours a rational implementation style. This view is reinforced by the importance the organisation places on ensuring its strategy, and in particular its various strategy documents, are aligned or nested, both horizontally and vertically, with government policy and other government departments, in particular the DPER and the Dept of Finance, in order to ensure the organisation remains able to justify its allocated resources.

**Conclusion**

The ongoing economic crisis means resources are becoming increasingly scarce, and the Irish public are more sceptical of central government and the public sector in general. As a public sector body, Defence consumes significant resources, and the strategic management of these resources is becoming increasingly important. This paper has identified and evaluated what I consider to be the key variables that frequently materialise as potential obstacles to strategy within the Defence Organisation. Indeed, the variables discussed here are by no means complete and certainly once accounted for, new ones will emerge. Nevertheless, what is important is for military management to develop a recognition and appreciation of the variables that impact on the organisation’s strategy. This requires an organisation that is self-critical and is continually analysing its environment, in order to ensure that its strategy is being formulated and implemented in a manner that will achieve its objectives, while simultaneously maximising the use of available resources.
Recognising the Maritime Picture – A Cure for ‘Sea Blindness’

“We are a maritime nation. Whether we are from urban, rural or coastal communities, we all have a real interest in the social, cultural and economic impact of our coasts and seas.”

An Taoiseach, Enda Kenny, T.D.1

ABSTRACT

As Ireland looks to the sea to create the conditions needed for economic growth, investment and job creation the State recognises the necessity for a safe, secure and protected maritime environment. This necessitates effective and efficient security and surveillance capabilities allied to quality maritime regulatory regimes to meet our international legal obligations. Improving our national capabilities in security, surveillance, safety and eco-protection of the maritime domain can be achieved through improved information sharing and increased cooperation and innovation among all actors, at both national and EU level. The development of a shared common maritime picture will facilitate enhanced maritime data sharing at national and international levels and enhance the ability of the relevant actors tasked with ensuring the protection, safety and security of Ireland’s maritime domain.

While it is readily apparent that borders delineate and separate countries on land, what is often overlooked is the unique nature of the sea and how it actually connects nations in a globalised market that is built on the underlying principle of freedom of navigation to enable global economic trade and supply. Freedom of the high seas has been an accepted customary and international law norm for centuries, yet the future development and security of the world’s extensive maritime domain is endangered by a range of complex challenges and threats. Such diverse threats includes climate change, narcotics smuggling, trafficking in persons, piracy, terrorism, marine pollution, large scale illegal fishing, illicit movement of weapons of mass destruction, resource competition including energy security and nascent territorial conflicts with the potential to generate significant threats to global maritime security.2 Adding to the complexity of these challenges is the interrelated nature of these threats which straddles the line between defence and law enforcement and between domestic, regional and international level security. The identified challenges and threats have the potential to expose the underlying vulnerability of global maritime trade with the ensuing impact on global security and the increasingly realistic potential impact on national sovereignty and integrity. Nonetheless, it is almost


incredible to consider that the fundamental importance of the maritime domain from a security perspective has until very recently been largely overlooked. This is despite the fact that over 70% of the Earth’s surface is covered by water, 90% of global trade and just over half of the world’s oil movements are transported by sea. From a European Union (EU) perspective, maritime areas provide a vital dimension of Europe’s economy. It is estimated that 90% of the EU’s external trade and 40% of internal trade is transported by sea and approximately 350 million passengers and over 3.5 billion tons of cargo per year pass through European seaports. The EU is the world’s leading maritime shipping actor with European ships owners managing 30% of the global fleet, 35% of the world’s shipping tonnage which includes 55% of container vessels and 35% of tankers; representing 42% of the value of global trade. From a geostrategic and maritime security viewpoint, these European waterways include a number of vital chokepoints including, for example, the English Channel and the Straits of Gibraltar where the freedom of movement of shipping can be relatively easily challenged with the ensuing potential drastic economic consequences. One of the fathers of international law, Hugo Grotius established the fundamental concept of freedom of the seas; 

mare liberum

in 1609. Grotius sought the optimisation of the uses of the sea because of the very nature of the oceans which he claimed demands that they be available to all. Freedom of the high seas has remained as an international law constant since. Currently the high seas freedoms promoted by Grotius include not only freedom of navigation and fishing but also over flight, the freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, and a number of military activities which are typically considered as high seas freedoms. Nations have accepted that the freedoms of the high seas as enunciated in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) entail certain responsibilities and that the purpose of such regulation was to safeguard the exercise of this freedom in the interests of the international community. Nonetheless, the recent emergence of a number of high profile asymmetric attacks such as those against the USS Cole in Aden in 2000, the French oil tanker Limburg in 2002, and the ongoing piracy attacks off the Horn of Africa, Straits of Malacca and the Gulf of Guinea have demonstrated the necessity to tackle these challenges to maritime security which now seriously threaten freedom of the high seas. The most common theme in these emerging threats and challenges is that the perpetrators are primarily transnational in nature. The complexity of the nature of the threats and the unique international dimension that the seas represent necessitates a combination of both preventive and responsive measures and an unprecedented coordinated management of the maritime domain from the civilian and military instruments of nation states.

Ireland, as an island nation with a rich maritime heritage, albeit latterly recognised, finds itself in the unique geopolitical and geostrategic location as the ‘maritime sentinel’ to the Western approaches to Europe. The recent economic downturn has forced Ireland, amongst many other nations, to look to alternative and innovative means of growth. Ireland’s Integrated Marine Plan – Harnessing Our Ocean Wealth sets an overarching target of doubling the value of our ocean wealth to 2.4% of GDP by 2030. Of critical

7 Department of An Taoiseach. (July 2012) Harnessing Our Ocean Wealth: Towards an Integrated Plan for Ireland.
8 The plan was approved by Government in July 2012 with an overarching target to eventually exceed the global average of 2% of GDP and achieve the EU average of 3.5%.
importance to the future success of the Irish Integrated Marine Plan is the recognition that good governance and, in particular, effective maritime safety, security and surveillance are vital to achieving Ireland’s vision and goals for the marine. While the island of Ireland itself covers over 20,863,360 acres of land, following a series of successful legal and scientific submissions by the Government to the United Nations Continental Shelf Limits Commission under Article 76 UNCLOS, the State now has a significant sea area which is almost 10 times the size of the nation’s land mass. If this vast sea territory, the ‘Real’ Map of Ireland, was counted in addition to the land mass, Ireland would constitute one of the largest countries in the EU. Ireland’s recently expanded maritime area contains as of yet unharnessed natural resources inclusive of fossil fuels, minerals and fisheries. There is now recognition that the marine leisure industry can boost tourism and that renewable ocean energy and marine biotechnology are but some of the untapped key economic capabilities that can make a significant contribution to Ireland’s economic recovery and future stability. As an island state, Ireland has always acted as a significant trading nation and has an open economy which critically depends on safe and secure sea-lanes to underpin our economic security. Of necessity, this brings its own specific maritime security operational challenges. Maritime Security Operations (MSO) describes “the full range of naval operations outside of international armed conflict, including those which include an exercise of rights under Article 110 of UNCLOS.” Ireland has responsibilities and obligations as a member of the EU at the vanguard of the Union’s maritime borders and must counter illicit and illegal use of the waters under our responsibility by an ever growing myriad of actors whose illegal activities can have direct consequences for the security of our citizens. Ireland shares the challenges and the opportunities in the maritime domain with other EU Member States. For instance it is estimated that the ‘Blue Economy’ in the Union accounts for over 5 million people in employment with a value of almost €500 billion per year. The EU’s Integrated Maritime Policy was launched in 2007 to provide a more coherent and comprehensive approach to maritime issues. This policy was subsequently enhanced by the “Limassol Declaration” where the EU Ministers for maritime policy and the European Commission set out a European wide agenda to encourage the creation of growth and employment in the marine and maritime sectors specifically. Importantly, from a security and surveillance perspective, the “Limassol Declaration” emphasises the necessity for increased dialogue and enhanced cooperation with regard to maritime affairs at both regional and international level.

By looking seaward and linking Ireland’s national objectives in the marine to more expansive EU policies, Ireland has accepted that the seas can provide an essential contribution to the nation’s recovery and future economic wellbeing. There is now an acknowledgement that the sea holds immense untapped economic opportunities in terms of energy, mineral resources and food. While there may be latter day recognition

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10 Department of An Taoiseach. (February 2012). Op Cit, p. 1.
11 Ibid.
15 Ministerial Meeting on EU Integrated Maritime Policy, Limassol, 7 October 2012.
by the State that it has a very significant resource of enormous potential benefit, there is also the realisation that this resource requires protection if the maximum benefit to the State’s economic recovery is to accrue. In acknowledging the complexities of the threats and challenges in the EU’s maritime domain there is recognition that these have significant potential to impact adversely on the security and safety of the EU and on its economies and citizens. Simultaneously there is an acknowledgement that due to the international nature of the threats they cannot be addressed in isolation by individual Member States. Klein outlines an example of the international complexity that transnational criminal activity at sea can have and explains how it has grown to the extent that a number of states may be implicated during a criminal enterprise; the involved individuals may each be nationals of different states, the vessel may be flagged in one state and owned in another, more than one vessel may be used and these may transit the waters of various states and call at different ports before arriving at final port of destination.16

Further adding to the complexity of providing effective maritime security and surveillance within the EU’s maritime domain is the existing multi layered approach to maritime affairs within the EU. There are already a number of different actors and stakeholders who operate both domestically and internationally within the maritime sphere, each with different powers and capabilities. Nonetheless, what acts as a possible unifying catalyst is that each actor and stakeholder is concerned with eliminating illegal activities that threaten at and from the sea. To achieve truly effective capabilities will necessitate a higher level focus on how to improve cooperation between these existing actors and stakeholders. Of necessity this includes the navies, coastguards, customs, police, border police and other security actors engaged in the respective EU member states tasked with delivering maritime security, safety and surveillance. The existing number of available surveillance systems will also need to be reviewed to maximise the leverage that innovation and research can bring to bear to support a more integrated approach to maritime security. This includes the existing EU wide programmes such as the EU Sea Basins Strategies, the Integrated Maritime Policy and Integrated Maritime Surveillance. However, just granting access to these systems alone will not deliver the cooperation required and this must be recognised politically.

Demonstrating the recognition of the importance of effective governance to facilitate the efficient harnessing of the ocean’s wealth, Ireland established as one of its 2013 EU Presidency priorities the necessity to address the potential for innovation, cooperation and collaboration to enhance maritime safety, security and surveillance within the EU.17 In emphasizing the importance of building an EU wide consensus to deliver effective security and surveillance in the maritime domain the Minister for Justice, Equality and Defence, Mr. Alan Shatter, T.D. stated that “in order to achieve these benefits closer cross-sector and cross-border cooperation is required.”18

Following the seismic events of 9/11 and the very realistic fear of an attack at or from the sea, an unprecedented and comprehensive security regime for international shipping entered into force on 1 July 2004. This new security regime was created following the adoption at by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) of a series of measures

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17 Ireland Irish Presidency of the Council of the European Union, accessed at eu2013.ie/.../eupresidency/.../maritimeseminarpresentations/
Minister-speech on 10 April 2013.
18 Opening Address by the Minister for Justice, Equality and Defence, Mr Alan Shatter T.D - Challenges and Opportunities in Maritime Security and Surveillance for Effective Governance and Innovation in the EU's Maritime Domain, Dublin Castle – 8th & 9th April, 2013.
to strengthen maritime security and prevent and suppress acts of terrorism against shipping. The multilaterally agreed code for risk management at ports was implemented as the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS). The ISPS security code applies to passenger ships and cargo ships of 300 gross tonnage and upwards, including high-speed craft, mobile offshore units and port facilities serving such ships engaged on international voyages. This was followed by the conclusion of the 2005 Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA)\(^\text{19}\) which authorises boarding of ships at sea for the suppression of particular terrorist offences and informal partnerships under the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) which focuses on interdicting vessels carrying weapons of mass destruction.

**Recognising the Maritime Picture**

Dáil Éireann voted on 27 September 2011 to allow Ireland to participate in the European Defence Agency (EDA) sponsored Maritime Surveillance (MARSUR) project. The MARSUR project is comprised of 17 EU Member States plus Norway with a shared network enabling the exchange of maritime surveillance information between the participating States. One of the principal aims is to improve the common Recognised Maritime Picture (RMP) by linking up existing maritime networks and systems to allow the exchange of operational maritime data such as vessel tracks, ship position reports and identification data. MARSUR also aims to make it possible to exchange any type of data over the network as it aims to aid the protection of maritime trade, natural resources and safety and security at sea and facilitate Member States in combating illegal activities in the maritime domain. The EDA has recognised the necessity for maritime domain awareness; “it is the sine qua non of maritime security and depends on surveillance and information sharing by the international community.”\(^\text{20}\) Similarly, the EU has accepted that security and safety at sea is critical to the Union both as one of the key global trading blocks dependant on safe and secure sea-lanes for commerce and also in terms of individual nation's internal security. In an attempt to mitigate the risks and challenges it is necessary to have as complete a picture of what is happening at sea as possible, in short, an integrated recognised maritime picture of what is afloat in the maritime domain. Without such surveillance and the intelligence gleaned from accurate analysis it is not possible to fully know what is actually taking place at sea. Equally, without such surveillance and intelligence it will be almost impossible to effectively deploy the ever dwindling requisite capabilities to provide the necessary response to the emerging security and safety threats. The EU Commission is striving towards an integration of maritime surveillance capabilities within the EU and to this end sees the development of a Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE) for the EU maritime domain as optimum solution. In recognising that a number of systems which can be leveraged from already exist, the intent is to enable relevant authorities and their surveillance systems effective methods to exchange their data. This would link authorities such as European Defence Agency Maritime Surveillance (EDA MARSUR), the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) and the European Maritime Safety Agency's (EMSA)

\(^{19}\) Updating the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation which is implemented in Irish Law by the 2004 Maritime Security Act.

‘SafeSeaNet’. The latter is an integrated system of mandatory declarations from merchant ships using their Automatic Identification System (AIS), the signals of which are then picked up by the respective coastal stations. Fishing vessels are tracked through the Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) and the Long Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) system allows all passenger and cargo ships above 300 tonnes within one thousand nautical miles of the European coast to be monitored. While these surveillance systems already exist their ‘Achilles Heel’ is the fact that the Member State respective agencies tasked with fighting threats in the maritime domain do not yet have complete data sharing agreements in place. Integrated maritime surveillance is essentially about providing the respective agencies tasked in maritime surveillance with ways to exchange information and data. The EU recognises that sharing such readily available data will make surveillance cheaper but, more importantly, also make enforcement more effective as a consequence. Currently the EU and respective national authorities responsible for different aspects of surveillance such as border control, maritime safety and security, fisheries control, customs and defence collect such data separately and most commonly do not share this material with each other. As a result, the same data may be collected more than once. CISE aims to make the different systems interoperable so that data and other information can be exchanged easily through the use of modern innovative technologies.

The Atlantic Strategy and Maritime Security

Creating an Action Plan for the Atlantic Strategy was established by the Irish Government as a key focus for the Irish Presidency of the Council of the EU in 2013. The primary focus of the Atlantic Strategy is on the shared environmental and economic issues that impact on the Member States of the Atlantic seaboard. The role of maritime security is recognised as one of the key points of the strategy. The Atlantic Strategy seeks to establish areas for research and investment for the five Atlantic Countries to enable them to mutually deal with common challenges and identify areas for greater collective effort between the ‘Atlantic Five’. The EU and the USA constitute the two major Atlantic economies and between them account for almost half of the world’s GDP and nearly a third of the world’s trade flows. Both trading blocks agreed in June 2011 to mutually recognised standards in order to achieve the twin goals of reducing unnecessary restrictions around trade, while simultaneously building a credible secure environment within which such transatlantic activity could continue. The Atlantic Strategy is already being further enhanced through the development of discussions with the other Atlantic Rim coastal states such as Canada and Iceland. EU Member States have been systematically cutting national defence budgets in response to the ongoing economic slowdown. These cuts are largely unilateral in nature and are uncoordinated at EU level which may potentially weaken the European Security Strategy and consequently diminish the EU’s ability to deal with maritime security challenges. What is required is greater co-ordination at EU level to result in smarter spending to give greater results for each euro spent. The current economic crisis affords an ideal opportunity to implement the ‘pooling and sharing’ concept in EU maritime security capability generation to ensure that the Union remains fully capable of meeting the global security challenges.
MARSUR constitutes one such innovation and through the RMP brings added value to the development of the maritime dimension of the CSDP. The MARSUR project is now seeking to enhance mutual cooperation with other relevant EU projects such as EMSA’s work in maritime surveillance to provide services and support to ongoing CSDP missions in matters of surveillance, patrolling and the collection, analysis and dissemination of relevant satellite acquired information such as utilised in the current, albeit informal, relationship between EMSA and Operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta. NATO is quite explicit in its most recent Maritime Strategy Statement of the roles that the Alliance members may have to engage in within the maritime environment. Included in these roles are maritime security, crisis management, and cooperative security – through partnerships, dialogue and cooperation. A large majority of the EU’s Member States are members of NATO or have PfP status. Each EU Member State and each NATO member has only one navy; accordingly there is a distinct need for greater strategic coordination between the two organisations in the area of maritime security; “neither organisation can afford to engage in a ‘virility contest’ which would lead to the adoption of unrealistically ambitious goals and to unnecessary duplication.” While it is remain expedient that the maritime strategies of both the EU and NATO remain independent; it also worthwhile that they should remain complementary. This will enable the most efficient use of limited assets and recognises the existing operational reality of the co-location of both organisations HQs at Northwood, London. This co-located HQ and comprehensive approach has underpinned the success of Operation EUNAVFOR ATALANTA, the Union’s first maritime mission. It also represents a significant step in the contribution to protect international shipping, crews and cargo and secure trade routes.

Curing ‘Sea Blindness’
The lack of visibility and the common misunderstanding of maritime affairs by non mariners, often referred to as ‘sea blindness’, has regrettably created a skewed balance of security investment between the land and sea domains. The emergence of transnational maritime terrorism allied to the resurgence of piracy internationally has resulted in a departure from any notion that the high seas can remain largely ungoverned space. Effective governance must be underpinned by mutual sharing of surveillance data and coordinated enforcement by the different assets and maritime capabilities available to the EU. The EU Maritime Security Strategy seeks to ensure stability and security by collectively addressing the threats. This is based on the concept that the European maritime area represents a common capital asset in relation to the resources, security and ultimately prosperity of the respective Member States. There is a strategic recognition of the need to avoid ‘stove piping’ where different authorities tasked in the maritime sphere with border control, fisheries, marine pollution response, maritime safety and security of ships and ports and the prevention of illegal acts at sea harness surveillance data but retain such operational information solely within their respective sector. While there is recognition of the necessity for each sector to collect such operational data, there is a greater recognition of the need for each sector to mutually benefit from such information. While innovative methods of allowing such data to be shared are developing apace, the major potential impediment that...
to acquiring the effectiveness sought will be the natural human reluctance to exchange such data. Legal or other technical arguments are too often invoked as reasons not to share such data between the various responsible sectors, particularly where there is no tangible benefit to the donating sector or mandatory legal compulsion required of them. This only can be tackled by sustained political will and by also changing the culture to encourage mutual support of the various actors within the global maritime domain. The EU Commission is already evaluating suitable pilot projects in the Mediterranean Sea\(^{29}\) and in the Baltic and North Seas\(^{30}\) as part of the EU Action Plan to implement the Integrated Maritime Policy of the European Union.\(^{31}\) It is anticipated that the Atlantic Strategy will also receive similar Commission approval. The Integrated Maritime Policy is premised on three supporting pillars; governance, surveillance and knowledge. The development of a Maritime Security Strategy presents an ideal opportunity to provide more coherence within the myriad of existing EU surveillance systems but also greater clarity. Maritime surveillance underpins security and the EU and Ireland recognise the vital role of the sea in facilitating the current globalised market, trade and supply links. There is a need to build on the latter day awareness of the complex and internationally interconnected interests, challenges and threats faced at sea and in the littoral areas that impact directly on Member States and EU's security. This increasing awareness must accept that the challenges and threats dissect traditional boundaries of maritime transport, trade, justice and defence. Such a plethora of EU maritime needs and activities requires a holistic comprehensive approach. This is particularly relevant when one considers the ‘sea blindness’ that has resulted in a EU Security Strategy, which mentions piracy as the sole threat to the maritime domain, and the Integrated Maritime Picture which, somewhat bizarrely, failed to mention maritime security.

Ireland deliberately chose Maritime Security and Surveillance as one of its key EU Presidency priorities.\(^{32}\) This is a marked step forward for a nation that had previously suffered from ‘sea blindness’ and represents an increased awareness of the potential offered to the State by its maritime domain. The recent success of the continental shelf claims made by the State under the provisions of UNCLOS brings benefits but also the ensuing responsibilities of protecting this invaluable capital asset. Faced with a significant economic deficit Ireland now recognises the significant cost and efficiency benefit that enhanced mutual interoperability and co-operation between the respective stakeholders can bring in the sphere of maritime security and surveillance. The political will now appears evident within the EU to foster greater ‘pooling and sharing’ of the relevant surveillance systems; whether they are civilian and/or military based and the need to engage on national, regional and international levels. In developing closer integrated maritime surveillance and security than heretofore there is also recognition of the need to build on innovation and research which may come from outside of the traditional security stakeholders. Innovation and research are critical to the success of maritime security and surveillance and must be supported and encouraged. The “Blue Economy” has the potential to provide Ireland with

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\(^{29}\) BLUEMASSMED Project aimed at increasing the cooperation for maritime surveillance in the Mediterranean Sea and its Atlantic Approaches involving France, Spain, Italy, Malta and Greece.
\(^{30}\) MARSUNO Project consists of 24 authorities from 10 countries adjacent to the Baltic and North Sea.
\(^{32}\) Opening Address by the Minister for Justice, Equality and Defence, Mr Alan Shatter T.D - Challenges and Opportunities in Maritime Security and Surveillance for Effective Governance and Innovation in the EU’s Maritime Domain, Dublin Castle – 8th & 9th April, 2013.
invaluable employment in the associated sectors such as security provision, research and innovation, the offshore energy and renewable energy sectors, and in the pharmaceutical and biomedical spheres. The unique nature of the sea as an open environment means that any security or safety threats cannot be dealt with by individual Member States acting alone. Rather there is a need for the combined efforts of all Member States and the plethora of respective State actors acting in concert. As bespoke previously uniquely military surveillance and communications systems become more costly, the convergence of civil and military technologies has led to greater availability of capacity for surveillance as commercial off the shelf innovation continues in the area. It is now more economically prudent to leverage the advantages from such technology to build on existing systems for a more proactive approach to control of navigation at sea in the interests of safety and security at sea. This will require political will to enable the strategic benefit to materialise. While there is now recognition that the security and consequential governance of the interconnected activities at sea must be addressed strategically; it must also be accepted that failure to do so will result in any vulnerability becoming open for exploitation.
The Irish OSCE Chairmanship and the Aftermath of the 2008 War in Georgia

ABSTRACT

Ireland's 2012 Chairmanship of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) required it to pay close attention to several protracted conflicts in the OSCE area. Hitherto considered “frozen conflicts”, the 2008 war, involving combat between the regular armies of Russia and Georgia, showed in the case of the disputes between Georgia and its separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia how such conflicts have the potential, not only to “unfreeze”, but also to escalate. The role of the OSCE Chairmanship in such cases is constrained by the organisation’s consensus-based decision-making, but this in its own way can be a strength, in that the organisation can be perceived as an honest broker and its proposals better received by the parties.

The 2012 issue of the Defence Forces Review contained an outline of the work of the 2012 Irish Chairmanship of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on the “protracted conflicts” in the area covered by the organisation’s membership, and concentrated on the Transdniestrian settlement process.1 The present article will address the other major focus of this work, the South Caucasus, and in particular activities in the framework of the Geneva International Discussions, established after the 2008 war in Georgia.

Background

The present article does not set out to give a detailed history of the situation which existed on the ground at the beginning of the Irish OSCE Chairmanship in 2012, which has been written about extensively elsewhere.2 It may be useful nonetheless to provide some brief background. The dying years of the Soviet Union, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, saw an upsurge in nationalism throughout the former USSR, including in the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) and its ethnically-based autonomous parts, the Abkhaz Autonomous SSR and the South Ossetian Autonomous Region, which sought to break away from the control of Tbilisi.

Armed conflicts in both regions in the early 1990s, which caused considerable death, destruction and displacement, led to Moscow-brokered ceasefire agreements which


left both regions largely under the control of de facto separatist authorities in Sukhumi and Tskhinvali respectively (though parts of each remained under the control of Tbilisi), with the presence in each of the conflict zones of Russian troops with a peacekeeping mandate – in Abkhazia and on both sides of the Inguri river, dividing it from the rest of Georgia, as a peacekeeping force from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and in the South Ossetian conflict zone as part of a tripartite force consisting of a battalion each from the Russian Federation, Georgia and the North Ossetian Republic of the Russian Federation, under Russian overall command.

A UN observer mission\(^3\) was deployed to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire and separation of forces agreement in the Abkhazia zone of conflict, while the OSCE Mission to Georgia,\(^4\) established in 1992, conducted military monitoring activities in the South Ossetia zone of conflict, as well as participating as an observer in the Joint Control Commission (JCC) which supervised the peacekeeping operation, and conducting other conflict-relevant activities as part of its wider mandate in the politico-military, economic and environmental, and human dimensions of security.

The period following the coming to power of a new, avowedly western-oriented Georgian government, explicitly focussed on NATO and EU integration, under President Mikheil Saakashvili, who was inaugurated on 25 January 2004, saw a progressive deterioration of relations between Tbilisi and Moscow in particular, as well as of Tbilisi’s relations, such as they were, with Tskhinvali and Sukhumi. The arrest by Georgia in autumn 2006 of four alleged Russian spies brought about the cutting by Russia of air, postal, banking and other communications between the two countries, as well as the targeting for inspection of Georgian businesses in Moscow and the expulsion of some hundreds of Georgians from Russia. The Western-backed unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo in February 2008 caused Russian commentators to question whether the same principle should not also apply to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. At the NATO Bucharest Summit in April 2008, the organisation failed to grant Georgia a “Membership Action Plan” but promised that Georgia would become a member.\(^5\) This was alluded to by then Russian President Medvedev in November 2011, when he hinted that the 2008 war was conducted to prevent Georgia becoming a member of NATO.\(^6\)

### 2008 War and Immediate Aftermath

The Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (IIFFMCG), which was established by the European Union in late 2008 and headed by Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini, has researched in detail the various events which led to the outbreak of hostilities in early August 2008, and the conduct of those involved.\(^7\) The report details a series of incidents around the ceasefire lines from Spring 2008 onwards, involving activities of manned and unmanned aircraft and exchanges of fire. Tensions were already high by the beginning of August.

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7 The report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia is available at www.ceig.ch.
In brief, following an attack by Georgian forces on the South Ossetian capital Tskhinvali late on 7 August, Russian troops (who according to the Georgians had already crossed the border) drove them out of South Ossetia and advanced on Tbilisi, taking control of the main east-west highway, and at the same time, from Abkhazia, overran much of the west of the country. Russian forces took control of the Akhalgori valley and other parts of South Ossetia mostly inhabited by ethnic Georgians and previously under Tbilisi’s control, and helped Abkhazian forces to take control of the upper Kodori valley, the only part of Abkhazia not previously controlled by Sukhumi.

As the result of a visit to Moscow and Tbilisi on 12 August by French President Nicolas Sarkozy (France then holding the Presidency of the European Union), agreement was reached on six points, as follows:

1. Not to resort to force;
2. To end hostilities definitively;
3. To provide free access for humanitarian aid;
4. Georgian military forces will have to withdraw to their usual bases;
5. Russian military forces will have to withdraw to the lines held prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Pending an international mechanism, Russian peace-keeping forces will implement additional security measures;
6. Opening of international talks on the security and stability arrangements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.8

Controversy persists over the nature of the agreement and the parties to it, with Tbilisi portraying it as a ceasefire agreement between Georgia and Russia, and Moscow considering it a joint proposal by Medvedev and Sarkozy to the leaders of Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.9 Controversy also exists regarding the last point, with Russia insisting that Medvedev's agreement with Sarkozy was to refer to the security and stability “of” Abkhazia and South Ossetia rather than “in” Abkhazia and South Ossetia.10

On 26 August 2008, Russian President Medvedev signed decrees recognising Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent States. Russia subsequently established diplomatic relations with these entities, signed treaties on friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance, and separate agreements on defence cooperation and border protection. As a result of these “new realities”, Russia’s position is that it has complied fully with the terms of the 12 August agreement by withdrawing its troops from the areas adjacent to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and that the presence, on foot of bilateral treaties, of Russian troops within these entities, which it has since recognised as sovereign States, is not a breach of the agreement.

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9 See IIFFMC report, Volume III, pp. 589-592.

A further document, dated 8 September and known as the “Implementing measures for the Plan of 12 August 2008” provided inter alia that the international mechanisms to be deployed in the zones adjacent to Abkhazia and South Ossetia would include at least 200 observers from the EU, that these would be deployed by 1 October at the latest, and that Russian forces would be withdrawn from the zones adjacent to Abkhazia and South Ossetia within ten days of this deployment.

The Council of the European Union established the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia) on 15 September 2008. EUMM deployment took place rapidly, and it was operational by 1 October as envisaged. The withdrawal of Russian forces from the areas adjacent to Abkhazia and South Ossetia took place in advance of the 10 October deadline, apart from one village, Perevi, where the presence of a Russian post remained under dispute for some two years, until it was eventually withdrawn in October 2010. Ireland initially seconded four personnel to EUMM.

The Geneva International Discussions began on 15 October 2008, co-chaired by the EU, the OSCE and the UN, with participation from Moscow, Tbilisi, Washington, Sukhumi and Tskhinvali. By the beginning of the Irish Chairmanship of the OSCE, eighteen rounds of the Geneva Discussions had taken place and they had settled into an established pattern, taking place in two working groups, one on security and stability and the other on humanitarian issues, with participants attending nominally in their personal capacities in order to avoid the thorny issue of recognition.

The first, and at the time of writing the only, concrete agreement reached in the Geneva Discussions was at the fourth round, in February 2009, on the establishment of “Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms” (IPRM), one in each of the two theatres. The aim of these mechanisms is;

- to ensure a timely and adequate response to the security situation, including incidents and their investigation, security of vital installations and infrastructure, responding to criminal activities, ensuring effective delivery of humanitarian aid, and any other issues which could affect stability and security, with a particular focus on incident prevention and response.

The first IPRM meeting took place on 23 April 2009 in Ergneti, on the South Ossetian administrative boundary line close to Tskhinvali. Meetings of this IPRM have taken place in Ergneti and another village, Dvani. Meetings are co-facilitated by the EUMM and the OSCE. The other IPRM, of which the first meeting took place on 14 July 2009, meets in the town of Gali, in Abkhazia, and is chaired by the UN. Since their establishment, the IPRM meetings have dealt with such issues as conduct of security

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15 As far as Tskhinvali is concerned, the administrative boundary of the former South Ossetian Autonomous Region of the Georgian SSR is now the State border of the Republic of South Ossetia. In the official view of Tbilisi, this line does not exist, as the former South Ossetian Autonomous Region was abolished as a territorial division in post-Soviet Georgia. Nonetheless, Tbilisi recognises the line de facto for practical purposes, and international actors refer to it as the administrative boundary line (ABL).
personnel on both sides of the ABL, detentions of civilians and animals, flights of aircraft (manned and unmanned), advance notice of the conduct of military exercises, freedom of movement, including for the conduct of agricultural work, missing persons, detention conditions, demining etc.

In December 2008 and June 2009 respectively, the Russian Federation withheld its agreement in the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna and the UN Security Council in New York to the extension of the mandates of the OSCE Mission to Georgia and UNOMIG, with the result that both of these missions were forced to close. The result of these closures, and of the expiry on 30 June 2009 of the mandate of the twenty additional OSCE military observers authorised in August 2008, was the end of any international presence with a monitoring mandate in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. EUMM conducts patrols on the Tbilisi-administered side of the ABLs only, and has not been granted access to Abkhazia or South Ossetia apart from attending IPRM meetings in Gali and a few other exceptional cases. Visual observation or recording by EUMM personnel of activities within the breakaway entities from the Tbilisi-administered side of the ABL attracts regular complaints at IPRM meetings, from the South Ossetian participants in particular.

The period since the 2008 war has seen considerable investment by the Russian Federation in constructing military bases and border guard facilities in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Each contains a military base forming part of the Russian Federation’s Southern Military District. On 19 November 2008, the Chief of the General Staff, General Nikolai Makarov, announced that both bases had been fully staffed, with 3,700 personnel in each. In addition to the two military bases, both Abkhazia and South Ossetia host a large number of smaller bases of the Russian Federal Security Service’s Border Guards Directorate. Some 19 border guard bases are located in South Ossetia.

**Ireland’s OSCE Chairmanship**

Ireland’s approach to the protracted conflicts was founded on a realistic understanding of our limited capacity to influence the positions of the main actors, and on the experience of conflict on our own island, which showed that conflict resolution is a process requiring time and patience, and a desire on the part of all concerned to achieve a solution.

While Ireland is located at the opposite end of Europe from Georgia, and does not have an Embassy in Tbilisi, the OSCE Chairmanship was far from being the first Irish involvement with the issues concerned. As well as the paying of attention to the issues by the accredited Irish Embassies, in Moscow and later in Sofia, Ireland had over the years provided several staff members of the OSCE Mission to Georgia, these being mostly serving Defence Forces officers who acted inter alia as Military Adviser, Deputy Head of the Border Monitoring Operation\(^{18}\) and manager of the 2005-2006 Training Operation.*

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17 Article Четыре года на границе югоосетинских рубежей (Four years guarding the South Ossetian border), South Ossetian information agency RES, 30 April 2013 (in Russian) accessed at: http://cominf.org/node/1168497783.
18 This operation, which lasted from 1999 to December 2004, was tasked to observe and report all movements on the ground or in the air over a mandated stretch of border between Georgia and the Russian Federation. At full expansion of the Operation, that stretch was 280 km bordering the Russian Federation’s Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia.
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Assistance Programme for the Georgian Border Police. Irish people had also served in contracted positions in the OSCE Mission HQ. An Irishman, Denis Corboy, served as Head of the European Commission Delegation in Tbilisi from 1994 to 1999, and other Irish people had also worked in the EC Delegation as well as for various UN and other international presences. Ireland’s EU Presidency in 2004 had coincided with political change in Georgia. Foreign Minister Brian Cowen had attended the inauguration of President Saakashvili on 25 January 2004 as President of the Council of the European Union, and had meetings with Saakashvili as well as with Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania, Speaker of Parliament Nino Burjanadze and his Russian and US counterparts Igor Ivanov and Colin Powell. Foreign Minister Micheál Martin visited Georgia in November 2008. At the beginning of Ireland’s OSCE Chairmanship, there were five Irish staff in EUMM, four in the headquarters and the other being the Deputy Head of one of the Mission’s three field offices, in Mtskheta.

In preparation for the Irish Chairmanship of the OSCE, the Tánaiste (Deputy Prime Minister) and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Eamon Gilmore, appointed Pádraig Murphy, a retired Irish Ambassador, as his Special Representative for the South Caucasus. In addition to other duties relating to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Murphy, a Russian-speaker and former Ambassador to the Soviet Union, would serve as the OSCE Co-Chair of the Geneva Discussions, and co-facilitate the Ergneti/Dvani IPRM on behalf of the OSCE.

The situation at the beginning of the year was not entirely a propitious one. South Ossetia was in political turmoil following the invalidation of a “presidential election” held in November, which the Moscow-backed candidate had lost. The political scene in Tbilisi was also embroiled in controversy, following the announcement by billionaire businessman Bidzina Ivanishvili of his intention to mount a challenge to the ruling United National Movement at parliamentary elections due in October 2012, and his subsequently being stripped of his Georgian citizenship. The situation in the Geneva Discussions was little better, with participants at loggerheads over the issue of commitment to the non-use of force, and participants from Sukhumi and Tskhinvali refusing to address issues relating to internally displaced persons and refugees in protest at the presentation by Georgia of a resolution on the matter at the United Nations General Assembly. The situation on the ground, however, was somewhat more positive, with the release by Tbilisi and Tskhinvali of some 26 detainees, arranged via the IPRM, having taken place just before the New Year.\(^\text{19}\)

Rescheduled “presidential elections” in South Ossetia resulted in the election of Leonid Tibilov, a veteran security official who had not been a candidate in the invalidated election. Tibilov set about trying to unite South Ossetian political society by offering government positions both to his runner-up, David Sanakoev, and to the de facto winner of the December election, Alla Jioeva. The Co-Chairs of the Geneva Discussions had a first meeting with Tibilov on 7 May.

A minor, if quite practical achievement in early April was the first meeting of a “technical working group” under the Ergneti/Dvani IPRM, intended to examine situations on the ground where people residing close to the ABL had difficulty gaining access to agricultural land to carry out work, or other similar problems. The meeting took place on 6 April in the village of Kveshi and reached agreement that Kveshi residents would be allowed to work in a pocket of land close to the ABL without interference by Russian border guards or South Ossetian law enforcement personnel, and that residents of a neighbouring village located on South Ossetian territory would be allowed to use a road running beside this pocket, through Tbilisi-administered territory, to access other parts of South Ossetia, without interference by Georgian law enforcement personnel. Unfortunately, it did not prove possible, for a number of reasons, to organise any further meetings of this working group during 2012.

Unhappiness on the part of Sukhumi with the perceived lack of seriousness with which EUMM approached security incidents taking place in the Gali district of Abkhazia, and offence taken at remarks by the Head of EUMM, Andrzej Tyszkiewicz, on the matter at the 28-29 March round of the Geneva Discussions, prompted Sukhumi to declare Tyszkiewicz persona non grata just before the 36th meeting of the Gali IPRM, planned for 24 April. This step, and the refusal of the Georgian and EU participants to attend IPRM meetings unless Tyszkiewicz was allowed to attend, led to a prolonged suspension of the Gali IPRM which continued at the time of writing (May 2013) and was likely to be ended only by the replacement of Tyszkiewicz at the end of his term of office in Summer 2013. The UN Chair of the Gali IPRM endeavoured to fill the gap left by the absence of meetings by engaging in regular contacts with all participants and encouraging the use of the hotline as required, as well as working to find a solution to the impasse.

The fate of people who remain missing after an armed conflict is a basic humanitarian concern, which is of interest to families on all sides and important for reconciliation. The Irish Chairmanship sought to draw on experience of conflict on the island of Ireland in this regard. As well as raising the issue in bilateral contacts, at IPRM meetings and in the Geneva Discussions, the Irish Chairmanship organised an information session for participants in the October round of the Geneva Discussions, with the participation of two experts from the Independent Commission for the Location of Victims’ Remains. The presentation by the experts on their work to locate the remains of victims of the Northern Ireland conflict was received with great interest and was the subject of follow-up contacts. The Irish Chairmanship also funded a project overseen by the International Committee of the Red Cross, which sought to identify the remains of several casualties of the 2008 war. The project, at the time of writing, had resulted in the successful identification of three individuals, whose remains had been passed to their families for burial.

As part of its efforts to bring the experience of conflict resolution on the island of Ireland to the attention of OSCE participating States, the Irish Chairmanship organised a conference in Dublin on 28 April 2012. This conference, which was chaired by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, featured insights from veteran peace mediator Senator

21 Information on the work of the Commission is available on its website: http://www.iclvr.ie/.
George Mitchell, who played a key role in the negotiations which led to the 1998 Good Friday agreement, the Northern Ireland First Minister Peter Robinson and Deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness, and others.22

The Irish Chairmanship also offered to organise a visit for the participants of Working Group II (humanitarian issues) of the Geneva Discussions to Dublin, Belfast and Derry, along the lines of a visit successfully organised for the participants of the two sides in the Transdniestrian settlement process. This visit would have focused on issues such as identity, preservation of cultural heritage, language, history and education. Unfortunately, it did not prove possible to secure the agreement of all participants to take up this offer.

The Irish Chairmanship continued work begun by its predecessors on a number of practical issues aimed at improving the living conditions of the civilian population affected by the conflict. This included a number of projects related to safety and supply of irrigation and drinking water, and the question of the supply of gas from Tbilisi-administered territory to the Akhalgorgi valley, which was under Tbilisi’s control until 2008. Work on the water projects benefited from the dedicated and professional work of the OSCE Secretariat’s regional desk and a number of engineers from Vienna, Tbilisi and Tskhinvali. The contribution of the Irish Chairmanship was mainly in helping to overcome inertia in the EU (at the time the main source of funding for the projects) and OSCE bureaucracies – Ireland’s position as an EU Member State was useful in the former case.

At the request of some of the participants, the Co-Chairs organised an information session on the concept of occupation in the margins of the 20th round of the Geneva Discussions in early June. Predictably enough, perhaps, participants from Tbilisi on one hand, and from Sukhumi, Tskhinvali and Moscow on the other, all claimed afterwards that the presentations by international experts had confirmed the correctness of their respective positions on whether or not Abkhazia and South Ossetia were under Russian occupation.

The Tánaiste visited the capitals of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in his capacity as OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in mid-June. In Tbilisi, he stressed the importance of the Geneva Discussions as “the only way forward” and noted that the OSCE was working to help improve the lives of people affected by the 2008 conflict and wanted to do more.23

The month of July was distinguished by two ad hoc IPRM meetings held in the village of Zardiantkari, located close to South Ossetian ABL on the Georgian side. The village has a mixed Georgian-Ossetian population. The Tskhinvali authorities claimed that, following the relocation of a Georgian police post from the edge of the village into its centre, the Ossetian population took fright and fled across the ABL, and were afraid to return to their homes. Discussion at these two meetings and on other occasions revealed dispute as to the facts of the case. The Georgian authorities undertook to reassure the local population but refused to move the post back to its former location.

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22 For information on the conference Shared Future: Building and Sustaining Peace, the Northern Ireland case study, including the texts of statements delivered there, see http://www.osce.org/event/buildingpeace2012.
The month of September, the height of the Georgian parliamentary election campaign, saw heightened tension along the South Ossetian ABL, with large-scale military movements, including of heavy weaponry, on the South Ossetian side. EUMM proved its worth in documenting these movements as well as confirming that there were no movements on the Tbilisi-administered side which could serve as justification for them. Following the raising of concerns at these developments by the Co-Chairs with the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, as well as over the IPRM hotline, the troops and equipment were withdrawn. The South Ossetian representative explained at the next IPRM meeting that these deployments were security measures taken in connection with the celebration of the South Ossetian “Republic Day” on 20 September, the anniversary of its declaration of independence in 1990.

The hotly-contested Georgian parliamentary election on 1 October saw comments made, both before and after polling day, by some representatives of the victorious “Georgian Dream” coalition about improvement of relations with Sukhumi and Tskhinvali, which the reality of being in government, and especially in cohabitation with Saakashvili, whose term as President would not expire until October 2013, soon showed were not likely to be capable of realisation in the short term. Sukhumi and Tskhinvali, encouraged by these apparent openings, began to demand changes to the format of the Geneva Discussions, to which it became clear Tbilisi was not in a position to agree. This background, together with changes of personnel on the Georgian side, made the last couple of rounds of the Geneva Discussions during 2012 rather difficult, though work proceeded more or less constructively at expert level on a draft declaration on non-use of force.

At the OSCE Ministerial Council in Dublin in December, the Irish Chairmanship explored the possibility of agreement, primarily between the Georgian and Russian delegations, on a joint statement on the Geneva Discussions which could be adopted by the Foreign Ministers of all participating States of the OSCE. As previously, however, agreement did not prove within reach, due to fundamentally differing views on several of the issues involved.

Conclusion
The new Georgian government elected in October 2012 has been trying to improve relations with Russia, but has made it clear that this will not be at the expense of its position of principle regarding its territorial integrity. The Russian authorities have been equally clear to the rather worried Sukhumi and Tskhinvali that any improvement of relations with Georgia would not affect Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The Geneva Discussions have, as mentioned, produced little in the way of concrete achievements. However, it is worth bearing in mind that they were not established as

a conflict resolution mechanism in the sense of determining the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (indeed, in August 2008 Georgian President Saakashvili deleted from the draft six-point plan a provision that the talks would deal with status)\textsuperscript{27}, but rather as a forum to discuss questions of security and stability, and humanitarian issues – it could hardly be otherwise, given the fundamental differences of view which exist, and are not likely to change any time soon, regarding the status question. It is also worth noting that the talks in Geneva, as well as the related IPRM meetings (which have had considerably more of a concrete impact), have a value in bringing together people from different sides who would not otherwise meet, and that discussions on the margins can be as useful as, and often more so than, those in the formal meeting.

At the same time, it is undoubtedly the case that, while the talks in Geneva continue, the de facto separation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from the rest of Georgia is being consolidated, with the erection of more and more fences and other “border” infrastructure, the closure of the South Ossetian ABL (apart from the Akhalgori valley, medical emergencies and a few other special cases), the putting in place of further infrastructural links to Russia etc. The situation around the boundary lines is generally calm, and the justification for maintaining EUMM at its current strength (265 international staff as at 10 January 2013) is no longer very apparent, but Georgia, supported by certain EU Member States, can be expected to oppose any reduction, which would give an impression of normalisation of the situation. The fact that the 8 September 2008 implementing measures provide for at least 200 EU monitors is also a relevant consideration.

Despite their limited concrete achievements, the Geneva Discussions will no doubt continue for as long as the participants see value in them. This is currently the case: for Tbilisi they are an opportunity to show that there is an unresolved conflict, for Abkhazia and South Ossetia the talks are their only chance to appear on the international stage, and for Russia they help to keep things calm on the ground and provide a mechanism to resolve any tensions, something which is of particular interest in the perspective of the Winter Olympics in Sochi in February 2014.


ABSTRACT
Ireland’s Presidency of the Council of the European Union from January to June 2013 provided an opportunity for Ireland to demonstrate support for the development of the Common Security & Defence Policy (CSDP). Under the Treaty of Lisbon, European Security and Defence Policy has been renamed the CSDP, whilst at a deeper level it also introduced additional instruments which may facilitate the Union to pool its resources and strengthen peace and security beyond its borders. The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy now conducts the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy assisted by the European External Action Service. In the area of CSDP, the role of the Presidency of the Council of the European Union is now limited to supporting the High Representative and the European External Action Service. In this context, Ireland has utilised the Presidency as an opportunity to influence the development of the CSDP agenda. The first six months of 2013, during the Irish Presidency, have been largely focused on providing tangible progress to enable significant development of CSDP through consensus at the European Council at the end of 2013. Important decisions on Europe’s military capabilities are expected from the December 2013 European Council.

Introduction
The coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009 brought about the renaming of European Security and Defence Policy to what is now called the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). At a deeper level the Treaty also introduced additional instruments to facilitate the Union, in the context of the current economic and financial crisis, to pool its resources and strengthen peace and security beyond its borders. The crisis and its implications for national defence budgets may be seen as an opportunity to develop European military capabilities and the CSDP. Under the Lisbon Treaty, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Baroness Catherine Ashton, now conducts the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy assisted by the European External Action Service. The EU CSDP forms an integral part of the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In the area of CSDP, the role of the
Presidency of the Council of the European Union¹ is now limited to supporting the High Representative and the European External Action Service. This article will respond to the question posed in the 2012 Defence Force Review; “Does Ireland have an agenda for an EU specific defence and security policy...?”², and outlines how Ireland has utilised the Presidency as an opportunity to influence the development of the CSDP agenda.

The European Council³ meeting at the end of 2012 under the chairmanship of President Van Rompuy, recognised the requirement for significant work to be done in the area of security and defence to ensure that CSDP was relevant, responsive and sufficiently resourced to respond to various challenges. It identified the changing international context which together with the evolving financial crisis demanded development within the CSDP. Various tasks have been set, with the requirement to provide a focused response for the European Council meeting at the end of 2013. Important decisions on Europe’s military capabilities are expected from the December 2013 European Council. The first six months of 2013, during the Irish Presidency, have been largely focused on moving toward and providing tangible progress to enable significant development of CSDP through consensus at the European Council at the end of this year.

**European Council 2013**

Important decisions on European military capabilities are anticipated from the December 2013 European Council. The agenda for that meeting is broad and likely to encompass; Pooling & Sharing of military capabilities, improvement in the working procedures and institutions for crisis management, and an increased focus on the role of the European defence industry. The European Council is the highest political body of the European Union, and at the instigation of its President, may also recognise the need to discuss the political dimension of European defence. The 2003 European Security Strategy, although ground-breaking at the time of its publication, could be currently described as inadequate and in need of revision.

At the December 2012 European Council meeting, where the agenda for the December 2013 European Council meeting was set, it was agreed to:

> note that in today’s changing world the European Union is called upon to assume increased responsibilities in the maintenance of international peace and security in order to guarantee the security of its citizens and the promotion of its interests.⁴

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¹ Also informally known as the EU Council, this is where national ministers from each EU country meet to adopt laws and coordinate policies. At each Council meeting, each country sends the minister for the policy being discussed – e.g. the defence minister for the meeting dealing with security and defence matters. That meeting will then be known as the “Defence Council”. The foreign ministers Council has a permanent chairperson – the EU High Representative for foreign and security policy. All other Council meetings are chaired by the relevant minister of the country holding the rotating EU Presidency.


³ The European Council defines the general political direction and priorities of the European Union. With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009, it became an institution. Its President is Herman Van Rompuy. The European Council consists of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States, together with its President and the President of the Commission. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy takes part in its work.

The conclusions highlighted the need to enhance the development of defence capabilities by:

- identifying current redundancies and capabilities shortfalls and prioritising future requirements for European civilian and military capabilities;
- facilitating a more systematic and longer term European defence cooperation, including through “pooling and sharing” of military capabilities; and in this regard, systematically considering cooperation from the outset in national defence planning by Member States;
- facilitating synergies between bilateral, sub-regional, European and multilateral initiatives, including the EU’s “pooling and sharing” and NATO’s “smart defence”5

Many believe that the European Council in 2013 may assert that Member States, as an integrated economy with a distinctive social model, do indeed share vital interests, despite differences in the focus of national foreign policies and threat perceptions. The regions and situations in which their vital interests are most directly threatened by the potential use of force must be recognised as the priority focus for the European military strategy. The responsibilities that the European Union assumes as a security provider outside their own territory, include crisis management (evacuation, support for humanitarian relief, military assistance and training, peacekeeping and peace enforcement), prevention and deterrence. Throughout this range of options it is recognised that the military will always be one dimension of a comprehensive approach aiming at a clear political end-state. Three areas of European vital interests and priority responsibilities have been proposed: assuring peace and security in Europe’s broader neighbourhood, contributing to global maritime security and contributing to the collective security system of the United Nations.

The future of CSDP is not solely focused on the capacity of the Europeans to work together, but almost as crucially on their ability to work together with others. Conditions established through global interdependence highlight the effectiveness of multilateral cooperation in the United Nations framework, which remains the source of unquestionable legitimacy for interventions. This will probably be even more the case in the future, as the UN is once again the preferred framework for emerging powers to contribute to international peace.

The European Security Strategy states that:

We are committed to upholding and developing International Law. The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority.6

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5 Ibid.
The European Union and the individual Member States have a responsibility to contribute to the UN collective security system. Concentration and consistency of effort from the EU may provide a meaningful contribution to meet the emerging requirements of the UN.\(^7\)

In his speech entitled Defence in Europe: Pragmatically Forward, presented at the annual conference of the European Defence Agency (EDA) on 21 March 2013, President Van Rompuy expressed his main concern as “the state of defence in Europe” and not the Common Security and Defence Policy. He stated:

> I am well aware of all the constraints, but the fact is that as long as we duplicate as much as we do today, it will be very difficult to maintain the best standards for our armies. Military experts are telling us we will not be able to maintain key military assets under current trends. In the end, to guarantee our ability to defend ourselves effectively, something needs to change.\(^8\)

Although not previously stated clearly by such a high level official, the message was that the total armed forces of all Member States must be taken into account when considering the future. The military capabilities debate cannot be limited to some theoretically separable part of the armed forces available to the CSDP only. Similarly, the strategic debate that should drive capability development cannot be limited to some aspects likely to be acted upon through the CSDP. The challenge is to define overall priorities for the use of the military instrument, as it will function in the vital interests and the foreign policy of the EU and its Member States alike.

If the European Council reaches agreement on strategic priorities, Sven Biscop proposes that it can translate these priorities into a level of ambition, which will serve as political guidance for defence planning and capability development at the European and national level.\(^9\) The current European level of ambition for expeditionary operations, as agreed in the 1999 Headline Goal, is to deploy up to an army corps or 60,000 troops, within two months, and sustain it for at least one year. There is a requirement to establish a level of ambition which would be realistic, both with regard to threats to Europe’s interests, and to political, economic and military realities. Based on a definition of interests, priority responsibilities, and capability objectives, the European Council may be able to decide on a number of specific tasks to be progressed over the following year.

**European Military Capabilities 2013-2025**

In the context of preparations for the European Council, the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) requested the European Union Institute of Strategic Studies (EUISS) to provide a report to inform the debate. That wide ranging report is entitled: Enabling the future – European military capabilities 2013-2025: challenges and avenues.\(^10\)

\(^7\) An interesting development in the UN approach to conflict was seen in the 28 March 2013 UN Security Council Resolution 2098, extending the mandate of the UN Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo, which also provided for the creation of a 3,000-strong ‘Force Intervention Brigade’, with a mandate to carry out ‘targeted offensive operations’ against rebel groups in the country’s resource-rich east.


The report highlights that whereas the European Union is endowed with capable and effective armed forces, within the EU there is limited awareness or recognition of the emerging challenges, a basic disinterest in strategic matters, and few calling for effective and sustainable armed forces. Furthermore, the European political and institutional landscape regarding defence and military matters is extremely fragmented. Due to the wide spectrum of operations, decreasing defence budgets and modest deployability levels, the existing EU military capabilities are increasingly stretched, raising concerns about the sustainability of both current and future commitments. The report outlines that there are various factors at play in considering the future of CSDP, and that whereas many factors have some military implication; none has an exclusively military dimension. It identifies that:

a mixture of acute budgetary pressures, lack of investment in research and development, and widespread reluctance to make the maintenance of effective armed forces a political priority could cause additional reductions in EU military capacity as well as a potential exodus of the defence industry and a loss of technological leadership. Demilitarisation and deindustrialisation risk going hand-in-hand.11

The report proposes that the problems are likely to be worsened by current trends, including the rise of new regional powers and players. It highlights the need to identify and define the common ‘strategic interests’ of the Union, which will determine what sort of armed forces Europeans are likely to need by 2025.

In order to enhance EU military capabilities, this Report identifies five avenues, which should be understood as cumulative (and not necessarily mutually exclusive) sets of solutions.

**Avenue 1** – Implementing **consolidation** to generate military efficiency. This suggests a coordinated reduction of redundant and obsolete capabilities to generate immediate and future savings. In order to facilitate this task, member states may consider asking the EEAS and its specialised bodies to undertake, in close cooperation with the EDA, a targeted EU Military Review.

**Avenue 2** – Favouring **optimisation** to boost military effectiveness. With respect to equipment, the EU member states could devise a framework whereby armed forces cooperate across service lines for the development of future capabilities. A second solution would be introducing a new procurement concept – ‘total life-cycle EU-wide management’ – for new military capabilities.

**Avenue 3** – Promoting **innovation** to enhance military technology. Innovation is not only a source of efficiency and effectiveness, but also of technological advancement. This option proposes some tailored solutions to promote innovation, which also include borrowing ideas from funding schemes.

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11 Ibid.
originally adopted by NATO or proposed by the European Commission in other policy areas.

**Avenue 4** – Framing and reinforcing **regionalisation** to bolster operational width and depth. Targeted (bilateral or multi-lateral) integration could lead to pay-offs in the maintenance and acquisition of a wider spectrum – and, to some extent, greater depth – of military forces.

**Avenue 5** – Moving towards **integration** to further increase depth and elevate sustainability. Bringing together the armed forces of member states under an EU-wide force structure would enable Europeans to vastly boost their logistical capacity and undertake the most demanding operations that any future security environment may necessitate. This may require establishing a new ‘family’ of targeted Headline Goals for 2025 and synchronising national armament programmes and procurement cycles.

Recognising concerns about the possible loss of national sovereignty that managing and developing military capabilities together may entail, the Report argues that Europeans are already losing sovereignty by not consolidating, not optimising, not innovating, not regionalising and not integrating their military capabilities. It proposes that without joint developments, there would be a loss of ‘strategic autonomy’.

As the EUISS Report highlights, the discussion on the scope of European military capabilities cannot really be dealt with in isolation. In looking to 2025 and beyond, the report identifies that the spectrum of policy challenges and issues with which it is connected demands a common, systematic, comprehensive and regular assessment of ends, ways and means. This in turn requires political impetus from the highest possible level, as well as continuity over time.

**Ireland’s Role in the Presidency**

Since the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) now conducts the Union’s CFSP assisted by the European External Action Service (EEAS). In the area of CSDP, the role of the Presidency is now limited to supporting the HR and the EEAS. Within this context, Ireland has used the Presidency as an opportunity to influence the development of the CSDP agenda.

As part of Ireland’s Presidency of the European Council 2013, the Minister for Defence prioritised a number of areas to progress during our Presidency. These priorities included:

1. Contributing to the preparations for the European Council in December 2013, which will include a thematic discussion on security and defence and military capabilities.

2. Continued development of the Common Security and Defence Policy.
3. Addressing the impact of the Financial Crisis on Defence, (including progressing the opportunities for Pooling and Sharing).

4. Enhancing EU/UN Relations;

5. Developing EU cooperation in the area of Maritime Security and Surveillance;

6. Support for Jobs, Growth and Innovation through focusing on the role of Small and Medium Enterprise in fostering innovation in the security sector.

In relation to progress made during the Presidency, the key event of the Presidency was the Informal meeting of Defence Ministers held in Dublin Castle in February. The Secretary General of NATO, Mr. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, on his first formal visit to Ireland, attended the meeting. So too, for the first time, did the United Nations – represented by the Under-Secretary General in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Mr. Herve Ladsous. A range of issues were discussed including the upcoming European Council on Defence, Mali, the Horn of Africa and Partnerships between the EU and the United Nations.

Three very successful CSDP seminars have also been held in Ireland. The first seminar was on the topic of Regional Organisations Co-Operation with the United Nations in the area of Crisis Management, Peace Support and Peace Enforcement Operations. The second seminar dealt with the issue of Maritime Security and Surveillance. The final seminar focused on the defence issues for consideration at the European Council meeting later in 2013. The outcomes from all these seminars have been very positive and they have stimulated debate in these areas at EU and institutional levels. In summary, the priorities have centred on how Ireland and the Union as a whole can contribute to the enhancement of the EU CSDP, a critical component of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, which is central to the achievement of Ireland’s foreign policy objectives.

A further meeting took place in Dublin Castle during the Presidency, which saw the Minister for Justice, Equality and Defence, Alan Shatter, T.D., receive the Inter-Parliamentary Conference for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy. This was the second meeting of the Conference which operates in accordance with Article 10 of Protocol No.1 to the Lisbon Treaty on the role of national parliaments in the European Union12. Also the Political and Security Committee and the European Union Military Committee both held informal meetings in Ireland during the Presidency and visited the Defence Forces Training Centre for a briefing and demonstration on military capabilities.13

12 A conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs may submit any contribution it deems appropriate for the attention of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission. It may also organise interparliamentary conferences on specific topics, in particular to debate matters of common foreign and security policy, including common security and defence policy. Interparliamentary scrutiny of the CFSP: avenues for the future, EUISS Occasional Paper 94, October 2011.

13 In order to enable the European Union fully to assume its responsibilities for crisis management, the European Council (Nice, December 2000) decided to establish permanent political and military structures. The Political and Security Committee (PSC) meets at the ambassadorial level as a preparatory body for the Council of the EU. Its main functions are keeping track of the international situation, and helping to define policies within the CFSP including the CSDP. It prepares a coherent EU response to a crisis and exercises its political control and strategic direction. The European Union Military Committee (EUMC) is the highest military body set up within the Council. It is composed of the Chiefs of Defence of the Member States, who are regularly represented by their permanent military representatives, permanently based in Brussels. The EUMC provides the PSC with advice and recommendations on all military matters within the EU.
Conclusion
The coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009 brought about significant potential in the area of CSDP. The financial crisis and its implications for national defence budgets may be seen as an opportunity to develop European military capabilities and the credibility of CSDP itself. Although the role of the Presidency is now limited to supporting the High Representative and the European External Action Service, Ireland has utilised the Presidency as an opportunity to influence the development of the CSDP agenda.

Ireland continues to make a meaningful contribution on a daily basis through its participation in Missions and Operations, including EU Training Mission Somalia where it has maintained a key leadership role. Furthermore in the Brussels context, Ireland contributes in a practical sense to the evolution of the policies and concepts through the regular meetings of the Political and Security Committee and the European Union Military Committee.

The European Council meeting at the end of 2013 will see important decisions reached on Europe’s military capabilities. The various levels of debate and discussion in the CSDP framework during 2013 will have played a significant part in shaping those decisions. Having completed its functions, Ireland handed over the Presidency for the last six months of 2013 to Lithuania¹⁴, during which preparations for the European Council meeting were completed. Developed throughout the period of 2013, the formal conclusions from that meeting will set the agenda for CSDP in the next decade.

¹⁴ Ireland, Lithuania and Greece constitute the ‘Trio’ Presidency of the Council of the European Union. The Trio Presidency was established in 2007, following a Decision by the European Council, according to which the Union’s Member States are divided in groups of three consecutive rotating Presidencies of the Council of the EU, which form the Trio. The aim of the Trio is to achieve continuity and consistency in the work of the Council of the EU, and also to allow the three Member States, to achieve greater cooperation and exchange of expertise.
COMDT RONAN CORCORAN

‘Ready for Battle’ – The EU Battle Group as EU Force Projection

ABSTRACT
This article draws on the author’s experience as a staff officer at the HQ of EU BattleGroup (BG) 2012/II and outlines the background to the EU BG Concept and Irish participation since its inception in 2004. There follows an insider account of the force generation and predeployment training conducted for EU BG 2012/II. The paper concludes with an analysis of the future potential for the BG concept and suggests that despite criticism for the failure to deploy an EU BG to date there are substantial advantages in persisting with this flexible European rapid reaction capability.

‘There is going to be a debate in the European Parliament about the Battlegroups because, to use the rugby term or the scrum term, ‘use it or lose it!’’

Brig Gen Liam MacNamee

Introduction - Background
This paper details the strategic process of the creation of the European Union Battlegroup (EUBG) and the operational process of EUBG 2012/II to prepare it to stand-by for deployment.

It concludes by proposing that although the EU BGs have yet to deploy in anger, the concept is still a valid one for developing EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

The Battlegroup Concept consists of highly trained, battalion-size formations (1,500 soldiers each) – including all combat and service support as well as deployability and sustainability assets. These should be available within 15 days notice and sustainable for at least 30 days (extendable to 120 days by rotation). They should be flexible enough to promptly undertake operations in distant crises areas (i.e. failing states), under, but not exclusively, a UN mandate, and to conduct combat missions in an extremely hostile environment (mountains, desert, jungle, etc). As such, they should prepare the ground for larger, more traditional peacekeeping forces, ideally provided by the UN or the Member States.1

It was inevitable, given Ireland’s longstanding commitment to the development of the EU and to multi-lateral peacekeeping operations, that the Irish Defence Forces (DF)

would be welcome contributors to the EUBG. The DF has been engaged continuously in Peace Support Operations (PSOs) since the first contingent of Irish Observers went to Lebanon in 1958.\(^2\) In the intervening years the DF has kept in step with developing internationally held concepts of peace operations. It is widely accepted that there has been a development of four generations of peace operations, from the initial use of military observers to monitor a cease-fire through the second, interposition between sides in a conflict, through the third, multi-dimensional complex operations to the fourth, in which the UN itself provides governance to a state in transition.\(^3\) Within peace operations, military operations are collectively termed Peace Support Operations (PSOs).

The global optimism for peace at the breaking of the new millennium in 2000 was understandable. The Cold War had ended, inter-state warfare was declining and the world economy was booming. Europe had yet to feel threatened by Islamist terrorism. However, the preceding decade had witnessed a sharp increase in intra-state conflict, and PSOs, free from the constraints imposed by the Cold War, were increasing in number and ambition. Ireland, in keeping with its traditional policy of supporting multi-lateral approaches to global security embrace these new developments through participation in PSOs under UN, OSCE, NATO/PFP and EU auspices. In the space of nine months three key papers were written which were to have significant influence on DF PSO strategy.

In December 1999 the European Council Summit, held in Helsinki, had stated that the EU would prepare to provide joint combined forces of ‘up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 persons)... Member States should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and within this to provide smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness’\(^4\). As Gustav Lindstrom writes ‘These and similar statements would serve as the political underpinning to the future battlegroups’\(^5\).

In Ireland, Defence policy was renewed by the February 2000 ‘White Paper on Defence’ which stated that government policy is to enable the Defence Forces ‘To demonstrate Ireland’s commitment to European security by having a suitable range of military capabilities that can be used to make appropriate contributions to regional security missions authorised by the UN.’\(^6\)

The third significant paper was the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, published in August 2000. Commonly called the Brahimi Report, after Lakhdar Brahimi, the chair of the committee which wrote it, it detailed a number of recommendations which the then United Nations Secretary General (UNSG), Mr. Kofi Annan, deemed ‘essential to make the United Nations truly credible as a force for peace.’\(^7\) It was enthusiastically received by most member nations, and resulted in improvements in the field of peacekeeping.

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\(^4\) European Council Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki, 10-11 December 1999 29.
Operational demands on DF increased significantly, according to then Deputy Chief of Staff (Support) and subsequently Chief of Staff, Lt Gen James Sreenan DSM;

By the end of 2003 the Defence Forces were involved in a very new situation in that we had an Infantry Group in Kosovo under the command of a Finnish Battalion, while in Liberia we had a battalion group Quick Reaction Force preparing to take a Swedish Company under our command... The new arrangements reflect the move towards interoperability among EU nations and may well be built upon in the context of the proposed EU Rapid Response Battle Group arrangements.8

In 2003 both the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) deployed their first regional peacekeepers to Burundi and Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) respectively. The EU PSO was facilitated by the strategic crisis-management co-operation between EU and NATO developed in the Berlin-plus bilateral agreement of December 2002 and welcomed in UN Security Council Resolution UNSCR 1371. Earlier attempts at a UNSC mandate authorising a PSO had been vetoed by China, who were aggrieved at FYROM's diplomatic engagement with Taiwan.9

Ireland and Denmark were the lone EU states who did not contribute to the first EU military PSO. 14 non-EU states did. According to the then Minister for Defence, Mr. Michael Smith TD, 'The Attorney General advised the Government that the UN endorsement did not satisfy the requirement, as laid out in the Defence Acts, that the UN must establish or authorise the establishment of the EU-led force.'10

When UNSG requested EU to deploy a PSO to the Democratic Republic of Congo later the same year, UNSCR 1484 gave the DF the required authority to deploy personnel to the OHQ and FHQ.11 The PSO, called Operation Artemis, took six weeks to move from a Crisis Management concept to ‘boots on the ground’. The experience ‘gave EU policymakers confidence that the EU could execute rapid response missions via framework nations.’12

The Battle Group Concept
In February 2004 a UK/France/Germany ‘food for thought’ paper outlined the Battle-Group concept. For Nicole Gnesotto, director of the EU Institute for Security Studies, 2004 was a time for Europe to reconcile its political differences over the US-led invasion of Iraq the previous year.13 The paper ‘proposed that the EU should aim to build upon the precedent set by Operation ARTEMIS in the DRC by developing a number of battle-group size forces available to undertake autonomous operations at short notice, principally in response to requests from the UN. These forces should be capable of operating under a Chapter VII mandate.’ Chapter VII of the UN Charter ‘authorizes the Security Council to take necessary action to maintain or restore international peace and security (Article 42). Activities include low-level military operations to protect the delivery of humanitarian

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assistance, the enforcement of cease-fires, using force to persuade parties to settle the conflict by negotiation, forceful implementation of the terms of comprehensive peace agreements, and assistance in the rebuilding of so-called failed states.\textsuperscript{14} Specifically, the paper provided the following ‘Outline Battle-Group Concept’;

- Coherent, credible battle-group size force packages (around 1,500 troops strong) including appropriate supporting elements (Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) together with necessary strategic lift, sustainability, and debarkation (APOP, SPOD) capability.
- Designed specifically (but not exclusively) to be used in response to a request from the UN and capable of participating in an autonomous operation under a Chapter VII mandate.
- Appropriate for, but not limited to, use in failed or failing states (of which most are in Africa).
- Capable of deploying within 15 days to respond to a crisis.\textsuperscript{15}

Significantly for smaller EU member-states ‘unable to contribute a full BG alone’, such as Ireland, ‘Multinational solutions will have to demonstrate a high degree of interoperability and will be required, as a matter of routine, to train and operate together. Ultimately military effectiveness should be the overriding criteria.’\textsuperscript{16}

At a Military Capability Commitment Conference in November 2004 initial pledges of manning were made. Contributions to the Battlegroups was not confined to EU forces - any member of NATO was welcome.

Initial Operational Capacity was declared in January 2005, and for the next two years a Battlegroup was continuously on standby. In January 2007 this became two Battlegroups, and Full Operational Capacity was declared. The following year, Ireland contributed an Explosive Ordnance Disposal/Improvised Explosive Device Disposal (EOD/IEDD) component with its own security element to the Nordic Battlegroup (NBG) 2007.\textsuperscript{17} NBG 2007 was manned by troops from Estonia, Finland and Norway (which, while not an EU member, is a member of NATO). The EOD/IEDD component was based in Ireland, while twelve personnel were stationed in OHQ and FHQ in Sweden. A similar arrangement again occurred when the DF served with NBG in 2011. On this occasion an ISTAR Company was provided by 1 Southern Brigade. Thirteen DF personnel were posted to NBG HQ, Sweden. While this ISTAR Company were on standby for deployment, another was being created by 2 Eastern Brigade, for service with EUBG 2012/II. One officer was posted to FHQ in Germany. EUBG 2012/II was the third DF EUBG deployment, the second DF deployment of an ISTAR Company and the first DF deployment as part of a German EUBG.

\textsuperscript{17} Defence Forces Annual Report 2008, Dublin, DFHQ, p. 41.
Germany has been an enthusiastic supporter of the BG concept since its conception. According to Major and Mölling ‘The goals behind the creation of the Battlegroups - ensuring the operational capability and transformation of armed forces - correspond to Germany's security interests.’\(^{18}\) The then commander of Bundeswehr’s Response Forces Operations Command (RFOC), Generalleutnant (Lieutenant General) Markus Bentler, was appointed as Operation Commander, and RFOC became the location for the operational planning of the force.

**EUBG 2012/II – Force Generation and Training**

EUBG 2012/II was composed of personnel from Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Germany, Ireland and Macedonia. The infantry battalion was composed of troops from 23 Infantry Brigade of the German Bundeswehr, the logistics battalion by troops of the Austrian Bundesheer and the ISTAR Company by DF personnel. The EUBG was to plan and prepare for actual deployment, and this preparation was to be confirmed through an EUBG HQ exercise, scheduled to take place over two weeks in late May / early June in Wildflecken, an old US Cold War training ground. On certification for their readiness to deploy, the EUBG assumed a stand-by posture, and for the second half of 2012 would be prepared.

On deployment, OHQ was to be provided in Potsdam, with the majority of the FHQ staff deploying from RFOC, located in Ulm, Baden-Württemberg. During the planning and stand-by phases this arrangement was proven to be of major assistance to EUBG 2012/II, for, though the FHQ was accorded Combined Joint (CJ) status, the very considerable abilities of the permanent staff of RFOC provided a highly collaborative situation. Unlike the ISTAR Company, whose personnel were posted to that unit, the Bundeswehr members of EUBG 2012/II were not uniquely focussed on EUBG, and conducted EUBG matters along with other demands. Many personnel were concurrently preparing to deploy to ISAF on completion of the stand-by phase. Throughout the lead-in and stand-by phases the FHQ was manned by staff officers of RFOC. The Deputy Chief of Staff Operations (DCOS Ops) Brigadegeneral (Brigadier General) Frank Leidenberger was designated as Force Commander.

Brigadier General Leidenberger assembled his headquarters in Ulm in November 2011 for Key Leader Training. Pearson Peacekeeping Centre (PPC), of Canada, were contracted to provide an exercise scenario for the EUBG to use with J7 RFOC in the planning and conduct of a Command Post Exercise, Exercise European Endeavour 2012, which would be used to certify the EUBG as prepared for deployment immediately prior to their entering the stand-by phase. The scenario provided was set in a politically fictional but geographically actual area located in the Nova Scotia / Prince Edward Island/New Brunswick region of Eastern Canada, and involved a complexity of crises and actors. The scenario included state security services and secessionists, smugglers and traffickers, religious and ethnic divisions, nationalists and diaspora, resources and history. It was a complex scenario, and throughout the planning and execution of the exercise Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) and external agencies such as police and media were also included.

Using the NATO Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive (COPD), a full Operational Planning Process (OPP) was conducted throughout January 2012. ISAF had already used COPD in their updating of the Operation Plan (OPLAN) to support flood relief in Pakistan,\(^\text{19}\) and it was strongly believed that it would benefit EUBG’s own OPP. Unclassified, the COPD was intended for use by EU, PfP and ISAF so that it can be used ‘to provide common understanding, principles and approach to operations planning and training.’\(^\text{20}\)

During the OPP DF supplied a LEGAD and an operation planner to FHQ. Their assistance was beneficial, as both had Senior Command and Staff Course training in operational planning and good PSO field experience, which provided a practicality which informed decision making and was appreciated by the Force Commander, himself an experienced ISAF commander, having served as Commander DEU CON and Commander of Regional Command North (RC N). Likewise, the Operation Commander had previous PSO command experience, having been COM KFOR immediately prior to taking up command of RFOC. Throughout OPP the FC expected to remain fully briefed of developments and assessments in order to make reasoned decisions. This was done at the daily Joint Operation Planning Group (JOPG) brief.

EUBG 2012/II used a software system used during OPP called ‘Tools for Operational Planning Functional Area Service’ (TOPFAS). Designed specifically for NATO Operational Planning, TOPFAS permits all planners access to an integrated system of analysis, assessment and planning via a networked LAN system. It permits a large HQ to quickly record and find information needed for their particular functional planning. This information was readily exportable to PowerPoint and Word applications, allowing for a comprehensive Daily Decision Brief to the commander. In addition to the Operation Planning Tool (OPT), the System Analysis Tool (SAT) allowed analysts to break down the substantial amount of information provided by PPC/J7 in Exercise Country Information Packs, identify systems and rank elements in terms of their centrality or influence within those systems.

Following the OPP liaison with PPC continued, as gaps in the information available were identified and PPC/J7 tasked with supplying or creating the information. The Comprehensive Picture of the Operation Environment (CPOE) was developed accordingly; the OPLAN was developed to ensure that all staff procedures were specified and beneficial. Real-life developments were monitored by J2 RFOC, who kept EUBG briefed on several situations within the 6,000 km radius of Brussels to which the BG might be deployed. During this period, the civil-war in Syria, elections in Egypt and conflicts in Libya, Mali and Somalia were all of major concern.

Throughout this development phase there was a requirement for clear liaison between the geographically dispersed EUBG, with troops in several different European states. The Force Commander regarded it as important to meet with as many of the soldiers who would, on deployment, be under his operational command. Therefore, a visit to Ireland

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\(^\text{20}\) Ibid.
was deemed a priority. Brigadier General Leidenberger visited ISTAR Company, Eastern Brigade HQ and DFHQ in March, and returned to Ulm with a solid impression of the Irish capabilities, experience and professionalism. This visit was immediately followed by further Battle Staff Training, which took the form of OPLAN analysis, the product of which was a determination of what information was required for a Joint Coordination Order (JCO).

Immediately prior to the FHQ certification exercise (CERTEX) European Endeavour 2012 the ACOS and DACOS of CJ2 visited 2 ISTAR Company on the ground in TISK (Kilworth), where their own CERTEX was conducted. Exercise European Endeavour, a two week exercise, was run in Wildflecken, North Bavaria. The purpose was to certify the FHQ as fit for purpose; and it allowed the entire FHQ to collectively exercise in a high tempo scenario. RFOC can supply both a containerised FHQ for sustained operations and an air-deployable tented FHQ for initial deployment. With about 170 workstations, this tented option was used for Exercise European Endeavour 2012. Exercise Control (EXCON) was kept as realistic as possible, and manned not only by PPC but by troops of the 23 Mountain Brigade and officers of ISTAR Coy.

The exercise also permitted the staff to meet with the new Force Commander. Brigadegeneral Leidenberger had been posted to Berlin, and the new DCOS Ops and hence Force Commander designate of EUBG 2012/II was Flottillenadmiral Markus Krause-Traudes. Flottillenadmiral Krause-Traudes had already been heavily involved as J7 in the conduct of Exercise European Endeavour 2008.

Following his takeover of RFOC responsibilities, his stated priority was to meet as soon as possible with the ISTAR Company. In September a visit was conducted, with the Force Commander highly impressed by the display of OPs and M-UAV flights put on at Gormanston Camp. As he had done earlier in Cathal Brugha Barracks, the Force Commander spoke to every soldier present, and notably climbed under every vehicle bonnet possible.

A Concept Under Attack – EU BGs and the Future
Despite a long process of planning, multinational force generation and a comprehensive equipping and training process EUBG 2012 II, like all its predecessors did not deploy operationally. This fact typically forms the basis for criticism of the EU BG concept put succinctly in the question; “If it never deploys – why bother?” What is the point in continuing to spend money on a project that is politically sensitive and potentially merely duplicates NATO capability?

According to Major and Mölling ‘The reasons why the Battlegroups have not yet been deployed result broadly from the different positions taken by member states regarding the role of the EU in international crisis management, their different strategic goals, and their stances on the use of force in general. These differences present fundamental barriers to arriving at the unanimous decision required for military operations.’21 ‘The difficulty is

the political willingness to use the Battlegroups’, according to Brigadier General Stefan Andersson, Commander of NBG 11. The development of a separate force (EUFOR) for a PSO in Chad was an indication of the difficulty of reaching political consensus on the use of BGs. Brigadier General Liam MacNamee was, as Military Representative of the Permanent Representation of Ireland to the EU, involved in the development from the start, and states; ‘there was a large debate as to whether the Nordic Battlegroup would be committed to it’. According to MacNamee ‘Some of the other member states were not happy the Battlegroup even was being contemplated to fulfil this role because they don’t see it as a Battlegroup function, the Battlegroup is a fire brigade essentially to fill the gap for a short term period of 120 days of so.’ This frustrated Andersson, then planning for NBG 11.

This is very difficult decision because you have to have consensus...

They have to review the political willingness if they are going to use the battlegroups... When General Nash was standing in Brussels a couple of months ago and saying ‘I need units, resources, to Chad’. And suddenly the whole of Europe was empty. I mean, in the next room they were talking “Okay now it’s the Northern Battle Group with fully operational capability. Why can’t we use that one?”

This is not a difficulty that is likely to be overcome in the near future. According to Flamini, ‘European nations are increasingly cautious about committing forces to non-self defense missions.’

Notwithstanding the historical lack of commitment to deploy, this paper posits that the EU BG concept has an important purpose and can play an important role in future European security requirements. Currently the BG concept is the only form for an EU institutional response that involves military capability to support EU CSDP initiatives. As much as political flexibility is important – necessary even, the continued use of ad hoc operations such as the EU Mission to Tchad, may prove unsatisfactory as they run the risk of being characterized as operations launched to defend the interests of specific member states rather than the EU as a whole. As the EU CSDP continues to deploy missions across the broad spectrum of its capabilities – civilian and military, the military contributions continue to evolve. It is not entirely improbable that the success of discrete training missions, such as EUTMs Somalia and Mali, will create the conditions for more ambitious military deployments including the EU BG.

In the interim the BG concept is providing the building block for high end military cooperation and interoperability amongst member states. It provides a focus for training, equipment and force generation with discrete levels of ambition relevant to member state requirements. The DF has now acquired a niche ISTAR capability, through continuous training over the various BG commitments which will continue to benefit the personnel...

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22 In interview with the author, 2008.
23 In interview with the author, 2008.
24 In interview with the author, 2008.
and the organisation in future PSOs conducted under the auspices of either the EU, which the Green Paper on Defence provides as a parameter for future Irish Defence planning, or the UN.

The financial constraints in the European Defence sector identified by Major and Molling persist and pooling and sharing amongst EU partners is becoming a necessity rather than a luxury. The BG concept offers an excellent model for sharing both military capability and the cost burden associated with military rapid reaction. It also offers a solution regarding access to higher end military capability that remains beyond the reach of smaller states.

The BG concept has also been criticized as duplicating NATO capability. However the EU continues to offer a more comprehensive array of conflict resolution tools than NATO, which remains, primarily a military organisation. The EU, therefore has a more flexible tool at its disposal and can operate with less ‘baggage’ than NATO of whom many ‘Cold War Warriors’ remain suspicious and unwilling to support.

Finally, the purpose of any military organisation is to be ready to respond to the requirements of political authority. The historical political reluctance to commit/deploy the Battlegroups may not persist. The regional and global environments are dynamic and highly volatile and may provide imperatives for EU military action. The Battlegroups provide a highly flexible and refined military tool for EU policy makers which offers the possibility of value for money rapid military reaction. As with UN mandated operations such a military action, being a collective one can claim greater legitimacy than any unilateral state intervention. Given the relatively modest commitments involved in terms of personnel and budget, it would be foolish to discard the concept without detailed consideration.

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27 Op Cit.
28 Major and Mölling, op cit.
Knowledge Management in Defence

ABSTRACT
Knowledge management in the military has traditionally been carried out by the incorporation of knowledge gained over many years into training and doctrine. Nonetheless, a great deal of knowledge is still learned and transferred in the field, often in quite informal ways, and specialised expertise and insights are frequently lost when experienced personnel leave or are killed in action. This paper examines the emerging trends for knowledge exchange, and explores ways in which technology can be used to facilitate knowledge capture and knowledge transfer, particularly with regard to peacekeeping. It presents the findings of a recent study of over 150 defence personnel from twenty different nations and organisations, including all brigades and formations of the Irish Defence Forces. A number of recommendations are made to improve the implementation of Information and Communications Technology (ICT) enabled information and knowledge management initiatives in defence.

Introduction
The concept of a transition in the military from traditional soldier to ‘knowledge worker’ is well underway. Information and Knowledge are a military member’s primary resource, regardless of rank. A US Marine Corps General introduced the idea of the ‘strategic corporal’ in 1999, and since then the concept has gained widespread academic and military recognition.1 Militaries have always valued information, but they are increasingly recognising that information, and more specifically, knowledge, is indeed power.2 The capture of knowledge, both explicit and tacit, is a challenge for most organisations, but even more so for the military and defence sector. There exists an inherent conflict between allowing information and knowledge to flow freely within the organisation, and the need to keep certain information secure; this is particularly acute in the armed forces where the correct dissemination methods in a closed information environment need careful design.3 A balance must be found between ease of use and a high level of security and information assurance.

Over the last ten years the Irish Defence Forces have embraced the need for continuing change as part of its culture. They have gone through a major evolution and today are a highly professional, modernised, lean organisation with an establishment of 9,500 personnel serving at home and abroad. Ireland has a long and proud tradition of peacekeeping having contributed to nineteen international missions in recent years.

These engagements have resulted in a large body of knowledge about how to conduct peace keeping operations in what are often extremely volatile and sometimes hostile environments. It is this need to retain corporate knowledge that motivated this research.

This research therefore set out to address the question of how Information and Communications Technology (ICT) can support information and knowledge management in defence. The objectives included understanding the current status of information and knowledge management in the Irish Defence Forces, the particular barriers to information and knowledge sharing and the possibilities for using information systems in facilitating the capture and dissemination of information and knowledge.

**Data, Information and Knowledge**

To understand the process of managing information and knowledge requires an understanding of the building blocks of data, information and knowledge. Although some authors use data, information and knowledge interchangeably, it is generally accepted that in any accurate study of the discipline it is important to differentiate between them. This is easy to do with data and information but less so with knowledge.

**Data** is most the easily understood of the four, it is perhaps best described as a set of discrete objective facts about events which are of little use by themselves, unless converted into information. Examples of data are numerical quantities or other attributes derived from observation, experiment, or calculation. Cost, speed and time are examples of quantitative data.

Peter Drucker defined **information** as data that was endowed with relevance and purpose. He contends that information has meaning; for example a collection of data and associated explanations, interpretations, and other textual material concerning a particular object, event, or process have meaning in relation to that object, event, or process. Data becomes information when its creator adds meaning and we transform data into information by adding value in various ways;

- Contextualising;
- Categorising;
- Calculating;
- Correcting;
- Condensing

**Knowledge** is considerably more difficult to define. While considerable debate exists over a definition, there is a consensus amongst scholars that knowledge is broader, deeper and richer than information or data. As some epistemologists spend their lives trying to understand what exactly it is to know something, it is not the place of this paper to propose new definitions, merely to examine some well established ones and try to select a definition that best encapsulates the concept for use in the military context. Nonaka and

Takeuchi propose that knowledge, unlike information, is about beliefs and commitment,\(^7\) while Rumizen proposes that knowledge is data put into context to produce actionable understanding.\(^8\) This is a well informed, concise definition of knowledge, and given the author's previous experience in the defence/military sphere, is arguably a good definition for the purpose of this research. Perhaps Davenport and Prusack's definition also suits this purpose;

Knowledge is a fluid mix of framed experience, values, contextual information, and expert insight that provides a framework for evaluating and incorporating new experiences and information. It originates and is applied in the mind of knowers. In organisations, it often becomes embedded not only in documents or repositories but also in the organisational routines, processes, practises and norms.\(^9\)

It is with this concept; that knowledge can be captured for the good of the organisation, coupled with Rumizen’s concept of knowledge set out above and illustrated in Figure 1 that we can proceed to explore the best possible practises for capturing this knowledge in a military/defence environment.

![Figure 1- Relations between Data, Information and Knowledge.](image)

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9 Op cit, p. 5.
The Origins of Information and Knowledge Management

Unlike the evolution of the definition of knowledge which began with the ancient Greeks, knowledge management’s emergence as a recognised discipline began much later. Sometimes referred to as the founding father of knowledge management, Karl Erik Sveiby was one of the first to write about the measurement of ‘intangible assets’ and other aspects of ‘intellectual capital’, even then, the strong ties with information management were evident. However, even Sveiby himself is not happy with the term knowledge management, preferring “knowledge focus” or “knowledge creation”. Rumizen treats knowledge management more as a systematic process and states that it is by this process that knowledge needed for an organisation to succeed is created, captured, shared and leveraged. So the business world view knowledge management as a systemic process or a management function or process, but what view does the military take? The US Army argue that; “knowledge management is a discipline that promotes an integrated approach to identifying, retrieving, evaluating, and sharing an enterprise’s tacit and explicit knowledge assets to meet mission objectives.”

There is some debate as to whether ‘management’ is the correct term to be used in relation to knowledge. Sveiby prefers to talk about ‘knowledge focus’ or ‘knowledge creation’. While NATO has a definition of knowledge management in the Bi-Strategic Command Directive 25-1 that states; “NATO knowledge management is a multi-disciplined approach to achieving organisational objectives by making the best use of information, expertise, insights and best practises,” the organisation tries to avoid the term ‘management’ and instead refers to the “knowledge centric organization” and “knowledge development.” In a later publication NATO goes on to state that: “Knowledge is the new ammunition. It is a commodity we are constantly collecting, integrating, exploiting and sharing. Regardless of whether you are an operator, staff officer, Subject Matter Expert or General, we are all knowledge managers in the business of transforming information to best serve our needs.”

Information Management Processes

Information management is a much more widely recognised discipline, NATO defines Information Management as; “a discipline that directs and supports the handling of information throughout its life-cycle ensuring it becomes the right information in the right form and of adequate quality to satisfy the demands of an organisation.” NATO IM, illustrated in Figure 2, is organised on a four stage cycle with storage and protection resting at the core. The four stages are;

1. Collection, Creation & Generation
2. Organization
3. Retrieval, Use, Accessibility and Transmission
4. Disposition.

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11 Op cit.
12 US Army Knowledge Management Principles 2010
14 Ibid.
In chapter two of *Information Management for the intelligent organisation* Chun Wei Choo presents a process model for Information Management. The model traces six key information processes that form a continuous regenerative loop. These processes consist of:

- Identifying information needs
- Acquiring information
- Organising and storing information
- Developing information products and services
- Distributing information
- Using information

What is clear from the study of both disciplines is the intrinsic link between information and knowledge management. Any approach should attempt to address both in a holistic way. As Choo correctly points out, information management is frequently equated with the management of IT, the management of information resources, or the management of information policies and standards. He argues that what is needed is a unifying perspective that binds all of these functions together. Choo calls for the recognition that information, knowledge and insight are formed by human beings and accordingly, they are best leveraged through a network of processes that acquire, create, organise, distribute and use this information.

17 Ibid.
Knowledge Management Processes

It is widely accepted that tacit and explicit knowledge are very different. Explicit knowledge is easily codified and made available throughout the organisation, but unfortunately, by far the largest body of knowledge in any organisation is tacit. The frequently used iceberg model explains this quite well, whereby tacit knowledge represents the unseen part of the iceberg; the habits, intuition, assumptions and skills that are so difficult to codify.

Unlike Schultze and Stabell\(^\text{19}\) who ask if the use of tacit knowledge as well as explicit knowledge is a key feature of knowledge management, Nonaka and Takeuchi suggest that organisational knowledge creation occurs through a continuous process where knowledge is converted from tacit to explicit.

This is by far the most well documented methodology and model for knowledge management, sometimes referred to as the SECI (Socialization, Externalization, Combination, Internalisation) Model.

![SECI Model for Knowledge Creation](image)

**FIGURE 3- The SECI Model for Knowledge Creation\(^{20}\)**

**Socialisation** deals with the transfer of knowledge from tacit to tacit and is closely linked with/facilitated by:

- Teamwork
- Sharing experiences
- Informal communication
- Open workplace without barriers

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20 As presented by Lt Cdr Chris Blodgett (CAN) at the 2010 NIMAG, NATO HQ
**Externalisation** deals with the transfer of knowledge from tacit to explicit. Recording information makes it understandable, interpretable and repeatable; otherwise knowledge is lost when employees leave the organisation. Examples of externalisation include:

- Writing notes
- Brainstorming
- Encouraging a learning environment

**Combination** deals with the transfer of knowledge from explicit to explicit, it involves the following actions when dealing with information or data;

- Categorising
- Storing
- Sorting
- Updating

**Internalisation** deals with the transfer of knowledge from explicit to tacit. Understanding explicit information transforms it to tacit and it becomes part of an individual’s information. Issues relating to internalisation are;

- Practising and repetition
- Experience and expertise
- Creates “know-how”

Simply put; knowledge management deals with how best to leverage knowledge internally and externally, but perhaps what is needed in the modern environment is recognition that one can never fully manage knowledge, one can only transfer it.\(^{21}\) The focus should therefore be on managing knowledge transfer frameworks and facilities. Liebowitz and Megbolugbe present a useful breakdown of some knowledge management methodologies shown in table 1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IKM Solution</th>
<th>Complexity of Use</th>
<th>Difficulty of Development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequent get-togethers to exchange tacit knowledge (i.e. knowledge fairs, brown bag lunches, inter-department seminars)</td>
<td>Low – trying to maximise tacit-tacit knowledge exchanges</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chat rooms, bulletin boards, list servs, online communities, communities of practise, communities of interest, tech clubs, etc. – on the organisation’s intranet</td>
<td>Low – maximising tacit knowledge exchanges in a virtual context</td>
<td>Low</td>
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There are many examples of these knowledge management approaches proving highly successful, not only in the introductory phase, but also over extended periods of time.23

The importance of information and knowledge in the modern military environment is well described by McIntyre, Gauvin and Waruszynski.24 The exponential growth in the number of sensors and inputs on the battlefield or humanitarian relief environment means that filtering through this Clausewitzian ‘fog’ of information, to satisfy the Commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR) is fast becoming an almost impossible task. The difficulty lies not in getting the information to the decision-maker, but first in ensuring compatibility and then in the processing of that information, transforming it from data to information and from information to actionable knowledge.

It is important to understand how this information transformed within the military. One means is by staff officers adding their own knowledge, wisdom and insight during the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) before it reaches the commander.25 McIntyre et al describe how Choo’s 2002 model of the ‘knowing cycle’ when combined with the Nonaka and Takeuchi model of knowledge creation is reminiscent of the military command and control OODA loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act) in which information and then knowledge are transformed into action.26 The US Army’s Centre for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) is often cited as one of the pioneering institutions in relation to knowledge management; the NATO Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) is another

| Table 1 – Sample Knowledge Management solutions.22 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corporate portal for accessing expertise locator systems and used as entry to the organisation’s web site</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Low to medium</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Codifying knowledge and information into knowledge repositories, best practices/lessons learned databases, etc.</td>
<td>Low to medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capturing knowledge and decision making processes via expert systems, intelligent agents, video streaming technologies, etc.</td>
<td>Low to Medium</td>
<td>Medium to high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Using intelligent agents to actively build user profiles and push appropriate lessons learned and material to the respective user</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium to high</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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22 Ibid.
23 Rumizen, op cit & Davenport, op cit.
26 McIntyre et al, op cit.
such institution. Yet despite this head-start on the business world, what in business terms might be called a ‘first mover advantage’, a divide still exists between the effectiveness of civilian KM initiatives and military KM initiatives or programmes. In order to be successful organizations must have robust information and knowledge management strategies, processes, and protocols, but the challenge arises in reconciling the conflict between encouraging an open, information sharing environment, and maintaining the appropriate security protocols.

The problem for Defence organisations, as others, are barriers to knowledge sharing. One barrier to adoption is the perception that knowledge is power, and that an individual or sub group that holds onto that knowledge for itself will retain the power associated with it. Another barrier identified by Goh and Hooper is the absence of trust. Hexmoor, Wilson and Bhatteram recognise the particular need for security, both for the individual and the organisation, but some debate exists over the best ways of overcoming these barriers. Desouza and Vanapalli advocate a strict, controlled approach to information security systems and information assurance while Goh and Hooper recommend a more open, holistic approach to information mechanisms and procedures, leading by example, embracing technical systems and compulsory training. Whichever approach is taken, it is clear that this issue must be addressed as there is a growing interest in applying these technical systems towards the knowledge management of sense-making, threat analysis and decision-making.

This holistic approach, while still leveraging technology to the fullest, ties in closely with the policies of the US Army. In constructing their ‘12 principles of Knowledge Management’ the Army included policies ranging from compulsory training to the “encouraged embedding of knowledge in media such as podcasts, videos and simulations” in the implementation of their knowledge management information system; ‘Army Knowledge Online’.

Responsibility to share, Balanced with Need to Know

The dominance of the traditional concept of “need to know” may in the past have held some military and defence organisations back from exchanging information effectively in recent years. This concept is evolving, and NATO’s Information Management Policy takes cognisance of this; one of the principles of this document is information sharing. Here NATO states that “Information shall be managed with an emphasis on the ‘responsibility-to-share’ balanced by the security principle of ‘need-to-know’, and managed to facilitate access, optimise information sharing and re-use, and reduce duplication, all in accordance with security, legal and privacy obligations.”

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29 Op cit.
31 McIntyre et al, op cit.
33 NATO (2007), op cit.
This is a major paradigm shift in the approach to information exchange within a defence environment. NATO today recognises that the benefits of timely and accurate information exchange far outweigh the risks.

**Methodology**

In this study, a multi-methodological approach was taken combining a quantitative survey with structured interviews. This study was conducted on quasi-randomly selected personnel from the Irish Defence Forces representing all ranks, units, corps, arms and brigades. Permission was also sought to interview and survey a wide selection of international militaries. Quantitative and qualitative research was conducted in Little Creek Naval Base, Virginia, NATO headquarters in Brussels, the Swedish Command and Control Training Regiment in Enkoping, and in a number of Irish locations. The large number of international responses obtained made it possible to compare and contrast the opinions of foreign military personnel to those of serving Irish Defence Forces personnel.

The survey questionnaire was constructed using mostly closed-ended questions and a (5 point) Likert scale.\(^{34}\) A literature search for comparable studies revealed one such study conducted on a smaller scale within the New Zealand Defence Forces.\(^{35}\) Although the latter focused on the barriers to information sharing, some guidance on the construction of suitable questions relating to the potential for information systems to aid information and knowledge management was obtained. Pre-testing was conducted on the questionnaire on a sample group of thirty Irish military personnel. Once these findings had been incorporated into the instrument design, the full survey was undertaken. Due largely to the personal approach taken in the delivery of the surveys and possibly the regimented nature of military organisations, there was a 98% response rate. The data collected from the surveys were analysed using SPSS statistical analysis software.

In total 159 surveys were completed, with the figures breaking down as follows;

- Irish Army 82
- Irish Naval Service 28
- Irish Air Corps 9
- International 40
- **Total** 159

The semi-structured interviews were conducted in the USA, Sweden, Ireland and Belgium. Due to the nature of the subject, no identities of personnel interviewed may be disclosed, but the interviewees represented a wide range of nationalities from civilian defence agencies, militaries and military bodies. A senior representative from the CIMIC Fusion Centre based in Norfolk Virginia was also interviewed, giving valuable insight into the difficulties of information sharing in a Civil – Military context. In total fifteen interviews were conducted.


\(^{35}\) Goh and Hooper, op cit.
Findings and Analysis
The results of the questionnaire and semi-structured interviews showed that all ranks from junior private to senior officer, regardless of their nationality, recognised that there was a definite need for improved information and knowledge management in defence. A considerable amount of analysis was undertaken and there is insufficient space in this paper to report more than a modest faction of the output. The analysis included comparisons between Irish military and international personnel and between different branches of the Irish military. The following are some of the salient findings.

Many military personnel feel they have too little information available to them in their daily work (Figure 4). Some 61.3% of Irish Defence Forces personnel and 48.8% of international personnel agreeing or strongly agreeing with this statement. The majority of respondents felt that the information that was available to them was inconsistent though almost all respondents regarded information received through information systems as accurate.

![Figure 4](image) **FIGURE 4 – I trust the accuracy of information I access through IS**

There is broad agreement that the current information systems are facilitating knowledge and information sharing within defence; however international respondents were noticeably more in agreement with this statement than their Irish counterparts. While respondents felt that ICT does facilitate information sharing, they also felt they received insufficient training on these systems to fully leverage the possibilities they offer.
Information hoarding is regarded as a serious problem (Figure 5). The threat of possible punitive action for the mistaken sharing of inappropriate or 'over classified' information creates a powerful disincentive and prevents some knowledge exchanges existing on any significant level (see next finding).

![Information hoarding exists between units/ formations](image)

**FIGURE 5 – Information hoarding exists between units/ formations**

Information hoarding is also influenced by concerns about confidentiality as can be seen in Figure 6. During the course of this study confidentiality and the inaccurate of over-classification of documents has frequently been cited as a key inhibitor to information and knowledge exchange in defence. It is clear from Figure 6 that regardless of rank, branch or indeed nationality, all respondents felt this was a major inhibitor of information exchange.

Confidentiality concerns deter people from sharing information (Figure 6). This is a major problem and has several dimensions not the least of which is confusion and uncertainty about the requirements for confidentiality in certain types of information and in who is entitled to see what.
FIGURE 6 – Confidentiality concerns deter people from sharing information

One international interviewee noted that the situation had become so difficult that even the processing of routine paperwork had been inhibited:

I could not even share information with myself...routine unclassified documents that I had created on one PC on my desk were automatically deemed too secure to move to the PC beside it.

Absence of motivation to engage in KM related activities is a further contributory factor. (Figure 7). Staff felt that there were no incentives to engage in sharing of knowledge.
FIGURE 7 – A suitable reward system exists for positive contribution to knowledge capital

As noted by Stevens (2000), though rewards are not essential, they often act as a catalyst to improve sharing. However, the findings of this study show that there are almost no such rewards in place. As was noted in by Goh and Hooper this runs counter to the advice of Bartol and Srivastava who emphasized the importance of rewarding knowledge sharing.

International respondents appear to have a much higher awareness of the mechanisms in place for the capturing of lessons learned. There is a similar, if less pronounced problem with dissemination (tables 2 and 3). The former can be most clearly seen in the finding that over 70% of international respondents agree or strongly agree with the statement that there are data capture mechanisms in place compared to only 35% of Irish respondents.

37 Goh and Hooper, op cit.
There are recognised mechanisms/procedures in place for capturing lessons learned

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>31.4%</td>
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<td>7.7%</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>40.1%</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>28.7%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 2 – There are recognised mechanisms/procedures in place for capturing lessons learned**

The Irish Defence Forces have recently formed a *Lessons Learned Cell* in the Directorate of Training and Education, J7, and the establishment of this office coupled with an effective awareness campaign should bring these figures in line in with the international average.

There are recognised mechanisms/procedures in place for disseminating lessons learned

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irish Defence Forces</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>39.5%</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 3 – There are recognised mechanisms/procedures in place for disseminating lessons learned**

While there is broad recognition of the existence of mechanisms for capturing lessons learned respondents were non-committal about the existence of mechanisms for the distribution of these lessons learned. This finding reflects a crucial failing on the part of defence organisations worldwide in getting the crucial lessons learned by the organisation out to the end users that need it most; a central premise of knowledge management.

There is a strong belief that a key factors in information and knowledge hoarding is the belief that information and knowledge are power (Figure 8). This suggests that there is a degree of cynicism in the military, but if this perception is close to reality, it suggests that operations may be put at risk by an individual or group playing territorial games.40

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Enhancing Knowledge Management
Several ways of enhancing KM in the military were explored in the study. There was agreement on most of the approaches examined, particularly on the need for improved knowledge and information flow between units (Figure 9).
This survey suggests that in general the Irish military is not as advanced in its use of KM as its international counterparts. It must be stressed that, given the small size of the sample, this is only an indicative finding, but it is strongly supported by respondents’ comments and observations in the interviews. Table 4 is one of several examples where international respondents suggested that they were happier with their information and knowledge management than their Irish peers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Irish Defence Forces</th>
<th>International</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
<td>37.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
<td>29.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 4 - I currently have enough access to information and corporate knowledge**

International responses also presented numerous different approaches to addressing information and knowledge management initiatives. The use of portals was a common method, however some used different combinations of functionality within the portal, for example one interviewee commented:
We have a wiki for knowledge management and a document management system for information management.

The use of awareness campaigns for information management has been particularly effective in Canada where even the most simple of mechanisms was noted to be effective at getting the message across to a large number of personnel. Mouse mats, cups and pens were made up with messages on the importance of data security and information management.

What was also apparent from the international responses was that while information management is steadily gaining acceptance as an essential element of any military organisation’s business practises, knowledge management is still a slightly more ‘fuzzy’ concept. Where the responsibility for the direction and leadership of this knowledge management lies is at present not fully understood. This problem was put by one informant thus:

The problem is information and knowledge management is being treated as a G2 (intelligence) issue, when really it should be a staff or headquarters issue.

Current information systems do not seem to be providing the level of collaboration facilities required by defence workers. In the current cost-conscious economic climate where defence budgets are being continuously scrutinised for possible savings this situation is less than desirable (Table 5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irish Defence Forces</td>
<td>.9%</td>
<td>20.9%</td>
<td>34.8%</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>28.9%</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
<td>34.2%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
<td>35.3%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 5 – Information systems encourage collaboration**

It is well established in the information systems’ literature that for systems to be effective and successful, they should, *inter alia*, be well designed, be built in close consultation with users and have support from top management. However several interviewees were quite critical of the quality of information and knowledge management systems design. The degree of frustration can be seen in Figure 10.
Finding expertise is a common problem (Figure 11). In the survey, there was strong disagreement expressed with the statement “I can always locate an individual with a specific skill set”. This was particularly evident in international responses where ‘disagree’ and ‘strongly disagree’ accounted for a large percentage of the responses.
FIGURE 11 – I can always locate an individual with a specific skill set

Curiously, this was one area where the international experience was worse than the Irish one, but this may largely be a matter of scale. It may also be due to the increased emphasis ‘joint’ operations at an international/strategic level in the military world today. This working environment does not lend itself well to the traditional model of subject matter experts becoming known to an organisation through socialisation and other informal, contact based means. On a positive note, there is widespread belief that access to information has improved in recent years. The interesting observation here is that despite the majority of international respondents agreeing with this statement, a sizable percentage disagreed completely; again pointing to the complex international operational environment of modern day crisis relief and peacemaking operations coupled the growth in the type and number of information systems trying to address this, not always in a cohesive and structured way.

Conclusions and Future Work

Information and knowledge are the most valuable resources to any military while paradoxically also becoming the new ‘fog’ of modern war. The modern operating environments that peacemaking and peacekeeping forces find themselves in require military leaders to process exponentially increasing amounts of information fed to them by a myriad of sensors in the field. Identifying the relevant information and knowledge to enable faster, better informed decisions is a challenge.
Despite an apparent ‘first mover advantage’ represented by the early recognition of Lessons Learned dating from Napoleonic times, to the US Army’s Centre for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), through to NATO’s more recent Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre, there still exists a divide between civilian KM adoption and military adoption. This stems from security concerns hindering interoperability, the lack of understanding by military personnel in the appropriate security marking of documents and finally a lack of awareness of the principle of ‘responsibility to share’.

One of the key findings of this research noted above, and one which little is currently written about, is the tendency of military personnel to deliberately over-classify documents they are working on so as to err on the side of caution, and for poorly designed information systems to perpetuate this problem.

Militaries must ensure that they stay abreast of relevant interoperability considerations and standards when designing/implementing any system. Relevant use of standards such as STANAG (standardisation agreement) and interoperability platforms such as MIP (multilateral interoperability programme) should be leveraged to the fullest. Where possible, use one system or platform, and control access rights accordingly.

Another key finding is that there are currently insufficient reward systems in place to motivate personnel to contribute to the knowledge capital of the organisation. This problem is aggravated by the perceived advantages of doing the converse, i.e. hoarding knowledge. In addition to the usual recommendations (more training, top level support for new initiatives, etc.) this research suggests that systems that reward contributions to KM and penalise unnecessary hoarding are important. Greater clarity about confidentiality is also important. At present, military personnel will assume the most restrictive rules apply unless they know otherwise, particularly in a multinational operating environment. Good policies are essential. Fostering communities of practice will enhance cooperation and sharing. In the military these may have different nuances from the civilian sphere, but the basic principles remain the same.

New challenges continue to emerge. In any situation information overload is a problem. In a military context, it can literally be fatal. This study suggests an increased awareness and investment in information and knowledge management in defence. With the correct balance of human and technological interaction, information and knowledge transfer frameworks and mechanisms can be facilitated and managed to supply the correct information at the right time, in the right format to the right person to satisfy the military decision maker’s informational needs and objectives. But the effort required is considerable and must be planned and executed with the support of all ranks.
ABSTRACT

In an organizational context, the word ‘meeting’ tends to evoke an immediate and negative response from many people. This article proposes an alternative way to conceptualise organizational meetings. Considered as a collective organizational resource rather than as isolated events, there may be a latent capacity for meetings to contribute more to an organisation than just the sum of their individual parts. Three concepts are proposed as a basis for developing a systemic view of meetings – Collective mind, Sensemaking and the Communicative Constitution of Organization. When considered together, these three elements provide the potential to re-orient how meetings are viewed and to achieve a form of enhanced organizational awareness termed here as Collective Mind[ing]. While still subject to more detailed research, a tentative view is provided of how organizational thinking may need to change in order to embody such a systemic view of meetings.

Introduction

Meetings - not another meeting! How many times have we heard this statement, whether in work, in our local sports club or perhaps related to our children’s schools? Yet meetings are used every day, in virtually every organisation and we continue to take part in them. So is there a new perspective on meetings that might inform a change in our disposition towards them?

The purpose of this paper is to introduce a different way to look at meetings. The topic is informed by on-going research into organisational meetings. The primary research data was collected in a company of approximately 70 staff, over an 18 month period. The proceedings at 61 organisational meetings, from board level to weekly operations team meetings, were attended and recorded.

The academic literature on meetings reports on them from two main perspectives: they are analysed and reported as single events, in which case the meeting is the topic of interest; alternatively, a topic is tracked through a series of meetings, making the topic and the meetings, the unit of analysis.

This paper considers meetings in a different way – it views meetings as a collective phenomenon in organisations, explores the theoretical background on which this view is based and finally offers some preliminary implications if meetings were treated as a systemic resource within organizations.

The paper begins with an overview of research on meetings. Three theoretical perspectives are then briefly introduced as a basis for conceptualising meetings as a collective phenomenon - Collective mind, Sensemaking and the Communicative Constitution of Organization (CCO).
Collective mind derives from studies of High Reliability Organisations (HROs) such as operations on aircraft carriers or nuclear powered installations and is particularly relevant to military organisations. Sensemaking focuses on how we interpret events around us and how those interpretations are used to ‘make sense’ of what might be confusing or conflicting inputs. Again, research in this area is derived from and relevant to military organisations and operations, where people are in high tempo situations with asymmetric or incomplete information, yet have to take immediate and decisive action that may prove fatal, even to own forces in some instances. CCO is considered as a theoretical basis for explicating systemic connections between meetings, enabling them to be developed and treated as a systemic component within the wider organisation. The paper concludes by introducing preliminary ideas for how to adopt a systemic view of meetings in practice.

Research on Meetings
In an early study of ‘what executive managers do’, Mintzberg\(^1\) identified five media through which managers engage, detailing formal and informal meetings as two such media. He reported that formal meetings accounted for in excess of 50% of an executive manager’s time, while other researchers\(^2\) reported that 67% of managers’ time was spent in scheduled and unscheduled meetings. In this context, meetings place very significant demands on human resources, yet our intuitive reaction to them is often ambivalence or to dismiss them as a waste of time.

Meetings are frequently reported as an under-researched organizational activity.\(^3\) Early research tended to focus on the internal processes associated with meetings. In later studies the focus shifted towards features such as the use of language within meetings, interactions between meeting participants, modalities related to the use and deployment of power within meetings and how meetings are used in the formulation, development and communication of organizational strategy. In the latter case, Jarzabkowski and Seidl\(^4\) studied the development of strategy in three organizations, involving fifty-one meetings. Their findings show how structures within meetings impact on the development of organizational strategy and how these structures link across meetings to stabilize or destabilize existing strategy. The common thread through the previous research on meetings is that meetings were analysed as individual events rather than researched or conceptualised together as a collective entity.

While meetings have been studied in a diverse number of academic disciplines, such as communications, management science, sociology and political science to name a few, the body of knowledge on how meetings operate and their purpose in organizations is fragmented.\(^5\) It is interesting to note from numerous literature reviews on organizational meetings that there is no reference to meetings in Military organizations. Schwartzman provides a thought provoking view of meetings in asserting that “they are the organization

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or community writ small.\textsuperscript{6} She identifies meetings as the locus of organizations, in which people represent many of the characteristics that define an organization - values, methods, culture, practices and procedures. She also identifies meetings as “sense makers” for organization members, a theme that will be explored in more detail later in this paper.

In combination, the diversity of existing research on meetings testifies to their importance and centrality in all organizations. Military organizations are unique in many ways but in a peace time context and in the absence of supporting research, it is a working assumption that their meetings serve similar purposes and operate in similar ways to those of non-military organizations. The concept proposed in this paper may be particularly amenable to application in a Military context due to the systemic way in which military organizations are structured, how military personnel are trained, their disposition to think in a collective sense and the inherent systemic nature of how they operate in their professional practice.

**Collective Mind – The Military and High Reliability Organizations (HRO)**

The concept of Collective Mind was first proposed by Weick & Roberts\textsuperscript{7}, arising from their study of operations on US aircraft carriers. Researching organisations that were concerned with reliability, they sought to understand the processes that enabled a group or organisation to act (and react) as though they were controlled by one ‘collective mind’. They found that these organizations comprised many components that could act independently of each other, but were highly ‘mindful’ of the reciprocal impact of their own and others’ actions on each other.

From a theoretical perspective, their work was partially based on organizational research that studied transactive memory systems, distributed information systems and connectionism. These different but related areas of research had a number of features in common that Weick & Roberts considered directly relevant to their concept of collective mind - they involved components of human activity systems acting together; they envisaged neural network type connections between components; communications were central to how these connections operated; the nature and extent of connections between components are as integral to the operation of the whole as any of the individual components.

Hutchins\textsuperscript{8}, analysing the operation of navigation teams on Naval vessels, proposed the following conclusion on how the navigation team’s output was accomplished:

> The structure of the activities of the group is determined by a set of local computations rather than by the implementation of the sort of global plan that appears in the solo performer’s procedure.

This insight from the interactions of some military teams, points towards the central tenet of Weick and Roberts’ concept of collective mind - heedful interrelating.


For the purpose of definition, collective mind is an attribute of a group or organisation that Weick and Roberts consider to be “located in the process of interrelating” - processes they consider to be inherent in all organizations. However, for collective mind to exist as they describe it in the high reliability situations of aircraft carriers, chemical plants or nuclear power stations, the processes of interrelating between different organizational components must be continually adapted to take account of what is happening with and between the other components. Interrelating is not a pre-ordained, static attribute but rather an adaptive and responsive set of actions and reactions between parts. As such, interrelations are constantly being constructed and reconstructed by participants in an unfolding drama, in which the actors are consciously aware or ‘heedful’ of what others are doing and modify their inputs according to the actions of others. In this type of situation, the more heed that is imbued in the patterns of interrelating, the more developed the collective mind that results. Weick and Roberts suggest that this results in “the greater capability to comprehend unexpected events that evolve rapidly in unexpected ways,” this contributes to the increased reliability of HROs.

In the literature on HROs a distinction is drawn between achieving reliability versus efficiency. One of the distinguishing features of HROs is their unrelenting focus on achieving operational reliability. Reliability in this context refers to the ability to perform consistently in changing or unknown circumstances as opposed to constant repetition of the same routine processes. A principal reason for this focus is that “the scale of consequences precludes learning through experimentation.” The implicit requirement in HROs to get things right the first time (and every time), demands a level of mindfulness that is developed through five cognitive processes as in Figure 1 below.

**Figure 1 - A Mindful Infrastructure for High Reliability**

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Closely related to the previous concept of heedful interrelating, mindfulness in this context is focused on the quality of attention people pay and is “more about inquiry and interpretation grounded in capabilities for action.” In summary, mindfulness is a persistent mindset that sees the latent possibility for error or failure in familiar events and activity, necessitating a constant vigilance and capacity to react and respond to failures from any source and to remedy them without undesirable consequences.

Accepting Weick and Roberts’ proposition that collective mind is inherent in all organisations, developing this capacity may confer benefits without incurring additional cost to the organization. The increased reliability arising from a developed collective mind may therefore be a desirable feature to achieve in non-HRO organizations. This paper proposes that conceptualising and organising meetings as a collective organizational resource may enhance the collective mind of organizations. Implicit in interactions between people or components of organizations is the need for participants to make sense of the inputs they receive and for their outputs to make sense to their counterparts. The following section outlines the concept of sensemaking in this context.

Making Sense of Sensemaking
As with most academic research there are as many definitions of concepts as there are researchers examining those concepts. Taken at face value, the simple expression ‘that doesn't make sense to me,' is both familiar and readily understood. How we move from something 'not making sense', to understanding the sensemaking process we are involved in, provides the theme for this section.

In his book ‘Sensemaking in Organizations’, Karl Weick clearly identifies sensemaking as a process that is grounded in action and activity, which precedes interpretation and reinterpretation, and is ultimately driven by plausibility rather than accuracy. He identifies seven features of the process of sensemaking as outlined below.

Grounded in identity construction - we need go no further than listening to two eye witnesses recounting their experience of the same event, to see that both the recall and the sense that individuals make of any event will always differ. Our recollections are as much part of who we are as individuals, as they are perceived to be objective recordings of facts that occurred in the past. We experience our individual version of reality through the lens of our values, previous experience, opinions and sense of self. Our sensemaking is influenced by our own interpretation of these events, as well as by our interactions with others who may have experienced the same events. This illustrates that there is no single recipe for sensemaking, since the conditions for making sense in any given situation can never be replicated in any other situation. It also highlights why different individuals can come to very different sensemaking conclusions from the same apparently objective situation.

Retrospective - Can you recall a situation in the past where you were not entirely sure if something made sense to you; but on explaining it to someone else, the act of explanation seemed to crystallise the sense you could make of what previously was not fully clear.

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12 Ibid, p. 38.
13 Op Cit.
Weick’s recipe for sensemaking\textsuperscript{15} is often quoted in the literature on sensemaking and captures the essence of this idea: “\textit{How can I know what I think until I see what I say}”. In order to make sense of the here and now, we naturally revert to what has been, in order to contextualise and understand our current situation. We also find that as time elapses between the present and that which we are trying to make sense of, we may find that our sense of those past events continually changes. Retrospection in this context also indicates that cognitively, we are not capable of making sense of the immediate here and now and we can only do so to the extent that we reference past events, whether recent or more distant. Weick, Sutcliff and Obstfeld\textsuperscript{16} summarise this by reference to the paradox that “seen from the point of view of an actor, an act becomes mistaken only after it has already gone wrong”. In other words, understanding and sensemaking occur after events have taken place and the outcome is already known.

\textbf{Enactive of sensible environments} - by virtue of simply being, we are participants in creating the environment from which and in which we strive to make sense of events around us. Our own behaviour and interactions in part create an environment which makes sense to us and in which we can make sense of events taking place around us. We are therefore involved in a form of recursive loop – our enactment of our surrounding environment provides some of the ingredients required to make sense of that environment. In the context of making sense in an emerging crisis situation Weick\textsuperscript{17} suggests that “\textit{Our actions are always a little further along than are our understanding of those actions}”. In the absence of sense being made, actions intended to forestall crisis may in fact exacerbate it, due to sensemaking lagging the impact of our intended preventative acts.

\textbf{Focused on and by extracted cues} - The overall human cognitive process can be said to use two types of process - a subconscious process of which we are seldom aware and a conscious process with which we make known, calculated decisions and judgements.\textsuperscript{18} Our subconscious process is dominant and uses ‘extracted cues’ from our environment to build a picture of what is happening. This is why we are so good at seeing only a small part of something or some event and then creating a plausible account or explanation of what it is, or of what is happening. While a strength in some cases, it may also result in sensemaking taking place without all factors or information being taken into account. Important contextual information may also be filtered out of consideration, when that very context may provide essential cues for selecting or interpreting information which directly impacts on sensemaking.

To illustrate this, consider the photo on the right and simply ask – what situation does this represent? What sense can I make of the photo, in the context of what I have read so far. An additional context for making (different) sense of the photo is provided on the following pages. Consider how your sensemaking of the photo changes when that context changes.

Driven by plausibility rather than accuracy - The search for total accuracy is premised on the notion that an objective truth exists about all experiences. We only need to consider different perceptions of personal interactions or even personal views on solid objects such as works of art, to appreciate that no such objective truth really exists. In its place, past experience as the primary input to sensemaking, is reconstructed in the present and therefore cannot be said to have occurred exactly as we remember it. People tend to believe or accept what will fit with their current sensory perceptions. This can result in ‘plausible reasoning,’\(^\text{19}\) which works with incomplete information that may be considered acceptable or true because it fits with the known available facts. Well recorded international disaster events such as the Three Mile Island nuclear accident in the US or the Bhopal chemical plant accident in India, illustrate how safety teams struggled to make sense of unfamiliar events through the use of ‘plausible reasoning’, but subsequent analysis identified the absence of critical information as contributory to the cause of the unfolding disasters.\(^\text{20}\)

From a military perspective, Weick describes how a Hungarian military detachment on exercises in the Swiss Alps was given up as lost after being trapped in a critical blizzard.\(^\text{21}\) Appearing safe and well some days later, they used a map of the Pyrenees to navigate to safety in the Swiss Alps! In this case, plausibility trumped accuracy in their sensemaking, when the confidence of having a map (any map!) enabled sufficient sensemaking within the detachment to effect a recovery from a near fatal situation.

Social - Sensemaking is not an isolated activity of a lone individual. It arises in the context of social contact and interactions between people and is necessarily informed by those interactions. As talk and discourse are the principal means of social interactions, sensemaking also focuses on these interactive media. Other social means of interaction such as written texts, symbols and non-verbal body language are also used in the sensemaking process.

Ongoing - Sensemaking does not have a beginning or an end. As a process, it is activated when required to enable individuals or groups to understand, cope with and respond to interruptions in the routine flow of activity. It is heightened when these routine flows are interrupted and need to be made sense of, in order to support decision making and action to bring perceived order and understanding back into events taking place. Sensemaking is also significantly conditioned and influenced by an individual’s emotional state. Current emotions may significantly influence recall of past events and consequently the sense we make of those events.

From the very brief summary above of the key inputs to sensemaking, it can be seen that it is not a linear process; it is subjective in so far as every individual makes sense in a different way; it is socially constructed and therefore is not amenable to producing an objective truth; it will vary over time as new information impinges on the on-going sensemaking process.


\(^{20}\) Weick, K. E., Sutcliffe, K. M. & Obstfeld, D. Op Cit.

The picture on the right shows the wider context of the picture on the previous page. Consider your sensemaking of the picture now, in comparison with the sense you previously made of it. I can only assume, but I am willing to wager that whatever sense you made of the previous picture has significantly changed having seen this one! It is a simple illustration of the importance of context to sensemaking as well as how it is an ongoing process as perspectives and information change!

In the context of interactions within organizations, sensemaking takes place in what I have previously characterised as a “river of discourse”, represented in Fig 2 below.22 Meetings as a specific location for sensemaking are conceptualised as tributaries, branches or pools within the so called ‘river’, and communication is analogous to the water in the river. Water is the river but the river is also more than just the water. Without the water it would not be a river and as such, water could be said to constitute the river but is not the only constituent of the river.

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Communication Constitutes Organization (CCO)

Early research on organisations tended to view them as tangible, reified entities. They were defined in structural terms such as people, buildings, hierarchical charts, rules, protocols or other forms that could be objectified, measured and quantified. In his seminal work, *The Social Psychology of Organizing*, Karl Weick shifted the focus from organization as a static entity to organizing as a dynamic process. He also shifted the focus from individual components to systemically connected organizational elements. This had a significant impact on how the concept of organization was viewed and studied.

The idea that organization is constituted through or by communication is based on the premise that organizations are brought into being and sustained through various means of communication. Organizational features such as development of relationships, coordination of activity or creation of culture are all dependent on various acts of communication. McPhee and Zaug developed this into their ‘four flows framework’. It deals with four distinct but interrelated constitutive features of organizations: 1 - the negotiation of membership of organizations; 2 - the control of organizations; 3 - coordination of activity within organizations and; 4 - the positioning of an organization with respect to other organizations in wider society. In a military context, these ideas were specifically examined by Browning et al., where they identified ‘military entrepreneurs’. The four flow framework was used to identify activities and behaviours in and between aircraft technicians in an Air Force squadron. The technicians achieved optimal operational and economic efficiencies in the maintenance and turn around of training and operational aircraft. The researchers established that while all four flows could be identified in the military unit's activity, there was an uneven emphasis on each of the flows but this did not skew the relationship between the flows - all four were important to the achievement of the organization of the squadron.

In contrast to the more macro view implied by the four flows model, other scholars show how micro level conversation between individuals or within groups contributes to the broader constitution of organization. This view may not be intuitively apparent to people who are not involved in this area of organizational research. It prompts both the debate and the challenge to show how small scale or micro level communications (within meetings for example) relate and contribute to broader, organization level activities and interactions. Some research shows how repeated patterns within the micro level interactions become evident within the wider organizations communications. Boden introduced the concept of ‘lamination’ to explain how elements of these micro levels of communication could layer one on top of the other to build the more macro aspects of organization.

A third view of organizational communication focuses on non-human communicative elements which may contribute to both the macro and micro concepts previously described.
introduced. Elements such as signs, symbols, texts, written rules and so on, form a key part of the communication within any organization, at both micro or macro levels. Notwithstanding the apparent conflict between the belief that organization derives from a macro structuralist view, versus a belief that it is constructed from the micro interactions between individuals, they share a common view that communication involves more than just human to human interactions and that it is central to the constitution or organization. The argument is made that without these various forms of communication, organizations would not exist as we know them and thus organizations are constituted by communication. Of course, as with most areas of theoretical study, the propositions of CCO are not universally accepted and it remains just one branch of organization study seeking to account for what organizations are, how they are formed and how they are sustained. For the purpose of developing a systemic view of organizational meetings, CCO provides one theoretical framework that could account for and guide how interactions within and between meetings may be used to develop a systemically based theory on organizational meetings.

**A Different View of Meetings**

It should be noted that the research on which this article is based is ongoing and findings and conclusions are tentative at this stage. The theoretical foundations identified so far consider sensemaking, collective mind and the constitutive nature of communication as key drivers for adopting and developing a systemic view of organizational meetings. Meetings are seen as a place where people in organizations ‘come together’ and ‘make sense’ out of what is happening in their environment. The process of sensemaking is recognised to be largely dependent on retrospection but requires numerous other inputs. If we consider actions and activities in a meeting today as material that will be used to make sense in future meetings, we may be able to enhance the future sensemaking that will take place, or at least make it somewhat easier. We cannot foretell the future, nor can we say what might have happened if we did something differently in the present. However, similar to laying the foundations for a house, we may be able to use current meetings in a different way, with a view to providing different or more deliberate inputs to the future sensemaking that we or others will carry out in future meetings.

This prompts the development of a concept I call ‘prehension’. In the context of organizational meetings, a tentative definition of ‘prehension’ is: *taking conscious steps in the present that are intended to inform a future sensemaking process*. Prehension may well involve the very individuals who will take part in future sensemaking. Future meeting participants may have to look back at their own past activity to make sense of their (future) present position. In the same way that retrospection is a fundamental part of sensemaking in the present, it is proposed that developing prehension in the present, way usefully contribute to sensemaking at some point in the future. In so far as the concept of ‘prehension’ might be applied throughout an organization, meetings of one group may feed into the sensemaking that will take place in future meetings involving other groups within the organization.
Developing heedful interrelating between meetings seems to provide for the possibility of improved collective mind in normal organizations, as defined by Weick & Roberts.\textsuperscript{28} Collective minding as proposed by Cooren\textsuperscript{29} is the process though which collective mind is developed. Collective Mind[ing] is the expression adopted here to reflect the duality of both, as reflected in the same organization.

Communication provides the principal means by which meetings may be more explicitly connected. Viewing meetings as a systemic organizational phenomenon, communication provides the constitutive scaffold around which this systemic view can be built and embodied. This provides the basis for adopting CCO as one of the three theoretical frames for developing a systematised view of meetings.

Explicitly interconnecting organizational meetings provides the potential to develop organizational collective mind[ing]. Separate research will be required to validate if any improvements from this theoretical proposal actually occur, or if the theoretical concept remains just that - a theoretical concept.

While the current research is focused on the theoretical foundations on which a systemic view of meetings can be based, organization members can reasonably ask the practical question - what can we do differently within our organizations to realise benefits from such a systemic view of meetings? A preliminary view suggests that the practical embodiment of this theoretical concpet is likely to be reflected in changes to four main aspects of organizational meetings - or more specifically, changes to how we think about meetings and what we do with them:

- Explicitly specifying the collective role of meetings, rather than treating them as individual events.
- Developing the internal workings of meetings to explicitly contribute to connections between them.
- Becoming aware of unplanned or unconscious connections between meetings, through people, processes or artefacts engaged within meetings.
- Building deliberate connections between meetings as an integral part of our our overall constituting of organization.

Meetings consume an enormous amount of time and resource. They are dreaded by many and embraced by few. Yet we continue to use them and to attend them. Edward de Bono is quoted as saying – “You cannot look in a new direction by looking harder in the same direction.”\textsuperscript{30} Perhaps it is time to take a fresh look at our meetings and to find ways to generate an output that amounts to more than the sum of their individual contribution.

\textsuperscript{28} Op Cit.
Beyond Rules or Engagement: Social Media and the Irish Defence Forces

ABSTRACT
To date, much of the discussion on the use of social media in the Irish Defence Forces has centered on a binary question of ‘rules or engagement?’ In this context engagement with social media is set out as inevitable, but risky, thus requiring some mechanisms of regulation. However, recognising its capacity to bypass the gate-keeper and agenda setters of traditional media and emit the message from within the Defence Forces directly to the public, this article reframes the scope of the discussion of social media by highlighting and unpacking current thinking on the possible positive uses of social media as communications tools for the Irish Defence Forces. Social media can be used to direct international perceptions during conflicts, to better understand partner organizations and conflict environments, and as a tool of institutional education. The challenge is to move beyond merely ‘enduring the time line’ to a ‘culture of embracement’ of the multitude of possibilities generated by social media.

Introduction
In the last decade there has been a seismic shift within mass media, away from unidirectional transmissions to more complex, networked and interactive digital media exchanges. The outcome of this transformation, in De Zengotita’s terms, is that ‘we have been consigned to a new plane of being, engendered by mediating representations of fabulous quality and inescapable ubiquity…’¹ There is no longer any influence or power without visibility, without appearance without the occupation of mediated space.² There is no longer any capacity for the Defence Forces or any other organisation to avoid or to escape mediation and yet it has a fundamental impact on how the organisation is represented and understood within Irish society. The key question for the Defence Forces in this context becomes how best to participate in the mediation of the organisation.

In order to gain influence over the manner in which it is depicted the Defence Forces needs to understand the nature of contemporary mediation. This is a process clearly understood by the Defence Forces Press Office, which introduced social media as an integral part of its communications strategy in 2008. As Young comments this ‘early adoption’ of new media allowed us to monitor and correct (where possible) misleading information about the DF, thus increasing our awareness of discussions and becoming a source for answers. It was also (able) to increase public knowledge of the DF and its job, build our reputation (among the public in general and media in particular) and

hopefully, increase the credibility of the organisation.3 However a more general culture of embracement of social media beyond the Press Office still needs to be endgendered in the Defence Forces, as new technologies continue to change the manner in which real-time information flows impact on institutional power, policy and responses.

In the social media world, any ‘digital native’ can effectively become a member of the media. The net consequence is that a ‘single digital eye on a mobile phone often has as much influence as a traditional, corporate media platform and often more’.4 This latter scenario, of the digital native transmitting from a ‘single digital eye’, is likely to create a reflex response within institutions and organisations such as the Defence Forces to regulate the messages emitted by such individuals. While some regulation is obviously necessary, social media is after all a form of publication where the usual rules apply, and online reputations need to be managed, the preoccupation with controlling the message largely misses the point regarding the benefit to organisations of embracing social media. The dividend from social media is that the organisation, and its supporters can become the ‘single digital eye’, the author that emits the message rather than remaining the mere subjects of the story.

To date, much of the discussion of the use of social media in the Irish Defence Forces has centred on a binary question, best summarised as ‘rules or engagement?’ While Young5 correctly points to Christiansen6 and Jones7 critiques of the idea of technology and the internet as inherently positive, stating that the ‘utopians’ have overstated the positive effects of social media and failed to examine the negative. In the context of the Defence Forces, engagement with social media is more generally viewed pessimistically, presented as inevitable, but risky, thus requiring some mechanisms of control and regulation. O’Connor focuses on the regulation issue, arguing that the ‘omnipresent moral gaze of social media increases the strategic risk to an organisation’s reputation’.8 He proposes that this risk is best alleviated through ethical leadership training ‘in order to prepare our soldiers to conduct their increasingly complex operations under the omnipresent moral gaze of social media’.9 However, in his presentation the soldiers are positioned as objects of the gaze of social media, which demands compliant behaviour, rather than positioning them as subjects or authors of the digital narrative on the Defence Forces. O’Connor’s perspective sees the Defence Forces as a potential victim of social media, rather than recognising its capacity to bypass the gate-keeper and agenda setters of traditional media and emit the message from within the Defence Forces directly to the public. In short a more comprehensive examination of the exact benefits to be gained from the military’s engagement with social media needs to be outlined so that the Defence Forces’ debate on social media can move beyond a position of reluctant acceptance to a more deliberate culture of embracement of social media. This paper seeks to contribute to

5 Young, op cit.
9 Ibid, p.104.
reframing the scope of the discussion of social media by highlighting and unpacking current thinking on the possible positive uses of social media as communications tools for the Irish defence forces.

**Social Media and @twitter**

The advent of Web 2.0 in the early 2000s, whereby software developers and end users generated basic functionalities for user-generated content, saw a rapid increase in internet-based applications that came to be known as social media. Social media are defined as web-based services that allow individuals to construct a profile, connect with other users and view and traverse their list of connections within a bounded system. Increasingly, social media platforms are no longer the realm of 'screenagers' only, with more participants emerging from the ranks of Generation X's 35-44 year olds. Mobile Web 2.0 has also opened up access for developing world countries to the internet and social media. While social media is an active and fast-changing realm some of the most common sub-components of social media include blogs, micro-blogs, wikis, social networking sites, and image sharing services. One of the earliest forms of social media are blogs, diary-style entries by one person or unified by a theme, which invite comments from the public. Another form of social media is the collaborative project, for example wikipedia, which is 'trending towards becoming the main source of information for many consumers' and which enables the creation and removal of information content by end users. Facebook, with 1.06 billion monthly active users is an online social networking application, that allows users to connect by creating profiles, allowing friends access to the profiles and sending emails or instant messages between friends. Flickr and YouTube are image hosting and video sharing platforms respectively.

One of the more interesting global social media formats is Twitter, a site where users post micro-blogs of 140 characters, referred to as ‘tweets’ which are sent to a list of ‘followers’ or people who have chosen to receive the users’ messages. Users can send the tweets directly to a particular follower, they can rebroadcast messages sent to them by ‘retweeting’, and they can engage in group discussions by searching for particular subjects or by following trending topics, such as, for instance #defenceforces. Twitter is currently one of the fastest growing social media platforms with over 500 million accounts globally and 1.058 billion tweets issued per month. People use twitter for four main reasons, daily chatter, conversation, sharing information and reporting the news. In these four ways twitter and other social media are in effect creating a new type of public engagement with news, by facilitating the audience to be active in news-making discourses and by providing live coverage of events. The potential benefit to the Defence Forces of embracing social media is this latter capacity to be active in news-making discourses and by providing live coverage of events. The potential benefit to the Defence Forces of embracing social media is this latter capacity to be active in news-making discourses and by providing live coverage of events rather than remain the passive subject of mainstream news and media.

Selling points for social media Mayfied points to three main reasons for militaries to engage with social media. Firstly, the nature of warfare has been impacted by social media, secondly, social media may help the Defence Forces better understand the environment in which it operates and thirdly social media can help achieve unity of effort with partners in conflict zones.16 Caldwell offers further advantages such as the fact that new media holds a enormous potential for education and it forces users to think consciously about becoming informational gatekeepers and agenda setters.17 Each of these advantages offered by social media are discussed further below.

**Warfare and Social Media**

Globally, social media have been used as tools for political and social activism, such as the #occupy movement and the arab spring18 but they have also been used directly for military action.19 Caldwell documents how an effective social media strategy worked to the advantage of Hezbollah in the Second Lebanon War in 2006 when Hezbollah exploited information as a ‘warfighting function with new media as the weapon of choice’.20 Hezbollah used photographs and videos (at times staged and altered) on YouTube and blogs to highlight the negative impacts of the Israeli bombings. In addition Hezbollah maintained absolute control over where mainstream journalists went and thus framed the story internationally on their terms alone. ‘In strategic perspective Hezbollah used information to reduce Isreal’s strategic options in terms of time’.21 Hezbollah portrayed Israeli Defense Forces military operations as a disproportionate use of force against the Lebanese civilian population and so provoked an international response against the Israeli position. Israeli forces ignored social media platforms, reverting to traditional use of information in psychological operations against Hezbollah, but was ultimately unable to control international perceptions of the conflict.22

As Caldwell documents, by contrast, during Operation Cast Lead in December 2008 the Israelis had devised a more effective strategy for directing international perceptions of the conflict and its impact. Social media was central to this latter strategy. The Israeli Defense Forces launched its own YouTube channel, which became the ninth most watched worldwide, with 2 million views. As Caldwell comments ‘one newspaper featured the headline “On the frontline of Gaza’s War 2.0”’.23 The point of the media campaign, Caldwell claims, was that Israel used all the informational tools it possessed to buy time. ‘The longer the incursion might be framed in a positive or neutral light, the longer the IDF could continue its actions without undue concern for world opinion’.24 The IDF used social media to hold off international responses long enough to achieve their objective in Gaza. These two cases illustrate the fact that social media has been used directly to impact on the outcome of conflicts. Just as the informational sphere becomes ever more politically and morally complex, ignoring it is simply not any longer a viable option as its position in doctrinal importance becomes ever clearer.

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19 Caldwell et al, op cit.
20 Ibid, p.4.
21 Ibid, p.6.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
Understanding Environment

Mayfield notes that by systematically observing social media communities in deployed locations commanders may develop a better understanding of societies in which they operate and may begin to see emerging trends or issues and potential threats. Moreover social media can also give remote viewers definitive live information on events on the ground as they happen. This is currently the case for instance with Syria, where up-to-the-second information on incidents are posted by both sides of the conflict on social media. As Gavin Sheridan of Storyful notes ‘A recent example of this is the compelling story of the Abkhazian Network News Agency (ANNA), embedded with the Assad forces in Daraya’. The news agency placed high definition cameras on tanks and armoured personnel carriers as they carried out operations. Similarly, the Almekdad Battalion, had its own YouTube account, where it also posted high definition videos. However as well as ‘seeing’ the war occur in real time, Sheridan points out that using freely available internet tools, viewers can identify precisely where a video was taken. Moreover live Facebook posts add further visual data and comments to give local context to the event. With regard to the availability of such minutely detailed information via social media, Sheridan poses the key question ‘What does all this say about modern warfare and technology?’ Some would say that it renders the Irish Defence Forces subject to intense scrutiny. With reference to Syria, O’Connor notes ‘the Milobs’ actions and performance were open for the world to critique, open to the omnipresent moral gaze of social media and thus transforming the individual member of the Defence Forces into an online brand ambassador’. However the other side of the social media equation is that it offers the Defence Forces opportunities to locally adopt and adapt social media and internet tools, making them ever more central to understanding conflicts and their consequences.

Social Media and Unity of Effort

Similarly, Heaslip and Barber's analysis offers a useful setting within which to consider the potential role that social media could play in communicating amongst partner organisations in a humanitarian crisis context. They note that fundamental differences exist between military forces and humanitarian or development agencies, due to ‘the differences in the principles and doctrines guiding their work, their agendas, operating styles and roles, and that the area of civil military logistical coordination in humanitarian relief remains a difficult interagency relationship’. They observe that the presence of the military leads to conflicts of the Humanity, Impartiality and Neutrality principles, culture clashes and lack of trust. However Heaslip & Barber also note that Tatham & Kovacs argue that the key ingredient to improving trust between humanitarian agencies and the military are those of dialogue and communications. More importantly, in the context of social media, Heaslip and Barber note that collaboration has extended beyond cooperation exclusively during an actual disaster to engagement during the preparation phase, whereby NGOs are training more frequently with military forces and

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25 Mayfield, op cit. p.79.
26 Sheridan, G (2013). ‘Double vision: seeing both sides of Syria’s war’ Available at: http://blog.storyful.com/author/gavin/
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 O’Connor, op cit, p.98.
31 Ibid, p. 61.
32 Ibid, p. 64.
33 Ibid.
becoming acclimatised to military involvement in humanitarian aid’.34 It is at this juncture in the relationship between civil and military partners, with an objective of achieving an increased shared understanding of very disparate work cultures and paradigms, that social media can function to create an underpinning ecology of shared information and dialogue on humanitarian issues. The exchange of information and views from both aid agency and military perspectives, through social media, could ultimately help with discussing conflicting agendas and working towards enhanced unity of effort.

Social Media and Education
Social media holds tremendous potential for informing users and for institutional education. The London School of Economics’ Public Policy Group points to the benefits of twitter for large organisations with disparate departments that need to communicate internally.35 Social media facilitates exchange of information between sub-divided groups, which might not keep tabs on what each section is doing outside of their awareness via social media. Fullick documents some of the educational functions of social media for graduate students, which also apply broadly to the Defence Forces context. She notes that social media, and twitter in particular, offers: fora for professional networking and collaboration; support on projects from experts and peers; access to information and research materials; keeps users up to date with information or policy issues pertaining to particular fields and creates a digital footprint or profile for the user.36 In a similar vein, Carrigan proposes that being able to crowd source broad questions was one of the most striking advantages to stem from engaging regularly with Twitter as an academic. He noted it offered opportunities for augmenting face-to-face contacts from conferences and extending conversations over time, as well as allowing academics to engage with non-specialist audiences, with the public and with a global community.37 The functionality of social media for public engagement speaks directly to the Defence Forces’ stated objective of demonstrating its ‘value and relevance’ to the Irish people.38

Becoming Your Own Gatekeeper
Caldwell notes that social media ‘forces us to modify habits and to think consciously about the practical and constitutional obligations inherent in becoming our own version of gatekeepers and agenda setters’.39 As early as 1977 McCombs & Shaw pointed to the agenda setting capacity of traditional media, where editors and journalists acted as gatekeepers, filtering some stories and issues for dissemination and rejecting others, thereby dictating not so much what to think, but rather what to think about.40 The accessibility of social media as well as the volume of information shared and the variety of platforms on which to share it have all undermined the traditional gatekeeper role of the media. Now those who generate content in social media are their own gatekeepers, deciding what gets posted or not. As information is added to social media, the process itself builds to become an agenda-setter, determining what people think about in the form

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34 Heaslip & Barber op cit. p. 67.
39 Caldwell et al, op cit, p. 4.
of those subjects that trend. Caldwell’s case study identifies how this process played out in Operation Cast Lead where Gazans were able to circumvent Israel’s attempt to gate-keep and agenda set by denying access to traditional media. In order to shape the international news agenda Gazans sent out tweets, updated blogs, posted information, photos and videos on facebook and used cell phones to transmit videos via Youtube of the carnage in Gaza. While the Gazans’ content was matched by Isreali postings on YouTube and Twitter ultimately, despite the fact that the Israelis controlled the traditional media, they were not entirely able to win the information war, Gazans managed to determine the agenda, and shape the discussion of proportionality through social media.41

**The Currency of Influence**

If the currency or power of social media is influence, the key question for the Defence Forces is how to gain influence, but to do so appropriately. Perry puts the case very succinctly, ‘the challenge has been balancing operations security with public awareness’.42 Most experts point to training as the necessary safeguard against inadvertently releasing sensitive information on social network sites. Perry’s key acid test for posting is ‘If the information you shared made headlines, would you be happy about it?’43 While protecting sources, the objective nonetheless remains to share stories. Various experts offer key advice on how to gain influence in social media. Perry highlights the importance of presence ‘if you are not there to communicate your message, someone else will do it for you’, he also highlights the centrality of the relevance of posts ‘the medium requires content that adds value’.44 Kaplan & Haenlein advise on five key points. Firstly ‘be active’, social media is all about sharing and interaction so ensure that content is always fresh and that you engage with discussions. Secondly ‘be interesting’, listen, find out what the followers would like to hear, what they might find interesting, enjoyable and valuable then generate and post content that fits those expectations. Thirdly ‘be humble… if there is one certain path to failure, it involves thinking that social media is just about putting prefabricated press announcements on corporate blogs’, be unprofessional, firms would be wise to avoid overly-professional content offerings and be honest, respect the rules of the game.45

**Conclusion**

The flow and volume of information channelled through social media has changed expectations amongst citizens ‘statements in the public sphere can now be seen as invitations for a conversation, not as finished goods’.46 These changes have in turn lead to a growing mistrust of authority. This in turn has increased demands for transparency and accountability from those in positions of power. When institutions are put under pressure, during a time of crisis, social media challenges the structures of power to respond effectively and in a credible and timely manner. Gowing notes however, that currently institutional leaders are ill prepared to accept social media and its impact on power, ‘Indeed it was a typical instinctive and rejectionist response that is repeated time and time again in a multitude of institutions… of how problematic it remains for almost all

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41 Caldwell et al, op cit. p. 4.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Kaplan, et al, op cit, p. 66.
institutional mindsets to “get it”\textsuperscript{47}. Gowing notes however the exceptional enlightenment of Head of the British Army, General Sir David Richards who admitted publicly that the internet and linked technologies are ‘way beyond the state’s ability to control’ and that government institutions were equally ‘way behind our opponents in understanding and exploiting this aspect of the battle for people’s minds’\textsuperscript{48}. The challenge now is to move beyond merely enduring the timeline to a culture of embracement of the multitude of possibilities for generating, publishing and collating information through web, blog and twitter streams. For that to occur social media needs to be incorporated at the highest level of command, into formalised programmes with appropriate and expert staffing resources, because finally and unavoidably it seems to be indeed the case that ‘you are what you tweet’, if you don’t shape your story on social media, somebody else will.

\textsuperscript{47} Gowing, op cit.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.
The Military and the Media – Uncomfortable Bedfellows?

ABSTRACT
The relationship between the military and the media has over time been symbiotic while at the same time fraught with tension. This paper examines the evolution of military media relations through various conflicts over the last 150 years and suggests that although the military, through the embedding of journalists, maintains a greater element of control, the requirement for cultivating positive relations with the media. The Irish Defence Forces, although not likely to commit to a campaign of war in the near future, will still have to maintain healthy media relationships to ensure adequate support for operations both home and abroad on peace keeping missions in a resource constrained environment.

Introduction
The military and the media have been both an integral and influential part of western society for many years. They are recognised by many as important pillars in any modern democracy. However, they are at times strange and even uncomfortable bedfellows. The relationship between the two has ebbed and flowed, never more-so than during times of conflict. Yet despite this sometimes tempestuous liaison a link, no matter how tenuous has always been maintained.

Bartel contends that the media is the medium that links the Clauswitzian trinity of “People, Army and Government.”1 Through its effect on public opinion the media can act as a force multiplier and significant strategic enabler for the military.2 Equally the military can contribute to the media’s unquenchable thirst for stories. The public yearns for information and the more unusual and sensational the tale the better. This drives journalists in their hunt for the Holy Grail; a ‘juicy’ story.

Both sides have a vested interest in maintaining this symbiotic relationship, one which has rarely been on equal terms. One side is invariably dominating the interaction due to a position of strength. This strength can depend on a myriad of factors such as the perceived justice of the latest conflict the military are embarking on, technological developments, the physical environment, public opinion, patriotism, etc.

Meyer argues that there is “an inherent dichotomy of purpose and culture between the reporter and the soldier.”3 The media believe in the public’s right to know everything, militaries by their very nature are secretive and guarded. It seems each side is suspicious of the others motives and this influences their interactions with one another. Perhaps better education on both sides is the key?

2 Ibid.
This paper will look to briefly examine how military—media interactions have evolved over the last 150 years bringing us to the current status quo. I will do this by examining a selection of major conflicts spanning from the Crimean War, the first industrial war covered by a modern press corps, up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The history I will present indicates that both sides continue to need each other, and although not engaged in war fighting the Irish Defence Forces (DF) is no different in its requirement to foster and maintain a good relationship with the media and thus another conduit to the Irish people from whom our organisation obtains its legitimacy. The DF has in recent years certainly become more media savvy and there is a steadily increasing awareness across the organisation of the role every members plays in maintaining and building on this relationship. The paper concludes with a brief examination of the current ‘health’ of the Defence Forces relationship with our national media.

The Crimean War (1854-1856)
This was the first ‘media war’ and an Irish born journalist William Howard Russell is recognised by many as the original war correspondent. Russell’s reports from the front lines for the Times grabbed the attention of the public who heretofore had been used to reading the considerably more sanitised and less grisly writings of reporters far removed from the stench of death. The development of the electric telegraph meant that Howard Russell’s visceral description of war could be transmitted across the continent and back to London in a matter of hours. This was a quantum leap compared to how previous wars had been reported. Howard Russell refused to embed with the British forces and instead chose to roam the battlefield as he pleased.

His stories were often exaggerated or partial and took little heed of OPSEC. On one occasion the Times printed a report from him which included the number, type and position of artillery pieces the British had amassed prior to an attack. The piece even went as far as naming the individual regiments involved. Actions such as these obviously did little to endear the media to the military.

For the first time ever British commanders in the field were subjected to intense scrutiny from outside the military. Russell and other correspondents were highly critical of how the war was waged and particularly how the rank and file soldiers were treated.

The reportage of the war had two significant impacts. The first was that there was a major review of the British forces medical services. The second was its contribution to the fall of Prime Minister Aberdeen's government in January 1855. Deafened by public opinion a large parliamentary majority, informed at least in part by press coverage, voted for an inquiry to be launched into the ‘inept prosecution' of the war, ultimately causing the government to implode. This incident served to alert both the military and the government to the ‘dangers’ reporters could pose.

The American Civil War (1861-1865)
Developments in telegraphy and photography meant that this war was brought to the home front faster and in a more vivid and gruesome manner than any conflict prior. By 1860 more than 50,000 miles of telegraph criss-crossed the United States allowing news of slaughter on an industrial scale to be flashed across the continent in mere minutes.6

Reporters from both the Union and Confederate sides were afforded great freedoms in the pursuit of stories from the front with little in the way of restrictions imposed on them by the military. There were vastly differing opinions on whether this was a wise decision or not. General Sherman operating in the South believed that the Constitution should be suspended and all war reporters should be shot on sight as spies. However, the Commander of the Union Army, General Grant, believed that “the northern press was worth more than a 100,000 fighting men.”7 Commanders were now acutely aware that their decisions in the field would be almost immediately judged in the court of public opinion, a court from which there is rarely any right of appeal.

World War I (1914-1918)
This conflict was the most destructive in human history to date. This was war on a truly industrial scale and the competing nations harnessed every resource they could in the pursuit of victory, including the media. Cinema had emerged as “an intoxicating form of mass entertainment”8 but uncensored would have soon stripped bare the romance of war.

World War I saw all combatant countries tighten their grip on the media. At the outbreak of war authorities in London and Berlin were more concerned with curtailing rather than utilising the media. Strict rules were imposed on the media. Many German reporters were totally dependent on the censored at source information provided by the Kriegspresseamt (War Press Office). In Britain the Defence of the Realm Act enacted on 08 Aug 1914 imposed an expansive range of restrictions on the collection and publication of material. Punishments for infringements were harsh but the rules were deliberately vague. This led to self-censorship by many journalists for fear of violating a poorly delineated boundary.

Up until May 1915 the British had banned journalists altogether from the front. However, once it became apparent that the war would not be ‘over by Christmas’ the media was exploited in an effort to rally popular sentiment. Visits to the frontline for reporters were often tightly controlled, choreographed events. Journalists were billeted in relatively luxurious conditions far from the fighting and were brought en masse to carefully chosen locations. All reports were subject to censorship prior to publication. In contrast to many previous wars the military had kept the media on a short leash during this conflict.

World War II (1939-1945)
Just as in World War I the media were tightly controlled throughout this conflict. Censorship and propaganda were ubiquitous. The media was subsumed into the rest of the war effort and given little choice but to play its part.

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In the Third Reich the Ministry of Propaganda led by Dr. Joseph Goebbels pumped “ideological serum into German veins.” The innocuously name Office of Facts and Figures in the US and the Ministry of Information in Britain made sure the public received the ‘right’ information. Technological advances meant that film could now be produced with sound. As a result the cinema became a key tool in buttressing the war effort. Radio was also used extensively by all sides and as it respects no boundaries could be used to reach into the enemy’s territory. The media was called upon not only to deceive the enemy but the public at home as well.

World War II saw the beginning of journalists ‘embedding’ for extended periods of time with frontline units. They were heavily dependent on the military and did not possess the ability to transmit reports themselves. Stories being sent back from combat areas were heavily censored. The media was a burden that the military had to carry but also a tool that it would use. Editors, journalists and filmmakers for the most part played their patriotic duty and contributed to the war effort as best they could.

**Vietnam (1955-1975)**

In marked contrast to the two World Wars journalists were afforded much more freedom during the Vietnam conflict. The development of television and the capability to transmit film via satellite meant that the American family sat down every night to eat dinner while watching the latest gruesome events unfold. This Hoskin’s argues exerted a significant effect on the psyche of the American public many of whom eventually became war weary. As the war dragged on it seemed increasingly futile. The public struggled to comprehend why a sliver of jungle on the other side of the world was so important. Public opinion, which Clausewitz had identified as crucial to successful prosecution of war, was gradually slipping away. Although hardly the decisive factor in the eventual US defeat the media reportage of Vietnam did more harm than good to the military’s cause.

Carruthers maintains that the economic and human cost became too high and that the media simply held up a mirror to this. She contends that these costs coupled with military reverses ultimately doomed the US to failure and not the media’s reporting of the conflict. A myth was begun that the military had not lost but in the words of President Reagan they “came home without a victory, not because they had been defeated but because they had been denied permission to win.” Whatever the real reason for defeat, Hallin argues that by the end of the conflict media-military relations were certainly at an all-time low with deep mistrust on both sides. Never again would the Western militaries allow television to exert such an influence on events.

**The Falklands War (1982)**

The geographical inaccessibility of the Falklands Islands meant that the reporting of this conflict would be extremely challenging. With the Vietnam conflict still fresh in their minds the British Government made the decision that the Falklands would not be a television war.

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9. Ibid., p.67.
The MOD permitted only 29 journalists to travel with the seaborne forces, amazingly only two film crews were included within this group.\(^{13}\) These journalists would be dependent on the military for everything including communications equipment to transmit work back home. Journalists were not given access to satellite link ups for transmitting film back as this precious bandwidth was reserved for military use only.\(^{14}\) By the time film reached Britain it was weeks old and there was a complete embargo on pictures of casualties until after the Argentine surrender. Stories that were transmitted were censored first by MOD officials within the task force and then again on receipt in London before being passed to the journalist’s employer. The media were briefed en masse by MOD officials in London. Stories from journalists who failed to adhere to the militaries rules, simply never made it home.\(^{15}\)

The Pentagon studied with great interest how the British handled the media and utilised this model in the Grenada and Panama campaigns to great effect. However, although the military had complete control it was the subject of serious criticism and accusations that it had suffocated free speech. It became apparent that a more equitable military-media liaison had to be established to satisfy the public’s appetite for news.

**The Gulf War (1991)**

Carruthers describes *Operation Desert Storm* as “the first real television war”\(^ {16}\) and in many senses it was. Technological advances in satellite transmission meant that live shots could be broadcast into our living rooms. The world watched in awe as missiles rained down on Baghdad and Anti Aircraft Fire streaked into the inky black sky, like some macabre video game. Coldly detached we ate our dinners while men, women and children perished.

In an effort to avoid what President George Bush Sr. described as ‘Vietnam Syndrome’ the US military was determined to keep a tight leash on the media but wanted to exert this control as subtly as possible. A press pool system was used to corral reporters. Journalists who were part of officially sanctioned Media Reporting Teams (MRT) were granted a limited and very tightly controlled access to troops and briefings. Those who weren’t members of an MRT were effectively frozen out by the military. MRT members were required to sign a set of guidelines agreeing not to conduct off-the-record interviews with members of the military, always stay with and obey their military escorts and submit all copy for ‘security review’.

The daily briefings by General Norman Schwarzkopf were slick and professional and usually centred around grainy black-and-white footage from the nose cone of a smart bomb. These clips showed the amazing precision with which the coalition decapitated Saddam’s forces. They helped underline the technological gulf between the two sides and they sanitised the war. The public had never seen images like this before and it was compelling television. There was overwhelming public approval of the military’s media handling throughout the conflict.

13 Carruthers, op cit, p. 122.
16 Carruthers, op cit, p.130.
Carruthers maintains that most media outlets seemed happy to get on-side for the duration of the conflict.\(^\text{17}\) Perhaps it was a sense of patriotism or the lure of better ratings, or possibly a mix of both, which motivated the organisations that engaged with the military’s system. Whatever it was the military viewed the Gulf War as an unqualified success in terms of how the media was ‘handled’. The vast majority of the media quickly came to realise that it had been a “devastating and immoral victory for military censorship.”\(^\text{18}\)

**The ‘War On Terror’ and the Second Iraq War 2003-Present**

The 9/11 terrorist attacks spawned the oft touted yet ill-defined ‘war on terror’. The invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and subsequent operations in these countries would be the subject of much media interest. Technological advancements meant that it was now extremely difficult for the military to prevent journalists broadcasting from even the most remote locations. Rather than attempting to impose overt restrictions as in previous conflicts, the military depended on a kind of light touch censorship which was a by-product of embedding journalists with frontline fighting units.

The practice of embedding journalists alongside the military was lauded as a quantum leap in military-media relations. However, it appears it was in fact a very savvy manoeuvre by the U.S. government at handling the media who were viewed as “beasts to be tamed.”\(^\text{19}\) Embedding would ensure that the media was placated by this perceived unprecedented access and the resultant increase in viewers/readers. Reports from embedded journalists were overwhelmingly more positive than those from independent reporters and thus contributed to swaying public opinion in support of the government/military actions.\(^\text{20}\)

All of this was achieved while the military played the part of a guardian angel or honest broker simply facilitating the autonomous third party in getting to the truth. The embedded media would be the independent truth tellers who ironically were dependent on the military for almost everything, down to the very basics that sustain life, such as food and water.

Only 20\% of the 600 journalists who embedded with the U.S. forces invading Iraq were from outside America.\(^\text{21}\) A mere six out of the 136 journalists who embedded with the UK forces were from outside Great Britain.\(^\text{22}\) Reporters were also drawn from a wide spectrum of the media. The journalists did not come from just the mainstream papers and networks as one might expect, but from publications and stations as diverse as *Rolling Stone*, *Mens Health*, and *MTV*.

The heavily Anglo-American emphasis and the somewhat eclectic collection of publications and networks was a key element of the strategy. It is proof that embedding was designed as an intricately planned PR offensive to influence a wider public opinion, principally in the U.S. and U.K. The fact that the U.S. military was employing a PR firm,\(^\text{23}\)

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\(^\text{17}\) Ibid.

\(^\text{18}\) MacArthur in Carruthers, op cit, p.140.


\(^\text{22}\) Ibid.

\(^\text{23}\) Bamford in Carruthers, op cit, p.234.
Rendon Group, to vet applications for the embed program helps to illustrate the minute detail with which all aspects of embedding were controlled. Part of the background checks included an examination of journalists’ past stories to ascertain if they held a pro or anti-military stance.

No other organisation in society has a better understanding of the potency of camaraderie, and the strength of bonds forged in adverse and trying conditions, than the military. The unique intensity of combat is something relatively few in today’s society experience and thus the power of its effect goes largely unappreciated by the general public. It was this powerful experience in trying conditions that would lead to embedded journalists becoming, if only briefly, defacto brothers in arms with the soldiers, sailors and airmen with whom they ate, slept and dodged bullets. The military understood better than anyone, and depended on, the psychological effect embedding would have on journalists.

Anthony Loyd, a British journalist who embedded with U.K. forces operating in Afghanistan, described how over time “me” and “them” gradually morphed into “we” as he felt himself becoming part of the unit with which he was travelling. Loyd freely admits that he was ultimately compromised as a reporter.24

In a very aptly named article, “Embeds Perceptions of Censorship: Can You Criticize a Soldier Then Have Breakfast with Him in the Morning”25 Johnson argues that embedded journalists objectivity and impartiality were fatally compromised. He states that nearly all the reporters he contacted admitted self-censorship motivated due to intense feelings of patriotism, loyalty and a duty toward the unit they had embedded with.

Another important factor that embedding was designed to exploit was the change in demands from the public.26 With media now available on an ever-increasing array of platforms, immediacy was all important. Technological advances meant that embedded journalists could now report live from the frontline and the public could watch events unfold in real time. In the increasingly competitive media market the never-ending need for ‘scoops’ and exclusives meant the networks could not resist what embedding had to offer. In an industry where the bottom line was becoming ever more important the viewing figures that embedding guaranteed were compelling to media executives. Many in the industry, although aware of the journalistic short-comings of embedding, still supported the practice.27

**DF/Media Relations**

As the above history demonstrates, militaries with far greater resources than our own have tried, with varying degrees of success, to control and ‘handle’ the media. Despite having limited resources available for public relations, the DF enjoys a predominantly positive relationship with the Irish media. There is now a greater understanding and emphasis

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on the importance of the media. The chief architect of the DF/Media relationship is the Press Office which endeavours to “practice full-spectrum, proactive public relations in the communication of the organisation’s messages to its target audience.”

Tom Brady of the Irish Independent believes that there is currently a very good relationship between the DF and the media. He stated “we, in the media have been very lucky that successive Chiefs of Staff have taken the view that the position of Press Officer should be treated seriously and as a result most of the holders of that office have been top class.”

Comdt Denis Hanly admits there is still a degree of ignorance amongst some of the Irish media regarding the DF. This lack of understanding coupled with the economic realities of news organisations shrinking budgets means that the Press Office has to be extremely proactive in an effort to get our message across and appear as both relevant and value for money in the eyes of the public. “There’s a competition for diminishing resources and the DF has to show its relevance, it’s not about exposure it’s about the right kind of exposure.” This feeling was echoed by Tom Brady.

It is important that the DF continue to be out there and devise new ideas to garner coverage for their activities… the old adage of out of sight, out of mind, applies and if there is no publicity, people quickly forget we have a military organisation and they begin to query if there is a need for one.

By presenting consistently professional standards and cultivating a reputation for openness and transparency, while maintaining the natural need for a certain level of secrecy the DF insures a mostly positive relationship with the national media. “If we can’t tell them we tell them we can’t tell them, we are seen as straight shooters.”

Reporters do not ‘embed’ with the DF in the same way they do with the US or UK forces. The economic reality is that Irish media organisations are not prepared to expend the resources this would require. Reporters do make occasional trips to visit Irish troops overseas. Although the experience for a journalist visiting an Irish mission is much less intense than that of a reporter embedded in a war zone, it seems that similar psychological effects are at play. Coverage of DF operations overseas is nearly always positive – “it’s difficult to travel and not be impressed.” Brady argues that journalists who have travelled with Irish troops “obviously have a better understanding of what is involved in peace-keeping and as a result their reports are much better informed.”

In recent years there has been a slight shift in how the DF portrays its image, particularly its overseas operations. This has had the effect of giving the DF a ‘harder edge’.

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31 Brady, op. cit.
32 Hanly, op cit.
33 Brady, op cit.
34 Ibid.
We portray the reality of our missions now more than we used to. St. Patrick’s Day is now branded differently, it’s not the Tibnin Donkey Derby anymore, it’s about the busy day patrolling and then calling home at the end of it.\textsuperscript{35}

The DF has also made a significant effort at raising awareness amongst all its personnel, that regardless of rank every soldier has a PR role to play. The production of a PR Tac Aide and briefs from the Press Office on a widening array of courses is helping to increase the overall consciousness across the DF as a whole.

**Conclusion**

It seems the military/media relationship will continue to be somewhat tempestuous for the foreseeable future. Neither side can afford to walk away from what the other offers. It appears unlikely that either side will radically change its view of the other anytime soon. In recent years the military has been the more dominant partner and it is difficult to see how this is going to change. The ‘infotainment’ which embedding has provided is extremely popular and although it may be an anathema to the journalistic principles of some the ratings it offers continue to seduce media executives.

Media organisations are under increasing pressure as news becomes available on an ever greater array of platforms including social media. The public’s insatiable demand for up-to-date stories and the shrinking resources available to traditional journalists means that the larger militaries, with significant resources devoted to ‘handling’ the media will persist in dominating this relationship. The media is without doubt a significant force multiplier and it will continue to be utilised as such by Governments who need to control the agenda.

Even though it remains unlikely that the DF will get involved in a major combat role in theatres such as Iraq and Afghanistan, engagement with the media remains key to the future of the organisation. Budgetary constraints caused by the financial crisis and the potential for public distaste for military operations after critical coverage of the two aforementioned campaigns could impact negatively on DF operations. The Press Office must continue to ensure that target media audiences (the Irish public and the Government) fully understand the capabilities of the DF and provide the necessary support for their operations. DF personnel have a duty to continue to “think PR.”\textsuperscript{36} This can be facilitated by the inclusion of appropriate media training in all career courses and by staffing PR appointments with an appropriate number of well trained, capable and enthusiastic personnel. One can never be guaranteed permanent positive media coverage, however investment in training and personnel and the cultivation of positive respectful relationships with the media can tilt the balance of coverage to a positive outcome for the DF.

\textsuperscript{35} Hanly, op cit.
\textsuperscript{36} Hanly, op cit.
Towards an Increased Understanding of the Importance of Humility as a Leadership Attribute, and its Implications for the Defence Forces

ABSTRACT
Humility is a complex construct and a trait difficult to quantify. In different situations its application can be perceived as either a strength or weakness - dictionary definitions often paint a negative picture of humility. Increasingly, in the commercial world, the presence of humility is put forward as a key constituent of effective leadership, and though some military forces have also identified the importance of humility in this regard, there is considerable opinion that this trait is not prevalent amongst members of the military profession. The purpose of this Paper is to further enhance our understanding of humility and to determine its importance as a leadership attribute. The Paper also examines emerging views regarding the importance of this trait, whether it is considered to be part of the Defence Forces Leadership Brand and the consequential implications for the Defence Forces in light of the areas discussed. Leadership is a key functional component of the Defence Forces involving the projection of personality and character to inspire people to achieve the desired outcome. True leadership relies on a two-way relationship between the leader and follower, and it is suggested that when authentic humility is applied to relationships, mutual trust develops, stirring an abiding sense of loyalty and collaborative effort within the organisation as the group aspires to great achievement.

Introduction
Thomas Berney died on the 24 July 1988 aged 89 years. At his funeral a local lady approached me and expressed the opinion that my grandfather had been ‘a very humble man’. I was immediately engaged by this description and it has occupied a very prominent place in my memory over the years; I have always considered that it would have been a most apt epitaph for my grandfather, who was greatly loved and admired by me. At the time I associated humility with modesty, respect for others and tolerance, qualities which my grandfather had in abundance. Over the years, and mainly by way of life experience, my perception of humility has broadened. The purpose of this paper is to further enhance the understanding of humility and to determine its importance as a leadership attribute.
The process will allow the further examination of the concept of humility; to consider whether humility is part of the Defence Forces (DF) leadership brand; and to determine what implications exist for the DF in light of this study. Leadership is a key functional component of the DF; presently the DF is further developing its leadership doctrine, a process which is being led by a dedicated Working Group. The research undertaken in this Paper may be of some assistance to the DF Leadership Working Group.

The DF, as with most other military forces, has an ethos of a life long learning organisation, requiring its members to undergo a wide range of educational and skills related courses, in order to develop the character, knowledge and competencies required of a professional soldier. During a discussion period as part of a lecture on Strategic Leadership, which I recently attended, the audience were invited to nominate what they considered to be important leadership traits/ values, with a view to encouraging interaction amongst the group. An extensive list of attributes was recorded; however, humility was not mentioned until the lecturer proposed it towards the end of the process. The reaction of some of his audience to this suggestion was unenthusiastic, to say the least.

I have no recollection of the topic of humility being addressed/discussed in any great detail as part of my military education. Though I have had little difficulty in discerning and greatly appreciating acts of humility by individuals over the years, up until recently, I have given little thought to its importance as a leadership attribute – my reading on this topic, together with my enquiries to a cross-section of my colleagues, would suggest that I am not alone in this respect.

There seems to be some ambiguity concerning the nature of humility. A trait difficult to quantify, in different situations its application can be perceived as either a strength or weakness. It has been suggested that this trait is not prevalent amongst members of the military profession. Various commentators describe humility as the quality of being genuinely modest, respectful, tolerant, down-to-earth, open-minded and being aware of one’s strengths and weaknesses. Some suggest that humility is undoubtedly confused with a lack of self-confidence, meekness or timidity, and having a lowly opinion of oneself. The concept of humility tends to be clearer in a religious context where it is mainly associated with self worth – in this context humility is mainly seen as a virtue where a person, being aware of his shortcomings, willingly submits himself to the service of God and of others. More increasingly, in the commercial world, humility is being put forward as key constituent of effective leadership. Some military forces have also identified the importance of humility in this regard.

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1 Fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of national objectives; its primary purpose is to outline how the armed forces of a state intend to conduct operations across the spectrum of conflict. It guides, dictates and undergirds planning, training, organisation, leadership and support (DF Manual of Staff Duties).
2 Colonel Colm Campbel, Director of Defence Forces Strategic Planning.
101 Battalion

The author has thirty-five years’ experience in the DF, incorporating a wide range of operational, training and command appointments, the highlight of which afforded me the good fortune to lead 101 Battalion on its deployment to Chad in September 2009. The Battalion comprised 394 DF personnel, selected from a wide range of Units across the DF; 60 Finish military personnel were also attached to the Battalion, under operational control.\textsuperscript{10} 101 Battalion deployed as part of the Irish commitment to the MINURCAT mission that had been established in Chad and the Central African Republic in March 2009, having taken over from the European EUFOR bridging mission, which had deployed in 2008. Our mission comprised assisting with maintaining a safe and secure environment, protecting civilians, deterring criminality/banditry, and liaising with and facilitating Aid Agencies and Humanitarian Organisations in their efforts to assist the almost 40,000 Refugees, the approximate 85,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and the many disadvantaged members of the local population, who were located in our Sector of Operations.\textsuperscript{11} The commander’s leadership style aspired to be one of inclusiveness, aimed at creating from the outset an ethos of belonging and ownership amongst all members of the Battalion, in relation to the role that we had been assigned and the execution of the job at hand. The UK’s Leadership in Defence Manual (2004),\textsuperscript{12} which is extensively used by the DF, proposes that true leadership relies on a two-way relationship between the leader and follower. Citing Adair,\textsuperscript{13} it notes that leaders and followers share the same characteristics of needs and wants, though their motives may be different. From the outset, I was aware of the necessity to engender this positive two-way relationship; communication, honesty and respect were key enablers in this regard.

Understanding Humility

Tangney notes that dictionary definitions often paint a negative picture of humility, linking it with self-abasement, low self-esteem, and humiliation.\textsuperscript{14} Means, Wilson, Sturn, Biron, and Bach (1990), summarise humility as: a willingness to admit one’s faults; a recognition that one cannot control all social encounters; an attitude of patience and gentleness with other people; and a sense of empathy for others.\textsuperscript{15} Exline and Geyer posit that humility is likely to stem from a sense of security, in which feelings of personal worth are based on stable and reliable sources (e.g. a belief in the value of all life), rather than on transient, external sources such as achievement, appearance, or social approval.\textsuperscript{16} Their survey participants generally responded that humility could be considered a strength, and they mostly associated humility with good psychological adjustment. The link with Emotional Intelligence (EI) is apparent.\textsuperscript{17} Morris, Brotheridge and Urbanski contention that higher levels of emotional awareness and management predict higher levels of humility, suggests that EI and humility are very much intertwined.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{10} The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish certain missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time or location; to deploy units concerned and to retain tactical control of these units.
\textsuperscript{11} Sector South was approx 120,000kms squared; Darfur was on our Eastern Boundary and the Central African Republic to the South. The climate was austere, with day-time temperatures rising to between 40-45 degrees Celsius almost daily. The road network consisted of desert track; a 50km journey would typically take 4-5hrs. The main town in our area of operations was Goz Beida. Operations were conducted either using armoured personnel carriers (desert track) or through transportation by helicopters.
\textsuperscript{12} Op Cit.
\textsuperscript{14} Cited in Exline and Geyer, op cit.
\textsuperscript{15} Cited in Ibid.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{17} EI – a set of emotional and social skills that influence the way that we perceive and express ourselves, develop and maintain social relationships, cope with challenges, and use our emotional information in an effective and meaningful way.
Compelling modesty, a calm determination, an individual who channels ambition into the company rather than oneself, and one who takes responsibility for poor results are considered by Collins as key traits of personal humility.\textsuperscript{19} Drawing from a diversity of sources, Morris et al. suggest that humility is a more complex construct than had sometimes been portrayed in the past.\textsuperscript{20} They proffer a range of views emanating from recent theorists in their attempts to illustrate humility namely; a trustful understanding of one’s strengths and weaknesses;\textsuperscript{21} an accurate assessment of one’s abilities and achievements, and the ability to keep these assessments in perspective;\textsuperscript{22} requires both accurate self appraisal and a belief that all human beings have a positive worth which should be respected;\textsuperscript{23} and finally a positive human trait that is both stable and enduring, and is influenced by situation factors.\textsuperscript{24} Drawing from their definition of humility, Morris et al. identify three connected but distinct dimensions of humility, namely: ‘self-awareness’, which involves understanding one’s strengths and weaknesses; ‘openness’, which entails a willingness to learn from others; and ‘transcendence’, which suggests an acceptance of something greater than oneself, an understanding of the small role that one plays in a vast universe, an appreciation of others and a recognition that others have a positive worth.\textsuperscript{25}

While they argue for the inclusion of humility in the list of traits required for successful leadership, Morris et al. highlight a number of situations when the presence of humility may not benefit the leader. One of the examples cited is that of a humble leader who may do a disservice to his organisation by being unable or unwilling to put himself at the centre of attention, when this behaviour may be necessary to inspire a critical shared organisational vision.\textsuperscript{26} In a similar vein, Exline and Geyer note that those who fail to self-promote or to demonstrate their superiority, run the risk of being short-changed in competitive situations, or when dealing with highly aggressive, dominant people.\textsuperscript{27}

The United Kingdom’s Defence Leadership Centre, in acknowledging that humility is not a quality immediately associated with the military or government professions, offers the opinion that it is undoubtedly confused with meekness and timidity. Its 2004 Leadership in Defence publication identifies the key components of humility as welcoming diversity, appreciating one’s own fallibilities, valuing others and respecting their contribution, and suspending judgement; it further identifies humility as the attribute that mitigates between confidence and arrogance.\textsuperscript{28} Doty and Gerdges (2000) in highlighting the negative undertones associated with humility, namely a lack of toughness and resolve that is essential in an effective leader, argue that the humble leader lacks arrogance not aggressiveness, and that the desire to serve others eclipses any drive to promote self.\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{19} Op Cit.
\textsuperscript{20} Op Cit.
\textsuperscript{25} Op Cit.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{27} Op Cit.
\textsuperscript{28} Op Cit.
\textsuperscript{29} 2000, Op Cit.
I agree with Morris et al's suggestion that humility is the antithesis to narcissism, and I posit that humility is both a positive and very desirable leadership attribute; the presence of which, given the correct circumstances/environment, can be a very significant leadership enabler at all levels. Possessing humility, according to the literature reviewed above, suggests the co-existence of a range of interlinked traditional military leadership values/traits in the incumbent's make-up, such as; respect, courage, honesty, teamwork, fairness, flexibility, empathy, maturity, judgement and selflessness. Notwithstanding this, I suggest that the examples posited by Morris et al. and Exline and Geyer identifying situations where the presence of humility may not benefit the leader, cannot be ignored. An awareness of this potential downside may assist the incumbent to counter the possibility of it materialising.

One could argue that considering its positive constituents, drawn from the literature reviewed in this Paper, that it seems paradoxical to suggest that a lack of self-confidence, low self-esteem, indecisiveness and/or timidity, amongst other associated negative connotations, can be associated with humility. The possibility that these conditions could be caused by other factors; for example, a lack of competence, due diligence or professionalism, or as a result of the environment/background from which the individual derived, could be an interesting topic for future research – I would suggest that the complexity of the study in hand is apparent.

The Call for Humility
The Christian Faith has championed the call for greater humility for millennia; humility as a virtue is a major theme of both the Old and New Testaments. The context is generally one of service to God, and also of outlining the ethics and values that we should apply in our relationships with each other. Religious traditions have undoubtedly been the source of the ethics/values espoused in the various professional environments of today. Robinson, De Lee and Carrick note that this has traditionally been the case at Sandhurst and the British Army.

Alluding to the Press as a type of barometer of societal attitudes, Morris et al. highlight the relatively recent shift in emphasis from worship and adulation by the public of celebrity CEOs, to their distrust and denigration of these business leaders, as scandals affecting many of the large corporations in the US began to dominate the business news. We can certainly empathise with these sentiments in Ireland, following the recent catastrophic collapse of our banking and construction sectors, and the associated collateral on-going damage inflicted on our economy. Collins proposes that leadership by those who possess true humility may bring significantly greater benefits to the organisation relative to benefits realised from CEO’s of the ‘celebrity’ variety. In coining the term Level 5 Leadership, Collins suggests that Level 5 Leaders while still ambitious have as their primary focus the success of the organisation rather than their personal success. My research suggests a

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31 The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst is the British Army Officer induction training centre.
32 Op Cit.
33 Op Cit.
34 Collins found that consistently high performing organisations shared several important characteristics, the most counterintuitive of which was that great companies were led by Level 5 Leaders, individuals who possessed a paradoxical blend of extreme humility and tremendous professional will.
significant ‘buy-in’ to these sentiments from a wide range of theorists/authors, who rely on or support Collins’ ideas.

Kakabadse posits that the person-centred interpretation of leadership, so dominating leadership thinking over two millennia, is considered not sufficiently robust to provide answers to present day stakeholder pressures. I suggest that he alludes to some of the core constituents of humility, in proposing that transformative leaders need to listen as well as be consistent, persistent and focused, in order to both empower others and maintain momentum. He contends that a leader, who exhibits such transformative power, deeply penetrates the soul and psyche of others and thereby raises in others a level of awareness that rejuvenates people to strive for ever greater things.

The United Kingdom’s Defence Leadership Centre undertook a study from 2002-04 to determine the qualities/skills that were considered fundamental to effective leadership. Prior to the study the difficulty posed in reaching consensus on the elements, or how to measure or identify them was acknowledged. The study was extensive comprising four strands of research. Humility was one of the eight leadership attributes selected, which obviously is testament to the high importance placed on this quality by the British Armed Forces. A point to note is that the Defence Leadership Centre believes that the eight attributes are considered relevant for today, for the people and the context, and that it is their intention to continue to review them to reflect contemporary ideals in the fast changing times in which we live. Robinson et al. in comparing the military values and virtues of nine different Armed Forces, which they study in their book, note that the focus of the listed values and virtues is undeniably inward-looking and that they are overwhelmingly those required to make a soldier effective in a purely functional sense. Humility is mentioned once (the UK) and respect three times (Israel, Norway and the US); in relation to ‘respect’ they note that it could be interpreted as respect for all persons and/or mutual respect only concerning one’s military colleagues. A call for a greater prevalence of humility and mutual respect related virtues can be deduced. Concerning outward-looking virtues, Doty and Gerdes highlight the importance of humility which they contend will facilitate the requirement for culture awareness and sensitivity on peacekeeping operations. They cite as an example, that “loud, obnoxious arrogant ‘mediation’, simply will not achieve compromise during a town meeting between Albanians and Serbs’ – a sentiment that many Irish troops, including the author (two six month tours of duty to Kosovo in 2004 and 2008), can easily relate to.

36 The study comprised a review of leadership literature; a questionnaire survey of all Brigadier Generals in the armed forces and their equivalents in the Defence Civil Service, which was followed by an interview with selected candidates; a workshop for senior stakeholders facilitated by the London Business School; and research undertaken by Cranfield School of Management, which involved an analysis of data on leadership performance obtained anonymously from a 360-degree appraisal of senior personnel who had completed the Defence Strategic Leadership programme.
37 In addition to Humility the other attributes selected were; Integrity, Vision, Communication, Decision Taking, Innovation, Professional Knowledge and Developmental Focus.
38 Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Israel, Japan, Norway, United Kingdom and United States.
39 Robson et al, op cit.
40 Op Cit.
41 The DF initially deployed a Transport Group to Kosovo in 1999 under UN Resolution 1244; it was subsequently replaced by an Infantry Group in 2003, and this commitment was maintained until 2009. The DF continues to deploy twelve personnel to the mission Headquarters.
Humility as part of the Military Leadership Brand

The Defence Leadership Centre (2004) acknowledges that leadership still attracts suspicion, with overtones of a hierarchical and militaristic authoritarianism that is out of tune with the contemporary culture of the new millennium. It observes that military leadership still seems inescapably shackled to caricature, and together with those who hold authority in public life, these leaders are often portrayed as simple stereotypes of megalomaniacs and egotists, concerned only with the pursuit of self interest and aggrandizement at the expense of the led.

Several American authors identify a lack of humility amongst leaders in the US Forces. Doty and Gerdes contend that humility amongst military leaders is uncommon. They also express the opinion that you do not need the attribute of humility to be a leader; however, they imply a possible weakness/shortfall in the leader who may be lacking in humility, by emphasising that character matters in leadership, and that authentic humility in the leader will assuredly engender trust and collaborative effort within the organisation as the group aspires to great achievement. Wertheimer expresses the view that there is an endemic lack of humility in the US military, evidenced by the Military Academy’s dismissal of the study of moral reasoning as worthless and irrelevant to the military’s mission. Amongst other matters he argues that education in moral reasoning creates a disposition in the leader to consider opposing opinions. He does note that Academy leadership textbooks do commend due humility, but that it ranks way down the list of traits regularly emphasised. This perception of elements of the US military is fairly common, and in some instances it is probably accurate; the US, maybe for good reason, regularly talk-up their military capability.

It is conceivable that the perception of the military officer being overly confident and authoritarian is not uncommon in our own culture, a reputation that may have materialised due in some way to the stereotyping alluded to earlier by the Defence Leadership Centre, influenced by the film industry and aspects of the media. Some retired DF officers recount the initial apprehension they encountered, emanating from their junior civilian work colleagues, during the early weeks in their new employments; often their new colleagues knowing the individuals military background, expected a rigid, disciplined, hard task master to materialise. The widely held civilian perception of the military leader, in my experience, is that of an individual who is good at planning and organising and bringing structure to events; this opinion is most likely formed as a result of exposure they have had to the individuals concerned in their local environments, as part of sporting and community organisations. The question of arrogance does not tend to arise, because there is no great evidence of its existence, or that the matter is not aired due to the good manners and politeness on the part of our civilian contemporaries – I believe the former to be the more likely.

42 Leadership Brand – a shared identity among your organisations leaders, that differentiates what they can do from what your rival’s leaders can do; the perception that customers have of your organisation’s leadership ability. Ullrich, D. and Smallwood, N. (2011). ‘Leadership Brand.’ Harvard Business Review, Managing for the Long Term. July / August.

43 Op Cit.
44 Op Cit.
Following my thirty-five years service, and given my recently enhanced understanding of humility, I would suggest that the vast majority of leaders in the DF possess varying levels of humility; there is of course, as with any organisation, a ‘scattering’ of self-serving type individuals, some of whom it must be said are very effective in their positions. Given my earlier statement concerning the education gap experienced in relation to humility, one might ask how this prevalence of humility has come about. Without going into great depth, I would suggest that in many instances the individuals concerned have probably absorbed their humble tendencies from the environment and the people encountered throughout their lives. Significant influences on this environment most likely included: our families; exposure to the Christian ethos, which had an almost exclusive influence on our education system, and has always had the virtue of humility front and centre as part of its teaching; and the focal points around which we gathered – including family, church and community events. The challenging military education and training undertaken, and the experience gained in executing our tasks, in what is a unique work environment, is a very significant contributing factor. It is possible that our colonial history, together with its associated oppression, has also been an influence. Today’s young leaders tend to be much more confident and outspoken than was the case when my generation were at their stage; they don’t necessarily accept things at face value, and will usually seek further clarification if they deem it necessary – not a bad thing in my opinion. From the outset of their careers, the importance of looking after the welfare of the troops under their command is emphasised. The military decision making process, which they learn/implement, facilitates input from colleagues and hence some of the aspects that we associate with humility are cultivated at an early stage. Life experience will likely develop further aspects of humility over the years. The most noteworthy difference however, is the significant change that has occurred in our society in recent years; secularism has grown and the traditional influences of the extended family and the church have been diluted, negating these sources of influence on the development of humility in the individual. The passing of time will determine the extent of this dilution and whether it presents a problem for the organisation.

Prior to our deployment to Chad I addressed the personnel of 101 Battalion emphasising, amongst other things: the importance of respect for one another and for those with whom we would come in contact with; the fact that all of the members of the Battalion were ‘vital cogs in the wheel’, and that we were fully dependant on each other in order to achieve our mission; I proposed that if we were professional and honest in our endeavours, that we could expect everyone to deliver to the best of their ability, and that we could depend on each others support in any situation. I also stressed that we would all have to demonstrate effective leadership at our respective levels. On reflection, I can say that I spoke from the heart with a view to developing the two-way relationship that would be necessary to succeed. I believe, for better or for worse, that the content of my talk reflected my character which has been influenced significantly by my family, the military, my life experiences and my Catholic education. I am of the view that the vast majority of my contemporaries, finding themselves in a similar situation, would have taken the opportunity and delivered a comparable type address – given its sentiment, I would posit that it is evidence of the existence of a degree of humility in the DF Leadership Brand.
Acquiring Humility

Similar to wisdom, I would posit that it is likely that humility can be developed in the individual, and together with the environment in which we find ourselves, age and life experience are key facilitators with regard to this development. Doty and Gerdes contend that an individual may be taught humility by a parent, teacher, coach or mentor; that one may be humbled following a profound public embarrassment so significant to be life changing and value-altering; or that one may acquire humility after being in an important position and realising the pervasive of time and good fortune.46 Collins (2001) reinforces this view; in giving real examples of life experience as they affected certain Level 5 Leaders, he includes instances of serious illness, avoiding tragedy by chance, and as a result of a strong religious belief or conversion.47 In addressing the question as to whether Level 5 Leadership can be developed, Collins identifies two categories of people:

- Those possessing the necessary seed within them – the capability resides within them, perhaps buried, ignored or simply nascent; under the right circumstances he contends that it will begin to develop.

- Those who don’t possess this seed – he proposes that they will never bring themselves to subjugate their own needs to the greater ambition of something larger and more lasting than themselves; they are in it for what they can get out of it.48

Having made the case for the inclusion of humility in the list of critical competencies or traits required for successful organisational leadership, Morris et al. conclude that they are convinced that the process of developing greater humility is inextricably linked with developing one’s spirituality.49 I would suggest that the psychological state, the journey through life and the religious connotations of transcendence are apparent. Doty and Sowden report that during interviews conducted with 12 former Brigade Commanders, who had all commanded US troops in either Iraq or Afghanistan over the past number of years, that there was a recognition that the Army does not do a good job of developing soldiers morally and ethically.50 They contend that character competency is as important as tactical competency. To address this issue they propose that character must be developed and not taught and suggest a powerful ‘pedagogical method’, espoused by Dr Lee Knefelkemp from Columbia University, which gets people out of their comfort zones, making them feel uncomfortable by facilitating discussions on subjects that they don’t want to talk about. It is claimed that the process causes cognitive dissonance in individual’s minds, which challenges their beliefs and leads to change. If you accept that the presence or absence of humility has an influence on one’s character and their ethical disposition, I suggest that one can conclude that humility as a constituent of character can be developed in this instance. Ulrich and Smallwood propose a similar type approach in the development of executives, to the effect that by placing executives in unfamiliar territory, it forces them to develop new skills and not always rely on their core strengths.51

46 Op Cit.
47 Op Cit.
48 Op cit, p. 75.
49 Op Cit.
51 Op Cit.
A conundrum exists regarding how to measure humility, which obviously has implications with regard to how you would gauge its development in the individual. Notwithstanding their conclusions, Morris et al point to the requirement to develop a reliable and valid measure of humility as no widely recognised measure exists.\(^{52}\) Morris et al. and Collins highlight the paradoxical connotations of self-assessment in relation to humility e.g. humble individuals may not consider themselves to be humble.\(^{53}\) This may very well be the case with persons who possess extreme levels of humility; however, given the understanding of humility as portrayed in this paper, I posit that those located in the vicinity of the middle of the spectrum, where one end represents the haves and the other the have-nots, would be in a position to measure their levels of humility to an extent. Goleman, Boyatzis and Mc Kee and Walker contend that an individual’s EI can be enhanced with the help of others through accurate feedback from colleagues in relation to how our actions affect others.\(^{54}\) Given the link with EI, I would posit that the same could be said in relation to the development of humility. I am inclined towards Collins et al’s. viewpoint, that if the seed exists - then the potential to develop it exists.

While it sounds clichéd, I can say that from before we left Ireland, I had felt very humbled in relation to the support and goodwill that I received from all quarters within 101 Battalion – my own appreciation, was reinforced throughout our tour of duty and that effect continues to this day, long after the Unit has been stood down.\(^{55}\) Given the austere conditions in which we were operating, the attrition rate on equipment (that had to be maintained), and the physical demands made on individuals, this life experience has further enhanced my awareness and appreciation of the importance of the team effort, and the essential input that is required from all participants in order to ensure that the Unit’s operational capability is sustained. Doty and Gerdes's contention that one may acquire humility after being in an important position and realising the pervasive nature of timing and good fortune is not lost on me.\(^{56}\)

**Implications for the Defence Forces**

Leadership is a key functional component of the DF; it involves the projection of personality and character to inspire people to achieve the desired outcome. *Leadership in Defence* suggests that trust is arguably the most important facet of leadership, and that it may eclipse rational analysis where people are prepared to endanger their lives or reputations for a worthy cause.\(^{57}\) The importance of humility as a constituent of character and as a key enabler for the leader is highlighted by Doty and Gerdes, who suggest that when authentic humility is applied to relationships, mutual trust develops and stirs an abiding sense of loyalty and authentic modesty creating an environment to achieve great things.\(^{58}\) The military commander has a unique authority in that he can place the lives of his personnel in danger in pursuit of the mission. This may be applicable for leaders at all levels; consequently it is suggested that the relationship between the leader(s) and the

52 Op Cit.
53 Op Cit, op cit.
55 Composite Units that come together for deployment overseas are stood down following their return from the mission area – the majority of personnel return to their parent Units from which they originated.
56 Op Cit.
57 Op Cit.
58 Op Cit.
led must be such that the necessary levels of trust exists. I propose that the association between leadership, trust and humility is very much intertwined, and that the evidence from literature and previous studies presented in this Paper suggest that humility is a key enabler in developing and delivering effective leadership. It is suggested that the DF should determine the importance to be placed on the attribute of humility in relation to its education, training and culture – the Leadership Working Group may be best placed to advise on this matter.

My research has confirmed that in recent years leadership development now gets a lot more attention in the various educational and training institutions of the DF, than heretofore. Doty and Sowden’s contention that character must be ‘developed and not taught’ is made on foot of evidence emanating from the recent US experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is proposed that the DF review their process for character and leader development to ensure that the theory delivered in the lecture room is further developed in the practical exercise environment – the method of having people engage outside of their comfort zone, as espoused by Knefelkemp, and Ulrich and Smallwood, presenting in this instance moral and ethical problems or having personnel discuss related subjects that they are not comfortable with, certainly merits serious consideration.

It is suggested that as is in the case of the UK, the DF needs to be cognisant to the societal context that pertains, and that it continues to review its character development process to reflect contemporary ideals in the fast changing world in which we live.

**Conclusion**

As a result of my research, I would agree that humility is indeed a complex construct. I suggest that it is a state of mind, that it is closely associated with EI, and that the incumbent is likely to be well grounded, secure and in a positive psychological state – ‘generally happy in his or her skin’. Based on the literature reviewed in this Paper, I would put forward self-awareness, openness, transcendence, respect, tolerance, outward-looking, empathy, accountability, selflessness and modesty as key components of humility. Given this, it seems paradoxical to suggest that a lack of self-confidence, low self-esteem, indecisiveness and/or timidity, amongst other associated negative connotations, can be associated with humility. The prospect of the humble individual not representing his organisation effectively in a contentious/domineering environment is real in my opinion, and it should be countered through an increased awareness of this potential weakness by the individual, and an appropriate level of application/determination on his/her behalf.

I consider that the literature reviewed reveals that there are varying levels of humility amongst the vast majority of DF leaders. However, I doubt whether humility is perceived by outsiders to be part of the DF Leadership Brand – the organisation may need to consider its requirements in this respect. As with EI theory, I contend that it is possible for the individual to develop humility, on condition that he/she is well disposed to doing so, and assuming that his/her character is conducive to the process – an awareness/understanding by the individual of the components of humility will assist the process.

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59 Op Cit.
I contend that the presence of humility is potentially a key attribute and enabler for leaders at all levels; its effectiveness is dependent on the individual applying this attribute in tandem with other recognised leadership traits as the situation demands. Notwithstanding this, given the uniqueness of the military profession, and the fact that its members are often called upon to put their lives in danger, the military leader must retain the ability to be authoritative regarding his decision making when required to do so.
The Forgotten Voice: Christians of the Middle East

ABSTRACT
Christianity predated the rise of Islam within the Middle East. Despite persecution and minority status, a Christian community has always survived there. Recently, however, the Christian population has declined significantly. Violence directed against them has caused death and migration. This, coupled with falling birth rates, spells disaster for their long-term presence. Through examining the narrative surrounding the death of an Iraqi Chaldean Priest, this paper develops an understanding of the region’s often overlooked Christian community. It argues that Christianity within the Middle East matters and a potential Middle East without Christians, as a culture and a people, should not be allowed to develop.

Iraqi by birth, Ragheed Ganni was fanatical about religion. He was an ordained priest of the Chaldean Rite of the Roman Catholic Church and was murdered along with three religious sub-Deacons on the steps of the Church of the Holy Spirit, Mosel after celebrating Mass. A Deacon wife witnessed these killings and gave a chilling testimony:

At a certain point, the car was stopped by armed men. Fr Ragheed could have fled, but he did not want to because they were looking for him...Then one of the killers screamed at Fr Ragheed, ‘I told you to close the Church. Why didn’t you do it? Why are you still here?’ And he simply responded, ‘How can I close the house of God’. They immediately pushed him to the ground, and Fr Ragheed had only enough time to gesture to me with his head that I should run away. Then they opened fire and killed all four of them. Why did they make me a widow? Why did they tear the word ‘papa’ from the mouths of my children? What did we do wrong? ³

The simple answer to these questions is that Fr Ganni and his Deacons died because they were Christians. Although part of a religion that has existed in the Middle East since the time of Christ, they were deliberately targeted by their fellow countrymen, as they were no longer recognised as belonging to the narrative of the region.

The powerful narrative of Fr Ganni’s death can be interpreted within the concept of ‘thick description’. ⁴ Ponterotto explains that such a story injects a web of detail, context and

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¹ Unless otherwise stated, Roman Catholic Church and Catholic Church are interchangeable.
emotion into historical experiences. More than a story is told; the narrative gives voice, feelings and meaning to the protagonists and can be analysed for second and third order inference. Andrews, Squire and Tamboukou, contend that investigation of such narratives as a method of enquiry ‘...can help us describe, understand and even explain important aspects of the world’. This technique provides a gateway through which a deeper vein of analysis can be acquired. Therefore, the narrative surrounding one murder allows the development of tacit knowledge concerning other similar events, and the consequences that flow from them.

Fr Ganni’s death was both violent and brutal, but the surrounding story is equally vicious. Two sentences stand-out from the witness statement:

**Why are you still here**, and **how can I close the house of God** are more than a gunman’s quote and a murder victim’s dying words. As the final earthly dialogue both heard and spoken by a modern martyr, they are worthy of investigation. The narrative hidden in each and the context of both, describes not only the death of a single Christian, but shines a light on the difficulties the Christian community faces in today’s Middle East.

**Why are you still here** is a powerful statement. Simultaneously it is questioning, demeaning, contemptuous, aggressive and penetrating. It demands an apologetic answer to explain or excuse the presence of an individual, a people and a religion. It requires a response that accounts for, or rejects, a religious faith. Embedded in its construct is the implication of longevity, that the Christian community has been a continuous and historical presence in the Middle East. But it also displays a dark narrative of foreboding. It says your days are numbered and your presence is no longer wanted. Leave or die.

Fr Ganni’s last breath is, likewise, symbolically loaded. His answer demonstrates an inability to avoid death through compromise. Even if he wanted to seal the house of God, Fr Ganni could not. He was constrained by his faith; by his position as a leader of his flock and by a presence, not of this world. As a response, **how can I close the house of God**, accepts the inevitability of death and embraces martyrdom. As a Christian, Fr Ganni would rather die for belief, than escape his death by a lie.

The murder of Fr Ganni was not an isolated incident. Between 2003 and 2010 over 2,000 Christians were killed in Iraq alone. This figure includes Fr Ganni’s immediate superior, Archbishop Paulos Faraj Rohho of Mosul, who was kidnapped, tortured and his body dumped in a shallow grave. Describing the consequences of this death and those of many ordinary Christians, the Archbishop of Erbil in Northern Iraq, Bashar Warda, explained that numerous Christians have fled their homes due to intimidation and violence, coupled with an attitude of indifference to their plight from those in authority. He concluded that the very survival of a Christian Middle East, as a people, a religion and a region, is under threat.
Modern military education expects officers to reflect, see behind issues and develop ‘a mind that is flexible and able to analyse…in order to make timely and logical decisions’. This approach develops the function of understanding, identified as ‘a non-discretionary element of decision-making’. To understand complex ‘pivotal regions’ such as the Middle East, militaries have taken a cultural turn and the influence of anthropologists and cultural experts has grown. Despite such advances, Fr Ganni’s death and the flight of Christians from Iraq took place during the stewardship of the broadly Western military coalition governing the country; it happened on our watch. Did we really understand? Through examination of the death of Fr Ganni, certain themes emerge. Each provides a building-block supporting the contention that Christianity in the Middle East matters and that the potential of a Middle East without Christians as a culture and a people, should not be allowed to develop. In short, the following second order questions are explored: what is faith and why was it important to Fr Ganni and others like him? Who are the Christians of the Middle East? What factors explain their demise? Finally, what would a future Middle East resemble without a Christian presence?

These questions receive scant attention in mainstream deliberation. Contemporary events, such as the Arab Spring and the rise of political Islam, require an inclusive debate to comprehend the complexities inherent in the modern Middle East. Middle Eastern Christians cannot be overlooked in any such discussion. A people, history, culture and civilisation that has existed for over 2,000 years is now threatened. We risk the loaded question of why are you still here being replaced by where have they gone?

Faith
It is reasonable to query why Christians of the Middle East do not simply renounce their religion and convert to Islam in order to protect themselves. This proposition could, perhaps, provide them with a life free from persecution and violence. The answer to such a question, however, lies within the concept of faith. Implying complete trust, confidence and conviction in a core belief, religious faith is key to understanding the dilemma now facing the Christian communities of the Middle East.

Attempting to explain faith, novelist David Foster Wallace, utilises the analogy of fish swimming in water. When an older fish asks a younger one, how is the water, he receives the answer: ‘what the hell is water?’ This story demonstrates how humanity both exists within, and is surrounded by, a sea of faith. It also shows that faith can be personal, yet simultaneously groups require it to survive. Theologian Terrence Tilley maintains that we may believe that we have faith, but our understanding of what it actually is, and how it works, is such that we cannot question it fully, in ourselves or in others. He defines

faith as ‘fundamentally a relationship between the one who has faith and that which one has faith in’\(^{18}\) and posits that a true understanding of faith provides humanity with the explanation of what people live for, and more importantly, what they would die for.\(^ {19}\) Applying such thought to Fr Ganni’s story is simple. Faith was central to his existence; he both lived for it and was willing to die for it. But, how does the concept of faith resonate with communities in general and the Christians of the Middle East in particular?

Tilley again assists in understanding this group aspect of faith. He demonstrates that faith has a moral component that shapes societal patterns of behaviour; an emotional component that provides us with satisfaction and fulfilment, and a rational component that reveals to us what is important and what we believe in.\(^ {20}\) In Christianity, faith may be expressed as a creed, but to Tilley this concept is vague, and he articulates how our relationship with the ‘one we have faith in’ is best understood by ‘knowing how people live in and live out their faith’.\(^ {21}\) Theologians place emphasis on the symbols and ritual practices associated with faith and outline how such factors combine to bind a society or group together.\(^ {22}\) Cultural anthropologists broadly agree with the assumptions made by Church academics. They view religion as a part of a cultural superstructure that is the ‘collective body of ideas, beliefs, and values by which a group of people make sense of the world and their part in it’.\(^ {23}\) Religion is thus seen as an organised system, associated with ceremonial practices and rites of passage, through which people interpret elements outside their normal control.\(^ {24}\) It has a psychological function, in that it provides a model to explain life; a social function, which controls a group and sets guidelines for behaviour; and it also impacts on social cohesion and assists in maintaining group unity.\(^ {25}\) Thus the persistence of religious faith and the social norms it creates allows an identity to develop that links the Christian community with their spiritual homeland.

In summary, theology, anthropology and science all attempt to explain faith. Whereas each approaches the subject from a different angle, a degree of commonality is demonstrated. Faith and religious belief draws a society together, providing the bonds, anchors and guiderails that a group uses to define what it stands for, and importantly, what differentiates it from those outside its social construct. Critically, it permits individuals and groups to decide what is important in their lives and what they would give their lives for. It is not something to be altered on a whim.

**Who Are They?**

Fr Ganni was an ordained Chaldean priest. His Church is but one of a kaleidoscope of Christian Churches within the Middle East. Many Arab towns possess a skyline that displays an array of competing Church steeples and not just the minarets of Mosques. These structures metaphorically represent different communities, all fighting for influence.\(^ {26}\)

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19 Ibid., p. 46.
20 Ibid., pp. 26-56.
24 Ibid, p. 313.
Christianity was born in the Middle East. From Palestine it spread rapidly to the peoples of Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt and Iran.27 Over time, Christianity extended to the West and today is a world-wide religion.28 Despite the universal nature of Christianity, the Middle East is the cradle of the faith and the location from which the Western and Eastern divisions of Christianity grew.29 In order to preserve unity, Ecumenical Councils were held, many of which created union and consensus,30 but at others, splits and schisms occurred that continue to resonate.31 Consequently, in broad terms, the Christians of the Middle East are divided into five families.

The first grouping, the largest numerically at approximately 45.5 million, is the Oriental Orthodox Churches.32 This includes the Coptic Orthodox Church, the Armenian Orthodox Church and the Syrian Orthodox Church. Their doctrinal position is based upon the first three ecumenical councils (325, 381 and 431) and they reject the Council of Chalcedon (451).33 Historically persecuted for their faith by Byzantine, Muslim and Ottoman powers, until the 1960s they had limited contact with the Roman Catholic Church.34

The Eastern or Byzantine Orthodox Churches, sometimes referred to as Arab Christians, are the second grouping. This family principally comprises those who continue to practice in the Byzantine tradition and have allegiance to one of the four ancient patriarchates of Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem. Each is self-governing in administrative terms, but collectively they share a theology and liturgy that only recognises the first seven Church Councils. The division that created these Churches is theologically complex and evolved over Papal authority and political power. It culminated when attempts by the Western Church to enter the filioque into the text of the Nicene-Creed was rejected by the East.35 This led to the Great Schism of 1054, a division that eventually saw Western Christian Crusaders sack the Eastern capital of Constantinople in 1203.36

The complexity of the Eastern Orthodox is reflected in the Eastern Catholic Churches. This group comprises those Christians of the Middle East who are in full communion with Rome.37 The Maronites, with one million members in Lebanon alone, make up the largest sub-group, with the Chaldean Catholics of Iraq, of which Fr Ganni was a member, being the second largest. The remaining Churches are, in essence, Catholic mirror versions of the Oriental or Eastern Orthodox Churches and developed from

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30 The First Ecumenical Council (held in Nicaea - now Iznik in Turkey - in 325), for example, established the cornerstone of Christian faith, the Nicene Creed. It also condemned the heresy of Arianism and organised the structure of the Church under the major centres of Rome, Alexandria (Egypt) and Antioch (now Antakya in Turkey). See Ayres, Lewis. (2006). Nicaea and its Legacy. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
31 The Fourth Ecumenical Council (held in Chalcedon - now Bithynia in Turkey – in 451), for example, defined the doctrine of one person, two natures of Christ. This was not universally accepted and a schism developed. The Oriental Orthodox Churches continue to reject this theological concept. See Roberson, Ronald. OSB. (2008). The Eastern Christian Churches: A Brief Survey, 7th ed.Rome, Pontifical Oriental Institute, p. 19.
32 Exact figures are difficult to identify as records within the region are unreliable. Unless stated, total figures include the diaspora.
33 The Fourth Ecumenical Council (held in Chalcedon - now Bithynia in Turkey – in 451), for example, defined the doctrine of one person, two natures of Christ. This was not universally accepted and a schism developed. The Oriental Orthodox Churches continue to reject this theological concept. See Roberson, Ronald. OSB. (2008). The Eastern Christian Churches: A Brief Survey, 7th ed.Rome, Pontifical Oriental Institute, p. 19.
34 O’Mahony, Anthony, in O’Mahony and Flannery, op cit, pp. 8-10.
35 This theological debate concerns the essence of the Holy Spirit. The Latin term filioque was added to the Nicene-Creed by the West and thus it read ‘who proceeds from the Father and the Son’ This is still considered heresy by Eastern Orthodox Churches. See: Ware, Timothy. (1967). The Orthodox Church, Hammondsworth, Middxex, Penguin Books, pp. 58-60.
37 They are in broad theological union with the Roman Catholic Church, yet retain their own identity.
either internal schisms or conversion. The term Latin (the language of the West) is often used to describe these Churches. 38

The penultimate Christian community is the Assyrian Church of the East; also known as the Church of Persia. This ancient Church, which in places continues to use Aramaic, is numerically small with approximately 400,000 members. From a homeland in Mesopotamia, Assyrians are credited with the original missionary work that brought Christianity to Afghanistan, India and China. This Church today is mainly found in Iraq and parts of Iran, with a diaspora, chiefly based in America. 39

The fifth and last Christian family encompasses the various Protestant, Evangelical and Anglican-Episcopalian Churches within the region. Converts from both Islam and the other four traditional Christian communities, as well as expatriates, comprise the bulk of these groups. Their presence commenced in the early nineteenth century with the colonisation efforts of nations such as Britain and Germany.40

It may appear that internal differences preclude harmony; however, the Middle Eastern Churches themselves see internal unity as a critical requirement for existing. This was enunciated by the Catholic Patriarchs in 1992 who stated ‘in the East, we Christians will be together or we will not be’.41 In broader terms, Kasper points to a growing awareness that East and West need each other to survive because ‘since its separation from the East, Latin Christianity has developed unilaterally; it has, so to speak, breathed with only one lung and is impoverished’.42 Progress in this has been solid, with the Roman Catholic Church and the Orthodox Churches of Byzantine tradition declaring themselves Sister Churches in 1995.43 Local difficulties will always persist, indeed travel writer Dalrymple when in the Middle East exploring the lost heritage of Christianity, encountered a Greek Orthodox Monk who firmly held that the Roman Pope was the Antichrist.44 Although events such as the Great Schism and the Council of Chalcedon continue to cause theological difficulties, Christians principally ascribe themselves by their faith. Critically, they are also defined in the same way by their Muslim neighbours.45

Decline and its Causes
There are many dynamics that cause decline in the Christian presence within the Middle East. Crude population statistics, when examined, demonstrate that the reduction of indigenous Christians is an actual, quantifiable and continuing phenomenon. Precise figures are difficult to obtain and comparisons can be misleading due to changing political boundaries. Nevertheless, Vatican data estimated that in 2008, 1.6% of the Middle East was Catholic and 5.62% was Christian, equating to 20 million people out of an approximate total population of 357 million.46 Figures provided by the European

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38 Roberson, op cit, pp. 133-135.
40 Bailey and Bailey, op cit, pp. 101-102.
43 Bouwen, op cit, p. 94.
Centre for Law and Justice (ECLJ) are comparable to those of the Holy Sea. ECLJ estimate that in 1900, Christians comprised 22.71% of the population; this fell to 7.2% in 1970; 5.73% in 2010 and they forecast this will reduce to 4.43% by 2012.47 Depressing as these overall figures appear, they become stark when the countries associated with the historic locations of the five Christian Churches are analysed in greater detail. Figure 1, compiled from ECLC statistics, illustrates the Christian percentage of total population within these countries for 1900, 1970 and 2010. Based on historical trends, it estimates a figure for 2025.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY / YEAR</th>
<th>1900</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2025</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>18.61</td>
<td>17.79</td>
<td>12.18</td>
<td>10.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>3.61</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel-Palestine</td>
<td>8.08</td>
<td>2.73</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>1.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>5.84</td>
<td>5.18</td>
<td>2.82</td>
<td>2.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>77.41</td>
<td>62.04</td>
<td>35.46</td>
<td>31.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>15.66</td>
<td>9.68</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>21.77</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 1: Christian Percentage of Total Population**

Evidence from ECLC and the Vatican verify an increase in the rate of decline within the Christians cohort over the past twenty years and conservatively estimate that this acceleration has resulted in the Christian population falling by at least 2 million.48 Pontifex explains how a number of factors have converged to bring about a situation where ‘Christianity is under threat as never before and could yet disappear’49 from the Middle East. The simplest of these factors is migration, both internally within the region, and externally from the Middle East. Such shifting of people was described by Archbishop Louis Sake, Archbishop of Kirkuk (Iraq) as a disaster, representing not only a ‘haemorrhaging of humanity [but also]…of heritage, liturgies, spirituality and witness’.50 Persecution may be the principal basis for migration; however, this is occurring in tandem with demographic changes within the Christian population.

As previously explained, the Christian community is diverse in theology, but is bound by faith. This creates a societal group that, although Arab differs from their neighbours. This difference is reflected in norms, many of which transcend political boundaries. For the purpose of this research, norms such as fertility pattern, birth rates and the age structure of Christians are analysed to provide insight that assists in explaining decline.

Writing on fertility for the UN Population Division, Friedlander describes how prevailing societal structures and socioeconomic conditions are the principal explanations for changes in fertility patterns.51 His research, comparing the birth rates of Israeli, Muslim Arab,

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48 Ibid.
49 Pontifex, op cit, p. 10.
50 Sako, op cit, p. 5.
Christian Arab and Druze populations, reveals that Christian birth rates of 2.5 per woman (in 2000) was close to the level required to sustain a population, which is 2.2 births.\(^{52}\) He explains that the Christian community ‘has a higher socio-economic status than the Moslems [sic]…in various respects, such as educational attainment, occupational status and income’ \(^{53}\) and therefore, fertility rates for Christians have dramatically reduced from 7.6 in the 1930s to 2.5 in 2000. These figures broadly correspond to more up-to-date applied social research studies conducted by the Myers-JDC-Brookdale Institute. Their data (reproduced in Figure 2) reveal how Christian fertility rate actually dropped below the population sustainment barrier of 2.2 in 2010.\(^{54}\) Brookdale’s figures demonstrate that Christian fertility has consistently been below that of Muslims, but during the 1970s it also dropped under the Jewish rate.\(^{55}\) Both examinations identify Muslims as the more fertile group, despite their birth rate declining from 9.2 in the 1960s to 3.8 in 2010. Neither study anticipates a change in this relativity, with Friedlander concluding that ‘a meaningful decline in the Moslem [sic] fertility is unlikely in the foreseeable future’. \(^{56}\)

![Figure 2: Fertility by Religious Groups](image)

Data from both Friedlander and Brookdale confirms the research of McGaehern. She posits a Christian fertility rate of 2.15, verses 3.73 for Muslims\(^{57}\) and validates that Christians tend to be employed in higher socio-economic classes, are better educated and therefore have a lower deprivation index in comparison to Muslims.\(^{58}\) She additionally states that the Christian population is relatively older than Muslim society, with the average Christian being 10 years senior to the average Muslim.\(^{59}\) All three studies, draw data from Israel and the Palestinian Territories, but also reflect a wider Middle Eastern trend. Fargues undertook similar investigations in Egypt and Lebanon where the drift was

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\(^{52}\) Ibid, p. 441.  
\(^{53}\) Ibid, p. 443.  
\(^{55}\) Ibid.  
\(^{56}\) Friedlander, op cit, p. 446.  
\(^{58}\) Ibid, p. 51.  
\(^{59}\) Ibid, p. 47.
comparable: Christians have a lower fertility index in comparison with the majority Muslim population.\(^60\) Even when this difference is minimal, as in Egypt, he concluded that ‘…the result of decades of differential birth rates, started to have an effect, and the percentage of the Christian population continued to fall.'\(^61\)

To summarise, the erosion of the Christian population can be partially explained by societal norms. Resulting from their relatively high social status, Christian fertility has traditionally been lower that the regional average. This has steadily fallen and currently, in certain areas, has reached a level where the birth rate cannot sustain an enduring presence. The Muslim community, in comparison, possess a high birth rate and a young population. Although their fertility index has reduced, it is consistently above the replacement threshold and has always outstripped that of Christians. Therefore, even without the pressures of persecution and discrimination, the long-term future of Christianity in the Middle East is under demographic and societal strain from an ageing population that is not being replaced.

The longitudinal process of declining births leads to a slow, painless death and stands in stark contrast to the brutal killing of Fr Ganni. It was previously explained that Fr Ganni’s murder was not an isolated incident. The 2011 report of the charity ACN documents killings, kidnappings, beatings, rapes, intimidation by graffiti and text messages, as well as the destruction of churches, property and livelihoods, all taking place in the Christian heartland of the Middle East.\(^62\) In essence, the Christian East is dying, but unlike falling fertility, this death is quick and brutal. Reflecting in January 2011 on such attacks, Benedict XVI made the plight of Middle Eastern Christians central to the annual Papal address to the Vatican accredited Diplomatic Corps. \(^63\) The Pontiff framed the rights of Middle East Christians within the privileges and liberties theoretically extended to citizen of a state. In many parts of the region, however, the concept of citizenship does not equate to that of Western countries.

McCallum outlines how religious diversity continues to lie at the heart of a ‘discourse concerning…presence and activities in the Middle East’.\(^64\) The core of her argument is that whereas the Christian community recognise themselves as Christians, they do not see this as a contradiction when conflated with citizenship. Thus they require the state to treat them as equals and enshrine laws that afford them rights equating to those given to their Muslim fellow citizens. This concept is not, however, generally recognised in the Arab world. McCallum states that in most Islamic countries religion has preserved its significance and continues to influence political and social affairs.\(^65\) Confiming previous research by Sidney Griffith, who sees the current persecution of Christians firmly anchored in the past,\(^66\) McCallum posits that the ‘role of Christians has long been determined by interpretations of the view of the Prophet Muhammad and subsequent caliphs...[and]...
in contemporary Islamic thought, this dilemma has yet to be resolved. Oriental scholar Bernard Lewis has also studied this phenomenon. Describing the political and social norms of Middle Eastern states, he explains that the centrality of Islam results from the failure of Muslims to recognise the separation of church and state. Contrasting this with the Christian attitude of ‘render…unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s; and unto God the things that are God’s,’ Lewis states:

For most of the recorded history of most of the Muslim world, the primary and basic definition, both adoptive and ascriptive, is not country or nation, not race or class, but religion, and for Muslims, that of course means Islam. In their view, it is religion that marks the distinction between insider and outsider, between brother and stranger and at times between friend and enemy.

Accepting the argument of McCallum, Griffith and Lewis implies that perceptions from Islam’s past continue to be imbedded in contemporary attitudes and policies. Such a realisation explains emigration as, despite their historic presence, Christians remain partial citizens and outsiders and see little future in their homeland. It also implies that historical concepts, such as *ahl al-kitab*, *dhimmis* and Crusading, continue to resonate and actually underpin violence.

Clarifying the term *al-kitab*, Samir demonstrates how Muslims have historically recognised the status of Christians and Jews in the context of *People of the Book* (believers in the God of Abraham). This offered Christians protection, but second-class status, in return for undertaking certain duties and obligations, such as paying a special tax. Samir explains that Christians were tolerated, and could function in society as long as they did so ‘under the control and within the jurisdiction of the Muslim system.’ This concept developed into the *dhimma* system where Christians or Jews who did not convert to Islam were seen as *dhimmi* members of the *dhimma* system or diminutive in status. This provided safeguards to non-Muslims, but religious liberties such as visible worship, constructing churches, ringing bells and the freedom to convert others to Christianity were forbidden. Samir concludes that *dhimma* was a form of societal coercion because if Christians were tempted by social advancement they had little chance of progression unless they chose to renounce their faith. Similar to the longitudinal impact of falling birth rates, Samir sees *dhimma* as causing Christian decline not by violence, but by stealth. He justifies this hypothesis by quoting Muslim theologian al-Ghazali who advocated a non-violent approach to conversion because ‘if the first generation only adheres to Islam in word, the second will adhere in heart and the third will consider itself as having always been Muslim.’

Acknowledging the historic meaning of *dhimma*, Ye’or, however, disagrees with the non-violent discourse proposed by Samir. In a substantial study of the subject, she

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67 McCallum, op cit, p. 7.  
70 ibid, xiv.  
72 ibid, p. 70.  
73 ibid, p. 74.  
74 ibid, p. 75.
sees the process as one of total subjugation and violent repression. 75 Christians, in her opinion, were given few options and were looked upon as a ‘particular type of sub-human society…which encompassed and accompanied them from cradle to grave.’ 76 Ye’or frames her argument within the context of the Koran and jihad and posits that reducing the numbers of Middle Eastern Christians was conducted as a deliberate policy, interpreted by Muslims as the will of God. Whereas the analysis of Ye’or and Samir are diametrically opposed on the implementation of dhimma, both agree that the impact on the Christian community was devastating. They each conclude, separately, that the theory of dhimma endures and directly undermines a continued Christian presence in the Middle East. Khalil Samir estimates that the idea is embedded in the sub-consciousness of Arab Muslim states, 77 whereas Ye’or sees it reoccurring within the context of the rise of Islam, the attraction of shar’i law and the ideas of anti-Western jihad. 78

Attempting to understand the social factors affecting the relationship between Muslims and Christians, Michel maintains that each community carries a burden of history from which anger and violence flow. 79 He asserts that for many Muslims the principal historical event colouring their perception of the West is the Crusades. 80 Historian Jonathan Riley-Smith confirms this view and explains that ‘as far as the Muslims are concerned…crusading is…still a reality. Conducted in a more sophisticated and effective way than ever before.’ 81 Therefore, a rhetoric associated with Western intervention in the Middle East is created around the concept of a returning Crusade. The West is portrayed as renewing historic attempts to capture Muslim lands, attack the Islamic faith and exploit Muslim resources. The West is also depicted as the source of liberal and morally corrupt views that challenge Muslim traditional values. 82

To some Muslims, the Crusades were not simply Western; they were Christian, and they ‘planted in Muslim hearts the seeds of suspicion and doubt against their Christian compatriots.’ 83 Thus, the Muslim narrative equates Eastern Christians to a kind of fifth-column, orientated towards Western interests. As Rosen explains, once this mind-set is in place, the other who is ‘perceived as not part of one’s identity group, is demonised and all too often portrayed…as the perfect model of malice’. 84 Christians, consequently, who have traditionally been seen as dhimmi, are easily portrayed as Crusaders or agents of the West, despite their Arab lineage. Logic is created that transposes discord against the West onto those who are perceived as representing it. Therefore, when the killers of Fr Ganni referred to him as you, they demonised him as a person, a Christian, an outsider, and also as a Western surrogate.

76 Ibid, p. 106.
77 Samir, op cit, p. 77.
78 Ye’or, op cit, p. 265.
80 Ibid, p. 62.
82 Rabo, Annika. (2012). ‘We are Christians and we are Equal Citizens: Perspectives on Particularity and Pluralism in Contemporary Syria,’ Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 23, no.1, p. 89.
83 Bailey and Bailey, op cit, p.15.
An Empty Cradle?
The remaining line of enquiry, devolved from Fr Ganni’s martyrdom, concerns what a future Middle East might resemble if denuded of its Christian presence. To envisage this, the past contributions made by Christians to Arab society are investigated.

The Christian population of the Middle East has existed for centuries within an overwhelming Muslim society. Under the dhimmi system they had second-class status and were excluded from certain professions and positions. Christians were, however, able to flourish in niche roles as Islam precluded Muslims from several career choices. Ye’or relates how a skilled Christian administrative class developed under dhimmi as Muslim officials assigned the collection of taxes from conquered Christians to their coreligionists.85 Christians also worked as accountants, advisors to Muslim rulers and often found employment in diplomatic positions where their talents were utilised to forge alliances with neighbouring Christian states.86 Samir offers a longitudinal analysis of this aspect of Christian-Muslim relations. He traces the history of Christian employment and influence and demonstrates how, even to this day, Christians play a central role within education, commerce and the medical profession as well as in cultural activities such as painting, printing and literature.87 Samir’s research confirms the findings of authors such as McCallum and Milton-Edwards who posits that the Arab nationalist movement of the 20th century provided Christians with a mechanism to gain political traction and protection.

Educated and influenced by Western modernity, Christians saw pan-Arab nationalism as a means to replace the centrality of religious identity with a society based upon the rights of equal citizenship.88 Christians were active in the Arab Communist Party, were leading advocates for Egyptian independence, supported the Palestinian cause and Michel ‘Aflaq (a Syrian born Greek Orthodox Christian, educated at the Sorbonne) founded the socialist Ba’th Party in 1947.89 Christians have traditionally been tolerated by the authoritarian leaders who controlled the Arab world until the recent Arab Spring. As a minority, possessing a political ideology and a faith not as threatening to the state as their more fundamental Muslim neighbours, they were subjected to relatively less repression. This is not to say that state violence was never directed towards Christians, rather they were normally treated as ‘a religious minority performing useful social or economic functions...in exchange for...limited amount of protection from the political authorities’.90 Preece develops this theme and asserts that religious minorities are in a precarious position. Their contribution makes them an integral component of a flourishing society, but the value measure of this input is transient, and interpreted at the whim of the controlling political elites.91 Thus, Christians have to tread a fine balance and often must give tacit support to despotic regimes as a survival mechanism. Samir posits that such political acceptance is cyclic. He sees Islam remaining the controlling philosophy and therefore, when the Islamist paradigm of the majority population is adopted by

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85 Ye’or, op cit, p. 73.
86 Ibid.
87 Samir, op cit, pp. 77-90.
88 McCallum, op cit, pp. 4-5.
89 Ibid, p. 9.
91 Ibid.
those in authority, repression of Christians re-emerges. When this happen, the attitude displayed towards Christians turn from acceptance to tolerance and eventually spirals towards violence.

Currently we are witnessing such a cycle. Authors such as Hamid argue that Islamic ideals and norms are becoming the dominant political discourse within the Middle East and he maintains that the religious values of Islam now increasingly coexist with the political and social systems of the majority of the region’s states. The Middle East, therefore, risks losing the important voice that Christians have always provided within the public discourse; to paraphrase Preece, the utility of Christian will be marginalised. Should this happen, the fundamental construct of the Middle East will be altered because, as explained by the Issam Fares Centre in Beirut, ‘there is no Arabism without Christians’.

Conclusion

The contemporary decline of Middle Eastern Christians is a complex reality. Christians tend to have a fertility rate which is low and a high disposition towards emigration. In places, their community has reached a stage where it can no longer regenerate and support an organised social structure. This lack of youth, coupled with demographic ageing, spells long-term death for Christian society. Of more immediate concern is the upsurge in violence directed against Christians. Citizens’ rights, as recognised in the West, are not always generic in Islamic societies. Past perceptions of ahl al-kitab, dhimmis and Crusading continue to have utility and facilitate the portrayal of Christians as outsiders, second-class citizens and lackeys of the West.

The contribution Christians make to Arab society is historic, pioneering and real. As the current changes sway the Arab world from secular yet despotic rule to one where Islam is becoming the dominant political force, Christians find themselves increasingly isolated and the limited political protection they once enjoyed is eroding. Yet, despite violence and intimidation, Christians remain. They do so because of religious faith, historical connection and loyal citizenship. Like the death of Fr Ganni, their demise goes under-reported. It is time their voice was heard and understood. Waiting until the discovery of an empty cradle will be too late.

92 Samir, op cit, p. 90.
94 The Issam Fares Centre promotes freedom and cultural progress in the Arab and Mediterranean region. Its views on Arab Christianity are at: http://www.if-cl.org/Library/Files/uploaded%20Files/escore.doc (accessed May 10, 2012).
The Kosovo Conundrum: Nato, Security Sector Reform and The Kosovo Security Force

ABSTRACT
This article examines NATO’s role in Security Sector Reform (SSR) using the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) as a specific case study and explores the complex issues that have arisen from this task. NATO’s decision to stand down the Kosovo Protection Corps and establish the KSF, thereby contributing to the development of SSR in Kosovo, was implemented, in spite of international and regional political concerns with the process. The existence of UNSCR 1244, the partial application of the Ahtisaari plan and the unique status of Kosovo has meant that this capacity-building role is fraught with complexity. If SSR best practice is not possible in Kosovo the KSF may not become the ethnically unifying force that it could be. Different understandings of the SSR process exist between the donor and recipient, including how both parties view the KSF as a non-military or military force. However what is clear is that the establishment of the KSF was a necessity in the slow process of normalising Kosovo within an international context of Serbian EU membership discussions and the NATO strategic vision for the Balkan region.

Introduction
On 12 June 2008 NATO agreed to start implementing its ‘new’ tasks in Kosovo which centred on standing down the Kosovo Protection Corp (KPC) and establishing the Kosovo Security Force (KSF), with a civilian structure to oversee the KSF. NATO directed KFOR to implement these tasks and the Military Civil Advisory Division (MCAD) was established in order to facilitate this aspect of Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Kosovo. The KPC was formally dissolved on 14 June 2009, while in parallel the KSF was established and was brought to Initial Operational Capability (IOC) by MCAD. Although COMKFOR reported to NATO that the KSF was ready for Full Operational Capability (FOC) in Dec 2011, FOC was not announced until 9 July 2013.

There are two complex, interconnected areas which need to be focused on in order to explain the conundrum. The first matter to consider is Kosovo’s status. Kosovo is unlike Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Afghanistan, Haiti, and any number of other states where SSR is carried out. Kosovo is unique because it is regarded by some nations as a sovereign state, by others as still a part of Serbia, and by bodies such as the UN, EU and...
NATO as a protectorate. The UN does not recognise Kosovo as an independent state\(^5\) and does not recognise post Declaration of Independence bodies in the proto Kosovar state.\(^6\) NATO says that it is “status-neutral” with four members not recognising Kosovo as an independent state\(^7\) and others such as the USA, having bilateral training agreements with Kosovo,\(^8\) which any two independent states might have. There appears to be no definitive legal definition of Kosovo. Does it in fact exist in an international law vacuum?\(^9\)

The second matter relates to the position and nature of the KSF as a post Declaration of Independence body.\(^10\) The KSF is not officially a military force because the UN mandate 1244 and the Military Technical Agreement (MTA) allow for no military force in Kosovo except for NATO (KFOR). There are indications that The Institutions in Kosovo (IiK)\(^11\) will in time use the KSF as the nascent foundation for a Kosovan army. KFOR must uphold UNSCR 1244, so why would NATO/KFOR train a force which may become a military force, contrary to UNSCR 1244? Resolution may be sought by examining SSR as a concept and NATO’s modern role in this concept. SSR is a holistic concept incorporating policing, intelligence, military, justice, and security structures of a state. This article focuses on the military aspect of SSR.

**Security Sector Reform – The Concept**

SSR as a concept was initially an incoherent and confusing theory which was due to roots in a mix of Civil-Military Relations and Development Studies from the 1950s and 1960s. This led to government donors concentrating on reduction of military spending in developing nations, to find money for developing other sectors, rather than any meaningful reform of the security sector itself. However, it did not increase the democratic control or operational effectiveness of the security sector. The model was seen as flawed as the other sectors’ development was threatened if a stable security sector did not exist.\(^12\) The modern SSR model originated from concerns in the 1990s that some developing countries were failing to achieve sustainable development because of conflict and insecurity.

SSR in general\(^13\) follows two key principles of (re)establishing a security infrastructure to provide public security efficiently and doing so within a framework of democratic control. SSR post-conflict has the additional difficulty of addressing the legacies of violent conflict.

Brzoska and Law provide a practical definition of SSR as something that:

\[\ldots\text{includes all potential players, institutions, policies and contextual factors affecting security...SSR exemplifies a thrust for good governance - that is transparent, accessible, accountable, efficient, equitable and has democratic processes of decision-making – and implementation.}\]

\(^5\) Currently 89 UN member states recognise Kosovo as an independent state.
\(^6\) The UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) does not recognise bodies such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the KSF.
\(^10\) The locally elected Provisional Institutions for Self Government (PISG) (Kosovan Government) declared independence on 17 Feb 2008.
\(^11\) Institutions in Kosovo (IiK) – elected Government, since European Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) became operational 2009.
\(^13\) NATO carried out SSR with ‘Eastern Block’ countries such as The Czech Republic, but these were not post-conflict states.
The OECD states that SSR is a political process:

SSR has an explicitly political objective — to ensure that security and justice are provided in a manner consistent with democratic norms, human rights principles and the rule of law.\(^\text{15}\)

By fusing, Brzoska and Law and The OECD Handbook on SSR a list of SSR principles that represent modern opinion on the concept can be extracted. The objectives of SSR can be summarised as:

- Provision of security;
- Insurance of certain norms in the delivery of security;
- Effective and efficient performance of security sector institutions;
- Development of local leadership and ownership in the process;
- Sustainable delivery of justice and security.

To attain these objectives three main groups of shaping measures must be undertaken:

- Disarmament, demobilization, reintegration (DDR) and transformation of armed forces to re-establish a state monopoly on the legal use of force;
- The creation of new security institutions where none exist and preventing re-emergence of repressive institutions/bodies;
- Building up of accountable, efficient and effective security forces.

Furthermore the OECD proposes five basic principles of SSR:

- People centred, locally owned, based on democratic norms and human rights principles;
- Seen as a framework to structure thinking about how to face diverse security challenges;
- Founded on activities with multi-sectoral strategies;
- Developed according to good governance principles such as transparency and accountability;
- Implemented through clear processes and policies for justice to be delivered equitably.

**The Challenges**

There are two significant conceptual challenges relating to SSR implementation. The first one stems from SSR bridging previous discourses of security policy, peace-building, democracy promotion and development cooperation. The concept requires close collaboration between very different communities — the development and conflict transformation community on one side and the traditional, military focused

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security community on the other. The military, security community views, “SSR – with an emphasis on security actor capacity-building – as a short-term exit strategy”, while the conflict transformation community considers SSR, “as a component part of longer term reconstruction and development.”16 But this may be an unfair generalisation. For example, KFOR inherited various responsibilities in 1999 and continues to this day to perform duties more suited to civilian agencies. Also KFOR has been involved in capacity-building for over a decade and is still engaged. Furthermore, donor countries often provide for both communities. The EU members contribute to both KFOR (military, security community) and to EULEX (conflict transformation community). Therefore, if cost or the length of the mission becomes an issue for donors, both communities will find political will lacking to support an SSR process.

The second challenge is that there are different approaches among national and international donors, resulting in an incoherent policy. In essence the decision-making environment has been fragmented due to the fact that SSR issues tend to be shared amongst international (UN), regional (NATO, EU) and national organisations. The communication across these jurisdictions is sometimes weak. This permeates right down to the tactical level. “In relation to MCAD, the Division would be best served and have more of an impact if the mentors were from one country only. Multinational involvement does not help to achieve goals unless they can work from a recognised KSF training doctrine which does not exist in print at this time.”17

The other practical challenges specific to military peacekeeping forces involved in post-conflict SSR include the requirement for mentors not only to be a fighter but also a peacekeeper, policeman, diplomat, social worker and capacity-builder. Any type of external intervention is examined in the light of international legitimisation and deployments are becoming more internationalised. Therefore while the responsibility of providing a safe and secure environment (SASE) with a multinational force is challenging, the additional tasks of SSR can be particularly difficult to implement.

Figure 118 presents a SSR conceptual framework. SSR should be implemented over time through shaping measures and application of principles in order to achieve the objectives. However, challenges exist, which can not only disrupt the achievement of these objectives but also disrupt the application of SSR principles.

17 Comdt S Rockett (2013), member of MCAD, interview with author.
In a 2011 address to NATO members, Secretary General Rasmussen succinctly described NATO’s modern role:

**Smart Defence is not about NATO imposing anything on nations. It is about enabling them to work better, more effectively and efficiently together. NATO’s role is to set the strategic direction, to identify possible areas of cooperation, to act as a clearing house, and to share best practices.**

In 2013 in Ireland he continued this theme:

**NATO, the European Union, and the Defence Forces of Ireland, all need the right capabilities to get the job done. Yet acquiring and developing such capabilities during a major economic crisis represents a particular challenge. One way to overcome this challenge is through increased multinational cooperation. This means nations working together to deliver military capabilities that they cannot afford to deliver on their own...because we live in tough economic times and each of our nations only has one budget and one set of armed forces.**

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The building or reform of an army is a huge undertaking and multinational organisations such as NATO have a greater capacity in this regard than one single donor nation. Linked to this is the understanding that SSR requires a comprehensive approach in order to reform all aspects of the sector. In Kosovo, EULEX and NATO run SSR projects side by side. The Berlin Plus Agreement of 17 March 2003 is a political framework designed to support the strategic partnership between the EU and NATO and as 21 of the 27 EU members are NATO allies, this should be a closely coordinated relationship. However there are potential obstacles for developing this cooperation. It is possible, for example, that the USA will support the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) only as long as it does not challenge NATO’s primacy as the military decision-making body in Europe. In practice, to date, Turkey has obstructed all developments beyond the Berlin Plus agreement over its stance on Cyprus. In essence, both NATO and the EU are the sum of their member states, and if these do not agree on how or where SSR should be implemented, future post-conflict SSR efforts shall be constrained. Therefore political strategic differences may lead to practical challenges to SSR implementation.

The basis for NATO redefining its roles in Kosovo comes from the NATO new strategic concept ‘NATO 2020’. This document presents an insight into its strategy in the Balkans, which is basically that all former Yugoslav republics will be welcome to join NATO, accepting that one applies for membership, meets required standards and that it is voluntary. Currently NATO is providing a Ministerial Advisory Team (MAT) to prospective or new members throughout the Balkans, and one of those teams is in Kosovo.

NATO has moved from focused engagement in 1999 through to deterrent presence, and is now planning to move to minimum presence as the security situation improves. Part of the conundrum in Kosovo, is that while NATO is preparing for minimum presence and implementing SSR, in order to create a sustainable homogenous locally owned security sector, there is no internationally recognised government to hand over these responsibilities to. SSR was designed for transforming failed and post-conflict states but is Kosovo a state? NATO cannot accept a military force in Kosovo other than itself under UNSCR 1244, yet it is standing up the KSF. NATO cannot accept Kosovo into PfP because it is not a sovereign state in international law, yet NATO has a NATO Advisory Team (NAT) in the KSF ministry, implementing NATO standard procedures.

Kosovo and the KSF

The biggest problem in a post-conflict environment is dealing with former combatants, because they tend to be good at killing people… you need to put them into gainful employment otherwise they could revert to type.
By 2008 it was felt that the KPC, as a DDR tool, had run its course, was unaffordable and was not under civilian control. Therefore the KSF was established as a democratically accountable force. Figure 2 depicts NATO’s SSR plan for the stand up of the KSF. The NAC declared the KSF established (IOC) and the NAC will also declare FOC at a time politically acceptable to NATO.

**Lines of Development**

Stand-up of KSF

1. Personnel (Management, Recruitment and Vetting)
2. Security
3. Exercises and Operations (incl. Real Activities)
4. Logistics and Infrastructure
5. Policy and Plans (Regulations, Doctrines and SOPs)
6. C4I
7. Training (incl. Bi-lateral issues)
8. Budget and Finance
9. Civil Assistance

**Figure 2. Lines of Development: Stand-Up of KSF.**

The Kosovo Centre for Security Studies has argued that KFOR will hand over military tasks to the KSF – a move contrary to UNSCR 1244. Ironically this is exactly what the literature suggests should happen; that the peacekeeping force hands over responsibility for security to the newly reformed military force in order to promote recipient independence and local ownership, once certain standards are met. However in 2011 Major General Buhler recognised this as impossible in the Kosovo context. “For years to come I see no military tasks being handed over from KFOR to the KSF. It is politically not doable.”

Other security and SSR issues are interlinked with the key issue of KSF FOC and certain conditions need to be met for the comprehensive approach to be successful. These issues include a joint security concept and countering civil disturbances, border security.

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25 The KPC was seen as a direct descendant of the KLA, whose members were seen as freedom fighters by the Kosovo Albanians but as insurgent/terrorists by the ethnic Serbians. Therefore the KPC could never be seen as an organisation to help cross the ethnic divide.
27 KCSS, op cit.
28 Brzoska and Law, op cit, and OECD, op cit.
30 A joint approach by KFOR and EULEX to security issues in Mitrovica providing for EULEX tackling organised crime in Mitrovica.
administration, the Administrative Boundary Line (ABL), airspace management etc. All these issues are interlinked and are component parts for KFOR reducing its commitment to Kosovo thereby enabling NATO move to minimum presence and eventually withdraw.

On the surface the comprehensive approach appears to be working in Kosovo, with EULEX reforming the Rule of Law element of the security sector, UNMIK reforming the Kosovo Police and NATO creating the KSF. On closer inspection it appears that these organisations do not cross over into each other’s areas. Therefore the close cooperation required between these different sectors does not exist leading to a fragmented decision-making environment.

UNMIK by its nature and of its mandate is banned from talking to the KSF, because the KSF is a post UDI body. Therefore it was not created by UNMIK and the UN is not allowed to talk to it. You will find that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the mKSF and the KSF are bodies the UN does not deal with, because in the UN’s 1244 vision they don’t exist.

One glaring challenge that NATO cannot address alone is the recruitment of minorities into the KSF. The percentage of minorities in the KSF requires attention, especially with respect to Serbian members. The KSF have a long way to go in minority and gender balancing. Approximately 0.8% - 1% of the KSF are Kosovo Serbian with only 4.7% of the force female. The KP is far more representative of minority groupings, with approx 9% Serbian and 5% other ethnicities serving.

The factors creating these ethnic minority issues are numerous and complex and examination of them lies beyond the scope of this article. The MCAD is not capable of addressing this issue alone because MCAD has little or no capacity to influence the underlying factors. Therefore the establishment of an inter-ethnic unifying force is not currently possible. In mid 2012 I spoke to Mr Keith McBean, the Irish ambassador to the Protection and Security Committee of the EU. He stated that:

NATO has a defence orientated approach to issues, whereas the EU has the capacity for a more comprehensive approach to crisis management issues. NATO does not for instance have economic, development or social dimensions, while the EU has these and can bring together a wide range of complementary policies in seeking to solve complex issues beyond just initial security.

When I visited SHAPE also in mid 2012 one of SACEUR’s advisors stated that “Undoubtedly, the whole process of sorting out problems between Serbia and Kosovo

31 Border between Kosovo and Albania and FYROM.
32 The line referred to between Kosovo and Serbia. The responsibility for the security of the ABL is still with KFOR, while other areas have been handed over to the KP such as the border between Kosovo and Albania.
33 Universal Declaration of Independence by Kosovo.
34 Corbett, op cit.
is driven by the EU (the Belgrade-Pristina Talks).” Why therefore does the EU not engage with the KSF SSR process? One answer may lie with the issues of the Berlin Plus agreement which means that EU - NATO cooperation, on certain issues, is not as productive as it could be. The SHAPE advisor reveals another issue:

EULEX can only be more successful if they continue to receive substantial support from KFOR. Therefore many NATO/EU nations want KFOR to stay, in order to render continued support to EULEX. The problem is not so much SASE,37 but the lack of FOM38 for EULEX and KP.

The basic security situation is not benign enough yet for EULEX to deal with the complex issue of Northern Kosovo and, while NATO can deal with the security issues, the political situation still remains unresolved.

But what of the KSF recipients? One KSF Commander39 views the participation of NATO within the SSR process as beneficial, especially in the long term:

Participation with NATO makes us think not just about security in our country, but about security all around the world and it makes us think that we can be important participants in global security. It is also about preparation for peacekeeping missions abroad. The KSF expects to participate in peacekeeping missions abroad in the near future.

However the views of the KSF Commander also underline a continuous challenge in SSR implementation, which is to align the wishes of the donor with that of the recipient. “I think that KFOR should offer more military training for the KSF, and give it more responsibilities and just monitor and support the KSF in its daily routine.” This view is not shared by any of the donor interviewees or NATO documentation. The perception of how the KSF views itself, is far removed from the tasks NATO has given them, “We should understand that we are building a new army to the highest NATO standards…after FOC KSF is going to join NATO forces in missions abroad.” He claims that Kosovo’s institutions, including the KSF, are working very hard to join first PfP40 then NATO and then the EU, but that there are a lot of obstacles to this process. The “external” obstacles consist of countries “that work very hard to prohibit Kosovo’s progress and the KSF especially.” Serbia is central to the challenge of recruiting Kosovo Serbs to the KSF, which the KSF commander claims “is a very hot topic to speak about.” He claims that “Serbia is playing a negative role, and is not encouraging Serbians in Kosovo to accept Kosovo’s legal institutions; in fact it is doing the opposite.” This approach appears to have softened due to the agreement of April 19, 2013.41 However in spite of this agreement (or even because of it) it is unlikely that the KSF shall deploy/recruit to the northern enclave for the foreseeable future hindering the development of an ethnically representative KSF.

37 Safe and Secure Environment.
38 Freedom of Movement.
39 I worked with several KSF commanders in 2010/11 and continued my interviews into 2012. They requested that their names not be used.
40 KCSS, op cit.
41 Serbia has accepted the IiK’s authority to govern all of Kosovo, with Kosovo granting a large part of autonomy to the northern enclave. EU External Action Service. (2013). Serbia and Kosovo reach Landmark Deal, accessed at; http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2013/190413__eu-facilitated_dialogue_en.htm on 21 May 2013.
The KSF Commander’s “internal” obstacles differentiates between two groups in the KSF: one group “who worked in the ex-Yugoslavian army and were taught to work in a Russian system and it's very hard for them to accept and understand the new system,” and another group from the KLA that he bluntly calls “gangsters, who cannot change their mindset from the war.” Kosovo has serious corruption issues and although NATO’s vetting process for the KSF was extensive, corruption in Kosovo is endemic and therefore it is a challenge to the SSR process just as it is to security and democracy itself. However Kosovo is not unique as a post conflict state in this regard.

**Kosovo is Unique in SSR Implementation**

Once FOC is declared by the NAC, the executive control for the KSF moves from COMKFOR to the liK. What happens after this point appears to cause all some concern. Corbett observes that Kosovo “does not need an army... NATO is guaranteeing the territorial integrity of Kosovo.” Buhler is more apprehensive “it would be wise not to do it (declare itself an army) immediately after FOC. It would cause tensions and would not foster the dialogue... It would certainly not foster the integration into the EU for both parties, Belgrade and Pristina.” Rasmussen himself when announcing FOC stated that “The Kosovo Security Force Mission remains the same as it always has been...the Alliance will continue to provide support and advice through a NATO liaison and advisory team. KFOR's mission is also unchanged.” The NATO Secretary General is clearly indicating that even in FOC NATO does not yet see the KSF as an army.

KFOR is handing over certain competencies to the relevant authority, but has no legal authority to hand over its military presence role, to the KSF.

Kosovo considers itself an independent country even though parts of the international community does not...what to do? It is a dilemma. After the result of the ICJ ruling, which said that the Declaration of Independence was not against international law, one could argue that it is not against international law to set up a security force, or even an army for a country.

The SHAPE advisor sympathises with COMKFOR's position:

COMKFOR is in a difficult position...Some of the “big” nations want him/KFOR to support both EULEX and the liK even more... KFOR may be tied down in northern Kosovo for a very long time, doing somebody else’s job and filling in for the inability of others.

NATO nations are conflicted about downsizing and withdrawing from Kosovo as some of the nations want KFOR to remain to protect EULEX, while others view this as a policing role that the EU should take on itself. Conversely NATO needs EULEX to succeed in

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43 NATO, op cit.
44 International Court of Justice.
45 Buhler, op cit.
46 He is referring to larger, more influential NATO members here.
47 This comment is referring not only to NATO/EU/UN issues of responsibility but also of disagreement amongst NATO members on NATO’s role in Kosovo.
order for the political conditions to be set for agreement on northern Kosovo and the acceptance of the KSF. Within this complex and challenging environment one could argue that the KSF SSR project is a limited success, considering the issues both NATO and EULEX face. The agreement of April 19, 2013 is also very important but its implementation even more so if the situation in Kosovo is to be normalised.

**Conclusion**

SSR is a multi-faceted complex framework of systems, implemented in post-conflict societies, that espouses democratic control of security institutions, in order to provide individual and state security and allow the process of economic and social development. Such a progressive ambitious concept brings with it many and varied challenges, from post-conflict ethnic and gender issues to incoherent donor policies. Yet these challenges do not undermine SSR as a concept, rather they highlight how difficult SSR implementation is. SSR is inherently a positive process that is worth engaging in for both donors and recipients once the central principles of democratisation and recipient participation are adhered to and once the process is seen to achieve tangible benefit. SSR is also inherently a political process, therefore in countries with weak institutions and persisting tensions such as exist in Kosovo, greater emphasis should be placed on preparing political conditions for SSR, before encouraging ambitious and sensitive reforms.

In the aftermath of Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence, the KPC could not be allowed to continue, and the Kosovo security sector could not be allowed to stagnate in spite of international legal issues. NATO, as an organisation with a role in SSR, acted for political and also practical purposes. It replaced a post-conflict DDR type body, which had direct links to the KLA, with a new organisation that aspires to NATO standards and is democratically accountable; despite the fact that the legal and political conditions required for KSF SSR to be fully successful, have not yet been fully developed.

The KSF already views itself as a military force and as a symbol of Kosovo’s independence, and hopes to deploy overseas with NATO in the near future; which would be a further expression of Kosovo’s sovereignty. The premature declaration of the KSF as a military force is a cause of concern for NATO and the EU, as it is politically sensitive and may affect other issues. This may have been a factor in withholding the KSF expansion of recruitment to North of Mitrovica in the April 2013 agreement. Nevertheless, all parties appear to accept that in the long term the KSF will become a military force, with a continued role for NATO in the development of this force.

The KSF is, even in its infancy, a more professional, democratically accountable and effective organisation than the KPC. Since 2009, the KSF have been carrying out explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) tasks in Kosovo as assigned to them by KFOR. The KSF have also carried out various flood and snow relief operations in Kosovo and Albania including search and rescue tasks. It has bilateral training agreements with various nations, and is attempting to reach NATO standards in its doctrine, regulations and training, if not yet its operations. Therefore, despite the KSF’s current inability to act as an ethnically unifying organisation, it does offer tangible benefits to the aspiring Kosovan state.
Both NATO and the EU acknowledge the former’s limitations in creating political conditions for successful SSR, and yet this does not appear to have been addressed in the context of the KSF. The EU and NATO need to overcome the political barriers that hinder closer coordination with regard to SSR within Kosovo and the KSF in particular. The agreement of April 2013 brokered by the EU may actually halt KSF development as an organisation to fully reflect the ethnic diversity of Kosovo.

The EU and NATO do not have comprehensive strategic SSR policy documents and these need to be developed in tandem with the OECD DAC SSR handbook. The Irish Defence Organisation, as a member of PfP and the EU, and with officers deployed in SSR roles, is ideally poised to participate in this process, and participation should include the development of an Irish Defence Organisation SSR handbook for deployments of this nature. It was recommended as far back as 2008 that The Irish Defence Organisation needed to play a more active role in SSR but that “aligning security and development polices in an Irish context is the greatest challenge and needs to be addressed in the formation of an Irish SSR policy.”

The agreement of 19 April 2013; where Serbia accepted the Kosovan government authority over all of Kosovo, with Kosovo granting a large part of autonomy to the Serbs living in northern Kosovo, included the provision that; “Kosovo’s nascent armed forces will not be deployed in the north either.” This agreement was possible due to the negotiations between the EU and Serbia on Serbian membership negotiations. On 21 April 2013 the EU Commission recommended to EU national governments that Serbia should in June 2013 be given a date to open membership talks. While FOC has been granted by NATO on 9 July 2013, the fact that the KSF shall not, for the foreseeable future, deploy to and recruit from all of Kosovo underlines the difficulty of SSR in a post conflict environment and how the practical implementation of SSR often eschews the accepted principles and best practice.

48 There are numerous papers written on the EU, NATO and SSR, but there is no accepted strategic EU or NATO handbook or roadmap for SSR implementation.
Defence forces review 2013

The IRA Campaign From 1969 to 1998: A Case Study in Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Theory

ABSTRACT
This paper examines the period of the Northern Ireland ‘Troubles’ from 1969 to 1998 in the context of insurgency and counter insurgency theory. It focuses on two events which occurred early in the period, Operation Demetrius the campaign of internment of suspected insurgents by the Northern Ireland authorities and Operation Motorman the denial of so-called ‘No – Go’ areas. The paper contends that Demetrius, by not conforming to the principles of counter insurgency, was counter productive and disrupted the counter insurgency campaign. Motorman on the other hand, returned the momentum to the counterinsurgents by adopting a more doctrinaire approach and forcing the PIRA to adopt terrorist tactics. This approach forced PIRA into the long war strategy that eventually led to the Good Friday Agreement of 1998.

Introduction
The IRA, in its various forms, has existed and maintained an armed struggle, in some shape or another, against British rule in Ireland from the early part of the twentieth century to date. During this time, the conflict has taken many forms, including open armed revolt in 1916, guerrilla warfare such as that practiced during the War of Independence from 1919 to 1921 and the border campaign from 1956 to 1962, campaigns of terror on the island of Ireland and on mainland Britain, as evidenced by the bombing campaign of 1938-9. The scope of this paper, however, is the recent ‘Troubles’ from the arrival of the British Army onto the streets of Derry and Belfast in August 1969 to the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. It focuses in particular on two seminal events which took place in the early part of this campaign, and contrasts the approaches taken by the two conflicting parties to these two episodes. In doing so, it examines how these approaches deviated from classic insurgency and counterinsurgency theory, in order to test existing military doctrine - specifically that which derives from counterinsurgency study, against the actual events in question, thereby examining the validity of academic and military thought relative to the events in question. The reason these two episodes were selected

1 Max Caulfield’s *The easter rebellion*, New York, 1995, is a thorough account of the rising of 1916 and serves as an excellent source on all aspects relating to it.
2 There are many well known accounts of the War of Independence, or the Anglo-Irish War; less renowned is Ernie O’Malley’s *Raids and Rallies* which, in particular, provides first and second hand accounts of several episodes of the nature of guerrilla warfare, including ambushes and attacks on RIC barracks.
5 Ibid, p. 364.
is because they took place at a crucial moment in the history of the struggle; indeed by examining both events through the lenses of insurgency and counter-insurgency theory, this paper argues that they determined the nature of that struggle and the direction it would take for the next twenty-five years.

The issue of bias is to be expected in the study of any conflict, and the historic and emotive nature of the troubles fosters such distortion. A wealth of literature has been published on the subject, and within that field, inevitably, there are widely contrasting views and perspectives in evidence. Some authors of works on the British and Northern Irish security apparatus appear to display a frustration with the portrayal of their paramilitary opponents, particularly the IRA, as anything other than terrorists while apparently neglecting to search for possible reasons as to why a section of the population in one part of the United Kingdom could be driven to such extremes of violence over a protracted period. Authors of a different persuasion, while arguing that there may have been reasonable explanations for the origins of the IRA campaign, often fail to demonstrate that the ensuing violence could only generate resentment and terror among the Protestant unionist population in Northern Ireland. Indeed, it is not until much later on in the 1990s that IRA spokesmen themselves seem to recognise the extent to which their armed struggle affected ordinary Protestants, who felt that their entire community was under attack from their Catholic neighbours. Whereas such differences of outlook and opinion are not necessarily evidence of wilful prejudice, they serve to underscore the complexity of the conflict and the influence of different traditions and backgrounds.

It is the intent here to examine the doctrine and strategy of both the PIRA and the Northern Ireland security forces (NISF) in impartial military terms, noting in the sources used possible bias, in order to compare and contrast the insurgent and terrorist strategies of the PIRA and the counterinsurgent and counterterrorist strategies of the NISF, principally the British army and the RUC, but also other agencies and organs of state. In doing so, it is intended to approach the conflict from the point of view of both protagonists through the application of contemporary insurgency and counter insurgency theory, in order to demonstrate how the nature of the conflict transformed following Operations ‘Demitrius’ and ‘Motorman’, the subjects of this case study.

Theory of Insurgent Warfare

The idea of asymmetric warfare, or the use of smaller forces to engage, and possibly defeat larger, stronger ones, has been discussed for some time. Rupert Smith, in his work *The Utility of Force*, eschews the term ‘asymmetric war’ itself, but proposes an antithesis to the paradigm of interstate industrial war, the development of which he traces from the Napoleonic era. This antithesis takes the form of guerrilla war, and he traces its origins to the Peninsular War of the same era, chronicling its development alongside that of interstate industrial war. The theory of such warfare is first put forward by Von Clausewitz, stating that it is possible for weak forces to defeat strong ones, provided that they use the

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opponent’s weight and strength against him, much as a judo wrestler would. Smith goes on to outline the three distinct phases in Mao Tse-Tung’s concept of revolutionary war:

**First:** form cells within the community, ideally deep in rural areas and on a border with a sympathetic neighbour, in order to achieve a local dominance by corrupting and replacing government through massive use of propaganda and indoctrination.

**Second:** this local area is developed into a sanctuary by expanding the cell structure and linking with other liberated areas to form a region in which forces are prepared and food and weapons can be stored; this is coupled with an escalation of attacks on government institutions and military forces.

**Third:** formed forces consolidate the sanctuary and operate against government forces in other areas where the cell structure can support them. This phase will continue until the government forces are defeated in the field and revolutionary government has progressively taken over rural area after rural area until the cities fall as well.\(^9\)

Smith states that it was Vladimir Lenin, however, who first drew on Clausewitz’s thinking on the strategy of weak forces against strong opponents, with his discussion of a ‘people’s war’, which should rely on popular support and his argument that no single event could decide the outcome of such a war.\(^10\) Retired United States Marine Corps Colonel Thomas X. Hammes posits a similar argument to Smith’s antithesis to industrial war, with his idea of the evolution of fourth generation warfare (4GW), the first three generations having been previously set out as the advent of Napoleonic warfare after the French revolution, the industrialisation of warfare and its expansion in scope and horror and the introduction of manoeuvre at the end of World War I and into World War II.\(^11\)

In addition to this, Sheerin, drawing on the work of Mao, Guevara and T. E. Lawrence, sets out the key competencies necessary for the insurgent in asymmetric warfare as audacity, commitment, initiative and flexibility, as well as political and cultural sensitivity.\(^12\) Against this, the counterinsurgent commander's requisite characteristics are less clear, but must, according to Gen. David Patraeus, include initiative, adaptation and innovation.\(^13\) What is significant from this is that, as the insurgent is of necessity a flexible warrior, usually lightly armed, organised in small units, capable of adapting quickly to strike at enemy weakness at short notice, so the conventional military must counter the threat in a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign by devolving freedom of action to the lowest possible level, usually down to company commanders, as they will be at the forefront of the fight, bearing the brunt of the insurgent's action and must be empowered with the confidence to adapt at a local level to the needs of a rapidly changing situation as they see it.\(^14\) The commander of conventional military forces must, in order to succeed, be prepared to think unconventionally and adapt to the unique nature of the particular insurgency with which he is dealing, while drawing only on experience of lessons learned

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\(^{9}\) Ibid, p. 168.

\(^{10}\) Ibid.


\(^{13}\) Ibid.

\(^{14}\) Ibid.
in other campaigns which is of relevance to his situation in order to achieve an initial advantage over his opponent.\textsuperscript{15}

Of particular interest to us as we look at the case of the PIRA campaign in Northern Ireland is the Maoist idea of forming a base, preferably in rural areas, from which to conduct operations and expand the movement until it can achieve decisive armed conflict against the forces of authority. As we examine the two episodes below, we can see that during this time, the establishment of ‘No-Go’ areas would have been vital to the conduct of guerrilla war; consequently, their dismantlement was of paramount importance to the British army. Had they remained in place, they could potentially have facilitated the ongoing expansion of the IRA campaign throughout the next few years, escalating it to a point of decisive conflict which could have brought about their aim of forcing a government withdrawal from Northern Ireland completely. Instead, the campaign transmuted into one of terrorism rather than insurgency, as the PIRA reorganised in the late 1970s and embraced the strategy of the ‘Long War’.\textsuperscript{16} The possibility of decisive victory for the PIRA can therefore be said to have vanished at this point, leaving only a long and attritional war, which is why Operation Motorman (the dismantlement of the No-Go areas) is pivotal to the entire conflict of 1972-1998.

\textbf{Counterinsurgency Theory}

Modern British military COIN doctrine is set out in Army field manual volume 1 part 10 – counterinsurgency operations. This publication firstly examines in depth the area of insurgency in general, looking at three areas:

- The general concept of insurgency, including causes, characteristics, aims, and strategies of modern insurgents, along with studies of historical examples such as Lenin’s theory of international revolution, Mao’s protracted war, Guevara’s Foco theory (important in the context of the IRA throughout the twentieth century, as it proposes that the revolutionary forces do not have to wait for ideal conditions to strike but, by taking up arms, can become the focus of the revolution), urban warfare as practiced by Maringhela in Brazil and the threat of Islamism.\textsuperscript{17}

- The conduct of insurgency, looking at the context of, factors affecting and weak points within insurgencies, as well as taking a case study, ‘strategic deception, the North Vietnamese model 1964-72’.\textsuperscript{18}

- Insurgent tactics, including subversion, sabotage, terrorism, fundraising, weapons and equipment, rural and urban tactics and communications.\textsuperscript{19}

The manual goes on to outline, in broad terms, a theoretical approach to COIN operations. This lists the principles of COIN, but does not include much on specific tactics in any

\textsuperscript{16} Bell, op cit, p. 437.
\textsuperscript{17} Directorate General of Development and Doctrine, Army Field Manual vol. 1 Part 10 – Counterinsurgency Operations (AFM 1-10), Chapter 1, accessed at; http://www2.armynet.mod.uk/linkedfilesANOpen/aks/coin_afm/20100408_afm_vol1_part10_jar2010Oct71876-u.pdf on 06 May 2011.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid, Chapter 2.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid, Chapter 3.
given situation, as the manual itself acknowledges that ‘every insurgency is different’.20 These principles are:

- Primacy of political purpose
- Unity of effort
- Understand the human terrain
- Secure the population
- Neutralise the insurgent
- Gain and maintain popular support
- Operate in accordance with the law
- Integrate intelligence
- Prepare for the long term
- Learn and adapt21

This doctrine can be traced back to Maj. Gen. Sir Charles Gwynn’s *Imperial Policing*, written in 1934, one of the most important works in British COIN doctrine in the twentieth century, retaining currency throughout the years of the British army’s deployment in Northern Ireland.22 Gwynn sets out three principles which he believed must guide COIN operations:

- Minimum use of military force
- Use of firm and timely action (in accordance with minimum use of force)
- Unity of control; where this is not available, there must be close cooperation between agencies23

The use of minimum force became a constant guiding principle for military commanders in Northern Ireland and was explicitly mentioned in the ‘yellow card’, an aide-memoire disseminated to all individual soldiers on rules of engagement (ROEs).24 However, guiding principle or not, it was in deviating from this policy of restraint that the NISF scored ‘own goals’, including their most spectacular ones of ‘Bloody Sunday’ and the implementation of internment without trial in 1971.

Having examined contemporary and current insurgency and counterinsurgency theory, let us now look at how these theories played out in practice in the theatre of Northern Ireland, using as case studies two examples of military, paramilitary and political actions: the decision by Westminster to impose internment without trial in 1971, and Operation Motorman, which followed in 1972.
Operation Demetrius - Internment

On 09 August 1971, the military launched Operation Demetrius, beginning with an early morning swoop on known or suspected members of the IRA. The military operation had been conceived, planned and put into place on foot of Prime Minister Edward Heath acquiescing to Northern Ireland Prime Minister Brian Faulkner’s demand for internment without trial for suspected insurgents. Compare the effects of internment in August 1971 with those of internment being introduced during the 1956-62 border campaign, when the targeted nature of the campaign netted effective results with fewer arrests. Although those picked up were not, in the main, active service volunteers and no more than 187 persons were detained in any one year and only 113 were imprisoned out of 204 prosecuted during the entire campaign, the Special Constabulary were able to effectively impair the support network available to active service units. Compare these figures with those of Operation Demetrius, whereby 2,357 arrests had been made by January 1972, of whom 598 had been interned and 159 detained. What this served to achieve, rather than the desired effect of crushing the insurgency, was to alienate the Catholic population (Faulkner had insisted that no Loyalists would be targeted, thus the Catholic population felt that it was being unfairly discriminated against; no Protestants were interned at all until February 1973). It is not unreasonable to suggest that the success of the instance of 1956-62 relative to that of Operation Demetrius was due to the intelligence provided by the Special Constables, ensuring the sweep picked up valuable targets without overly antagonising the local population by needlessly bringing in large amounts of people not directly connected with the IRA; in 1971, the army was aware within the first twenty-four hours of the operation that mistakes in target identification had been and were continuing to be made, while Joe Cahill, the then Chief of Staff of the PIRA, claimed that only thirty volunteers had been captured among the hundreds arrested up to 16 August. British army commanders admitted that the structure and capabilities of the IRA, particularly the PIRA, remained largely undamaged; indeed quite the opposite: recruitment to the PIRA increased as did positive sentiment within the heretofore moderate Catholic community. Indeed, the army had recommended that internment should not be used at that time, prior to the launch of Demetrius. Faulkner had called on Heath for internment to be introduced for the purpose of defeating the IRA’s insurgency, but instead the outcomes were:

- A strengthening of the IRA, in terms of recruitment and sympathy, particularly the PIRA as the Officials (OIRA) were talking about ceasefires at this stage, while the PIRA were advocating violent action.
- Polarisation of the Nationalist and Unionist communities.
- A disastrous reduction in the flow of intelligence into the military.

25 van der Bijl, op cit, p. 39.
26 Bell, op cit, pp. 302-3.
27 van der Bijl, op cit, pp. 39-40.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid, p.41.
32 Ibid.
33 Beggan, op cit.
34 Ibid.
• International condemnation of the British and Northern Irish governments, and a deep deterioration in relations between Dublin and Westminster.  

• A failure to stem insurgent activity. In the four months after the introduction of internment, thirty soldiers, eleven RUC and seventy three civilians were killed. While this represented a reduction on the mayhem that had gone before, it was not the return to law and order promised by Faulkner to Heath.

Another consequence was the suspension of Stormont and the imposition of direct rule from Westminster. Now the sectarianism of Faulkner’s government which the Catholic population had suffered under was there for the entire world to see.

The reasons for the disastrous failure of internment between 1971 and 1975 are many, but include some of the key points highlighted in the examination of counterinsurgency theory. There was a lack of clarity of the political objective of the operation, which led to the unease expressed by General Officer Commanding (GOC) Northern Ireland and the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) in advance, violating the principle of military action being placed in political context and retained under control of the civil authority. The targeting process involved poor intelligence, based on out-of-date information, verified by the fact that many innocent people were caught up in the initial sweep. In one example, an officer of the OIRA recalled how ‘they arrested the guy who bought my house from seven months previous and he was interned for two or three months.’ The army failed to ‘secure the population’, as the Catholic population, seeing the process as wholly discriminatory against them were brought into direct conflict with the military, who had now become ‘fall-guys’ for implementing Faulkner’s sectarian policies. The military also failed to limit the use of force to a minimum, evidenced by the huge numbers arrested and detained, most of whom were not directly involved with the campaign.

On foot of this, the military were forced on the defensive, adopting a low profile policy. It would have been so for some time afterwards, had the PIRA not reciprocated with a propaganda ‘own goal’ of their own: the massacre of nine civilians in a coordinated series of bombs detonated in Belfast on 21 July 1972 in an attempt to escalate the insurgency which became known as ‘Bloody Friday’. The revulsion this caused eroded much of the public opinion the PIRA had garnered in the wake of internment and provided the military with the most advantageous of circumstances to resume the offensive against them. It was against this backdrop that one of the most significant British military operations of the troubles took place.

**Operation Motorman – ‘No Go’ Areas**

‘No Go’ areas had existed in Belfast and Derry since 1969, when Catholics had erected barricades in their localities during the civil rights campaign in response to loyalist violence.

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35 van der Bijl, op cit, p. 42.
36 Ibid.
37 Bennet, op cit.
38 Bell, op cit, p.381.
39 Edwards, op cit.
40 van der Bijl, op cit, p. 42.
41 Bennet, op cit.
42 Ibid.
and intimidation by the RUC. These had been tolerated at the time by Stormont, but by the time of the negotiations between the PIRA leadership and William Whitelaw in London, Westminster (now in direct control of Northern Ireland after Stormont had been prorogued for a year), made it clear that under no circumstances would areas considering themselves beyond the writ of the Crown be tolerated anywhere within the United Kingdom.

The military had not been idle during the low profile period. They had used the time to reorganise their intelligence gathering efforts. The PIRA had also used the operational pause provided by the talks with Whitelaw to reorganise and rearm in Belfast and Derry. Now, on foot of Bloody Friday, the army realised they had the momentum and necessary latitude granted by public opinion to mobilise against the No-Go areas and dismantle them. At the same time, IRA leaders also knew, or could guess that a British military backlash was coming, and many fled to the safety of the Republic, with the result that the subsequent operation would be largely unopposed.

Within a week of Bloody Friday, the British cabinet had commissioned and decided on a course of action. Operation Motorman would require the redeployment of seven units from the British Army on the Rhine (BAOR). Agreement was sought, and received from NATO, and the ambitious plan was put into action on the morning of 31 July 1972. It involved night time beach landings of men and materiel, coordination of logistics and operational efforts and audacity to achieve surprise, overwhelming superiority and thereby seek to preclude an armed response. The stated aim was to dismantle physical barriers, flood the areas with a military presence and replace the authority of the IRA with that of the regular security forces and thereby reengage the local population with the organs of the state. This last objective would, of course, necessitate the utmost restraint on the part of the military. This would be achieved in three phases:

- Establish bases in ‘all hard Catholic areas’, concentrating on Creggan and the Bogside in Derry and Andersonstown and Ballymurphy in Belfast.
- Achieve total domination in these areas by swamping them with patrols.
- Gradually accumulate intelligence by mass patrols and selectively arrest key terrorists for interrogation.

The impact of Motorman was immediate. As has been already stated, many volunteers had already absented themselves from the areas, seeking refuge in safe houses or across the border. The OIRA and PIRA were now effectively cut off from the urban centres and restricted to action in rural areas.

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43 van der Bijl, op cit, p. 15 and Bell, op cit, p. 364.
44 Bell, op cit, p. 387-9.
45 Bennet.
46 van der Bijl, op cit, p. 65.
47 Bell, op cit, p. 393.
48 Bennet, op cit.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
Government authority was restored to the areas, the NISF gained and retained the intelligence initiative and all this was achieved without inflaming the local population in the way internment had.

The reasons for the success of Motorman can be analysed against COIN doctrine, just as the failure of internment was earlier. The political objective was clearly defined and military actions and objectives were complementary to it. While the audacity of the initial deployment by land and sea constituted a firm and timely action (less than two weeks had passed since Bloody Friday before the government seized the initiative, allowing the army to exploit the prevailing circumstances before public revulsion over the bombings could have died away), utmost restraint was observed: there were no civilian casualties. The primacy of intelligence came to the fore in the military action: as soon as the force gained a foothold, operations were directed at gaining as much information as possible to guide future actions, keeping the military’s adversary off-balance and maintaining the initiative. However, the main significance of Operation Motorman was that it dismantled areas which could have been, and were, used as bases for activity within the Maoist model of insurgency. The IRA campaign in Northern Ireland differs significantly from this classic model in that it is one that primarily takes place in and is focused on urban centres, rather than rural areas.51 Without these areas in urban centres, the possibility of the IRA achieving a military victory receded to become almost impossible. As if recognising this, the campaign moved from resembling a classic insurgency to employing purely terrorist means. The IRA was reorganised in the late 1970s to a cell like structure, more closely resembling other terrorist organisations, to combat the penetration achieved by the intelligence agencies of the state and the gains they had made in the earlier part of the decade as the leadership prepared for the “long war”52 The capacity to engage the army, in particular, in a shooting war was diminished, and bombs and mortars became the way forward, coupled with the policy of ‘Ulsterisation’ whereby the army were progressively removed from conflict within Northern Ireland and the counterterrorism effort became more and more dominated by the RUC and specialist organisations such as Special Branch, the SAS and MI5.

Conclusion
It is contended that the possibility of a decisive victory for the PIRA receded in the aftermath of Motorman, which led to the transformation of the armed campaign from one of classical insurgency based on guerrilla warfare mounted from semi-independent geographical areas, to one of terror with no possibility of a decisive end. It can also be shown that, due to the fact that the United Kingdom is a democracy, there was a reticence on behalf of the government to use unrestrained repressive measures, as has occurred in authoritarian regimes.53 Indeed, many measures that the army had employed in previous COIN actions elsewhere in the colonies were not brought to bear; it would not be politically expedient to admit a state of war within the United Kingdom. It could also be argued that, while the British army was reluctant or unable, due to political considerations, to bring the full spectrum of warfighting assets to the Irish theatre, the

51 Beggan, op cit.
53 Beggan, op cit.
IRA was also restricted to limited use of the assets available to it in the campaign. This meant that the insurgency never progressed beyond the second stage of Mao’s model for revolutionary war and transformed in the mid to late 1970s into a protracted terrorist campaign – the long war. As this transformation occurred, the PIRA adapted its strategy to include targets on mainland Britain and in Europe, and the security forces, in turn, adapted from fighting a COIN war to implementing a counter terrorism action, in order to meet the new challenges. As the prospect of a military victory receded, the political process came to the fore, eventually culminating in the Good Friday Agreement of 1998.54 However, in an analysis based purely on military insurgency and counterinsurgency theories, using the case studies above, both the IRA and their opponents demonstrated adaptability and innovation in a changing situation over a protracted campaign. Both sides developed highly sophisticated intelligence and counterintelligence systems, crucial in the case of the authorities and their fight against terrorism.55 It could be said that, as the IRA never formed conventional forces to engage the military, taking the revolutionary war to its final stage, the revolution remained incomplete, as it had in 1922, leaving a final political solution to be found and thus possibly leaving the door open for further organisations committed to physical force to continue the armed struggle.

Therefore, while both sides achieved some of their objectives, the possibility of absolute victory, post 1972, was highly unlikely for either party. The British administration, through successful application of counterinsurgency military doctrine and political thought, brought about a set of circumstances that successfully thwarted their opponents. The ability of the British administration to adapt its political and military approach in Northern Ireland, coupled with the moment of opportunity provided by the PIRA error of judgement on Bloody Friday, allowed them to transform the republican campaign from one of classic armed insurrection to one of terror. This in turn provided the British administration with the legitimacy needed to give enough military and political freedom of action to effectively counter their opponents to the extent that they were able to maintain the political status quo, which still pertains, slightly altered, to this day.

“The Decision Point”
Why Female Officers ‘Opt Out’ of a Career in the Defence Forces

ABSTRACT
Where are all the senior female officers gone? After 34 years there is an absence of senior female officers within the Defence Forces (DF) and the majority of those who remain have not reached or qualified for promotion to Lt Col and beyond. By conducting interviews with both serving and retired female officers this article examines the reasons behind the lack of progression to senior management and why so many of the most senior officers have retired. The research shows that the absence of women from senior management is a cause of concern across private and public sectors alike. There are numerous causal effects that both push and pull women out of the workforce. The opportunities to advance to senior management are often denied to women by the impacts of domestic (pull) and workplace (push) factors. The article briefly illustrates that it is the combination of push and pull factors that is responsible for the absence of female officers at senior levels in the DF. This paper examines these factors and recommends that the DF explores ways to make both the Senior Command and Staff Course and Overseas Service more available to female officers.

Introduction
I was the 37th female officer commissioned into the Defence Forces (DF). I joined 10 years after the first intake of female officers. twenty-three years later I found myself breaking new ground being the first Irish mother and second Irish female officer1 as a student on the Senior Command and Staff Course. I decided to investigate why. Why did it appear that so many of my female colleagues decided not to pursue a career in the DF by either opting out of promotion or retiring from the organisation altogether? What could be done to encourage greater participation by female officers in the advancement / retention of their careers? This paper, based on research conducted on the Senior Command and Staff Course analyses these questions. I found through reviewing current literature and interviewing both serving and retired female officers2 that the answer was not simple. A fine balance of competing pressures push and pull the individuals both on and off the promotion path, and in and out of service in the DF. This paper presents the findings of my research and identifies important issues for the DF to address in order to retain experienced and qualified female officers in the future.

1 Two US female officers, one a mother, completed the Senior Command and Staff Course previously.
2 All interviewees had in excess of twenty years service as it was found to be a critical point in an officers career due to pension entitlements. In addition all the females who had in excess of twenty years service are subject to the same terms and conditions of service.
Background

Of the 43 female officers who could potentially now be serving at the ranks of Commandant and Lieutenant Colonel only 19 remain, with one having achieved the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. 63% of females who have in excess of twenty years service have retired, with the three year period 2009-2011 witnessing the largest retirement of female officers in any three year period since the recruitment of women into the DF. This represents a massive loss in investment and talent for the DF. All of these officers were highly trained and skilled with many years of managerial and leadership experience and all would have had many years of service remaining before having to retire on age grounds.

The absence of females at higher ranks is not solely an Irish problem. Quester notes that, “military personnel of the United States, and of most countries in the world, retire at a considerably younger age than do workers in the civilian sector.”3 In addition Nuciari focuses on a gender bias, stating; “it seems that female careers in the armed forces are shorter with respect to men...”4 While Valenius further contends that the critical age that women abandon their careers is between 30 and 40 years of age.5

Stone and Lovejoy make a key assertion that women’s career decisions are influenced by “workplace push and family pull” factors.6 The push elements drive women out, while the pull factors entice them away from careers. When push and pull combine it can be the catalyst for change in women’s careers. Change may result in leaving the career path temporarily, finding the road to promotion blocked or even early retirement. This article looks at the push and pull factors from global and national perspectives, then narrows its focus on the DF and why the contemporary senior female officers succumb to these factors.

Push Factors

Anything that contributes to unhappiness, inflexibility, or dissatisfaction in the workplace can be considered a “push factor”.7 Redundancy packages, unfriendly family practices, male dominated work environments, economic incentives, gender discrimination, joint domicile8 and career prospects were identified as potential push factors by Metz, and Steinberg, Harris & Scarville.9

For the female officers in the DF the push factors which influenced most were: the misalignment of female career paths and organisational career milestones; workplace demands; the promotion process – motherhood issues; the potential promotion limitations of the ‘mommy track’.10

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7 Ibid.
8 Joint domicile is the ability for both partners to work and conduct successful family life.
10 “Mommy track” is a more flexible career track that allows women more time with their families rather than forcing them to follow an ambitious fast track to success.
Misalignment of Female Career Paths and Organisational Careers Milestones

...Men as a group are more likely to have linear career paths, following the traditional wisdom of working continuously in a series of progressively more complex jobs in a single industry. In contrast, women have less predictable careers. Their careers are marked by interruptions, employment gaps, and a tendency to build a career crafted out of a combination of available opportunities, personal passions and the needs of others close to them.\textsuperscript{11}

Madden (2004) highlights the clash that occurs between peak home life demands and time critical performance goals; she states

\begin{quote}
The tight time period for performance typical of these systems, which also overlap with peak childbearing years, make it difficult for parents who have no partner available to care for young children, or who desire to spend time with children themselves…\textsuperscript{12}
\end{quote}

Madden goes on to outline how career paths for success have not been modified. The norms which individuals must follow for a successful career have their origins in an era where men were the primary earners and the women remained at home supporting male careers. Ruderman and Ohlott suggest that the conventional career, based on married white men, is not easily applicable to women.\textsuperscript{13} In many cases, organisational career paths have not been modified to take into account the modern family.

This misalignment was clearly identified in the DF with female officers stalling family life to facilitate their careers, such as deferring having a baby until they had completed the Junior Command and Staff Course, and then consequently stalling their careers by deferring or opting out of overseas service for a period after having a baby. This often occurs at a critical time in the career path as it is at this stage that officers, going forward for interview for promotion to Commandant are requested to commit to overseas service. Their reluctance to commit can, and has had, a negative effect on their promotional prospects.

The Promotion Process – Motherhood Issues - Perception

There’s a lot of talk about the individual decisions of individual women. “Is it good? Is it bad? She gave it up. She couldn’t hack the cot in the office.” Like anybody says they can’t hack it, to me that’s like . . . [trailing off in annoyance and bewilderment]. And there’s not enough blame, if you will, being laid at the feet of the culture, the jobs, the society.\textsuperscript{14}

Motherhood in particular shapes perceptions of women’s suitability for promotion to the senior levels of management. A common theme is the perceived mismatch of motherhood

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and the ambitious executive woman. Halpern and Cheung propose that while there is an implicit assumption that motherhood is incompatible with “life in the executive suite”, the opposite assumption is true for men.  

\[15\] Hewlett, Peraino, Sherbin, and Sumberg discuss how women find that the road to the top is also fraught with judgements about their personal lives.  

\[16\] If they’re married with children, their would-be sponsors assume they are less available and less dedicated and unsuitable for the C-suite.  

Barnett calls this the gender difference myth, where it is perceived that women don’t want power and those women who achieve high status in the workplace, opt out.  

This perception is not just held by men in the work place but also by women.

…a survey of Fortune 1000 CEOs and women executives at the vice president level and above reveals that 67 percent of female executives, but only 35 percent of CEOs (almost all male), hold the perception that commitment to personal or family responsibilities is a barrier to advancement in the business profession.

Sheryl Sandberg, the Chief Operation Officer (COO) of Facebook, argues that the women of today are less ambitious than those of twenty years ago because they are more interested in looking ahead to motherhood than pursuing the top jobs; that they fail to “Lean In”.  

It is a sentiment that is echoed within the DF as this female officer articulated “…to be honest I look at some of the girls and I think that they don’t come up to the mark in that area, that they are inclined to prioritise home too much and obviously so.”

**The Promotion Process – Motherhood Issues - Reality**

Various pieces of research have been carried out on the family constructs of those employed at executive level and the reality supports the perception. Surveys conducted in both the US and Ireland found similar results. The US survey examined top executives within three levels of CEO, and the Irish Report sampled Higher Executive Officers and above employed in the Civil Service. The US survey concluded that 49% of women were married with children, compared to 84% of men. The Irish study of senior managers concluded that 86% of men were married with children compared to 53% of women. Similarly in the US military, “82% of the male general officers had children whereas none of the women did.”


17 A widely-used slang term used to collectively refer to a corporation’s most important senior executives. C-Suite gets its name because top senior executives’ titles tend to start with the letter C, for chief, as in chief executive officer, chief operating officer and chief information officer. Definition taken from http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/c-suite.asp#ixzz1mIQvQGfg


21 Ibid. Mason and Elman, op cit. This was in fact a global study managed through the US. Overall, 62% of executives surveyed worked in the United States and Canada, 16% worked in Western Europe, 11% worked in Asia-Pacific, 7% worked in Latin America, and 4% worked in other regions of the world.

22 The HEO (Higher Executive Officer) is considered to be the same level as a Comdt, mid management


24 Ibid, p. 5.

The statistics support the incompatibility perception, but are the imbalances at senior management caused by this perception? If so it becomes a self fulfilling prophecy with the perception feeding reality and reality feeding perception. This notion is reinforced by Hartmann who states:

Mothers invest more of their time in caring for their children personally, take time off from work to do so and impose higher standards on the quality of their own care of children than men do. They seem to feel more guilt than men do when they work long hours. Indeed, there seems to be an ideology of intensive motherhood developing that threatens not only to rein women in and get them back in the home but also to destroy the progress our society has made in getting men more invested in their children.26

Again this is reflected in the DF “if I needed time off, I perceived they were saying ah God she has a child now and she suddenly needs time off.” stated one officer. The result of the perception of the incompatibility of motherhood and the ‘C’ suite has lead to numerous terms being coined for the stagnated career progression of mothers who achieve mid management levels but then fail to advance into senior management positions.

The Mommy Track

“The Mommy Track” and “The Second Tier” are terms describing how the workplace is divided in two. Felice Schwartz’s (1989) coined the term “Mommy Track” in her article ‘Management Women and the New Facts of Life’, which suggested that corporations should offer professional women and mothers, a more flexible career track that allowed them more time with their families rather than forcing them to follow an ambitious fast track to success.27 The two tier concept, articulated by Mason and Ekman, who suggest that the first tier is reserved for the “prestigious, well-paid jobs dominated by men and an expanding second tier, composed largely of women with children.”28 The second tier may have lower status, lower pay and a minimal chance of career progression, but it does facilitate the coexistence of home and work life. This compromised position is also known as the “marzipan layer” – the layer below senior management who are “the icing”.29 The rank of Commandant could be considered as the “marzipan layer” for female officers at present. Mason & Ekman acknowledge that women working in the second tier both lament and celebrate its existence. It is a sentiment echoed by some of the serving officers:

“We can’t all be GOC’s, we can’t all be Colonels, we can’t all be Lt Col’s, the appointments get less as you go up, so what is wrong with the person who says I am happy to be a Comdt, a Capt, or a Sgt or a Cpl, work to my highest ability at that level and commit to it? You get the due recognition and you are still fulfilling the value of the job, where you are not in this rat race environment to fill a CV to move into the top of the bottle, where not everybody is going to get into the top of the bottle...."

28 Op cit, p. 68.
The military in general has been pro-active in the provision of family friendly policies. The 2011 NATO Annual National Reports on gender perspectives outline many measures that nations are undertaking to improve the service conditions of their female soldiers, such as paid maternity leave, flexible working hours to facilitate child care, provision of day care facilities, exemptions from overseas service for a specified period after child birth and guaranteed joint-postings with their partner. The DF also offer family friendly options such as term time, parental leave, paid and unpaid maternity leave. Family friendly policies are designed to help negate the strength of children and work life balance pull factors but workplace demands are not so easily abated.

Workplace Demands
Workplace demands are identified as a push factor by McCann (2008) when she states “… that top level positions often require 60+ hour work weeks, travel, relocation and 24/7 availability…” She contends that these are not trade-offs that all women are willing to make for the corner office. Workplace demands push factors and children and work life balance pull factors are intertwined as the requirements of one are contrary to that of the other.

Wechsler-Segal defines the military as a greedy institution, making immense workplace demands on the individual by way of time, energy, loyalty and commitment. She lists the specific military work life demands including the risk of injury or death, geographic mobility, family separations, and residence in foreign countries.

Overseas service is rarely short and is a critical part of a military career and all participants in this study recognise it is a necessary criterion for promotion. The DACOWITS (Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services) report of 2003 stated that many female officers short circuited their careers for more personal and family time due to the inherent and accompanying demands of the military, in particular the frequent and multiple deployments overseas. In 2007 Market Research Bureau of Ireland (MRBI) was commissioned to conduct a study into the recruitment and retention of females in the DF. It identified that a greater understanding of family commitments was needed especially regarding overseas duty.

When workplace demands are combined with pressures at home it appears that some women choose to “opt out”. Many interviewees confirmed the MRBI findings stating that if detailed for overseas service they would be forced to opt out. Metz argues however that the ‘opt out’ premise “…divests organisations of some, if not most, of the responsibility for the persistent scarcity of women in senior management.” Again the findings of the literature are confirmed by the interviewees who propose more family friendly variations...

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32 More hours in work are required for promotion which is directly opposite to the desire to spend time with family.
36 Metz, op cit, p. 286.
to the organisation’s current overseas deployment constructs.\textsuperscript{37} The suggested variations could potentially increase female participation in overseas deployments.

Also proposed was the restructure and modularisation of the typical 60+ hour work week of the Senior Command and Staff Course; another essential requirement for promotion within the DF. All of the interviewees recognised that additional training to hold the rank of Lieutenant Colonel or higher is absolutely necessary, but many had reservations about the manner in which the course is conducted. The single course of forty weeks makes it an endurance test of time and commitment and incompatible with family life. None of the officers had any doubt about their academic ability to complete the course, but about half of the officers interviewed saw it as the biggest barrier to promotion thereby pushing women off the promotion path. Many suggested that the organisation needed to rethink how it could deliver more family friendly training that could negate the strength of the pull factors off the career path.

**Pull Factors**

Pull factors influence a woman’s decision about her career and have roots outside the workplace. Typically those factors involve family or family related issues, such as children, career breaks, and the impact of dual earner couple households.\textsuperscript{38} Many of these factors resonated with the interviewees.

**Children and Work Life Balance**

In Stone and Lovejoy’s study 72\% of respondents identified the pull of children as a factor in their decision to leave the workforce.\textsuperscript{39} The pull in this case was not limited to just very young children, as approximately one third referred to the pull of older children and their increasing demands such as homework and afterschool activities.

The effects of childbirth in the military are comparable internationally. In the US empirical evidence states that “…active duty air force women who gave birth were found to be twice as likely to leave the military compared to women who did not give birth during the same period.”\textsuperscript{40} “The true turning point for a military woman’s career is marriage and childbirth” concludes Nuciari.\textsuperscript{41} A view supported by Lovell, Kallmeier-Hatch, Euesden, and Terry who found as a result of their studies in the UK Armed Forces that “Work–life balance was, arguably, the biggest issue impacting the long-term retention of female personnel.”\textsuperscript{42}

From a national stance the impact of having children on a woman’s career was borne out when the National Women’s Council of Ireland (NWCI) reported that

For men having children has almost no impact on their employment rate. In contrast approximately 6 in every 10 women with children are employed,
compared to almost 9 in 10 women without children. …This is not unique to Ireland, but the impact of having children is greater in Ireland than in almost any OCED country.43

Endorsing both the global and national findings, the majority of the participants in this study stated that having a family was the turning point in their career. In every case it was present as one of the two most important reasons behind their decision to retire or opt out of promotion. It was stated that "getting married and having kids changes everything from that [promotion] perspective."44

Hakim’s Preference Theory identifies three groups of people, the home centred whose primary interest is in family life and children; the work centred who are committed to a career; and the adaptives who are in between and who try to combine work and family.45 Hakim (2004) asserts that the home and work centred on average account for about 20% of women depending upon the country.46 The majority of women find themselves somewhere in the middle and they will respond to any measures that makes life easier for them. She contrasts this to men, over half to three quarters of whom are work centred, the remainder of whom are adaptive with a negligible number being home centred. The interviewees were all adaptives who tried to combine work and family life for as long as they could, but when the measures that made life easier for them resided either in the home or a career without promotion, they responded to it. However it is not just children and work life balance that pull women from their career paths, the knock on effects of dual earner couples must also be considered.

Dual Earner Couples
In the US “…in 1960 there were twice as many breadwinner-father/homemaker-mother families as dual earner families, but in 2000, there were more than twice as many dual earner families as breadwinner-father/homemaker-mother families.”47 The impact on women of dual earners couples has been examined by many researchers. Moen and Sweet investigate how many hours a dual earning couple can work and still have time for family life.48 The answer depends on whether they have children. Those without children can work the long hours that careers require while those with children adopt a modification of the 1960’s family. The primary earner is still the breadwinner-father and “wives work less on the job and more in the second shift at home.”49 The second shift50 is also addressed by Beck when she states “Housework and childcare the world over…are still seen mainly as woman’s responsibilities, whether or not she has a formal job. Many of

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44 Ibid.
49 Ibid, p. 33.
the male partners were not physically available as they worked long hours.\footnote{Op cit, p. 6.} This lack of support pulled many women from the workplace, and back into the home.

The DF is not immune to the effects of dual earner couples on career progression. The primary research indicates that the impact of dual earners focused on which career would facilitate the more stable home life. In the majority of cases the effect of the husband’s career in deciding to retire or pursue promotion was evident; however it was the primary pull factor in only one or two cases. The decision to give one career priority by either not going forward for promotion or retiring was not easy and it is apparent that for many of them it meant putting the needs of the family or their husband’s careers ahead of their own desires. But in many cases this decision was facilitated by economics means also.

**Dual Earner Couples – Pensions**

The literature does not reveal much by way of the influence of economic incentives in this context. Only Steinberg, Harris and Scarville highlight its influence in the military sphere.\footnote{Steinberg, A., Harris, B. C., and Scarville, J. (1993). *Why Promotable Female Officers Leave the Army*, Alexandria: United States Army Research Institute for Behavioural and Social Sciences.} In the course of the primary research the importance of the pension cannot be understated. Only one participant stated with any certainty that she would have retired without the pension. All of the other retired officers spoke of how the pension facilitated the decision to retire. The availability of a pension against reducing salaries and increasing childcare costs meant that the economic impact of retiring was minimal.

The implication of the primary research turns the light on the junior officers currently advancing through the ranks. If they do not have access to their pensions until the age of 50 or 60 years of age will it drastically affect the current retirement trends of female officers? If it does then how will the DF address the continual stress of the push and pull of work and home on its female officers? Considering the significance attached to the pensions by the participants of this study, a further study into the long term effects of pension rights on the careers of female officers is worthy of investigation.

**Conclusion – The Decision Point**

What the literature revealed was that there are two types of influences constantly pushing and pulling women as they progress throughout their careers. Those factors that push are rooted in the work environment, with the potential to feed dissatisfaction with one’s career. These factors include misalignment of female career paths and organisational career milestones, workplace demands, the promotion process – gender attribute issues, the promotion process – motherhood issues, and the ‘mommy track’. Those factors that pull are firmly rooted in the family and often attempt to entice the individual out of the work force or curtail their career progression by giving the home life issues priority over work.

None of the participants expressed any regret upon reflection on their decision to retire. All spoke of how they enjoyed their careers in the DF and of the pride they took in their work but that the quality of life attained through retirement justified their decisions. One officer rationalised it as “the little bits of regret you have, you have to balance that with the
choices that you made and the benefit of these choices.” Another described her career priorities by saying

    when they are putting me down into the grave I just wanted the three people there and I want them to say she was a very good mommy ... I don’t want them to say she was a colonel I just want them to say she was a very good mommy.

All of the participants harboured ambition to go further in their careers. All have the self belief that they were capable of advancing in their careers. But as the literature highlights it is the constant balance of push and pull factors that culminate in the decision point for women. While not all of the push/pull factors identified in the literature and by the DF respondents are identical, the effects of the combined push/pull factors are. The push factors cost more than the female officers were willing to pay in terms of absence from their families versus the possibility of being promoted. Add to that the pull factors of home life, available pensions and a husband who has a secure job - it just didn’t make sense to remain in the marzipan layer or to climb the promotional path.

The questions to be addressed by the DF are, does it firstly see this as a genuine issue to be addressed, and if so how to retain its female officers and how to facilitate the advancement of female officers to higher ranks within the organisation? The loss of female officers, as realised in the period 2009 -2011 for example, represents a loss in available talent and investment made by the DF into the development of these officers. The trend continues with 3 more female officers having retired in the period 2012/13. While a third female officer completed the 69th Command and Staff Course, there is no female student on the 70th course. Can the DF afford to allow these trends to continue? The implications for the DF are that if it wants senior ranking females, it needs to examine the push/pull factors over which it can exert influence. The workplace demands of overseas service and the Senior Command and Staff Course have been identified as two of the strongest push factors off the career path. As the incentive effect of the pension will disappear for junior officers the organisation needs to investigate how to make both more available to its officers in order to avoid the stagnation of careers both now and in the future.

The Future
Undergoing the Senior Command and Staff Course focused my attention on the fact that 32 years after the first women joined the DF, I was only the second Irish female student complete the course. I wanted to know why; why so many of our senior female officers, my peers, had disappeared. These were officers whom I knew to be exceptionally capable and who enjoyed their military life. There is no simple answer, the truth lies in a myriad of competing pressures. Increase or remove any one pressure and it forces the decision point. While the exact combination of factors varies from individual to individual, the commonality amongst female retirees is that they reached a decision point where they no longer felt they could have it all, family life, motherhood, own career, husband’s career, overseas service, uncertain work environment, etc. The predominant reasons are however firmly rooted in the family. Something had to give and unfortunately for the DF they all choose to give up their career by either retiring early or stepping off the promotion track.
Comprehensive Planning for 21st Century Operations; the Military – NGO Relationship

ABSTRACT
This paper examines the relationships between the military and Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) set against the backdrop of the dynamic environment in which crisis management operations are conducted. It suggests that the need for cooperation on mutually agreeable objectives between both sets of actors has never been greater. Military commanders will have to recognise important barriers to cooperation in the field and develop an understanding of areas of sensitivity for civilian actors in order to achieve good working relationships. The Defence Forces will have to address these issues in policy, doctrine and in training in education to operate successfully in current and future Peace Support Operations.

Introduction
As Ireland prepares to issue a new White Paper on Defence, it is safe to assume that Irish commitment to UN sanctioned Peace Support Operations (PSOs) will continue.1 The regional and global defence environments have become even more intricate since the publication of the last White Paper in 2000.2 Perceptions of threat have transformed since the 2001 terrorist attacks in the US and multi-lateral responses to security challenges have become even more complex. While the UN continues to play a prominent role in many crisis situations, the role of other regional security organisations continues to develop. For example, NATO’s role in PSOs has extended beyond the Balkans to Central Asia (Afghanistan) and into North Africa (Libya 2011) and the EU, through CSDP, is expanding the number of missions both civil and military, dispatched to crises in Central Asia, the Middle East and in Africa. While the military elements are important in these missions they constitute only one of many parts in comprehensive peace support activity. It continues to be as important as ever for military planners to consider the interaction with a broadening spectrum of non-military actors in the contemporary operating environment.

Within the civilian community there have been steps towards developing synergies with the military. NATO and the EU aspire to adopting comprehensive approaches to crisis management. The UN, in the quest for greater sustainability of development, also recognises the requirement for a broader range of instruments and interventions.3 There has also been an attempt by the broader humanitarian community to adopt standards for the activities of all humanitarian activities including dealing with military actors.4 These

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developments notwithstanding, it is suggested that while the attitude of Governmental and Intergovernmental civilian institutions may be changing, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), in emphasising their non-governmental character, frequently avoid interaction with governmental actors including the military. This paper therefore focuses on military relations with this set of actors in order to allow military planners and leaders to measure success in such relationships and to facilitate the harmonious achievement of mutual goals. The paper provides food for thought both for CIMIC Doctrinal production, currently underway within the Defence Forces (DF) and for Commanders at every level who will deploy on PSO duties.

**The Requirement for Cooperation**

Before examining the factors impacting on civil – military relationships, it is necessary to outline the requirement for such engagement. This paper suggests that two imperatives support it. The first is the requirement to maximise resources in crisis management scenarios. The global economic recession has emphasised this requirement as funds dry up. The lack of a functioning relationship, apart from denying synergy, can lead to wastage due to duplication of effort, unnecessary bureaucracy in planning and delivery of support, delays and counterproductive strategies due to lack of complete knowledge of the environment (note this refers to both the military and civil strategies).

The second major imperative is the impact on security. Because perceptions of security differ (discussed below), this aspect proves controversial. However, security concerns dominate the calculus of both sets of actors and many of the threats are mutual. A caucus in the civil community blame the military for the degradation of security of civil actors in the field. They cite the behaviour of coalition troops in Afghanistan and Iraq who they claim blurred the lines between military and humanitarian operations and statements by senior political figures in the US government including President Bush and Secretary for State Colin Powell for claiming humanitarian effort as part of their strategy in these campaigns. History, however, shows that the civil sector security began to degrade much earlier than these campaigns and a pattern can be traced back to the fragmentation of states in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War. In Somalia in the early 1990s, the traditional security of civil actors had begun to erode to such an extent that NGOs began to employ “Technicals”, armed local militia who acted as security providers and who earned their title because the agencies had no budget for security and had to account for it as technical assistance. In 1996 in Burundi and in Chechnya, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) delegates, who normally go to extremes to emphasise their impartiality, were attacked and killed (in Chechnya within a hospital).

Evidently, before the 2001 and 2003 Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns, a pattern of security degradation for NGOs had already emerged. It is not intended to investigate the reason why this occurred. It is sufficient for the purposes of this paper to outline the contemporary security dilemma and the imperative for good relations between civil and military actors in operational theatres.

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6 Ibid.
Military Approaches to CIMIC

Militaries adopt differing strategies to engage with civil actors. Despite 55 years experience on PSOs the DF has not produced any formal doctrine on civil military relationships in conflict (although a CIMIC doctrine is currently being drafted). Irish forces deployed abroad have relied on ad hoc procedures, informal contacts and cultural empathy to maintain such relationships. On the other hand the US Army has produced a body of doctrine on the matter. FM 3–07 identifies many of the challenges in coordinating or cooperating with non-military actors. It also identifies the humanitarian principles which shape the thinking of the leadership in these organisations in how they should interact with the military on the battle field. The manual identifies the requirement for Civil Affairs (CA) personnel to identify measures of performance and measures of effectiveness for CA operations to support the larger military operation without clearly defining what they might be. This paper suggests that this may be easier said than done. In order to succeed the military commander must be able to identify and deal with two phenomena; the barriers to cooperation and certain areas of sensitivity.

Barriers to Cooperation

Measuring success in CIMIC relations is extremely elusive due to a number of barriers. The first barrier is achieving agreed definition of the relationship. There is no common or agreed answer to the question ‘what is civil – military cooperation?’ in the humanitarian sphere. This stems in part from the lack of a clearly defined ‘humanitarian community.’ There is no homogenous group that is capable of articulating positions on behalf of the entire spectrum of agencies and organizations. Systemic limitations such as lack of policy-making capability on the part of most NGOs and political considerations make general policy-making and coordination difficult. In practice the attitude towards the military can vary according to the context and time. There are however sources which provide some insight into how this broad community perceives both itself and the appropriate relationship with military organizations. The most obvious source is the corpus of international humanitarian law and the policies and guidelines provided by the IGOs themselves. Some organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) (Doctors without Borders) invest considerable effort in the development of a form of humanitarian ‘doctrine’ which although is not binding on all organizations is influential in how they conduct their business. There exists also a considerable growth of academic literature on the subject much of it in the wake of the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The second barrier is the fundamental objection by many organizations to the military entering ‘the humanitarian’ sphere. Many agencies are fundamentally opposed to cooperating with the military for ideological reasons. They perceive the military and humanitarian actors existing in two totally different and unconnected spheres of activity. For this reason they can be expected to vigorously oppose military effort to cooperate or coordinate with them. This issue is recognized in FM 3–07 which identifies the

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8 Ibid, para 3-80.
requirement to seek common ground. The creation of Coordinating centres, as provided for in the Field Manual, such as Civil Military Operations Centers (CMOCs), Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Centers (HACCs) and Humanitarian Operations Centers (HOCs) is unlikely to appeal to such organisations and they are unlikely to interact with them in any meaningful way. Following on from this point, many groups will resist invitations to cooperate or to coordinate because they view such activity as efforts to control them or subordinate their work to military or political objectives.11

A third barrier to evaluating a relationship is that such a phenomenon is inherently difficult to measure. ‘Relationships’ result from human interaction and need to be analyzed utilizing an array of social, psychological and cultural skills. Quantative measurements are not always appropriate. Qualitative models also have to be flexible to account for the impact of personality, context and time.

In this regard this paper does not identify a series of prescriptive measurements for military commanders to measure success in the developing civil military relationships but rather identifies a number of issues which should facilitate the commander in maximizing his or her influence in the environment. These issues are important not only for specialist CIMIC officers but for commanders at all levels. Of course it is possible for military commanders to ignore the humanitarian actors as many task oriented ones have done in the past. Doing so, however, compromises the principle of adopting a comprehensive approach to crisis management. In PSOs the military action represents but one line in the overall campaign plan. It does not exist in isolation and the successful attainment of overall strategic objectives requires unity of effort. It is important for commanders to develop sensitivity with regard to their interaction with humanitarian actors in the battle space and pay particular attention to a number of areas.

Understanding Civil Actors – Areas of Sensitivity

Slim suggests that civilian actors on military intervention are generally developed on an ad hoc basis depending on the nature of the crisis and depicts attitudes towards the military on a sliding scale of support ‘governed by moral judgement rather than by moral absolute.’12 One can expect greater levels of support for an intervention in response to serious crises such as genocide and less support further down the spectrum for cases of less extreme forms of conflict. The commander’s first point of sensitivity should therefore be to understand where on this spectrum the current military operation fits. This should give a primary indicator of how humanitarian agencies will interact with the military force.

The second area of sensitivity is the importance of language. The military commander must appreciate the importance of terminology to the humanitarian community and the impact of poorly chosen jargon or expressions. The first issue arises with the term ‘humanitarian activity.’ As referred to above, for many NGOs and IOs military organizations are incapable of conducting ‘humanitarian activity’ because military interventions are essentially political in nature (civilians read Clausewitz too!). To the purists among them, humanitarian activity is conducted outside of a political context and represents motivated

11 Author interview with senior ICRC official (2009).
and impartial concern for human suffering conducted on the basis of need rather than supporting any other policy goals. Military commanders should avoid referring to their response to humanitarian emergencies as humanitarian action. Despite good intentions and the ability to provide fast and effective intervention an imprudent use of language or terminology can negatively affect relations with civilian humanitarian actors. The Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Reference Paper Civil – Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies of June 2004 proposes that every wording associated with the military provision of assistance should be referred to as ‘relief’ rather than ‘humanitarian.’ Consciousness of such small details can make a difference in setting the tone for a fruitful relationship.

The terminology used to refer to the relationship can also be contentious. Terms such as ‘influence’ and ‘Coordination’ rankle with many organizations who equate it with attempts by the military to control or subordinate them to the military agenda. The implication here for operational planners is that some groups will be reluctant to be associated with a military CIMIC unit such as the US Army Humanitarian Agency Coordination Centre (HACC) which offends on two counts using the terms ‘Humanitarian’ and ‘Coordination.’ To some even the term ‘cooperation’ is problematic because of the implied loss of impartiality and neutrality. By substituting the word ‘Support’ the effect of cooperation is achieved without alienating those organizations that are suspicious of the military.

A third area of sensitivity is the consequences or third order effects for the civil organisations derived from civil – military relations. Military Commanders generally consider that their activities increase the security of civilian actors in the battle space. Indeed it is an underlying assumption in FM 3–07. But many civilian actors fear a diminution of their own security arising from the relationship. They feel that by cooperating with military intervention forces they run the risk of being identified as either impartial or even hostile to one or more parties in the conflict. If humanitarian organisations perceive that military commanders are insensitive to their security situation it may lead them to avoid developing a relationship. Take the ICRC as an example. On grounds of principle they will not join any coordinated effort in a humanitarian action because they view such activity as fundamentally political and therefore in breach of their cardinal principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence. On a pragmatic note they are not averse to ‘sharing information’ with other organizations and agencies (of which we can count military forces) working on the same humanitarian problem. This is the area that the military must explore to maximize the opportunity of mutually beneficial outcomes. Military commanders who appreciate these potential third order effects and who communicate this appreciation are better placed to improve civil - military relations.

The final area of sensitivity is the requirement to distinguish between combatants and non combatants. The principles of impartiality, independence and neutrality require humanitarian workers to remain outside the fight. They cannot allow themselves to be seen as a participant or a supporter of one side in a conflict as to do so may limit their

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15 Interview of senior ICRC official by author in 2009.
access to the victims of conflict or threaten their own security. Humanitarian organizations therefore do not appreciate being labelled as participants or partners in a fight. The most obvious example of a potentially insensitive use of language in this regard is referring to these organizations as partners in the ‘global of war in terror’. Commanders should avoid use of such terminology or risk alienating potentially cooperative members of the humanitarian community.

**The Way Forward**

The areas of sensitivity outlined above are unlikely to be developed without emphasis on training and education. Furthermore it is the soft skill required of all commanders not just CIMIC personnel. Sensitivity can only be developed if it is catered for in policy, codified in doctrine and included in the study material in military training schools. It can be enhanced through organizational cultural awareness training. Furthermore the training should be proactive rather than reactive. Opportunities should be sought to engage members of the IGO/NGO community, both to learn about their own policies and thinking as well as to challenge some of our own perceptions and assumptions on the matter. The Military College should continue to invite guest speakers to address students on career courses to articulate their concerns. The ICRC for example has an active section dedicated to disseminating the principles of the Red Cross movement and articulating its philosophy on relief and development issues. Engagement can also include invitations to NGOs to attend or participate in appropriate military/PSO exercises.

The DF will have to address these issues in order to continue to contribute effectively in UN sanctioned PSOs. The dynamic nature of global threats, the diminishing availability of resources and the attempts made by the UN to embrace more comprehensive strategies in crisis situations require more than technological or hard military capabilities in response. Soft skills such as relationship building will if anything grow in importance and the DF should continue to build on previous success in this area.
Abstracts

68 Senior Command and Staff Course

MA in Leadership Management and Defence Studies
COMDT CONOR BATES
The Kosovo Conundrum: NATO, Security Sector Reform and The Kosovo Security Force

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines NATO’s role in Security Sector Reform (SSR) using the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) as a specific case study and explores the complex issues that have arisen from this task. NATO’s decision to stand down the Kosovo Protection Corps and establish the KSF, thereby contributing to the development of SSR in Kosovo, was implemented, in spite of international and regional political issues with the process. While the KSF is ostensibly seen as a non-military force, it appears that the KSF will become a Kosovan defence force. The existence of UNSCR 1244, the partial application of the Ahtisaari plan and the unique status of Kosovo have meant that this capacity-building role, which NATO has given itself, is fraught with complexity. This paper explores SSR literature in order to create a conceptual framework against which NATO’s experience can be measured, including the inherent challenges faced in SSR implementation. The methodology compares this theoretical construct to the practical experience of those involved, combining in-depth interviews, documentary analysis and personal experience, perspective and observation. The key findings of this paper are that SSR best practice is not possible in Kosovo due to its uniqueness and therefore the KSF is not the ethnically unifying force that it could be. NATO has an important role in SSR but it does not have the capacity to change the underlying political factors to create the conditions required for the KSF to achieve this unifying role. The UN and EU are also constrained in this regard due to Kosovo’s contested status. Different understandings of the SSR process exist between the donor and recipient, including how both parties view the KSF as a non-military or military force. Notwithstanding this, the KSF is of benefit to the people of Kosovo, is a democratically accountable organ of the nascent Kosovan state, and has operational proficiency in certain areas.
LT CDR RONAN BOYLE

The Utility of Applying Effects Based Thinking to Organisational Performance Management in the Irish Naval Service

ABSTRACT

The thesis asks if the Irish Naval Service could utilise Effects Based Thinking to improve the effectiveness of service delivery. Effects Based Thinking is a way of focusing on effects or outcomes as well as outputs or activity. It is associated with organisational effectiveness more than efficiency. The Defence Organisation already measures outputs annually. These outputs answer the question “What does the Naval Service do at sea?” and are recorded by Measures of Performance. For example, the number of patrol days completed annually by the Naval Service is an output. In contrast, effects or outcomes answer the larger question “Why do we need the Naval Service?” and are recorded by Measures of Effectiveness. The effect or outcome of these patrol days for the State could be measured by a reduction of illegal fishing off our coast or a reduction of illegal importation of narcotics for example. The literature suggests that a focus on effects and outcomes at Government level is aligned with recent policy on introducing Performance Budgeting. At the Organisational level of the Naval Service, an effects based approach is already taught to senior leaders as part of the Operational Planning Process. At the Individual level on the cognitive plane, increased knowledge of desired effects and the Why of the mission may increase personal motivation, job satisfaction and commitment. Most importantly, use of Effects Based Thinking supports better decision making at all levels through the concept of Mission Command – understanding the Commander’s Intent and acting to achieve the effect required, even without specific task instructions. The thesis methodology combined a survey instrument, a focus group and in-depth semi-structured interviews with key informants throughout the public sector and academic research fields. The methodology reflects the inherently post-positivist aspects of an effects based approach. The research found that the previous organisational management system, the Balanced Scorecard, did not facilitate internal communication between strategy formulation and execution within the Naval Service. Difficulties also emerged with measurement of effectiveness and a culture favouring higher outputs over outcomes. The research also found that the Effects Based approach has utility in cascading Government level programmes down to the organisational level, but that difficulties remain surrounding measurement, causation and attribution. At the organisational level, Effects Based Thinking is a good match with the extant but underutilised Operational Planning Process. At the individual level, Effects Based Thinking has utility as a means of improving knowledge of strategic organisational goals leading to increased motivation.
Environmental Security and the Irish Maritime Environment
What Future Role for the Irish Naval Service?

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the key influences on Irish maritime environmental security, with specific focus on the role of the Irish Naval Service. The thesis notes the importance of the maritime environment on trade, energy, aquaculture and biodiversity. It considers the ocean as the largest regulating biosphere in the world, which represents a strategic national asset and key driver for future economic development and sustainable national wealth. The research illustrated that changes are required for the adaptation of how Ireland and its agencies secure its maritime jurisdictions to protect the environmental equilibrium. The literature pertaining to the topic was reviewed and critiqued for its relevance to the Irish context. The broad topics of environmental and maritime security were refined with a focus on the Irish Naval Service. This refinement enabled the selection of key influences for primary research. Semi-structured interviews attained the views from a cross section of interests including the political, scientific, military, academic and operational authorities, all of whom exert influence within the maritime environmental arena. The research found that Ireland lacks a unified, coordinated approach to the delivery of maritime environmental security. Analysis of the research illustrates that Government devise policy on a stove-pipe departmental basis, without cognisance of actions of other departments. The thesis notes that the Naval Service, as the principal sea-going agency of the State, is suited to the delivery of hard security. Additionally, the collaborative ethos of the Naval Service with other entities provides opportunity for future integration of security through ‘soft’ passive measures and adoption of scientific studies. The findings illustrate that proper planning and consultation are critical for the future of Ireland’s environmental security, and in this regard the current consultative process on the future direction for Ireland towards its maritime responsibilities will determine the success of national efforts in this area.
The Libyan uprising against the Gaddafi regime in 2011 brought about an opportunity to define a new political order in that country. After years working in hiding, various sections of the former Libyan opposition, from liberalists to Islamists are seeking ways how to create new political structures based on democratic principles.

This thesis explores the notion of Islamic democracy by searching values that are common to both Islam and democracy, and how this notion could promote security in Libya. The concept of security has been approached through the Critical Security Theory which considers security the same as the notion of emancipation. Emancipation is based on the premise that people are emancipated once they are free from constraints that hinder what they freely choose to do. Conflicts, poverty, poor education and political oppression are some of these constraints. This people centric theory argues that emancipation, not power produces security.

Critical Discourse Analysis was applied on selected media reports covering the political, social and security issues effecting Libya’s democratic, evolutionary process. In addition, semi-structured interviews provided a meaningful understanding of perspectives.

This study sheds light on three findings. Fear from radical Islamists is being instilled through the media by contributors from the Arab Diaspora whose agenda is primarily tied to the promotion of either a liberal or a secular democracy in Libya. The second finding reveals that Islam could be the binding factor in a fragmented society such as Libya and therefore cannot be excluded from the democratic process. The last finding indicates that Islam is compatible with democratic values and that it does not hinder emancipation. Understanding the need to Islamize democracy rather than democratizing Islam is crucial in fostering emancipation.

On the basis of these findings this thesis recommends that Islamic democracy can provide a potential political solution towards the attainment of long term security in Libya.
From the Seabed to the Summit: 
Can Adventure Training be used to Enhance Leadership Development in the Defence Forces?

ABSTRACT

This thesis explored the potential use of adventure training as a leadership development tool for the Irish Defence Forces. Adventure training was recognised as having the capability to assist with leader development as early as 1940 and it is currently used internationally by business and military organisations for that purpose. While it is conducted in the Defence Forces, its capacity to develop leadership is not being utilised. The objective of this research was to examine whether leadership competencies developed through exposure to adventure training could successfully transfer to the military domain. From a theoretical perspective it could add to the emerging situational leadership theory of ‘leading in dangerous contexts’ and from a practical perspective it could inform the Defence Forces of the tangible benefits to be gained from exposing junior leaders to adventure training. Four leadership competencies, common to outdoor education and the military, were identified during the literature review and these competencies provided the framework approach for the study. These competencies were decision making, communications, resilience and interpersonal skills. A case study approach was adopted and semi-structured interviews were conducted with adventure training practitioners from the Defence Forces, the commercial sector and education. The adventure training disciplines involved were diving, parachuting, mountaineering, kayaking and sailing. Findings showed that participants believed that their leadership skills had developed as a result of exposure to adventure training, across the four key leadership competencies. In addition, it was found that this development transferred to the military domain and that participants’ military leadership improved as a result. The study supported ‘leading in dangerous contexts’ as a theoretical concept. It showed that the Defence Forces could benefit from the use of adventure training as a leadership development tool and recommended its inclusion in military leadership development programmes.
‘I Told You So!’
Information Security Policy Development in the Irish Defence Forces, an Examination of the Policy Process

ABSTRACT

Information Security Policy (ISP) development for the Irish Defence Forces (DF), an examination of the policy process. As the DF considers the development of its ISP, it is an appropriate time to examine; the DF’s understanding of policy, its policy process and the appropriateness of these to its implementation of ISP. This research, which includes in-depth interviews with DF and IT industry subject experts and policy makers combined with an extensive literature review, found that because the DF’s has a comprehensive and inclusive approach to policy making, along with an agreed interpretation of policy and defined responsibilities means, the DF has an appropriate policy process. Several findings resulted; when discussing ISP, the DF has an agreed understanding on policy interpretation; it is ‘an instruction’. Because the DF is electing to implement ISP rather than doing so in reaction to a security incident, the DF has an opportunity to do so in a considered, comprehensive and strategic manner. The alignment of organisational strategy with policy goals and culture of the organisation is vital; this requires a strategic risk management approach be adopted by the DF to ensure a correct balance between usability and security is achieved. The requirement for alignment extends to ensuring responsibility is appropriately positioned within the DF’s organisational establishment and that there is organisation wide input to the policy process. Implementation is something the DF believes it is good at, however implementation must not be seen as an end state. The ongoing process of reviewing policy and auditing compliance to ensure policy is and remains ‘fit for purpose’, by adapting and improving both the policy and the processes will be a challenge for the DF, as it is for the public sector as a whole.
A Just Flight Safety Culture and the Irish Defence Forces: An Impossible Legal Dream?

ABSTRACT

Is the Defence Forces an incongruous anomaly when it comes to the concept of a just flight safety culture? The research reveals that there is a lack of legal structures supporting flight safety in the Defence Forces that is inhibiting an effective flight safety culture. As a result this thesis demonstrates that the Defence Forces stand apart in failing to have legal support for the provision of a just, energised, informed and questioning flight safety culture. The objective of zero accidents in aviation is only approachable in a just culture, requires suitable organisational structures and legal supports. Military forces are separate from the civil structures and legislation that create and enforce the civil safety management systems. Therefore each State ought to provide its military forces with the legal tools and structures to create a just safety culture. The research focuses on a study of other military aviation organisations that have common cultural traits and legal heritage to Ireland. Key findings in the research show other representative military forces have implemented legal structures to promote a just culture. These initiatives have occurred as a result of fatal accidents. The common theme in the findings is that military forces have separated their air accident investigation authority from those responsible for enforcing discipline. The findings illustrate that military air accident authorities have functional independence to operate unhindered. The thesis demonstrates that other military forces are developing reporting systems with legal supports to protect those personnel that come forward with their mistakes and failings so that others may learn lessons. The keystone recommendation is that this legal situation can be addressed through organisational change and the provision of legislation to support the Defence Forces flight safety system. The recommendation is given full expression in Appendix ‘A’ in a Defence (Aviation Safety) Bill. The Air Corps Flight Safety Office should move to be an adjunct to the Office of the Chief of Staff with legal authority to investigate accidents and promote safety. The Director of Military Aviation, as the regulator, should be moved from the Air Corps to Defence Force Headquarters, separating it from the operational units of the Air Corps. Operational Command and discipline would remain the responsibility of the General Officer Commanding Air Corps. The thesis demonstrates that a just culture is within reach and so is the asymptotic zero accident rate.
COMDT LOUIS FLYNN

An Examination of the Impact of National Culture in Multinational Military Operations – A Case Study of The Irish Defence Forces in Chad

ABSTRACT

In recent years there has been a significant increase in the number of military operations that have required nations to contribute forces as part of a multinational coalition or alliance. Moreover the range of mission types has broadened to include peacekeeping, peace support and humanitarian operations. In order for a multinational mission to operate effectively, it is essential that national contingents achieve a high degree of interoperability. Interoperability in multinational forces generally refers to compatibility of hardware and software. Connectivity alone does not confer capability and must be accompanied by interoperability of people, process and organisation. This requirement brings many different challenges which include dealing with national culture. Culture in many ways defines how we perceive the world around us and how we interact with it. The aim of this thesis is to examine the impact of national culture in the multinational military operation and the impact on the organisational culture of the unit and on the commanders’ ability to lead it. This study combines in-depth interviews with former key commanders who led and managed the EUFOR tChad/RCA mission. While conducting extensive documentary analysis the case study found that national culture does impact on the organisational culture and the commanders. This thesis explores dimensions of national culture though the concept of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions and suggests the utilisation of a cultural lens to aid the commander in his multinational role. The findings indicate that the impact of national culture increases with increasing levels of command. The findings further confirmed the significance of national culture in the multinational environment. However, there was also evidence that the impact in the multinational military environment may be less than experienced in the multinational business environment. The findings also identified that the experience gained by commanders while on multinational deployments significantly improve their ability to lead in the multinational setting. The research also demonstrated the significance of the cultural lens in a multinational environment and the importance of communication by the commander within the force structure. The Defence Forces currently conducts training in both leadership and culture, particularly for those deploying overseas. On the basis of the findings a number of recommendations are made as to how this training and leadership development could be formalised and developed.
LT CDR ANTHONY GERAGHTY

How Seriously is Soft Security Taken by Policy Makers in Ireland?

ABSTRACT

The landscape of global security has changed dramatically in recent years. The European Union is now also focused on non-military security. Natural or man-made disasters, transnational crime, pandemic diseases, uncontrolled migration, the proliferation of narcotics, small arms and terrorism are some of the threats now considered ‘soft’ and non-military in nature. For the purpose of this thesis, the research focuses on these soft security threats. Whilst such threats have always existed, there is a fresh focus on them by commentators, the United Nations and European Union. It is, therefore, important to assess how policy makers in Ireland perceive and react to soft security threats. This research focuses on the reaction of Irish policy makers to soft security threats and the seriousness with which they are taken. There is little research in the field of soft security policy in Ireland. This may be because there is no shared understanding of the term within the literature or amongst the principal security actors of the State. Through documentary analysis and interviews, the study found a lack of consensus, among Irish security actors, on the need for an overarching soft security policy for Ireland. Those interviewed highlight differing interpretations of what policy is necessary. The stumbling blocks to soft security policy development include Ireland’s sensitivity to the subject of security, political unwillingness, the lack of policy making experience by ministerial advisers, the silo effect, resource distribution and the delay in the establishment of the National Risk Register. A ‘whole of government’ approach to soft security is evident at practitioner level but this is not being coordinated at Government level unlike in other states. The significance of the findings is that, despite calls from the United Nations, European Union and examples of overarching security policy documents, Ireland appears to be behind the curve in developing her own soft security policy. The existence of such a policy could increase Ireland’s resilience to crises and disasters.
COMDT HELEN HENEGHAN

‘The Decision Point’
Why Female Officers ‘Opt Out’ of a Career in The Defence Forces

ABSTRACT

Where are all the senior female officers gone? After 32 years there is an absence of senior female officers within the Defence Forces and the majority of those who remain have not reached or qualified for promotion to Lt Col and beyond. By conducting interviews with both serving and retired female officers this case study examines the reasons behind the lack of progression to senior management and why so many of the most senior officers have retired. The research shows that the absence of women from senior management is a cause of concern across private and public sectors alike. There are numerous causal effects that both push and pull women out of the workforce. The requirements to advance to senior management are often denied to women by the impacts of domestic (pull) and workplace (push) factors. The thesis illustrates that it is the combination of push and pull factors that is responsible for the absence of female officers at senior level. All the push and pull factors that were relevant to the private sector did not directly translate to the Defence Forces. The effect of career breaks by way of maternity leave was found to be negligible. The push factors that have an impact include; workplace demands such as the Senior Command and Staff Course and overseas service; misalignment of female career paths and organisational career milestones, and the ‘mommy track’; while the pull factors include children and work life balance, husband’s careers and pensions. The predominant factors are firmly rooted in the pull of family and pensions and the push of workplace demands. The Defence Forces needs to examine the factors over which it can exert influence. An investigation into how to make the Senior Command and Staff Course and Overseas more available to female officers is required.

ABSTRACT

Does the CSDP decision-making process take the ‘rapid’ out of ‘rapid reaction’? On 15 October 2007, an EU Heads of Government decision was taken to deploy a military force (EUFOR TChad/RCA) to Eastern Chad and North Central African Republic. Despite a planning urgency to deploy without delay, the military Operational Commander was unable to officially launch the mission until 28 January 2008 due to a prolonged Force Generation process. As a result, Initial Operational Capability with mission executing boots on the ground was not declared until 15 March 2008, a five-month planning and deployment window. The EU Security Strategy Statement (2003) promotes early and rapid deployment for crisis management operations and this thesis queries whether there are factors within the EU decision-making process that cause deployment inertia, thereby working against that strategic objective. A review of the existing literature explores the difference between decision-making and decision-shaping. The role of the Brussels-based bureaucracy and their influence on the force generation process is examined. Political support for force generation is linked to limitations in operational capacity and financial costs. A research gap is identified in that the literature does not define the root causes of deployment delay. A qualitative research methodology is employed and a case study of the EUFOR TChad mission is chosen to address the research focus. Unstructured and semi-structured interviews with military and political participants, with hands-on experience of CSDP, are chosen to reveal the hidden complexities, frictions and contradictions of decision-making. The research findings expose unanimous approval procedures, rather than the actions of the Brussels-based bureaucracy, as a cause of deployment delay. The levels of political will in support of the mission are also critically important. It is found that the longer it takes member states to force generate, the greater the expected delay. To overcome this, the support of at least two member states from the Big 3 (France, Germany, UK) is crucial. The data also confirms that the decision to launch is taken by the Operational Commander but identifies a weakness in that the commander has no organic units to draw his force from and is reliant on member states to willingly provide the assets he needs. Finally, the concept of trust between member states, between the military and political and between the commander and the Lead Nation, are introduced as factors contributing to deployment delay. The implications of this research recommend that unanimous approval procedures be amended to facilitate quicker decision-shaping at CSDP committee level. Prudent planning practices should also be introduced to caution against mission deployment if support from two of the Big 3 is not
forthcoming. Responsibility for force generation should pass from the Operational HQ to the PSC, as it is essentially political in nature. Finally, it is acknowledged that in time trust between participants to the decision-making process will improve and procedures to facilitate rapid reaction for EU crisis management operations will continue to develop.
ABSTRACT

“You reach every member of your organisation by the way you treat your dead” (Kolditz, 2007: 139). It is a vital component of military leadership to demonstrate respect for peers and subordinates and there is no greater measure of that than the way in which a military organisation treats its dead. Death notification is the means by which the news of the death of an individual is notified to their next of kin by a third party. The Irish Defence Forces issued draft Guidelines in 2011 to support this process. The author contends that the Guidelines are a good foundation but that without the key areas of training and consistent implementation a successful policy will founder. This study examines death notification procedures and training and their implications for emerging Defence Forces policy. The study examined available literature from international sources in the military, law enforcement and medical fields. This was then applied to the Irish situation with particular emphasis on the Defence Forces to gauge the applicability of international best practise to the Irish Defence Forces. The study examined the issues surrounding death notification across a range of disciplines with wide ranging experience and sought to identify ‘lessons learned’ that would be applicable to the Irish Defence Forces. These areas were examined in the primary research across the same disciplines in Ireland by means of semi structured interviews. The themes that emerged were in the areas of the effects of notifications on the notifier and notified. Also examined were the supports in place for notifiers and the effect of the cultural context in which the notification occurred. Data gathered from personnel who were key policy makers and those who had firsthand experience of the process allowed the author to explore the unique nature of the Irish Defence Forces context. The key findings focused on the training and selection of notifiers, the role of families and the cultural context. In the final analysis the research both national and international agreed that those who give their lives in the service of the state deserve the respect and attention of that state in the event of their death.
The current storms of the economic and financial crisis mean resources are becoming increasingly scarce and the Irish public are more sceptical of central government and the public sector. Today in Ireland the efficient delivery of public services seldom draws plaudits for its managers but delays, inefficiencies or high costs draw immediate criticism. Defence as a public sector body, although fulfilling a unique role in defending society, is no different. Therefore, the effective strategic management and employment of its allocated resources is becoming increasingly important. There has been limited study in the area of strategic management within the Irish Defence Organisation. This thesis identifies and analyses the primary organisational variables that frequently materialise as potential obstacles to strategy in the Irish Defence Organisation. This analysis is achieved through an examination of the theories of strategy formulation and implementation, and the role of strategic management within the public sector. Through this framework key themes are identified and then assessed in terms of their impact on the strategy process. The methodology employed a qualitative research model to generate a wider outlook of interviewees’ viewpoints and to explore the nuances and relevance of each of the themes identified. Case study methodology has been employed together with semi structured interviews with senior management personnel of the Defence Organisation and the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform. The findings highlight that there are a number of variables which manifest as obstacles to strategy that must be overcome. These obstacles occur throughout the entire strategy process and can be found both inside and outside the organisation. The study recommends that that the Defence Forces considers extending the length of time officers serve in appointments at Defence Forces Headquarters. In addition, it proposes increasing the emphasis on implementation training for officers and the cross training of DoD personnel on appropriate military courses. Recommendations are also made with regard to an independent evaluation of the organisation’s strategy, together with a suggestion for the Department of Defence to consider reviewing its internal vertical communication process. The further restructuring of the Defence Forces in the absence of a Green or White Paper is also questioned.
COMDT PATRICK MURNAE

Relations Strained?
How did the EU/UN Intervention in Chad Affect Future Cooperation in Crisis Management Operations?

ABSTRACT

From January 2008 to March 2009 the European Union (EU) deployed over 3,000 troops under a United Nations mandate into Eastern Chad and the Central African Republic. They comprised the military element of the Mission de Nations Unies en Republique Centrafricaine et au Chad (MINURCAT) and were to facilitate the deployment and operation of the civilian elements of the mission until the arrival of a United Nations follow on force one year later. From the beginning cooperation between the EU and the UN was difficult. This thesis analyses the complex motivations of both organisations to intervene in the ongoing humanitarian crisis in sub Saharan Africa. It assesses the collaboration of both organisations in the intervention and judges the impact of the Mission on their evolving relationship in the field of Crisis Management. The methodology employed is a combination of qualitative analysis of the Chad Mission as a case study and a series of semi structured interviews with the key leaders of the intervention coupled with my personal observations from the Mission.

The study finds that the capability of both the EU and the UN to cooperate is hampered by their internal politics and structures. It further finds that a significant military capability gap exists between the organisations and that the UN has great difficulty in supporting robust, mobile military operations like MINURCAT. Most importantly, the study finds that the Chad intervention has left the relationship between the organisations fractious and that further large scale missions are unlikely without revision of the relationship. In addition, the study identifies an absence of literature at the tactical and operational levels of Peacekeeping and contributes toward closing this gap. Finally, the thesis considers the implications of the Chad Mission for collaborative Peacekeeping from the perspectives of the EU, the UN, Ireland and the Defence Forces.
Does Pakistani Army Oversight Represent the Best Remedy for Pakistan’s Weak Political Institutions?

ABSTRACT

According to the tenets of Western democratic theory, there is a recurring principle or theme at the heart of civil-military relations which insists upon an overwhelming separation of the military and civil institutions within a state. This thesis questions the universality and appropriateness of this principle or theme, by assessing whether the strength and cohesion of the Pakistani military contributes a valid and broadly-agreed alternative governance structure for that nation. Research for this thesis was conducted using in-depth interviews with military and non-military respondents, who all possessed either a close personal and/or professional knowledge both of the political climate, society and culture of Pakistan, and of its military organisation. The findings of this thesis yielded a deep scepticism on the part of key respondents into the necessity for the institutional separation of civil and military institutions as espoused in Western-inspired civil-military relations. Such scepticism was chiefly founded on a profound dissatisfaction exhibited by Pakistani society, with regards to the morally ambivalent performance of the civilian political classes within the country itself, and a recognition of the long-term commitment of the military to the development of Pakistan as a modern nation-state. The chief recommendations driven by the thesis are that civil-military relations can be a more dynamic reflection of a region’s geo-political environment than Defence Force leaderships generally acknowledge. Consequently, the organisation should invest greater focus on a collective appreciation of politico-military affairs, which should result in an improvement to the training of personnel for imminent deployment to ISAF.
‘Emotional Intelligence and the Irish Defence Forces’
So You Think You Can Lead?

ABSTRACT

Up to 90 percent of the difference between outstanding leadership and average leadership is accounted for by Emotional Intelligence. This may surprise those in military circles who have a sceptical view of emotions. An emotionally intelligent commander achieves organisational synergy, by inspiring his subordinates to work successfully together, in pursuit of organisational objectives. The military mentality sees the mission as paramount while the human factor is considered very much secondary. A gap exists in the education of interpersonal skills in the Irish Defence Forces. This thesis examines the construct of Emotional Intelligence and the benefits it can provide for leadership education and development in the Irish Defence Forces. The Irish Defence Forces primary operational commitment is to Peace support and Crisis Management Overseas where a premium is placed on military leaders that can understand and effectively deal with the emotions of others. Combining semi-structured interviews and reflective practice with extensive literature review, the case study found that the relationship between Emotional Intelligence and leadership was a positive one, with many benefits for leadership education and development in the Irish Defence Forces. The findings confirm the significance of Emotional Intelligence to the Irish Defence Forces. Emotional Intelligence creates an ideal framework to aid the leader and meet the needs of the individual and the organisation while achieving the mission. The research found that self-awareness was the stepping stone for leadership with interpersonal relationship as a criterion for leadership success. Emotional Intelligence education and development can help fill the gaps in interpersonal skills which were identified. These findings provide a better understanding of the construct of Emotional Intelligence as it relates to leadership education and development, particularly Military Leadership.
The Defence Forces must maintain relevance to Irish society. Relevance is the key to ensuring the organisation secures resources. Over the last thirteen years the Defence Forces has decreased in size as have the level of resources allocated to it. Therefore the process by which the roles and policy for the Defence Forces are formulated must improve in order for the organisation to retain its relevance to the nation it serves. An aim of this study was to suggest an appropriate process for defining a role for the Defence Forces relevant to modern Irish society. In doing so it explores the notion of relevance and the relationship between societal values, and those of the Defence Forces. It describes the nature of civilian control over the military in an Irish context, how this relationship affects policy formulation, and how the Defence Forces itself can affect policy. A qualitative research method is employed given the social nature of both relevance and society. Combining in-depth interviews, liaison and correspondence with key players in Irish and other nations’ defence policy formulation, the author’s own personal experience and extensive documentary analysis, this case study found that the onus rests with the Defence Forces itself to ensure that it remains relevant to society. The research reveals that the relationship between the organisation and Irish society is a positive one, the Defence Force’s values being very much a subset of those of society. This thesis illustrates that the Defence Forces reinforces democratic institutions, safeguards the security of the state, supports Civil Authorities and the Civil Power and is innovating new ways to further this support. This thesis recommends that the process to formulate defence policy involve a national debate including all elements of society, and that some way be found to include the voice of the Defence Forces in that debate. This paper also recommends that the Defence Forces increase its activities in support of society, as these help secure the resources for core military tasks and that these activities be formalised in service level agreements and memorandums of understanding in order to define that support and protect the organisation.
COMDT DAMIEN POWER

Should There be a Minimum Educational Standard for General Service Enlistment in the Irish Defence Forces?

ABSTRACT

That the Defence Forces (DF) has never had a minimum education standard for general service enlistment is well established but is this policy fit for purpose in the twenty-first century? As the DF is reflective of society (Moran, 2010) it is reasonable to infer from the 1994 International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) (which established that one in four Irish adults was functionally illiterate) that a potentially significant cohort of the DF experience functional literacy difficulties.

This study is based on data collected from semi-structured interviews, focus group and literature review across a wide spectrum of DF and external sources. It explores the academic rationale for minimum education standards as an indicator of trainability and job performance, assesses the military's role as a social improver, interprets the scale of the literacy issue from a DF perspective and considers possible means by which the DF could achieve organisational efficiencies, improve its recruitment and selection processes and enhance the well-being of existing personnel.

The introduction in April 2012 of psychometric testing for recruit selection threatened to undermine the basis for the thesis but in fact served to highlight the divergent opinions between the Officer and NCO corps as to the type of soldier the DF requires in an increasingly complex, social, political and technological environment.

At issue also is the need to quantify the scale of the problem which everyone accepts exists but the extent of which is unclear. Psychometric testing should eliminate the problem in time, but what of those currently serving? The study finds that the possibility exists of engaging with an external agency such as the National Adult Literacy Agency (NALA) to provide a quantitative base in a credible and confidential manner which could then be utilised to determine appropriate courses of action which would benefit the DF and its members.
LT CDR DECLAN POWER

‘Treading Water or Steaming Ahead’ – Is the Irish Naval Service Ready and Capable of Fulfilling Ireland’s Responsibility to Contribute to EU Maritime Security Operations?

ABSTRACT

Ireland is an island nation, perched on the Eastern edge of the Atlantic Ocean and is the western sentinel for the European continent. Our nation has always relied on the sea, for trade, for resources and for transportation and is now an integral part of the European Union. The European Union is a unique economic and political partnership between 27 European countries. It has delivered half a century of peace, stability, and prosperity, helped raise living standards, launched a single European currency, and is progressively building a single Europe-wide market in which people, goods, services, and capital move among Member States as freely as within one country.

Essential to prosperity, the overall EU area of responsibility, the EU Maritime Domain covers over twenty five million km2 and stretches from the mid Atlantic to the Mediterranean. The EU and Ireland are economically reliant on these sea areas and this reliance requires that the security of all European maritime areas remains a priority. The EU also face other maritime threats in particular the threat to maritime trade due to the scourge of piracy near the Horn of Africa. United Nations Security Council Resolutions have given legitimacy to counter piracy operations and resulted in the first EU maritime security operation focused on anti piracy efforts, namely Operation ATALANTA with the first EU naval force EUNAVFOR as its key operational enabler. Ireland’s contribution to this operation to date has been minimal; two staff appointments at Operational HQ, Northwood, UK were filled in 2009 for a period of 6 months.

This thesis will explore whether the Irish Naval Service is ready and capable to fulfill Ireland’s responsibility to contribute to EU maritime security operations. The study will seek to define why Ireland has a responsibility to contribute, outline both national and EU policy with respect to defence and maritime security and analyse the requirements of ATALANTA in order to ascertain how Ireland could make a more substantial contribution to ongoing and future EU maritime security operations. The thesis will include an assessment of the current capabilities of the Irish Naval Service, the principal maritime force of the Irish State with the intention of identifying any capability gaps that might exist which would prevent participation in EU Maritime Security Operations. This study will illuminate the prevailing discourses and issues pertinent to Ireland’s participation in EU Maritime Security Operations.
COMDT JOHN PRENDERGAST
‘The Past is Never Dead, It’s not even past.’
Defining the Purpose of the Military in Newly Independent States

ABSTRACT

Most independent, sovereign states have armies. The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of the military in newly independent states. The formative years of the Irish Free State were used as a case study. The intention was to discover what, if any were the long term implications of decisions taken on defence policy in the early years of this state. It is arguable that these decisions continue to influence contemporary defence policy. The primary use of the Defence Forces domestically continues to be as a constabulary force in aid to the civil power. The military, therefore, had to rely on overseas peacekeeping service as a means to develop military competencies.

The research used a conceptual framework based on civil-military and post-colonial theories and combined extensive primary and secondary source documentary analysis supported by in-depth semi-structured interviews. Analysis of the case study found that interim decisions made on defence policy in the 1920s still resonate today.

The significance of this thesis emerges from the findings which highlight the nature of the relationship that existed between government and military in the early years of this state. Key findings include that the government believed that total civilian control over the military was more desirable than a functioning defence policy; in the early years of the state the government favoured the development of a constabulary force rather than a conventional army; the professionalism of the officer body helped prevent military intervention in domestic politics. The main finding of this thesis indicates that the postcolonial legacy left by partition and the Civil War led to the government focusing the efforts of the Defence Forces on internal rather than external threats. The government believed that no external threat existed that would justify the creation of a large, conventional military force.

Arising from these findings the author recommends that a widespread debate is required, both internally and externally, on the true purpose of our Defence Forces. This debate should focus on both internal and external threats to Irish society and Ireland’s national interests.
ABSTRACT

In recent years, Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) have become a distinct and increasingly relevant phenomenon on missions abroad. They can be found in growing numbers in various roles in conflicts all over the world and are now a reality in modern warfare. They offer: logistic and support services; military advice and training; security; armed combat support for national and international organisations; non-governmental organisations; enterprises and other non-state actors.

This thesis explores how their work affects the Bundeswehr on missions abroad with regard to their employment by different actors and the resulting implications.

A review of literature reveals that publications which look at PMSCs from a German military perspective are almost non-existent. To date, no one has examined the effect of their employment on military missions abroad with regard to their employment by different actors, namely, third parties, conflict parties, allies and on the Bundeswehr itself. A perusal of the existing literature has provided a tool to classify PMSCs based on the different services they offer. This classification of PMSCs in relation to their employment by the different actors establishes the framework for a differentiated consideration of their impact on the military.

The methodology employed, based on a post-positivist philosophy included a case study and review of existing literature, both of which allowed certain themes to emerge. These themes, in turn informed the content of semi-structured interviews with representatives from the military, PMSCs, academics and recognised experts in the field.

The central theme that is evident throughout the research is a lack of common operational principles, coordination and integration between PMSCs and the military. Therefore, the author recommends the establishment of Contractor Operation Cells in theatre and standardised communication and cooperation between the Bundeswehr, allies and PMSCs, and most importantly, the necessity of preparing soldiers in regular and in pre-deployment training for interoperability with PMSCs.

Finally, it is recommended that a Bundeswehr doctrine be developed in this regard.
MAJOR RICH TOWNER (USA)

The Subversive Nature of Corruption
How Does Widespread Corruption Undermine an International Military Intervention Mission in a Weakened or Failed State?
Afghanistan: A Case Study

ABSTRACT

Following a decade of international intervention in the weakened state of Afghanistan, widespread corruption continues to plague economic growth and development. Although corruption is only one of the Afghan government’s many problems, NATO officials now see corruption as the single most important issue to address in its security and nationbuilding efforts. Utilizing Afghanistan as a case study, the focus of this thesis is to critically evaluate corruption in a weakened or failed state to assess whether or not corruption undermines an international military intervention mission.

The term corruption is usually associated with the misuse of entrusted power for private gain. Yet, in some societies, limited forms of corruption are not seen as illegal or immoral, but rather seen as patronage or simply a way of conducting business transactions — especially when a state or regional economy is weak and in decline.

There has been a considerable amount of literature published regarding the political, economic and social advantages and disadvantages of corruption in a weakened or failed state. The two foremost theories on corruption are the efficiency-enhancing and efficiency-reducing theories. The problem with these theories is that they focus on corruption in absolute terms, without consideration for the application of both theories to maximize advantages. Utilizing a descriptive case study methodology, semi-structured interviews were conducted with key individuals and secondary documentation was sourced to fulfil the research requirements necessary in addressing the thesis question.

The research revealed that culture plays a significant role in the perception of what exactly constitutes corruption. The research also showed that implementing a balanced approach to efficiency-enhancing corruption and efficiency-reducing corruption would be most beneficial in the rebuilding and stabilization of Afghanistan. But most importantly, the research demonstrated that widespread corruption does undermine the international military intervention mission into the weakened state of Afghanistan.
Social Media: Fabulous or Fad?
How Effective is Social Media as a Tool for Public Relations?
A Case Study of The Defence Forces

ABSTRACT

Social media is the current ‘buzzword’ of contemporary media and public relations (PR). Its phenomenal popularity has enhanced public accessibility to information and has impacted right through traditional media. It can enhance or detract from a delicately constructed, complex message, but how effective is it as a tool for PR? Four years after the Defence Forces social media presence was initiated an analysis of its effectiveness is timely. This academic review of its successful instigation puts its use in context, analysing the active audience and gauging the worth of the medium. Combining in-depth interviews of key PR professionals and journalists, with an academic review, this case study has found that although traditional media is still dominant in Ireland, social media is increasingly creating a power shift within traditional media that has affected how PR professionals disseminate messages. The research has found that increased accessibility to information via social media has added complexity and heightened risk in an era where attention, clarity and context are scarce resources. While traditional media and PR professionals both use it as a marketing tool, journalists believe that PR professionals need to embrace it wholeheartedly; social media must add value to a PR profile, not noise. With a number of valid target audiences actively engaging with Defence Forces social media, it is now an expected, integral part of a comprehensive, full spectrum communications package. Enabled by direct, public, dialogic engagement the public now demands greater levels of information. While the friends and followers of social media receive that information, the overall effect of that message remains very difficult to measure.
SHORT BIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT

1. **Comdt Billy Campbell** was commissioned into the Cavalry Corps in 1974 and posted to 2 Cavalry Squadron. He served as Personal Staff Officer to the Adjutant General from 1985 to 1989. He was Officer Commanding 2 Cavalry Squadron from 1990 to 1993 and Officer Commanding 11 Cavalry Squadron from 1993 to 1996. He graduated from the Command and Staff School in 1997 and was an instructor there from 1997 until 2000. He has served abroad with the United Nations in Lebanon and in Iran and as a guest Partnership for Peace instructor in the NATO School in Oberammergau. He holds a BA from UCD in History and Geography, an MA in Military History and Strategic Studies from NUI Maynooth and has lectured widely on military history. Comdt Campbell retired from the Defence Forces in 2007 and is General Manager of the Irish Farm Centre Limited in Dublin.

2. **Comdt John Prendergast**, an Artillery Officer with over 20 years experience in a variety of appointments in the Defence Forces and on Overseas Missions in the Balkans and the Middle East. He is Currently Personal Staff Officer to Major General Ralph James, Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations). Comdt Prendergast is a graduate of the Irish Command & Staff Course and holds a BA in Politics and History from NUIG, an MA in International Relations from DCU and an MA in Leadership, Management and Defence Studies from NUIM.

3. **Comdt Owen McNally** is an Infantry officer with 25 years’ service in the Defence Forces. He has served in a variety of appointments in the former Western Brigade, Eastern Brigade, the Military College and DFHQ. He is currently serving as a staff officer in the Strategic Planning Branch. He has served five tours of duty overseas in Lebanon and Africa. He holds a BA from NUI Galway, a Post Graduate Diploma in Policy Analysis, a first class honours Masters in Economic Science from the Institute of Public Administration and a first class honours MA in Leadership, Management and Defence Studies from NUI Maynooth. He is a graduate of the 68th Command and Staff Course where he was awarded the Lt Gen Tadhg O’Neill Award for Best Student and the Lt Col Sean Clancy Award for the best overall MA (LMDS).

4. **Commander Pat Burke** is a serving professional officer with 27 years service. Commissioned into the Naval Service, he held a number of appointments ashore and afloat, including command at sea, before becoming the Navy’s first full time legal officer. He holds honours BCL and LLM Degrees in Law from UCC, a Barrister-at-Law Degree from The Honorable Society of Kings Inns and a first class honours MA (LMDS) from NUIM. He was awarded the Lt Gen Tadhg O’Neill Award for Best Military Student on the 63rd Senior Command and Staff Course. He was the legal advisor during **Operation Seabight** which resulted in the interdiction at sea of the largest consignment of cocaine in the history of the state by the Naval Service. He has completed professional courses with the Royal Navy, the US Navy War College, the International Institute of Humanitarian Law and the University of Liverpool. In addition to serving as a Courts-Martial Prosecutor, he has lectured
in law of armed conflict and maritime law enforcement in UCC and the National Maritime College. He has deployed as Legal Advisor to the Force Commander in EUFOR HQ, Sarajevo, during Operation Althea and has also served overseas as Legad to Battalion Commanders deployed in Chad and Lebanon.

5. **James C. O'Shea** is an employee of the Department of Foreign Affairs, who worked on protracted conflicts during Ireland’s 2012 Chairmanship of the OSCE. His overseas assignments include service at the Embassy of Ireland in Moscow, the Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Geneva and the Permanent Mission to the OSCE in Vienna, as well as with Finland’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs during that country’s EU Presidency in 2006. He is a Lieutenant in the Reserve Defence Force.

6. **Lt Col Cudmore** is a professional military officer with a broad range of military service over more than 30 years. He is currently holding an appointment in the Strategic Planning Branch of Defence Forces Headquarters and is integrated with the International Security and Defence Policy Branch in the Department of Defence. He served in the Permanent Representation of Ireland to the European Union, based in Brussels, from 2008 to 2010. He holds a number of academic qualifications including MA International Relations (DCU), MA LMDS (NUIM), Honours BA (NUIG), Diploma in Criminal Psychology (NCI), Diploma in Logistics (ILT), and a Diploma in European Relations (IERI). His article does not represent official Defence Forces or Department of Defence policy; rather it highlights some relevant ‘open source’ material which sheds some light on current developments within the Common Security and Defence Policy.

7. **Comdt Ronan Corcoran** is Chief Instructor of the United Nations Training School Ireland. He has served on eleven tours of duty on seven Peace Support Operations, including UNIFIL, KFOR, UNMEE and UNTSO. He was Senior Operations Officer in MINURCAT in 2009 and Officer Commanding the first Irish contingent of EUTM Somalia in 2010. He holds a BSc (hons) in Communications Studies from Trinity College Dublin, an MA in Communications and Cultural Studies from Dublin City University and an MA in Leadership, Management and Defence Studies from National University of Ireland Maynooth. He graduated from the Command and Staff Course in 2008 and is currently completing an MSc in Security, Conflict and International Development in University of Leicester’s Department of Criminology. He has recently returned from Germany, where he served for fourteen months as a Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff in the headquarters of EU Battlegroup 2012/II, an experience that prompted his article for this year’s DF Review.

8. **Capt Barry Byrne** is currently leading the newly established IKM Section in J6, DFHQ. This section is responsible for the creation of policies, procedures, training and technical solutions for Information and Knowledge Management in the Irish Defence Forces. He also has considerable experience lecturing at the Computer Science Department of Trinity College Dublin. Barry commenced his career in the Naval Service and transferred to the army to undertake a degree in IT and business in
NUIG. Since then, he has served in a number of appointments; from recruit platoon commander 2 Inf Bn, to acting OC 2 Fd CIS. Barry has served in a variety of roles overseas; Logistics in UNMIL (Liberia) in 2006, CIS officer in 2007 in UNIFIL and CIMIC and Operations Officer in MONUSCO (DRC) in 2011. He graduated with 1st class honours from the MSc in Management of Information Systems in Trinity College Dublin in 2011 and is a graduate of the NATO Information and Knowledge Management course in Virginia. Barry has presented papers at the New Ways of War Conference in UCD in 2011 and at the European Conference of Knowledge Management in Lithuania in September 2013.

9. **Frank Bannister** is an Associate Professor in information systems in Trinity College, Dublin. Prior to becoming an academic in 1995, he worked in both the Irish civil service and for PricewaterhouseCoopers as a management consultant. His research interests are e-government; e-democracy; on-line privacy and trust; and IT value and evaluation, particularly in the public sector. He is co Director of the Permanent Study Group on e-Government within the European Group on Public Administration and editor of the Electronic Journal of e-Government. Frank is a Fellow of Trinity College, Dublin, a member of the Institute of Management Consultants in Ireland, a Fellow of the Irish Computer Society and a Chartered Engineer.

10. **Martin Duffy** is a former Defence Forces Officer. Martin served in the Irish Air Corps from 1982 until 1997. Following his aviation career, he has worked as a self-employed management consultant from 2001 until the present, trading as ASA Consulting. On completion of an MSc in Strategic Management in 2010 he has continued PhD level research focused on organisational meetings. This article is based on two academic papers which have been accepted for presentation at the PROS Symposium in Crete, Greece in June 2013 and at the EGOS Colloquium in Montreal in July 2013. He is also co-author With Dr Brendan O’Rourke of a forthcoming article in the Journal of Business Communications titled “Dialogue in Strategy Practice: A discourse analysis of a strategy workshop.” Martin’s PhD research is supervised by Dr Brendan O’Rourke of the Dublin Institute of Technology.

11. **Dr Anne O’Brien** coordinates the provision by Kairos Communications Ltd. of all production modules on the BA Media Studies, BA Digital Media and MA Radio & Television Production for the Centre for Media Studies at NUIM. She has been a supervisor on the MA (LMDS) since 2006 and lectures on the programme on research methodology. She completed her PhD in Sociology in 2008 at NUIM. She has produced a number of documentaries for RTE and TG4 and published a monograph ‘The Politics of Tourism Development’ with Palgrave MacMillan. Her current research interests focus on the representation and participation of women in media, social and new media and women and work in media production.

12. **Capt Andrew Barry** joined the Defence Forces in 2002 and was commissioned in 2004 from the 79th Cadet Class. He has served in appointments in 6th Infantry Battalion, 4th (Western) Brigade Training Centre, the Cadet School during which he completed the Platoon Commanders Battle Course in the UK), B Company 3rd
Infantry Battalion and as SO Ops / Training the Central Medical Unit in DFHQ. He has served two tours of duty overseas with 93 Irish Battalion UNMIL (Liberia) and 6th NIC in KFOR. He is currently serving with the EU Training Mission in Somalia. He completed a BA in Geography and History at UCC in 2002 and an MA in Political and Public Communications at DCU in 2012.

13. **Lt Col Howard Berney** was commissioned in December 1977. He is an Infantry Officer who has served in a number of Infantry Battalions at home, as well as filling operational and training appointments in Defence Forces Headquarters and the Military College. He has served five tours of duty overseas – two to UNIFIL (Lebanon), two to KFOR (Kosovo) and one as Battalion Commander of 101 Battalion to MINURCAT (Chad). He is a graduate of the Command and Staff Course and holds a MA in Leadership, Management and Defence Studies from NUI Maynooth. He received the Lt General Dermot Earley Award for the officer who submitted the outstanding dissertation on the 3rd Strategic Leadership Course at the Military College. He is currently serving as Adjutant in the Headquarters of the Defence Forces Training Centre in the Curragh.

14. **Lt Col Stephen Ryan** joined the Defence Forces as a member of the 61st Cadet Class and was commissioned as an Infantry Corps officer in May 1986. He has served in many and varied command, staff and instructional appointments in the former Curragh Command, the 2 Bde and the DFTC. Lt Col Ryan has six operational tours of overseas duty. He served in UNIFIL on three occasions: with the 68 Inf Bn in 1990; 82 Inf Bn in 1997 and with 1 Finn/Irish Bn in 2007. He deployed to the Balkans twice: 2000 to KFOR and 2004 to BiH. He has also served in EUFOR Chad with the 99 Inf Bn in 2009. Lt Col Ryan is a graduate of the Command and Staff School. He holds a BA from UCG and an MA (LMDS) from NUI Maynooth. In 2012 he graduated from the UK Advanced Command and Staff College and in 2012, was also awarded an MA in Defence Studies from King’s College, London. His submission to this addition of the DF Review is taken from his MA thesis concerning the Christians of the Middle East submitted as part fulfilment of the King’s MA programme. Lt Col Ryan is currently the Chief Instructor of the Infantry School, Military College.

15. **Comdt Conor Bates** is an Infantry Officer with twenty-two years experience including service in several units and three formations. He has a BA in History and Economics and a First Class MA in Leadership Management and Defence Studies. He has lectured on Combined Arms Mobile Operations, Intelligence and Effects Based Operations in the Defence Force Military College. Comdt Bates has served on two tours of duty to South Lebanon (UNIFIL) and on two tours of duties to Kosovo (KFOR). His first tour to Lebanon coincided with the Israeli ‘Grapes of Wrath’ operation while his first tour to Kosovo was as an Intelligence Officer in a Task Force Headquarters (2008/09) during Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence. The second tour to Kosovo was as an advisor/mentor to the Kosovo Security Force (2010/11) where he was exposed to Security Sector Reform at several levels. He currently serves in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff (Support). This article is based on Comdt Bates’ Thesis submitted for his MA LMDS, updated to May 2013.
16. Lt Dónal Mitchell enlisted in the Irish Defence Forces in March 1997 and, after eleven years service with 2nd Infantry Battalion and 2 (East) Brigade Training Centre, was commissioned as a Lieutenant into 5th Infantry Battalion. He has served with 7th Infantry Battalion since its inception on the reorganisation of the Defence Forces in November 2012. He has served four tours of duty on UN peacekeeping missions in; UNIFIL (Lebanon) in 1998, UNTAET (East Timor) in 2000, UNMIL (Liberia) in 2004 and MINURCAT (Chad) in 2009. He deploys to UNIFIL in November 2013. Lt Mitchell received an MA in Military History and Strategic Studies from NUI Maynooth in 2012. Originally from Dublin, he lives in Wicklow with his wife and two children.

17. Comdt Helen Heneghan (nee Leacy) joined the 66th Cadet Class in 1989 and was commissioned into the Signals Corps in 1991. The majority of her career has been spent in various CIS Corps appointments with a brief period of service in the 28 Inf Bn. She has served overseas as the Signals Officer with the 79th Inf Bn. She has a BA in Legal Science and Italian from NUIG, a Masters of Computer Science from NUIM and an MA in Leadership, Management and Defence Studies from NUIM. Comdt Heneghan currently holds the IT Staff Officer and Budget and Planning Staff Officer appointments in CIS Branch, J6, DFHQ.

18. Lt Col Mark Hearn is the EO in the Directorate of Training and Education (J7 Branch). He was commissioned into the Eastern Command in 1985 and served there and in the 2nd Brigade until 2007 when he was posted to the appointment of instructor at the Command and Staff School in the Military College. He has completed a BA at UCG, A Post Graduate Diploma in Russian Studies at Dublin University, Trinity College, an MA in International Relations at DCU, a Diploma in Russian Studies at the University of Westminster and an MA in Leadership, Management and Defence Studies at NUI Maynooth. He is a graduate of the Command and Staff School and of the US Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has served 7 tours of duty overseas including a tour with the UN Supervisory Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) in 2012. This is his fourth year as editor of the Defence Forces Review.