



Óglaigh na hÉireann




DEFENCE FORCES IRELAND

Defence Forces Review 2009

- **Origins of 2 Fd Arty Regt**
- **The Cork City Bridge Guard of 1915**
- **The Battle for the Targeting Battle Space**
- **The Lost Tombs of Finner Camp**
- **Irish Aid and the Defence Forces**



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Preface

As Director of Defence Forces' Public Relations it is my great pleasure to publish the Defence Forces Review for 2009. I have no doubt that this edition will be enjoyed as much as previous editions. The purpose of the Defence Forces Review is to provide a forum whereby contributors can raise current issues, provoke thought, and generate discussion across the wider Defence Community. I have every confidence that this edition of the Review will achieve all these goals and indeed look forward to receiving any constructive comments as a consequence. The richness of the Defence Forces' military tradition is apparent in this edition of the review and I hope that everybody is included in the diversity of articles reproduced here.

For the 2009 Review the Editor has assembled an outstanding group of contributors all of whom I wish to thank personally for having taken the time to produce their essays, which I have no doubt will prove both very informative and indeed challenging for the reader. I am particularly grateful to our Editor Lt Col Mick Dolan who despite his normal duties has undertaken the task of editing this review with enthusiasm and commitment.

Again many thanks to all our contributors without whose commitment and generosity the production and publication of this Review would not have been possible.

Kieran Brennan
Lt Col
Director of Defence Forces' Public Relations

*The fact that an article appears
In this journal does not indicate official
approval of the views expressed by the author.*

Editor's Note

Since 2005, when we changed its format to accommodate the academic output from students of the Command and Staff Course in pursuit of their Masters' Degree, feedback for the Defence Forces Review has been positive and we continue it again this year. The full Defence Forces Review in 2008 was devoted to the anniversary of DF involvement in International Peacekeeping, at the expense of the Military College. As a result, I include, this year, the Abstracts of the dissertations from both the 63rd and 64th Command and Staff Courses. Great credit must be given to those students who undertook the task of "filleting" their own work in the interests of delivering a shortened version of what represented blood, sweat and tears. More credit is due to them for even having the courage and stamina to revisit the work before the pages had cooled on the shelves. These are important sources of information, both from the quality of the work and the diversity of topics studied in depth. The full versions are shelved in the Defence Forces Library, located in the Military College, DFTC*. If the readers' interest is caught by any particular topic, the full dissertation can be made available, electronically, on request. I would especially recommend study of the bibliographies of these works – a flavour of which can be gleaned from the footnotes included with these reworked articles.

On taking command of 2 Field Artillery Regiment in January 2009, I came across an OES book with the handwritten work of Comdt William Donnelly. The focus on names in this work is important as it will fill in blanks for many gunners – serving and departed. No doubt other units have benefitted from the diaries kept by former commanders. The Defence Forces review would feel privileged to collaborate in producing these for wider consumption.

The original works reproduced here are gratefully received and I have no doubt but the readers will appreciate the contribution made by the authors. The inclusion of articles by Legal Officers reflects the complexity of modern military operations and shows that the role of Legal Officers in overseas operations has changed dramatically in the last years.

It is hoped that the work of the Senior Officers' Course, currently underway in the Military College in partnership with NUIM, will provide a rich vein of information to be mined in future issues of the Defence Forces Review. Until then, I hope you, the reader will enjoy this, the 2009, offering. I have enjoyed the challenge of producing this work. The cooperation of the DF Printing Press was absolute and the professionalism of the staff there was a lesson in "Yes, we can!" approach.

Lt Col Mick Dolan MA (LMDS) DLIS

* This library has opening hours to suit all readers. It will honour ALCID cards and welcomes readers from other educational establishments. However, borrowing rights are restricted to DF and RDF Personnel. (Ph 045-445870/1)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<i>Article Title</i>	<i>Page</i>
The Lost Tombs of Finner Camp, Co. Donegal <i>Comdt Kevin McDonald</i>	1
‘Wigs on the Green’: Legads in the Ops Room <i>Lt Cdr Pat Burke</i>	11
Challenges of a Battlespace: Military Leadership in Assymetric Conflict <i>Comdt Rory Sheerin</i>	19
Irish Aid and the Defence Forces: A Synthesis of Humanitarian Forces or an Incompatible Union <i>Comdt Kevin McCarthy</i>	33
The Battle for the Targeting Battle Space <i>Comdt Richard Brennan</i>	45
Operational Art: And its Application to the Cromwellian Campaign in Ireland <i>Comdt Ian Byrne</i>	57
United Nations Security Resolution 1325: Just add Women and Stir – A Recipe for Gender Stereotyping in Peacekeeping Operations? <i>Comdt Maureen O’Brien</i>	71
The Cork City Bridge Guard of 1915 <i>CQMS Gerry White and Lt Col Brendan O’Shea</i>	81
Origins of 2 Fd Arty Regt <i>Comdt W. Donnelly</i>	95
Abstracts – 63 C&S Course	109
Abstracts – 64 C&S Course	133
Short Biographical Details	155

The Lost Tombs of Finner Camp, Co. Donegal

Comdt Kevin McDonald

Acknowledgment: *The author wishes to especially acknowledge the assistance of Col (ret'd) Declan O'Carroll for his expert advice and assistance in relation to the history of Finner Camp, in particular in relation to the use of Ffolliot map and the 1916 British Army map.*

References to archaeological sites at Finner appear in a number of publications during the final quarter of the 19th century. Of particular interest are three megalithic tombs that were sketched by the antiquarian William F. Wakeman. William C. Borlase included these sketches in his three-volume work *The Dolmens of Ireland*, published in 1897. While discussing various monuments in the Donegal area, Borlase mentions that there were five megalithic tombs in Finner that were not apparently marked on the OS maps. Three of these monuments are shown in Figures 222 and 223 on page 237 and Figure 224 on page 238 of Volume 1 of Borlase's work. The drawings are reproduced below. (*See Figures 1, 2 & 3*)

The tomb shown in Borlase's Figure 223 is still extant. It is located near the Grenade Range at the west end of the camp. It is a smaller version of Ireland's most famous passage tomb, Newgrange in County Meath. It would have been entered along a passage of which there is now no trace, leading from the south. At the inner end of the passage a side chamber opened to the left (west) and right (east). The western side-chamber is still in place but only part of the eastern one remains. Beyond the side-chambers there is an end-chamber, which would have been in line with the passage. The monument would have originally been roofed. Records in the National Museum refer to the recovery of both burnt and unburnt bone at the site in the 1950's. (1955:30)

The other two tombs (Borlase's Figures 222 and 224) had not been located since the end of the 19th century. Borlase's Figure 222 shows a large cairn with a door-like entrance giving access to the interior where it is recorded that there was a chamber measuring 9 feet long and 6 feet, 5 inches wide (about 2.75m by 1.95m). The circumference of the large cairn that covered the chamber is said to have measured 120 or 121 paces. Another drawing by Wakeman in 1880 is included as Figure 9 in Michael Herity's *Irish Passage Graves* published in 1964.

Borlase's Figure 224 shows what appears to be a long narrow gallery-type grave. It is said to have been 16 feet long and 7 feet wide (about 4.85m by 2.15m). It is difficult to say what type of megalithic tomb this was but the indications from the drawing is that it was a court tomb. So what happened to the two sites shown in Borlase's Figures 222 and 224 and where exactly did they stand? The first published reference to these sites date to the late 1870's. At this stage the lands that now comprise Finner Camp were in the ownership of a Col Ffolliott. He was well aware that on his lands stood a number of ancient monuments, including "*an array of primitive antiquities, sepulchral mounds, giants graves, pillar stones and caves, and at least one cromleac*" It was also noted at the time in Finner that "*By keeping a good lookout between the dunes, especially on spots from which the sand has recently been blown away, a collector of archaic remains might interestingly increase his store by picking up waifs, such as*



Figure 1 - (Borlase's fig 222)



Figure 2 - (Borlase's fig 223)



Figure 3 - (Borlase's fig 224)

arrowheads, scrapers, or other worked flints, hammer stones etc.”¹ Before he left the country on an extended business trip he decided that in order to protect these monuments from being plundered by road contractors he would have his estate workmen erect a large wall around them. Unfortunately his enterprising workmen demolished a portion of a chambered cairn in order to build the aforementioned wall. Both of Wakeman’s drawings, made in 1880, of the large cairn (Borlase’s Figure 222 and Herity’s Figure 19) show a wall alongside the large cairn and it appears that indeed a large quantity of stone was removed. In a published reference to the site in 1896 Wakeman stated that about half the cairn had been demolished. By this stage the area had been taken over by the military after Col Ffolliott had sold the property to the War Department.

During February 1897 the issue of the destruction of monuments at Finner was raised on three occasions in the House of Commons. The Under Secretary of State for War was asked by an Irish Member of Parliament, if he was aware that ‘*a cairn of great antiquity*’ at Finner was being plundered for material to construct a rifle range. The official position was that the supposed cairn was a natural limestone formation from which twelve cubic yards of loose stone were taken but to allay concerns removal would cease. The reply also admitted that there was a small ‘cromlech’ called Muldoons Grave 100 yards (about 91m) from the small cairn. The local newspaper, *The Donegal Independent*, of 12 February, 1897 was scathing in its comments about the official claim that the source of the material for the rifle range was a natural formation and went on to point out “*that a sepulchral cairn, of great antiquarian interest, is not “a natural limestone formation of loose stones.”*”² All in all it would appear that the source of the material for the rifle range was indeed the cairn. The reference to the existence of a small cromlech nearby, probably the site in Borlase’s Figure 224, would support this view.

There is further evidence to the two lost sites in the 1898. This is from the Regimental News Sheet of the Royal Iniskilling Fusiliers for September 1898. L.J. Emerson refers this to in an article on Finner Camp in the *Donegal Annual*.³ The news sheet mentions the existence of the cairn and another ancient grave that stood close to it. “*It may be news to some that close to our camping ground is an old Irish Cairn, in which it is supposed many of the chiefs of Ulster were preserved and owing to the exertions of the Royal Society of Ireland, was preserved during the levelling of the Camp. Close beside this is a large square set, surrounded by high stones, which is pointed out by the inhabitants as the grave of the famous Irish Giant Fin Macoul, but whether this be true or not a great deal of attraction is centred in it.*” Further confirmation of their survival at about this time is contained in an article by F.W. Lockwood. He referred to the sites and published drawings of them in the *Ulster Journal of Archaeology* for the year 1901.⁴

1 RSAI vol xxvi 1896

2 RSAI vol vii 1897

3 Donegal Annual Volume 38,1986

4 Ulster Journal of Archaeology for the year 1901(volume 7, 2nd series).

It is ironic that despite attracting considerable antiquarian attention in the last quarter of the 19th century no one seems to have recorded the precise location of these monuments. The extant passage tomb came to the attention of the National Museum in the 1950's when human bone was recovered at the site. (1955:30) The locations of the other two sites (Borlase's Figures 222 and 224) remained unknown.

Recently the writer noted the collapsed remains of what had clearly been a substantial wall. It runs more or less N-S for a considerable extent on a terrace bounded by a somewhat higher terrace to the S and generally lower ground to the N where sand dunes are numerous. In the absence of any other candidates this may well be the wall shown in the drawings of the cairn. Some 45m W of this wall there is a 25m long arc of a low bank or wall. It is scarcely 0.3m high and about 1m wide. By extending the line of the arc it is possible to reconstruct the extent of the original circle. Its origin and function are quite uncertain but it should be considered as the possible remnant of the footings of the kerb of a cairn, perhaps one of dry-stone construction. Only excavation could now confirm if this is indeed the case. The feature is located 150m N of the airfield and its NGR is 84231 60821 (See Figures 4, 5 & 6).



Figure 4



Figure 5

A series of walks through the area revealed other traces of ancient features. Some 100m W of the possible cairn there is a length of wall represented by a low bank of soil and moderately sized stones. Its age is uncertain but it is hardly less than some hundreds of years old and might be considerably more.

Further W again in a hollow among low sand hills there are two lengths of rough walling at right angles to each other. These may be the remnant of a rectangular feature. One wall runs east west and is 9m long. It is represented by a line of stones set on edge. The other length of wall is at right angles to the west end of the last and runs northwards for 5m. It is represented by an inner and outer facing of stones set in the ground. The surface between the two facings is grass-grown but is likely that it conceals a rubble infill. The wall remnants are not over 0.3m high. The nature of the feature is uncertain but it may be the remains of a substantial stone building. It is located 200m W of the site of the Great Cairn. Some 10m NW of the remnants of the same cairn are the remains of a small sub circular enclosure, which measures 4m in circumference. There appears to be the foundations for a wall running alongside it in a N/S direction.




Figure 6

A search for the third tomb sketched by Wakeman and entitled as a ‘Giants Grave’ was eventually rewarded by the writers discovery of a series of large stones with at least one upright orthostat with a view of the sand dunes that is replicated in the sketch (Borlase’s Figure 224). Without excavation it is hard to say for certain if it is indeed the same site but it would appear to be a likely candidate. (See Figure 7) Indeed a second site was also discovered in the vicinity which has the appearance of a megalithic structure (see figure 7a) but again it would take some detailed examination to confirm.



Figure 7



Figure 7a

There had been some interest in Finner since the Irish Defence Forces took over the camp in 1922. A Scottish antiquarian and his wife were walking in the area North of the water tower in 1931 and found a number of flint arrowheads and scrapers which they handed in to the National Museum.⁵ Some years later a Mr Swan from Lough Eske found a flint arrowhead “in Finner” and eventually handed it over to the National Museum in 1973⁶ and a local judge carried out an unauthorised excavation in 1955 in the extant passage tomb and recovered some human bone, both unburnt and cremated.⁷ It is interesting to note that the extant passage tomb and the one sketched by Wakeman as ‘the Great Cairn’ have their entrances facing due south. Approx. eight kms to the South of Finner Camp is the steep sided Arroo Mountain. This has a relatively flat summit plateau, upon which is a large cairn of stones, distinctly visible from both of these passage tombs. A further tantalising link with the Neolithic community that lived in Finner is that the easiest route to the cairn passes a large series of cliffs where chert can be sourced and this is identical to the distinctive black chert debitage presently lying in various spots on the bluffs in Finner.

Quite recently a flint tool, possibly a scraper, was discovered by the author in a crevice in a natural limestone outcrop. (83824 60597) (See Figures 8 & 9) One of the edges is damaged and the absence of any flint debitage waste by-product of stone tool production in the immediate area added to the fact that it was over 1m down a natural crevice would possibly suggest that it was discarded at some stage in the Neolithic Period. There is also a spread of debitage some 500m away from this find and a small polished stone axe was picked up as a surface find approx. 800m away from the flint tool. (See Figure 10) Indeed the area where this axe was found has produced a number of small bits of waste flint and chert, some with a distinct bulb of percussion. It is on an extended bluff overlooking the sand dunes and as the bedrock is only a few cms from the surface, most of the soil covering has been weathered away. This has proved useful from an archaeological perspective as it is possible to see waste flint and chert in situ that has more than likely not been moved since originally discarded some time in the Neolithic.



Figure 8



Figure 9

There was also a small midden or archaeological horizon, found by the author in the sand bluffs adjacent to the coast. (84543 61301) This contained shells, charcoal and what appears to be slag. This seems to suggest that human activity was not only limited to the high ground overlooking the dunes but spread out over a wide area that utilised both the dunes and the shoreline. (See Figure 11)

Discussion

The amount of tombs and other monuments that originally stood in Finner is difficult to quantify. Borlase, as mentioned above suggests that there were five dolmens in the townland that were not marked on the OS map, and the RSAI entry for 1896 stating that “*an array of primitive antiquities, sepulchral mounds, giants graves, pillar stones and caves, and at least one cromleac*”⁸ were to be found in Finner would certainly support the view that there was a

5 Information from National Museum of Ireland Topographical Files

6 Information from National Museum of Ireland Topographical Files 1973:198

7 Information from National Museum of Ireland Topographical Files 1955:30

8 RSAI vol xxvi 1896



Figure 10



Figure 11

significant number of important sites in the area. Wakeman however sketched only three of them and field walking has identified three possible sites in addition to the Passage Tomb he sketched and which is still extant. It can be suggested that Col Ffolliott instigated a wall to be erected around a series of ancient structures on his lands at Finner. Unfortunately this action resulted in one of these monuments, the great cairn, being partially destroyed. It seems that when the British Military authorities purchased the lands, that originally they intended to preserve them. This is indicated by the reference in the Iniskilling news sheet, but at some later stage, possibly when the rifle range was being laid out, that a considerable amount of stones was required to stabilise the building of the rifle butts. What remains are faint traces of walls and circular foundations that hint tantalisingly at the Wakeman sketches. Interestingly when comparing Ffolliotts 1896 map with the British Military map of 1916 (by which time the rifle range had been laid out) there is a sizeable amount of walls that are depicted in the earlier map missing from the later one which ties in nicely with the suggestion that the Military Authorities removed all sources of stone to build the rifle range. These maps are reproduced; (See Figures 12 & 13)

Regardless of these ephemeral glimpses of the past, it is certain that the landscape at Finner was well utilised from at least the Neolithic (4000BC to 2500BC). It is worth suggesting that there may well be an earlier element to the prehistoric activities at Finner. We know that Mesolithic communities survived in Ireland for 3000 years before the first Megalithic tomb was erected and these fairly mobile communities gathered, hunted and fished along the coasts, near river mouths and lakes in various parts of Ireland from as early as 7010BC. It is tantalising to suggest that on the bluffs overlooking the sand dunes and the tidal stretch of the River Erne, a Mesolithic community harvested the fruits of the sea and hunted and trapped further inland. Whether there was indeed a Mesolithic community living in Finner has still to be proved but that there was a Neolithic community living there is fairly certain.

The references to arrowheads, scrapers and hammer stones being easily picked up among the dunes suggests that a sizable community operated in the vicinity and no doubt harvested the fruits of the sea as much as that of the land. This has been borne out by the surface finds of waste flint and chert, flint tools, pottery and a stone axe, picked up by the author over a 2-month period. The spread of these artefacts is over an area stretching approx. one kilometre and is on a flat area of high ground overlooking the sand dunes and the tidal stretch and the mouth of the River Erne.




Figure 12 - 1886 Map of Col Ffolliotts estate Finner



Figure 13 - 1916 British Army Map showing Rifle Range

One can imagine that this same community, in keeping with similar communities along the Sligo and Donegal coast, raised their sepulchral monuments to their ancestors and in doing so not only honoured the memory of the dead but also claimed the land for the living members of the tribe, for these megalithic tombs were not just receptacles for the dead but a ritual foci for generations to not alone worship their dead with various funerary rituals but they were also a way for the living to intercede with the 'other world' and gain favours for better harvests, better weather, better land. They also served as territorial markers, as a tribes claim to the land of their ancestors and an indication of the collective strength of that particular community. It is indeed a great pity that these monuments, erected in the main some 5,500 years ago and having withstood the onslaught of time, weather and the Atlantic storms were lost in man's rush to build a rifle range.

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'Wigs on the Green': Legads in the Ops Room

Lt Cdr (NS) Pat Burke

"Decisions were impacted by legal considerations at every level. [During the Gulf War] the law of war proved invaluable in the decision-making process".

General Colin Powell, US Army Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff¹

In the last two decades law has become an increasingly prevalent factor in the conduct of military operations. As modern technology brings war to our living rooms virtually in real time, civil and military leaders have recognised that in order to maintain a nation's desire to fight, adherence to the law of armed conflict, both in fact and perception, is essential. Rupert Smith cautions that modern military operations are more closely scrutinised than ever, reflective of "the growing interest in both the morality and the legality of the use of force".²

The concept that there can be any law governing an entity such as war, a process so inherently violent and irrational, could at first consideration be thought absurd. Nonetheless, since antiquity there has been a perception amongst combatants that there is mutual benefit to be derived from the necessity for some level of restraint. Such perception led to the eventual codification of the law of armed conflict and the adoption of the initial Geneva Convention of 1864. The continuing evolution of the law of armed conflict prompted Hays Parks to state that this codification "reflects the evolutionary development of warfare as well as the slow but steady definition of the rights of individuals not engaged in battle".³

Conflict of Theories: Utilitarian Vs. Humanitarian

Since commencement, the ongoing codification of the laws of war has been driven by two competing perspectives, described by Krauss and Lacey as "a battle between the utilitarian or warrior, on one side, and the humanitarian, on the other".⁴ The utilitarian considers the humanitarian intent upon destroying national defence, the humanitarian views the utilitarian as unconcerned with the use of force and unnecessary killing of innocent civilians. Recognising the emergence of law as a possible restraining influence on the use of force, Von Clausewitz denigrated it accordingly: "Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed: war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst".⁵ Similarly, Peters decries legal restrictions: "We still find that sometimes we must fight the enemy on his ground by his rules. This is the hardest form of combat... because our own rules cripple us, and, at worst, kill us".⁶ Conversely, the frustration of the humanitarian is succinctly described by Greenwood: "All too often, the laws of armed conflict are seen as at best irrelevant and at worst a positive hindrance to the effective conduct of military operations".⁷ Arguably the most dramatic change in favour of the humanitarian perspective began in 1977 with the signing of two Protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions of

1 Cited by Green, L.C. (2000) *The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict*, Manchester, Juris, Publishing at ii.

2 Smith, R. (2005) *The Utility of Force, The Art of War in The Modern World*, London, Penguin at 268.

3 Parks, W. Hays (1992) *The Gulf War: A Practitioner's View*, New York, Dickinson J. International at 2.

4 Krauss, E. and Lacey M. (2002) 'Utilitarian vs. Humanitarian: The Battle over the Law of War,' *Parameters*, 73 – 85, at 73.

5 Clausewitz Von, C. (1976) *On War*, Howard, M. and Paret, P., (trans and eds), Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, at 75..

6 Peters, R. (2002) *Beyond Terror, Strategy in a Changing World*, Mechanicsburg, PA, Stackpole Books, at 15.

7 Greenwood, C. (1993) *Command and the Laws of Armed Conflict*, (Occasional Paper No. 4), Camberley, Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, at 11.

1949. The Additional Protocols place affirmative obligations upon the Commander in advance of operations who now faces an evolving and more demanding legal framework impacting the military decision making process.

‘The New Dynamic Duo’ - Commander and Legad?

Reflective of this legal framework, Article 87 of Additional Geneva Protocol I mandated that the Commander must have recourse to a legal adviser (Legad). The modern Commander is now not only expected to be aware of the legalities involved in the conduct of military operations, he is also required to comply with the law of armed conflict at all levels of command. In ratifying the Additional Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions, Ireland is obliged to provide Defence Force’s Commanders with legal advice to ensure accurate and effective interpretation of the meaning of the laws governing military operations.⁸ It is essential to this relationship to understand that the legal adviser does not usurp the Commander in the decision making process. Dunlap aptly describes the relationship: “a good JAG asks the hard questions, plays devil’s advocate, and demands the best of the intelligence assets and operational processes. In the end, however, the decision to attack belongs to the Commander”.⁹

Hurley expands on this concept of subsequent criminal liability stating “no legal advisers were hanged after Nuremberg, only Commanders”.¹⁰ This does not however exclude the possibility of criminal liability attaching to a legal adviser; Keeva explains: “If an order or a proposal is brought in that is patently illegal and a lawyer says we can ignore that ... he would have as much liability as the Commander”.¹¹ The notion of subsequent criminal liability attaching to both actors creates a unique nexus between the Commander and legal adviser. Nevertheless, despite this symbiotic relationship of duty between the legal adviser and the Commander, the former are still not always readily accepted in the ops room. James Baker claims that such reluctance may be *inter alia* “due to concerns about secrecy, delay, or ‘lawyer creep’- the legal version of ‘mission creep’; whereby one legal question becomes seventeen, requiring not one lawyer but forty-three to answer”.¹²

‘Wigs on the Green’ – Lawyers in War

The first Gulf War represents the zenith of operational lawyers being deployed in a theatre of operations; over 350 operational lawyers supported almost 800,000 coalition troops.¹³ This represented an unprecedented deployment of military legal advisers in any campaign prompting Keeva to describe it accordingly: “More than any other war in history, the Persian Gulf War was a lawyer’s war”.¹⁴ The extensive use of precision guided munitions (PGMs) and the ensuing media coverage led to careful selection and analysis of targets that has since become the standard practice for all modern military operations. Representing this progression, Baker describes subsequent NATO operations in Kosovo as “a campaign during which the law of armed conflict was assiduously followed. The campaign was conducted

8 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Article 83.

9 Dunlap, C.J. (2001) ‘Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st Century Conflicts’ (online) Available from <URL: <http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cchrp/intervention.shtml#papers.htm>> at 23.

10 Hurley, S. (1994) *The Force of Law: International Law and the Land Commander*, Canberra, Australian Defence Studies Centre, at 186.

11 Keeva, S. (1991) ‘Lawyers in the War Room’, *American Bar Association Journal*, December, 52-59, at 52.

12 Baker, J.E. (2002) ‘When Lawyers Advise Presidents in Wartime’, *Naval War College Review*, Vol. LV, (1), 11-28, at 27.

13 Desert Storm After Action Review—Lessons Learned, International Law Division, US Army Judge Advocate General’s School, 8.

14 Keeva, S. (1991) ‘Lawyers in the War Room’, *American Bar Association Journal*, December, 52-59, at 54.

with uncommon, if not unprecedented, discrimination".¹⁵ The evolving experience of having military advisers in the ops room as per the Gulf War and Kosovo has attracted differing academic commentary. Extolling the value of the legal adviser, Hays Parks stated: "I have heard Generals Schwarzkopf, Powell and just about any other general officer who I run into, say that they consider the lawyer to be absolutely indispensable to military operations".¹⁶ However, not all commentators are as overly enamoured.

Betts explicitly disagrees and is extremely critical of the role that law played in the Kosovo campaign: "the hyper-legalism applied to NATO's campaign made the conflict reminiscent of the quaint norms of pre-modern war".¹⁷ Rivkin and Casey, concerned by what they claim as unrealistic norms put forward by the advocates of international law, portray the law of armed conflict as hopelessly idealistic and believe that it unnecessarily hampers the Commander. They argue for permissive selective interpretation of the law to allow humanitarian restrictions to be suspended in the interests of military expediency. Dunlap as a soldier understands the warrior's desire for combat on the most favourable terms available to him; as a military legal adviser he understands the necessity for compliance with humanitarian legal norms demanded in modern war. Baker recognising the need for balance states: "If international law regulates but does not prohibit war, the law of armed conflict provides a framework to ensure that force is used in the most humane and economical manner possible".¹⁸

Command Responsibility – A Poisoned Chalice?

Global media coverage allows breaches of the law of armed conflict, at even the lowest level, to be placed under virtually instantaneous public scrutiny. Command responsibility is not exclusively the remit of the generals who plan and order attacks; their civilian leaders are also now liable as evidenced with the recent trial of Slobodan Milosevic.¹⁹ The heightened humanitarian expectations of Western society that war will be cleanly fought and the realisation that the Commander and his political masters may be found ultimately accountable has placed an increased legal onus on military planning. Recognizing the tension between military necessity and legal compliance, Garraway questions, "whether the responsibility of modern command has become a poisoned chalice?"²⁰

Garraway posits that this could be because there is a tendency to focus solely on results facts when examining the use of military force to the detriment of examining the conditions that existed prior to the military engagement. This is to ignore the military necessity, distinction and proportionality tests considered by the Commander before engaging his selected target. A 'good faith' test used to scrutinise the use of force post-action is not a question of second-guessing the Commander, rather it evaluates whether the Commander arrived at a decision that no reasonable Commander could have reached. The modern Commander faces an ever-increasing level of scrutiny concerning his decisions on the battlefield. Consequently, the Commander deserves robust, realistic and clear legal advice in making his decision. In judging Commanders

¹⁵ Baker, J.E. (2002) 'When Lawyers Advise Presidents in Wartime', *Naval War College Review*, Vol. LV, (1), 11-24, at 22.

¹⁶ Parks, W. Hays (1992) *The Gulf War: A Practitioner's View*, New York, Dickinson J. International.

¹⁷ Betts, R.K. (2001) 'Compromised Command', *Foreign Affairs*, July/August, 126-132, at 126.

¹⁸ Baker, J.E. (2002) 'When Lawyers Advise Presidents in Wartime', *Naval War College Review*, Vol. LV, (1), 10-24, at 10.

¹⁹ Prosecutor v Slobodan Milosevic, ICTY Case No IT-02-54. Milosevic, former President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, was charged with war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide during armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia.

²⁰ Garraway, C. (2005) 'Responsibility of Command: A Poisoned Chalice?' in Arnold, R. and Hildbrand, P.(eds), *International Humanitarian Law and the 21st Century's Conflicts, Changes and Challenges*, Lausanne, International Committee of the Red Cross pp.116-138 at 117.

it is important to note that they will not be held to a standard of perfection in reaching their decisions. Rather, the expected standard of care requires that they will take all reasonable steps, i.e. those that are practicable taking into account all of the circumstances including humanitarian and military considerations, in planning and executing their targeting tasks and that the law of armed conflict is respected. Garraway accepts that the law of armed conflict is a delicate balance between military necessity and humanitarian concerns; if the balance tips too far in either direction, the edifice will collapse. He cautioned that too much emphasis on military necessity leads to an attitude of anything goes, which in turn leads to barbarism. Echoing these sentiments, Brigadier-General Fraser²¹ cautioned about the fine line between legal and illegal, stating “you would be a fool to go into any military operation today without legal advice”.²²

Michael Ignatieff argues, “the Western military’s response to sharpened moral and political exposure has been to call in the lawyers”.²³ Commanders have concluded that they must have their targets vetted prior to attack for both legal and moral suitability, to do so they have developed the practice of targeting. Essentially the Commander is required to ensure that each target satisfies the definition of military objective, that the means selected in attacking the target are proportional to the military advantage to be gained and that incidental or collateral damage to civilians and their property is minimised. The targeting issue most publicised during the first Gulf War was the bombing of the Al-Ameriyah Command Bunker.

The bunker, originally built as an air raid shelter for the Iran-Iraq war, was subsequently converted into a command and control bunker, transforming it from a protected civilian building into a legitimate military objective. Intelligence analysts reviewing the bunker found it camouflaged and with armed guards deemed it a military target. The bunker was subsequently attacked at night resulting in the unforeseen deaths of over 300 Iraqi civilians who had, unknowingly to the Coalition, been allowed to sleep there. Under the principle of military necessity, the Commander selected and justified the bunker as a legitimate target. While there was undoubtedly unnecessary loss of civilian life following the attack, Myrow²⁴ states that the responsibility for that loss legally did not lie with the Commander; the attack was conducted within the norms established by the laws of war. To analyse the risk involved in planning for an operation that may involve collateral damage, some of the factors considered are selected weapon characteristics, blast effects on the kind of buildings found near the estimated impact point and known population distributions. Nonetheless, this cannot substitute for the reasoned judgment of the Commander. Ignatieff believes that the modern Commander therefore involves his legal adviser because:

Lawyers provide harried decision-makers with a critical guarantee of legal coverage, turning complex issues of morality into technical issues of legality, so that whatever moral or operational doubts a Commander may have, he can at least be sure he will not face legal consequences.²⁵

21 Canadian Army, former Commanding Officer of the Multi-National Brigade (Regional Command South) in Afghanistan, from February 2006 until November 2006.

22 Lecture to 63rd Senior Command & Staff Course, DFTC, April 2007.

23 Ignatieff, M.(2001) *Virtual War, Kosovo and Beyond*, London, Metropolitan Books, at 197.

24 *Ibid*.

25 Ignatieff, M.(2001) *Virtual War, Kosovo and Beyond*, London, Metropolitan Books, at 199.

Legal War – Future Warfare?

The battle lines are drawn between the protagonists contesting the future role of the law of armed conflict. The utilitarian claims that the Commander's ability to fight today's increasingly complex wars has been unnecessarily restricted by the encroaching humanitarian requirement for compliance with what they consider to be unrealistic legal norms. Conversely, the humanitarian believes that the Additional Geneva Protocols, International Criminal Tribunals and the continuing evolution of doctrines such as command responsibility will ensure caution before the Commander unsheathes the sword. The recent Gulf Wars and NATO air campaign against Kosovo witnessed the unprecedented impact of the law of armed conflict on the planning and conduct of military operations. Commander of the NATO Kosovo campaign, General Wes Clark, outlined his frustration at the impact of what he considered as unrealistic legal restrictions on his campaign planning. Clark referred to the fact that his Legad advised that Serbian air defence positions had to be actually observed and not estimated or 'templated' before being engaged by suppressive fires from his artillery:

The Commander would either have to accept the risk from other untargeted templated locations, or call off the planned mission. Surely there had to be a better way. Never had we imposed such a standard on ourselves. There had to be a misunderstanding, I thought".²⁶

Notwithstanding his frustration, Clark underlined the importance for him of conducting attacks with the utmost of legal discrimination, "on the public relations front we knew that NATO's greatest vulnerability was unintentional injuries to innocent civilians".²⁷

'Lawfare' – 'Duelling with words rather than swords'?

Kennedy describes lawfare as "using law as a weapon, as a tactical ally, a strategic asset, an instrument of war".²⁸ Dunlap describes lawfare as "a method of warfare whereby law may be used as a means to realise a military objective".²⁹ Dunlap believes that the increased public interest in compliance with the law of armed conflict has created a situation where "lawfare replaces warfare and the duel is with words rather than swords".³⁰ McCormack cautions, "adversaries have recognized the desire of Western militaries to comply with the law of armed conflict and opponents will now use lawfare to gain advantage".³¹

Contesting the legality of military action instead of seeking battlefield victories *per se* could permit challengers, through a manipulation of the rule of law, to attempt to destroy the will of a nation to fight. The Israel-Lebanon Conflict of Summer 2006, demonstrates clear examples of the attempted use of law by all sides to condemn the others use of force. Amnesty International accused both Israel and Hezbollah of committing war crimes during the conflict. Sheik Nasrallah replied: "as long as the enemy undertakes its aggression without limits or red lines, we will also respond without limits or red lines"; an Israeli military spokesperson stated

26 Clark, W. (2001) *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Combat*, New York, Public Affairs Books, at 304.

27 Clark, W. (2001) *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future of Combat*, New York, Public Affairs Books, at 296.

28 Kennedy, D. (2006) *Of War and Law*, New Jersey, Princeton, Princeton University Press, at 116.

29 Dunlap, C.J. (2001) 'Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st Century Conflicts' (online) Available from <URL:http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cchrp/intervention.shtmllpapers.htm.>, at 35.

30 Ibid, at 38.

31 Mc Cormack, D. (2006) 'Waging Lawfare', (online). Available from <URL:http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/index.jsp.htm>.

Hezbollah were “in blatant violation of international law”.³² The utilitarian fears that the increasing growth of humanitarian discourse in the law of armed conflict will create unrealistic expectations of clean, precise, casualty free wars and that the prospect of post-action legal review unnecessarily hampers the commander from attaining the military objective. For the attacker, the law of armed conflict is predominantly deployed in a justification mode to show compliance and to demonstrate the legalistic constraints under which they are operating. For the attacked, the converse argument applies, particularly if there is any collateral damage incident involving civilians or culturally protected property.

‘A Few Good Men’

Advocates of the suspension of the law of armed conflict in the interests of purported expediency would do well to heed the salutary warning from the eighteenth century Statesman Edmund Burke, “*all that is required for evil to triumph is for a few good men to do nothing*”. US military lawyers were quick to eschew any deviation from well-established international legal principles at the beginning of, what President Bush described as, the global war on terror (GWOT).

However they were systematically ignored in a misguided attempt by elements of the US civil administration to change the standards of warfare to conform to the unprecedented GWOT.³³ While there may have been questionable short-term tactical gains from such an approach, the original standards are being inexorably re-imposed through court actions against the US administration. Military lawyers have had a key role to play in this attempt to rebalance the law as a moral restraining device. Lt. Cdr. Charles Swift, the lawyer representing Guantanamo detainee Salim Ahmed Hamdan, in his successful US Supreme Court action against the US Secretary for Defence was a US Naval legal adviser. Assigned to defend Hamdan, Swift successfully argued that measures implemented to deal with GWOT suspects were in breach of the US Constitution’s guarantee to fair procedures. Swift explained: “This case is not about my client avoiding justice, it’s about what form of justice he should face”.³⁴

In the wake of the GWOT and Iraq War of 2003 that saw the United Nations cast aside in the clamour for war and numerous attempts made to selectively ignore or re-interpret aspects of the law of armed conflict, the question has been asked of the lawyer’s role in such a maelstrom. In such conditions the lawyer must speak up about the longer-term costs that will eventually accrue if policymakers believe that it is to society’s immediate benefit to skirt or bend the law. The law of armed conflict is hard law that addresses probably the noblest objective of law – the protection of innocent life. Observance of this law benefits all on the battlefield; the moral imperative of its application is to minimise civilian casualties and suffering to the fullest extent possible. Therefore it is in the interests of all parties to modern conflict that the law of armed conflict is maintained. The law of armed conflict is ultimately hinged on a balance, the legal adviser must not upset this balance by deciding that he may ignore the law’s restraining nature by attempting to be more compliant with what he perceives are his Commander’s

³² For a more detailed account see http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pt/fr/middle_east/5343188 last accessed 14/04/07

³³ See for example the ‘Gonzales Memo’ – Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President of the USA, regarding Application of Geneva Conventions on POWs to the conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban, Jan 5th 2002, where US military lawyers advice that the Convention’s provisions be applied was overruled.

³⁴ Swift, C. (2006) ‘The One Good Man who Brought Down Guantanamo’, The Sunday Telegraph, 2nd July 2006, (online) (cited 14 March 2007). Available from <URL:<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main/2006/07/02/html>>.

wishes. Contemporary militaries have recognised that law of armed conflict issues in the commander's military decision-making process should be resolved in advance by having the legal adviser fully integrated in all aspects of military operations planning.

Lawyers in the Ops Room

The evolution of the legal adviser as a key member in the Irish Ops room continues to gain momentum as the increased complexity of modern overseas missions combined with more intricate ROEs demands a shift in focus in the Commander's military decision-making process. In addition to the vocational nature of their education as either Barristers or Solicitors, Defence Forces Legal Officers complete international Operational Law courses as part of their ongoing professional training. Older warriors may remember the legal officer deployed with Irish units overseas as being primarily responsible for the maintenance of discipline and 'double jobbing' as the unit's travel officer. This quaint image is dangerously outdated in light of evolving twenty first century conflict and requires an urgent re-evaluation to enable the modern Irish Commander to receive the best possible advice in operational planning and decision-making.

Operational law has necessitated the ongoing training of the contemporary Irish Legad to enable the immediate provision of clear, accurate and robust interpretation of the law of armed conflict for the deployed Commander. The continuing operational development of the Irish Legad has seen legal officers act as Deputy Legad to the Force Commander in EUFOR BiH and to the Irish Multinational Task Force Commander in Kosovo. More recent Irish Battalions deployed in Kosovo and Chad have witnessed the Legad become integral to their operational planning process. The Legad must remain proactive in the planning process because the Commander and their staff may not recognize a legal issue or problem; for this reason the Legad must be present at briefings to remain aware of the evolving military situation.

The advice the Legad provides real time to a Commander includes ROE interpretation, targeting issues, detention ops and handling of detainees, investigation of war crimes and the pursuit and handling of persons indicted for war crimes, legality of weapons, munitions and their use, ensuring press lines are legally accurate and the constant review and updating of Operational Plans for compliance with the law of armed conflict. Human rights law, civil affairs, environmental law, administrative law, civil claims, the ongoing negotiation of Status of Forces Agreements and Memoranda of Understanding with both the Host Nation and other troop contributing nations are all tools of the lawyers trade deployed with the Legad.

It is critical to the seamless integration of legal advice into the modern Irish Commander's military decision-making process that both the Commander and legal adviser are unequivocal about their respective roles; the former does not usurp the latter. It is also important that there is a greater understanding that the Legad is tasked with advising on compliance with the law of armed conflict; not only on the legal restraints upon operations but also on the legality of employing force.

Conclusion

The debate over the utility of the law of armed conflict continues apace as technological advances bring warfare to a new level. Twenty-first century warfare has evolved to unprecedented lethality, precision munitions, extensive weapon reach and incessant virtual media coverage are balanced against unconventional warfare, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Critics claim that the laws of war are struggling to keep pace with such technological advances, that they are outdated and should be ignored. The legal adviser has a key role to play in this debate. When the omnipotent are tempted to discard law, the lawyer must challenge them as to whether, when such power wanes, the law will again be needed. The principles and spirit of the law of armed conflict apply to all forms of conflict and stand as valuable moral guidelines for our sailors, airmen and soldiers. In the clamour, born of expedience, to ignore law, we would be better served by endeavouring to preserve it for our own sake. The law does not need to be ignored to facilitate the vagaries of modern war. On the contrary, what the law of armed conflict needs when confronted with such challenges, is logical argument to retain its value as a principled moral restraining device in contemporary and future conflict. The standards should not change with the winds of war.

Challenges of a Battlespace: Military Leadership in Asymmetric Conflict

Comdt Rory Sheerin

“I am not writing all this, to show what a genius I was, but to point out how difficult it is to convince people, especially the military, to change traditional ways and adapt themselves to new conditions”.¹ With these words, David Galula, a French officer with extensive personal experience of asymmetric war² in then French Indochina and Algeria, summarised the central leadership challenge faced by the French army as it slid to defeat in the Algerian War of Independence. This short sentence reflects the unease with which conventional military forces undertake a type of warfare for which they are not organised, trained, or culturally adept.

Introduction

Conventional military forces have traditionally seen counterinsurgency³ as an add-on capability. It has been normal for military doctrine and training to focus on external conventional threats, the asymmetric role being regarded as largely “secondary and peripheral” to them.⁴ Retired USMC Lt Col Thomas X. Hammes, who has written on the evolution of warfare, sees the military system as being traditionally focused on risk minimisation, standardisation, and orthodoxy, observations echoed by Dr Leonard Wong, who has written extensively for the US Strategic Studies Institute on army organisational issues.

Conventional warfare is characterised by the relative certainties of conflict between adversaries sharing broadly similar norms and methods. This contrasts with asymmetric warfare, typified by its ubiquity and ambiguity.⁵ Insurgents⁶ will typically be indistinguishable from the civil population, use unorthodox methods and may strike at any time or place.⁷ Dr John Lynn of the University of Illinois comments on the need for the regular side to be capable of imaginative and responsive countermeasures at all levels of its organisation.⁸ This imperative has far-reaching consequences for the military leadership function.

Organisational theorists have observed that the culture, and ultimately performance, of any organisation are correlated with leadership performance.⁹ The hierarchical nature of the military amplifies the influence of the leader on organisational output. In Wong’s view, if

1 Galula, D. ‘Pacification in Algeria 1956-1958’, 1963, p.178. Accessed at http://rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG478-1.pdf on 19 Sep 2006.

2 Asymmetric war: war between forces differing in composition, organisation, methods or means. (Metz, S. and Johnson D. V. ‘Asymmetry and US Military Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts’, 2001. Accessed at <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/asymmetry.pdf>. on 28 May 2007.)

3 Counterinsurgency: Military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency (US Department of the Army *Field Manual 3-07.22 Counterinsurgency Operations*, D.C. US Army TRADOC, Washington, 2004.

4 Williams, T.J. ‘Strategic Leader readiness and competencies for Asymmetric Warfare’, *Parameters*, Summer 2003, p. 20.

5 Hoffman, 2004; cited by Tomes, R. ‘**Schlock and Blah: Counterinsurgency realities in a rapid dominance era**’, *Small wars and insurgencies*, 16:1, 2005 pp. 37-56.

6 The terms insurgent, guerrilla, revolutionary and irregular and their corresponding opponents, though context-specific, are used interchangeably in the literature.

7 Wong, L. *Developing adaptive leaders: The crucial experience of operation Iraqi Freedom*, 2004. Accessed at <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB411.pdf> on 02 Jan 2007.

8 Lynn, J. A. 2005 ‘**Patterns of insurgency and counterinsurgency**’, *Military Review*, Jul-Aug 2005, pp. 22-27.

9 Peterson, R.S., Smith, D.B., Martorana, P.V., and Owens, P.D. 2003 ‘The impact of chief executive officer personality on top management team dynamics’, *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 88, pp. 795-808.

military organisations are to effectively counter a decentralised adversary, junior and mid-level counterinsurgent leaders must be adaptable and innovative and the military organisation must be flexible enough to provide for local discretion.¹⁰

Military forces have traditionally monitored developments in warfare and drawn appropriate lessons from them. It is thus opportune to investigate the implications of the proliferation of asymmetric war for the military leadership function. This article examines a number of distinguishing features of asymmetric conflict to isolate the leadership challenges that it presents. Using leadership competencies theory as a conceptual framework, a number of core requirements for the modern military leadership function are identified.

Leadership Concepts

Leadership has been defined as: “a social influence process in which the leader seeks the voluntary participation of subordinates in an effort to reach organisational goals”.¹¹ As a social process, it has been studied in terms of the interaction between the leader and the follower, arising from the leader’s traits or behaviour. Organisational theorist Peter Senge (1990) holds that leadership for organisations in dynamic environments is dramatically different. Dr Stephen Metz, writing for the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, characterises asymmetric conflict as just such a dynamic phenomenon “... every insurgency is so different that overarching concepts and doctrine must be tailored to specific situations and cultures”.¹² This suggests a requirement for a more flexible theoretical basis for an analysis of the leadership challenges of asymmetric war, more appropriate to the dynamic nature of the asymmetric environment.

The competencies model is addressed at the perceived remove between measures of input-related leadership dimensions (such as intelligence and aptitude testing) and practical outcomes in real-life situations.¹³ Under this concept, originally developed by Dr David McClelland (1973), organisation-specific leadership competencies are used as predictors of leadership performance. These competencies include job-specific and more generic, or core competencies which can be applied at individual and organisational levels. In an example of the application of this model at the individual level, Hogan and Warrenfeltz (2003) have proposed four categories of managerial competencies as illustrated in Fig. 1.

10 Wong, L. *Stifled innovation? Developing tomorrow's leaders today*, 2002. Accessed at <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub279.pdf>. on 02 Jan 2007.

11 Schriesheim, C. A., Tolliver, J. M. and Behling, O. C. 'Leadership theory: Some implications for managers', *MSU Business Topics*, Summer 1978, p. 35.

12 Metz, C. and Millen, R. *Insurgency and counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualising threat and response*, 2004. p. 233. Accessed at <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB586.pdf>. on 04 Jan 2007.

13 Garman, A.N. and Johnson, M.P. 'Leadership Competencies: An Introduction', *Journal of Healthcare Management*, 51:1, Jan/Feb 2006, pp. 13-17

<p>The Intrapersonal Domain: Internalised standards of performance; able to control emotions and behaviour. Sample competencies include Courage and willingness to take a stand Career ambition and perseverance Integrity, ethics and values Core self esteem and emotional stability Patience Tolerance of ambiguity</p>	<p>The Business Domain: The abilities and technical knowledge needed to plan, budget, coordinate and monitor organisational activity. Sample competencies include: Business acumen Quality decision making Intellectual horsepower Functional/technical skills Organising ability Priority setting</p>
<p>The Interpersonal Domain: Social skill – role taking and role playing ability – talent for building and maintaining relationships. Sample competencies include: Political savior faire Peer and boss relations Self-preservation and impression management Listening and negotiating Oral and written communications Customer focus</p>	<p>The Leadership Domain: Influence and team building skills. Sample competencies include: Providing direction, support, and standards for accomplishment Communicating a compelling vision Caring about, developing, and challenging direct reports Hiring and staffing strategically Motivating others Building effective teams</p>
<p>Fig 1: The domain model of competencies (Hogan and Kaiser, <i>Review of General psychology</i>, 9:2, 2005 pp. 169-180)</p>	

The established theories are largely focused at explaining leadership in the commercial context. Organisational theorists comment that leadership in many commercial organisations is exercised at executive level and management takes place at mid-level. The leadership function is distinguished by the leader’s capacity to innovate, inspire and visualise: “... managers are people who do things right and leaders are people who do the right thing”.¹⁴ Military leadership, on the other hand, is exercised from senior officer level to that of the “strategic corporal”.¹⁵ It is applied in situations of varying degrees of unpredictability, and its product is not easily quantifiable. Military leaders will be familiar with the tenet that the military commander alone remains responsible for everything the unit does and fails to do. A conceptual framework for analysis of the military leadership function must reflect the team-based nature of the military. Although the various approaches have application to some aspects of such analysis, the competencies model appears most appropriate because this approach is based on group performance and has application at both the individual and organisational levels.¹⁶

14 Bennis and Nanus, cited by Pettigrew, A. M. ‘Context and action in the Transformation of the Firm’, *Journal of Management Studies*, 24:6, 1987 p. 653.

15 “Strategic corporal” refers to the potentially far-reaching implications of decisions at relatively junior levels (Krulak, C.C. *The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War*, 1999 p.1. Accessed at <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/>

16 Garman, A.N. and Johnson, M.P. Op. Cit..

In order to establish the context-specific leadership competencies required at the organisational and individual levels in asymmetric conflict, it is first necessary to analyse this form of warfare.

The Nature of Asymmetric Conflict

Asymmetric conflict differs fundamentally from other forms of war. French Lt Col Roger Trinquier, writing in the aftermath of the Algerian War of Independence, states that it includes an interlocking system of political, economic, psychological and military actions that aims at the “overthrow of the established authority in a country and its replacement by another regime”.¹⁷ A counterinsurgent campaign aims at defeating this multifaceted threat. Although the military has long been primarily concerned with the security element of the counterinsurgency, US Lt Gen David Petraeus, commander of Coalition forces in Iraq observes that integrated inter-agency¹⁸ action across the political, military, economic, and psychological fields is still required.¹⁹

Integration of this nature requires co-ordination across all levels and agencies. Counterinsurgency theorist and retired UK Brig Gen Frank Kitson comments that “the most important aspect ... [is] to understand how totally interdependent all the measures must be, and how important it is that they do not cut across each other”.²⁰ This poses a conundrum for the counterinsurgent: how to balance freedom of action (for initiative by subordinate commanders) with control (for coherence of effort).

The asymmetric warrior swims in Mao Tze Tung’s political sea, a fact reflected in UK Lt Gen Rupert Smith’s observation that both sides strive for the support of the contested population, while retaining that of their own support bases. Von Clausewitz’s (1832) aphorism that war is the continuation of politics by other means remains valid, but military operations are a partial aspect of a counterinsurgency, and their conduct is heavily politically constrained.²¹ Former US officers Richard Gabriel and Paul Savage, in their seminal book on the post-Vietnam leadership crisis in the US military describe the need for soldiers at all levels to be competent in the use of force in an ethical manner, subordinate to civilian control.²² In the view of Lt Gen Petraeus, the leader remains crucially responsible for setting the correct ethical tone.

The differences between these forms of war are so marked that conventional military methods are of limited importance and never represent the full spectrum of asymmetric operations, a fact recognized by the Israeli military theorist Martin Van Creveldt.²³ The consequences of these differences are far reaching. Military forces, fighting amongst the people over extended timelines, whilst denied the ability to use all available force, are thus presented with unique leadership challenges.

17 Trinquier, R. *Modern warfare: a French view of counterinsurgency*. Translated by Daniel Lee, Praeger, London, 1964 p. 6.

18 Interagency: Integrated action across a range of state agencies to defeat an insurgency (US Department of the Army Field Manual 3-07.22 Op. Cit.).

19 Petraeus, D. H. ‘Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from soldiering in Iraq’, *Military Review*, Jan-Feb 2006, pp. 2-12.

20 Kitson, F. *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping*, Faber & Faber Ltd, London, 1971 p. 51.

21 Catiani, S. ‘The strategic impasse in low intensity conflict: The gap between Israeli counterinsurgency strategy and tactics during the Al-Aqsa Intifada’, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 28:1 Feb 2005, pp. 57-75.

22 Gabriel, R. A. and Savage, P. L. *Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army*, Hill and Wang, New York, 1978.

23 Van Creveld, M. *On Future War*, Brassey’s, London, 1991.

Asymmetric War Aims

In addition to the expanded scope of operations, the aims of the belligerents are distinctive. Insurgents and counterinsurgents, from T.E. Lawrence to Petraeus define their aims in terms of the centrality of the civil population. In asymmetric war, two populations are at issue, the government side's support base and the contested population. Legitimacy and ethical conduct are key elements to gaining and/or maintaining popular support.²⁴

There is some divergence on the perceived role of the contested population. At one extreme, Trinquier views the contested population as a victim, terrorised, controlled and manipulated by the insurgent. He personifies the view that the primary focus should be on the use of physical force to destroy the insurgent network. An alternative approach, espoused by Galula, views the population not as a hostage in the situation, but as a critically active participant in it. The focus of the counterinsurgency in this model will be "to capture the will of the people".²⁵

For military forces, the need to either secure or influence the population points towards geographic dispersion and maximum local initiative. Paradoxically, dispersed units must observe force protection measures. Both Mao (1961) and 'Che' Guevara (1961) describe the importance of captured military supplies to their respective insurgent campaigns. Similarly, the need to avoid counterproductive actions at local level, as observed by the journalist and author Thomas Ricks suggests a need for central control. The challenge for the military is thus to resolve this dilemma.

Key Asymmetric Competencies

If asymmetric war has a unique character, it follows that a different set of competencies may be required to fight it. The competencies required of the insurgent include cultural and political sensitivity, audacity, commitment, initiative and flexibility.²⁶ Those required of the military counterinsurgent are less explicitly set out, but include emphases on initiative, adaptation and innovation.²⁷

Initiative


A characteristic of asymmetric war has been decentralised execution under unified, if not centralised control. In the case of the insurgent, Mao (1961) describes the principal role as being played by small units acting independently. The trend towards increasing decentralization is reflected in Hammes' observation that insurgent leadership has evolved from the hierarchical (pyramidal) structure faced by the French in Algeria to the horizontal network of apparently unconnected and compartmentalised cells currently facing the US in Iraq, as represented in Fig. 2.

²⁴ Trinquier, R. Op. Cit..

²⁵ Smith, R. *The Utility of Force, the art of war in the modern world*, Penguin Group, London, 2006 p.277

²⁶ Guevara, C. *Guerrilla Warfare*, 1961, reprinted Souvenir Press, London, 2003; Lawrence, T. *Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, 1935, republished Wordsworth Editions, Ware, 1997.; Mao Tse-Tung *Guerrilla Warfare*, 1961, translated by Griffith, reprinted University of Illinois Press, Chicago, 2000.

²⁷ Petraeus, D. H. Op. Cit.; Ricks, T. E. *Fiasco: The American military adventure in Iraq*, Penguin, London, 2006.



Asymmetric conflict is primarily small unit warfare: “The mosaic nature of an insurgency means that local commanders have the best grasp of their own situation”.²⁸ Galula recognized that the critical tactical work in counterinsurgency is carried out by junior officers in close contact with the population, and that the direct leadership burden is mostly borne by the Captain and Major ranks. The challenge for the military leadership system is thus to enable decentralised operations at this level, as Senge describes it “... it is simply no longer possible for anyone to ‘figure it out at the top’”.²⁹

Decentralised execution requires unified purpose if it is to be cohesive. The long established military command philosophy of mission command³⁰ is one technique for this purpose. Under this philosophy, the commander sets out his/her vision for an operation, outlining the objectives, parameters, desired end state and unifying purpose. Subordinate commanders, in turn, decide how to execute their elements of the overall plan within the parameters set. True mission command, of the kind necessary to “match our efficient amateurs against a wide array of ever more adept enemies”³¹ requires that these parameters are kept to the minimum.

This philosophy requires mutual trust between superiors and subordinates. Trust, however, cannot be blind, but must be developed through learning and bonding.³² Commanders must educate, train and resource their subordinates for their role and facilitate the conditions for them to fulfill it. Metz feels that “Empowering and entrusting junior leaders to find durable solutions in their unique environments is the only effective way to combat dynamic insurgents”.³³ Military forces must be capable, through the mechanism of their command philosophies, of balancing local autonomy with the control necessary for cohesion and legitimacy. This cornerstone organisational competency is a pre-requirement of enabling the key competencies of adaptability and innovation.

28 Cohen, E., Crane, C., Horvath, J. and Nagl, J. ‘Principles, Imperatives and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency’, *Military Review*, March-April 2006, p. 51.

29 Senge, P. ‘Building Learning Organizations’ 1990, in Pugh, D. S., (ed), *Organization Theory: Selected Readings* 4th edition, Penguin Group, London, 1997 p. 487.

30 Mission Command, *Auftragstaktik*, “in which the commander gives general instructions as to his “intent” and what he wants done, but leaves it to his subordinates to implement his wishes.” (Holmes, R. (ed) *The Oxford Companion to Military History*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999 p. 261).

31 Hammes, T. X. *The Sling and the Stone: on war in the 21st Century*, Zenith Press, St Paul, MN, 2006 p. 237.

32 Handy, C. ‘The Virtual Organization’, 1995, in Pugh, D. S. (ed) *Organization Theory: Selected Readings* (4th edition), Penguin Group, London, 1997 pp. 83-96; Gabriel, R. A. and Savage, P. L. Op. Cit..

33 Metz and Millen, Op. Cit., p. 33.

Adaptation and Innovation

An inflexible mindset is a crucial and enduring disadvantage faced by conventional military forces in asymmetric war. It is not a new phenomenon. Institutional inertia was as much a feature of the French military in 1964 as it remains a feature of the US defence community in 2006:

We still persist in studying a type of warfare that no longer exists and that we shall never fight again ... The result of this shortcoming is that the army is not prepared to confront an adversary employing arms and methods the army itself ignores. It has, therefore, no chance of winning.³⁴

History has shown us that large bureaucracies are extremely slow to innovate. It has also shown us that monopolies are inherently inefficient. Yet the DOD is a hierarchical, bureaucratic monopoly ... bureaucracies strive to preserve the status quo. The larger the bureaucracy, the more effective it is at derailing change.³⁵

Writers from Trinquier to Ricks have commented that a feature of recent insurgencies has been the necessity for military forces to have innovation and adaptation forced on them during conflicts. Although the necessary adaptation was ultimately made, the cost incurred in the learning process, and the repeated post-conflict loss of the lessons learned described by Wong and Ricks appear to be luxuries that no military could afford. The question as to why inflexibility persists remains to be answered. It may suggest the presence of a 'zero defects' leadership culture, in which independent thought and preparedness to take calculated risk are discouraged.³⁶

The leadership challenges of this distinctive form of conflict require atypical military leadership competencies. The dispersed, dynamic and ambiguous nature of insurgencies demands that military leadership facilitates initiative by local commanders. This is a key organisational leadership competency, pre-requisite of the individual competencies of adaptability and innovation. The command philosophy to enable these capabilities will be based on trust and empowerment of subordinates. Without this crucial element, the other competencies will be negated. It is now necessary to scrutinize the implications of the necessity for modern military forces to develop these competencies.

Enabling Initiative

The implementation of an intent-driven command philosophy is required to enable initiative. This organisational competency has emerged as a precondition for military operations in asymmetric conflict. The ambiguous, dynamic and highly politicised characteristics of this singular operating environment make it so. It is foundational, as its absence negates the other competencies. Simply put, the military cannot adapt or innovate if it is hamstrung by a command philosophy that does not foster initiative.

³⁴ Trinquier, R. Op. Cit., p. 4.


³⁵ Hammes, T. X. Op. Cit., p. 242.

³⁶ Steele, C. E. 'Zero-Defect Leaders: No Second Chance', *Military Review*, Sept/Oct 2004, p. 66.

The idealised intent-driven command and control construct is one in which superior commanders communicate their intent for mission accomplishment, specifying the minimum parameters necessary to ‘deconflict’ and to control ‘friendly’ force operations. Von Moltke’s original concept: “The higher the command [level], the shorter and more general will the orders be ... Each [level of command] thereby retains freedom of action and decision within his authority”³⁷ sits equally well with modern military doctrine. Current Canadian Forces command philosophy, for example, explicitly recognizes the necessity of allowing subordinates maximum freedom of action consistent with commander’s intent.

The Psychological Contract

Decentralised leadership requires an underlying psychological contract of mutual trust under which the superior commander can trust his/her subordinates to use their initiative to fulfil the mission within the commander’s intent, and the parameters extant, and the subordinate commander can trust the superior’s judgement and assignment of tasks. This relationship is graphically summarised in Fig. 3.



Among the issues bearing on the development of trust and understanding between superiors and subordinates is that of ‘habitual association’, in turn empowered by stability of appointment, and collective training. These factors, when present, permit the bond between superior and subordinate to mature, allowing mutual understanding of each other’s capabilities and limitations. The challenges inherent in achieving the necessary stability of appointments while maintaining significant overseas deployments are apparent.

³⁷ Von Moltke, 1869 in Hughes, D. J. (ed.) 1993 *Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings*, Presidio Press, New York, 1993 p. 185.

Developing Adaptability

Adaptability is a “function of the cognitive skills of intuition and critical and creative thinking, and the relational skills of individual self awareness and team social skills”.³⁸ DF personnel have been remarkably successful at adapting to unusual circumstances, duties or roles, both at home and overseas. It is paradoxical that this adaptation results from an increase in temporary assignments. The consequent lack of stability in appointments should mitigate the bonding necessary to underpin effective mission command, and through it, adaptability.

Foreseeable Adaptation

Leader training in the Defence Forces has traditionally been designed to prepare personnel to hold appointments across a range of functions, and at two levels above their current rank. In this way, individual leaders accumulate the professional knowledge to support adaptation to new roles and responsibilities. It is important, however, to recognise that the adaptation required for these eventualities is largely foreseeable. It can be prepared for, and the training is designed to do so.

Adaptation to Unforeseeable Contingencies

The capacity to adapt to unforeseen situations, however, requires more than the accretion of role or rank-specific knowledge. To be truly adaptable, the individual must be capable of critical reflection and analysis. He/she must be empowered and supported by organisational values that allow for individual adaptation, consistent with organisational objectives. Development of a capacity to adapt to unforeseeable circumstances entails an entirely different learning process to the simple error-correction cycle that enables foreseeable adaptation. Single-loop learning, as illustrated in Fig. 4, focuses on “techniques and making techniques more efficient”.³⁹ Using this mechanism a single (inner) trial and error loop progressively refines the system’s ability to deliver the result specified by the governing variable. Double-loop learning, however, occurs when these governing variables, the underlying organisational norms, policies and objectives are questioned and modified. Organisational theorists Chris Argyris and D. Schon write that this type of learning involves the creative thinking that facilitates higher order adaptability.




Fig 4: Single and Double Loop Learning
(Smith, 2001)

38 Tillson, J. C. F., Freeman, W. D., Burns, W. R., Michel, J., LeCuyer, J. A., Scales, R. H. and Worley, D. R. 2005 *Learning to adapt to asymmetric threats*, 2005 p. 39. Accessed at http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs.pdf/learning_to_adapt.pdf on 17 May 2007.

39 Usher, R. and Bryant, I. *Adult Education as Theory, Practice and Research*, Routledge, London, 1989 p. 87.

Adaptation to the Indirect Leadership Role

At the company command level, the key focus of asymmetric war, direct supervision of all subordinates becomes impractical. The transition to more indirect leadership is greatest at this level, as subsequent career progression involves more evolutionary, as opposed to revolutionary adjustments to leadership roles. Among the possible reasons for a reluctance to relinquish direct control of subordinates are personal leadership preferences and the fact that induction education and training for leaders is aimed at the direct control role, and hence, it is the 'default' option. Adaptation from the 'directing' to the 'influencing' leadership roles thus has the potential to be a challenge for military leaders.

Organisational Adaptability

Adaptability at the organisational level is no less important for military forces in the asymmetric battlespace. The damaging effects of an apparent inability to assimilate lessons expensively learned in the field, has long been reported. What has changed is the speed with which these lessons must be applied before they become redundant.

Learning to Learn

To be a truly adaptive organisation, a continuous learning cycle of experience – reflective observation – abstract conceptualisation – experimentation⁴⁰ is indicated. Organisational adaptability entails a process of a higher order than a simple error-correction process within the bounds of existing organisational policies or objectives. Argyris and Schon state that more responsive learning process occurs when error is detected and corrected in ways that involve the modification of an organisation's underlying norms, policies and objectives. The organisation must effectively become a learning organisation, one in which, as Senge sees it, "people are continually expanding their capabilities to shape their future".⁴¹

Fostering Innovation

Adaptability, however, is essentially a reactive activity which allows an organisation to adjust to its operating environment. Through the creative competency of innovation, however, the military force attains a proactive capacity to shape its environment, and set the agenda. Senge, for example, draws a distinction between adaptive learning (concerned with coping), and generative or creative learning. Its importance further derives from the unique and dynamic nature of asymmetric conflict. In this form of warfare, the military leader is challenged to think 'outside the box' which normally bounds conventional military thought. The military leader must be capable of innovative approaches to defeat an inventive adversary. A distinct nexus between the leadership competencies of innovation and initiative is thus apparent.

Education or Training?

The degree of scope for innovation allowed by the commander, in part reflects his/her confidence that the subordinate is competent to undertake the tasks proposed. Military tactical training is designed to enhance the individual soldier's mastery of tactics, techniques and procedures, and as a vehicle for training leaders in the military decision making process. Preparation for military operations in unpredictable environments, however, requires more than a database of military facts. It requires that the leader concerned would have the ability to visualise, communicate and supervise innovative responses to novel situations. International

⁴⁰ Kolb, D.A. *Experiential Learning: Experience as a Source of Learning and Development*, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1984.

⁴¹ Senge, P. Op. Cit., p. 489.

best practice⁴² suggests that this capacity will be developed under a military educational philosophy which encourages learning and self-development. Von Clausewitz, for example, counsels that the purpose of theory is “to educate the mind of the future commander or, more accurately, to guide him in his self-education”.⁴³

Leadership: A Risky Business?

There are risks in every aspect of human life. The military commander’s risk, however, extends to all that his/her subordinates do or fail to do. The potential influence of risk management on personal development, effective training, and ultimately, innovative leadership is evident. The potentially corrosive effects of a ‘zero-defects’ culture and careerism on the military leadership function are well documented. It can result in a culture of compliance and adherence, the antitheses of innovation. A military force must ensure that its leadership ethos is one that allows its officers to “try, fail, learn and try again”.⁴⁴

Towards Meeting the Leadership Demands of Asymmetric Conflict

If a military force is to cultivate an organisational climate conducive to innovation and adaptability, it must first foster a leadership philosophy to support these competencies. The nature of hierarchical organisations, such as the military, is such that power and influence flow from the top down. It is expected that the degree of restrictive control exercised by a commander will likely mirror the degree applied to him/her by higher levels of command. This suggests that any attempt to standardise on a particular command philosophy will be driven primarily from the top, for example, through the medium of doctrine.

Doctrine and Organisational Culture

Military doctrine and organisational culture are inextricably linked. Doctrinal publications are the foundation documents for the conduct of military operations. The UK armed forces publication JWP01-1 describes it as being about how operations should be directed, mounted, commanded, conducted, sustained and recovered. The US Army sees doctrine as providing military organisations with a “common philosophy and language”⁴⁵ The US Army sets out its command philosophy in a doctrinal publication, Field Manual FM6-0. Intended as a guide, doctrinal documents are essential leadership communications tools which establish a common basis of understanding. This, in turn, leads to “...consistent behaviour, mutual confidence and understanding and effective collective action which does not constrain individual initiative”.⁴⁶ Former US military officer and prominent author on Organisational Theory and Organisational Psychology Professor Edgar Schein reports on the link between leadership and culture: “when we examine culture and leadership closely, we see that they are two sides of the same coin; neither can be really understood by itself”.⁴⁷ This, in turn, underlines the link between military leadership doctrine and culture. It is thus suggested that setting out a command philosophy in military doctrine is an essential first step in ensuring that the necessary consistency is propagated throughout the organisation.

42 Gehler, C.P. ‘Agile Leaders, Agile Institutions: Educating Adaptive and Innovative Leaders for today and tomorrow’, 2005. Accessed at <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB618.pdf>; on 02 Jan 2007.; Wong, L. *Developing adaptive leaders: The crucible experience of operation Iraqi Freedom*, 2004. Accessed at <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB411.pdf> on 02 Jan 2007.

43 Von Clausewitz, C. *On War*, 1832, translated by Howard and Paret, Princeton University Press, Guildford, 1976 p. 141.

44 Wong, L., 2002 Op. Cit..

45 US Department of the Army *Field Manual 6-0 Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*, US Army TRADOC, Washington, D.C. 2003 p. viii.

46 UK MOD AP 3000, *British Air Power Doctrine*, 3rd edn, HMSO, London. 1999 p. 3.11.1.

47 Schein, E. H. *Organisational Culture and Leadership*, 3rd edn, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco CA. 2004 p. 10-11

Value Systems

The two-sided nature of the leadership relationship indicates a requirement for a complementary process of fostering mission command from the bottom up, and of the dangers of creating doctrinal publications that are more observed in the breach. Fostering a culture of coherent, yet decentralised leadership requires, for example, that personnel are empowered in education with optional subject choices on military courses, that junior leaders are empowered through appropriate operational and training assignments, and that leaders are encouraged and rewarded to use their initiative, and to be adaptable and innovative. At the surface level, these proposals appear relatively straightforward. Their significance, however, emerges when they are seen as symptomatic of a requirement for a wider change of culture. This point parallels that made by Gabriel and Savage in relation to the need to change an aspect of military leadership culture in the US Army: “The mere promulgation of a code of honour for the military will not ensure its effectiveness. Yet ... it is unrealistic to expect the officer corps to act honourably when no such code has been promulgated.”⁴⁸

From findings to hypotheses

Empowering Initiative

Asymmetric conflict poses distinctive challenges for military forces and their leaders. It is contested through an expanded scope of operations, in a geographically dispersed environment, and over relatively long timescales. This demands a leadership function that can accommodate decentralised execution of operations. The highly politicised context and the “human terrain”⁴⁹ over which it is contested exert a counterbalancing force, encouraging centralised control over the execution of operations. The necessity for junior commanders to be empowered to exercise initiative, yet controlled to ensure coherence and co-ordination is not new. Whereas the basic concept of decentralised execution appears well understood in military forces, its application can be inconsistent. The necessity inherent in decentralised leadership driven by a superior’s intent for “command climates that inculcate and foster trust and mutual understanding”⁵⁰ has thus been denied, or at best, partially enabled. As an enabling philosophy, this inconsistency will also adversely affect the degree to which the other central leadership competencies are facilitated.

Adaptable Leadership

The core competency of adaptability also emerges as a pre-requisite for military forces engaged in asymmetric conflict. This derives from the dynamic nature of the asymmetric threat, which has been a characteristic of this form of warfare since it began to predominate in the latter half of the twentieth century. Whereas many military forces have ultimately proven capable of adapting to new circumstances of asymmetric conflict, this has typically been achieved at great cost. Similarly, although individual personnel have proven competent at adaptation, this has typically involved reaction to foreseeable contingencies through utilisation of the single-loop learning cycle, enabled through training. Learning of the type necessary for adaptation to novel, and unforeseen contingencies, however, requires a double-loop learning cycle

⁴⁸ Gabriel, R. A. and Savage, P. L. Op. Cit. p. 174.

⁴⁹ Kipp, J., Grau, L., Prinslow, K., and Smith, D. ‘The Human Terrain System: A CORDS for the 21st Century’, *Military Review*, 8-15, Sep-Oct 2006 p. 9.

⁵⁰ US Department of the Army *Field Manual 6-0 Op. Cit.*, pp. 1-7.

enabled through education. This constitutes a significant challenge for the military leader development system, and one which some of the world's leading armed forces have begun to grapple with.

Educating Innovative Leaders

Reflecting the distinction identified between the proactive (innovative) and reactive (adaptive) characteristics necessary for a military force in asymmetric conflict, the final core competency isolated is that of innovation. It is at this stage that the differentiation between the roles of education and training becomes most stark. Military training is the means through which tactics, techniques and procedures are mastered. Subordinate commanders are unlikely to be given the scope to be innovative unless competent in these skills. On the other hand, as leadership theorist J. Adair observes, creative capacity is developed through education, as opposed to training. It appears that an educational philosophy of empowerment and analytical thought, more conducive to the development of innovative leadership is another pre-requisite for success.

Enabling Innovative Leadership

A dynamic linkage between the competency of innovation and those of initiative and adaptability was observed. It is evident that, in common with the other core competencies, the capacity to innovate is mediated by the command philosophy which underpins its application. It is likely that the partial implementation of an intent-driven command philosophy will be mirrored in a similarly partially enabled competency of innovation. This factor suggests that the desired military educational philosophy can only develop and have effect within a wider leadership climate which fully endorses the values indicated.

Conclusion

It will be little news to any military that the trends in the evolution of warfare have been away from conventional, mass-scale hostilities between opponents using symmetric means and/or forces, and towards asymmetric conflict. The leadership competencies theory can be applied as a conceptual frame of reference to a study of this phenomenon with a view to identifying the implications of it for military leadership. It is hence possible to examine discern a pressing requirement for the competencies of initiative, adaptability and innovation in military leadership.

The dynamic linkage between these required leadership competencies and the associated need for an enabling intent-driven command philosophy suggests that the degree of cultivation of these competencies reflects the extent to which the command philosophy is intent-driven. It is apparent that an intent-driven command philosophy, supportive of initiative, adaptability and innovation must be promulgated and actualised in the leadership culture of military forces engaged in asymmetric war. The potential for a damaging disconnect between educational efforts to develop adaptability and innovation and the absence of a consistent command philosophy supportive of its implementation is implied. Argyris recognises that congruence between theories in use and espoused theories is necessary for effectiveness. To do otherwise is to court the possibility of repeating the mistakes of the past.

The implications of the difficulties experienced in capturing lessons from experience are far reaching. In modern asymmetric conflict, it can be the difference between success and failure. The learning cycle required can now be measured in hours. These lessons must be captured. This suggests that time-critical double-loop learning mechanisms must be put in place to capture these lessons and assimilate them into the corporate knowledge of the organisation before they become outdated. This would also contribute to a climate in which adaptable and innovative individuals could excel.

The degree to which any military force possesses these leadership competencies is thus central to its proper preparedness for its core business. The Defence Forces, in common with their international counterparts are duty-bound to address this issue. Could the Defence Forces look into its soul and honestly say that it values initiative and its dependent relatives, adaptability and innovation? Bigger forces than ours have recently re-learned the importance of these leadership competencies. We now have an opportunity to apply a maxim attributed to 19th Century German Chancellor Otto Von Bismarck:

“Fools say they learn from experience; I prefer to learn from the experience of others.”

Irish Aid and the Defence Forces: A Synthesis of Humanitarian Forces or an Incompatible Union

Comdt Kevin McCarthy

Preamble

This Paper is an extract from a thesis submitted in part fulfilment of the requirements for the MA (LMDS). The reduction in size has necessitated the omission of information from the original thesis relating primarily to the presentation and analysis of the accumulated research data. The reader should therefore, take into account the absence of much of the corroborating evidence that would substantiate the findings and recommendations.

Introduction

No one. . . . Has a monopoly on humanitarian work. The military should not just assist relief and aid organisations by protecting convoys but should become directly involved in providing aid.¹

On 14 September 2006, An Taoiseach Bertie Ahern launched Ireland's first *White Paper on Irish Aid*.² This paper articulates the Irish Government's policy on the provision of foreign aid, in what is a milieu of "changing global architecture, including the architecture of states, the nature of politics, the role of armies and the meaning of sovereignty."³ It also embraces Ireland's entering into what is considered the third phase⁴ of Irish foreign policy termed 'active neutrality' by Minister for Foreign Affairs Dermot Aherne.⁵

There is much debate over the role of the military within the humanitarian context. Within this environment, the military do not seem to participate in any systematic overarching coordinated humanitarian plan and are forced to dabble in the provision of humanitarian assistance in an ad hoc manner. There are guidelines such as the *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief – Oslo Guidelines*,⁶ which set out occasions when military should engage in humanitarian activities. However, these guidelines "are in fact rarely observed".⁷ The provision of humanitarian assistance by the military continues to generate passionate debate, between the military and non-military actors, in which there is seldom any meeting of minds.

The language used by Irish Aid⁸ (IA) to define the humanitarian role of the military has strong parallels with the United Kingdom's Department for International Development's (DfID) *Humanitarian Policy*.⁹ Yet despite these similarities, the level of integration between the

1 Ziegler, A. and Handle, J. (2004) 'The Future of International Humanitarian Action' review of the Ninth Annual Humanitarian Conference 22-23 April, Geneva.

2 Ireland (2006) *White Paper on Irish Aid* – Department of Foreign Affairs, Dublin Stationary Office.

3 Pieterse, (1998); cited by Gunde, J. (1999) "Humanitarian Assistance Braking the waves of complex political emergencies. A literature survey" Danish Institute for International Studies, Part 1.

4 According to de Bréadún (2006) "the first phase of Irish foreign policy was focused historically on securing sovereignty and international recognition. More recently, a second phase concentrated on peace and prosperity of the island".

5 de Bréadún, D. (2006) 'Foreign policy entering new phase' *The Irish Times*, Ireland, 29 December.

6 United Nations (1994) *Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (Oslo Guidelines)*, Geneva.

7 Gill, T. Leveillee, J and Fleck D. (2006) 'The Rule of Law in Peace Operations' general report of the Seventeenth Congress of the International Society for Military Law and the Law of War, 16-21 May, Scheveningen, Holland.

8 IA coordinates Ireland's programmes of long-term support and emergency relief to developing countries and is a department within the Department of Foreign Affairs.

9 Great Britain (2006) *Department for International Development Humanitarian Policy*, London HMSO.

respective donor and military of each country is markedly different. DfID actively engage with the British Army in a multilevel system of collaboration. No mechanism for such a broad collaboration exists within the Irish system. Instead, it would appear that contact between DF and IA occurs only at the strategic level, never down at the tactical level and predominantly relates only to the Rapid Response Initiative. Perhaps the DfID model of integration could be used to facilitate a harmonisation of the Irish humanitarian effort and lead to the development of a more synchronised and cohesive humanitarian programme.

In posing the question ‘Irish Aid and the Irish Defence Forces: A synthesis of humanitarian forces or an incompatible union?’, the thesis considers the potential impact of the *White Paper* on the DF and assesses, in particular, whether it can enhance DF humanitarian efforts through financial and co-ordination assistance.

Definition of Humanitarianism

Central to the exploration of this question is the understanding of the term ‘humanitarianism’. “Politicians routinely attach the work ‘humanitarian’ to political or military causes that need a wider moral justification”.¹⁰ The adoption of the term ‘humanitarianism’ by the military has caused much angst amongst the humanitarian community, who feel that it is a misuse of a philanthropic ideal, by those whose primary purpose is to inflict suffering. The utilisation of the military as quasi-humanitarians has caused a blurring of the distinction between the military and humanitarians, which may have repercussions on the safety of the Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO).¹¹

Winslow¹² believes that humanitarianism is a difficult term to define. Rieff considers that it “can mean anything and everything relief, human rights, refugee protection, charity, conflict, prevention, conflict resolution and nation building.”¹³ Slim¹⁴ rather provocatively compares humanitarian aid to laughter, in that both have persons dedicated to their delivery – NGOs and clowns respectively. However, this does not mean that either agent has the sole right to supply the ‘product’, for a “a hungry child knows no politics”.¹⁵ In order to create a pathway of understanding through what is described as the blur of humanitarian space,¹⁶ it is important to present a clear and unambiguous definition of humanitarian assistance. The following definition encapsulates its essence:

Humanitarian assistance is aid to an affected population that seeks, as its primary purpose, to save lives and alleviate suffering of a crisis-affected population. Humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the basic humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality and neutrality.¹⁷

10 Broughton, M. (2003) “Distinguishing between Military Relief and Humanitarian Aid” *The Lancet* 361:936, 1472.

11 Gordon, S. (2001) ‘Understanding the priorities for civil-military co-operation’ *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance* 068, (on line) (cited 29 March 2006). Available from, <URL <http://www.jha.ac/articles/a068.htm>>.

12 Winslow, D. (2002) “Strange Bedfellows: NGOs and the Military in Humanitarian Crisis”, *The International Journal of Peace Studies* (on line) (cited 28 Mar 2006). Available from URL:<http://www.gmu.edu/academic/tips/vol72/cover72htm.htm>.

13 Rieff, D. (2002) *A Bed for the Night*, London Vintage.

14 Slim, H. (2003) ‘Humanitarianism with Borders? NGOs, Belligerent Military Forces and Humanitarian Action’, *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, 118 (on line) (cited 12 October 2006. Available from <URL: <http://www.jha.ac/articles/a118.htm>>.

15 Parry, M. (2002) “Phyrric Victories and the Collapse of Humanitarian Principles” *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, 094, (on line) (cited 12 November 2006). Available from <URL:<http://www.jha.ac/artilces/a094htm>>.

16 Pugh, M. (2001) *Civil-Military Relations in Peace Support Operations Hegemony or Emancipation?*, seminar on aid and politics. Overseas Development Institute, 01 February, London.

17 UN-OCHA (2003) *Guidelines On The Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets To Support Unite Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies* (on line) (cited 10 July 2006) Available from URL:<http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/dbs9000SID/LGEL-5KUDK8/SFILE/MCDAGuidance - Mar03.doc?OpenElement>.

While there are a number of different aspects to this definition, it is asserted that “the sanctity of life is the first principle of all humanitarians and overrides all other considerations”.¹⁸

Significance

According to Thornberry¹⁹, it was not until the 1990s that humanitarian assistance was included in peacekeeping mandates. The *White Paper on Defence* stated that the DF will “participate in multinational peace support, crisis management and humanitarian relief operations in support of the UN and under UN mandate”.²⁰ This task has now been assumed as one of the DF’s five roles, as well as one of the DF’s four stated strategic goals²¹ thus connecting humanitarian tasks to DF activities in crisis situations. The DF has also made a commitment to “International Security, Defence and Crisis Management”²² through their participation in United Nations Standby Arrangements, Partnership for Peace, and the European Security Defence Policy, all of which have an integrated humanitarian commitment. Yet the DF does not have a specific humanitarian doctrine. It remains to be seen what impact this *White Paper on Defence* will have on the development of a humanitarian doctrine or indeed on the next *White Paper on Defence* due in 2010.

DF peacekeepers are currently serving on 22 missions²³ including Kosovo where they are deployed as part of a Multinational Task Force. There are strong indications that in 2007, Ireland will assume the role of Framework (lead) Nation of this Task Force.²⁴

This may present an opportunity for IA to assume a coordinating role over DF humanitarian activities, which could facilitate a harmonisation of the Irish humanitarian effort and lead to the development of a more synchronised and cohesive aid programme within the region. This closer alliance may also assist in the release of additional funding from IA for military humanitarian tasks. DfID provides a model of such co-ordination and funding, which could be adopted by IA.

Geopolitical Context

War can never be divorced from politics and ... the military must remain subordinate to political authorities.²⁵

Since the 1990s, changes in the nature of conflicts and resultant changes in the geopolitical context have had a significant impact on the environment in which humanitarian organisations operate. The catalyst for this change was the ending of the Cold War. During the Cold War any deployment of military forces, including peacekeeping forces, was viewed with suspicion by the superpowers, which felt that these actions might be a screen for intervention into a state’s

18 Weiss, T. (2003) ‘Principles Politics and Humanitarian Action’ in Lang, A. (ed) *Just Intervention*, Georgetown, University Press, pp84-106.

19 Thornberry, C. (1996) ‘Peacekeepers, Humanitarian, Aid and Civil Conflicts’ *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, 002 (on Line) (cited 01 Dec 2006). Available from <URL: <http://www.jha.ac/articles/a002.htm>>.

20 Ireland (2000) *White Paper on Defence*, Dublin, Stationary Office.

21 Ireland (2005) *Defence Forces Annual Report*, Dublin Defence Forces Printing Press.

22 Gannon, M. (2007) ‘European Security and Defence Policy’, lecture delivered to the 63 Senior Command and Staff Course, 22 January, Military College, Ireland.

23 Department of Defence (2006) ‘Defence Forces Overseas – List of Missions’, (on line) (cited 29 December 2006). Available from URL:http://military.ie/overseas/mission_list.htm.

24 Department of Defence (2006) ‘Irish troops to remain in Kosovo and Afghanistan following Cabinet approval. (on line) (cited 27 November 2006). Available from URL:<http://www.defence.ie/Website.nsf/Release+ID/368E1A5ADF7892738025719B003B897?OpenDocument>>.

25 Clausewitz, 1830 cited by Kinger, J (2006) ‘The Social Science of Carl von Clausewitz’ *Parameters* Spring 79-89.

internal affairs.²⁶ It had been expected, once the *détente* had been agreed between the two superpowers, that peace would emerge. However, Egeland maintains that in the absence of their overarching control “there is less immediate threat, but much more insecurity than ever before”.²⁷ He believes that his insecurity has led to conflicts that can generally be described as ethnic disputes, which can develop quickly, be extremely brutal and savage in nature and may need an external force to resolve, “Let there thus be no doubt: internal conflict or strife is not only the most frequent form of violence today but also the most complex, difficult and dangerous environment to operate in”.

A Re-Emergence of Pre-Westphalian Ideals?

In 1998, Solana questioned the future application of the principles of international relationships enshrined in Peace of Westphalia. He highlighted the limitations of these principles in that “we stand at a crossroads: where does the sovereignty of a state end and where does the international obligation to defend human rights and to avert a humanitarian disaster start?”²⁸ The increased deployment of external military forces into CHEs is in many ways a direct expression of a state’s foreign policy and desire for global security. “America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones ... We must defeat these threats to our Nation, allies and friends.”²⁹ The international community, in recognising the relationship between security and development, accepts the requirement for collective action by international communities in pursuit of global security.² It would appear that the situation now exists where state sovereignty is no longer a protection against international intervention and that there is “no reason why the dialectical process of extending rights and duties cannot transcend state borders”.³⁰ The Heads of State at the UN World Summit in 2005 agreed to resolve conflicts through appropriate levels of diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, up to and including ‘Peace Enforcement’ in order to help protect populations from “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”.³¹

Placing the Military within CHE

Although there are five distinct humanitarian scenarios in which militaries may deploy³², this paper will focus primarily on their activities as peacekeepers within a CHE. It will concentrate on the deployment of the military in areas where the primary concern is the provision of a safe and secure environment and not the provision of humanitarian relief.

A military intervention alone cannot resolve the innate complexity of these emergencies. It requires a more holistic approach involving a multiplicity of actors, both military and non

26 Eriksson, P. (2000) ‘Civil-Military Co-ordination in Peace Support Operations – An Impossible Necessity’, *The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, 061, (online) (cited 28 March 2006). Available from URL:<http://www.jha.ac/articles/a06.htm>.

27 Egeland, J (1999) ‘Peacemaking and the prevention of violence; the role of governments and non-governmental organisations’ *International review of the Red Cross* 81:833, 73-83.

28 Solana, J (1998) ‘Securing Peace in Europe’ paper presented at the Symposium of the Political Relevance of the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, 12 November, Münster.


29 USA. (2002) *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington, (online) (cited 27 Oct 2006). Available from <URL: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss1.html>>.

30 Kveinen, E. (2000) ‘Citizenship in a post-Westphalian Community; beyond external Exclusion; paper presented at the workshop ‘Citizenship in a Historical Perspective’ at the European Consortium for Political Research. Joint Sessions, 14-19 April, Copenhagen.

31 United Nations (2005) 2005 World Summit Outcome, (online) cited 11 November 2006), Available from URL: <http://www.who.int/hiv/universalaccess2010/worldsummitpdf>.

32 Cuny believes that there are five distinct types of deployment into humanitarian operations, which “can be identified for foreign military forces, each with its own set of prerequisites, operational modalities, and problems” (p.5). They include: deployment after natural disasters, deployment at the conclusions of a conflict, peacekeeping including in CHE, point relief (during active conflict), and humanitarian interventions and cross-border operations. Cuny, F. (1989) ‘Use of Military in Humanitarian Relief (on line) (cited 12 June 2006). Available from URL:<http://www.newshour.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/laptop/humanrelief.html>.

military.³³ The level of activity by the various groups, throughout the process of restoration of normality, is not constant. Figure 1 demonstrates how the level of activity of each actor is modified during its transition from the transformational phase through the stabilisation phase to the normalisation phase. During the transformational phase the civilian organisation are unable to provide support due to the instability of the situation³⁴. It is during this phase that the military are tasked with providing a safe and secure environment within which the rest of the external and internal actors can function.³⁵ The transition through the phases witnesses a reduction in the activities of the military; ultimately the rebuilding of the nation transcends the requirement for external provision of security, culminating in the withdrawal of the military.³⁶



Role of the Military within CHE

The post-Cold War paradigm for any military force in a CHE is increasingly the integration of a humanitarian role with a combat function. Cuny points out that “the use of military forces for humanitarian purposes is a long established tradition in all corners of the world”³³ and has occurred continuously since the time of Alexander the Great. While acknowledging that the “greatest contribution that the military can make to humanitarian action is to restore order and security”,³⁷ it is possible for the military to have a humanitarian role. There are many reasons why military forces should wish to undertake humanitarian tasks, ranging from external motivations (altruistic and evangelical) to the more internal ones (institutional and operational).³⁸ As an aid to understanding Anderson’s analysis of the motivations I have graphically represented them in Figure 2.

33 Barry, J. and Jeffreys, A. (2002) ‘A bridge too Far; Aid Agencies and the Military in Humanitarian Response’ Overseas Development Institute ODI Network HPN, Paper No. 37.

34 Pollick, S. (2000) ‘Civil Military Cooperation; paper presented at the Third Annual Graduate Student Symposium Conference of Defence Associations Institute 3-4 November, Canada.

35 DeConing, C. (2006) ‘Civil Military Coordination and UN Peacekeeping Operations’, (on line) (cited 15 November 2006). Available from <URL:<http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/doc207?OpenForm&query=3&cat=Civil-Military%20Coordination>>.

36 Anderlini, S. and El-Bushra, J. (2004) ‘Post Conflict Reconstruction’, *International Alert*, (on line) (cited 12 June 2006). Available from <URL:http://www.huntalternatives.org/download/39_post_conflict.pdf>.

37 Studer, M. (2001) ‘The ICRC and civil-military relations in armed conflict’ *International Committee of the Red Cross* 83:842, 367-392.

38 Ankersen, C. (2002) ‘Was It Good for You? Why Armies engage in Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC)’ paper presented at the Graduate Student Symposium Presentation, Fifth Annual Conference of Defence Association Institute 1-2 November, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.




Figure 2
Reasons for Military Participation in Humanitarian Activities.
Adapted from Ankersen (2002).

Conflicting Perspectives

Some commentators maintain the militaries may “be seen as the antithesis of the humanitarian concern”.³⁹ Others like Ritchie and Mott assert that even though military force deployed “to assist with a foreign emergency is a very visible show of support for a foreign government and its people ... the military should not be involved in humanitarian or nation-building activities ... a military is an inappropriate provider of humanitarian services”.⁴⁰ Studer³⁹ believes that humanitarian activities will divert the military from their primary responsibilities of providing a safe and secure environment. But this perspective does not take into consideration of the adaptability of the military. Enshrined in military doctrine during all phases of war is the concept of flexibility. General Krulak encapsulates this adaptability when he states.

In one moment in time, our service members will be feeding and clothing displaced refugees, providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they will be holding two warring tribes apart – conducting peacekeeping operations – and finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle all on the same day... all within three city blocks.⁴¹

³⁹ Cotter, A and Bikin-Kita, T. (2006) ‘The military and humanitarianism: emerging patterns of intervention and engagement’ Overseas Development Institute Network HPN, Report No. 21 21-38.

⁴⁰ Ritchie, E.C. and Mott, R.L. (2003) ‘Military Humanitarian Assistance: The Pitfalls and Promise of Good Intentions, Military Medical Ethics, 2:IV, 805 –830.

⁴¹ General Krulak cited in Finch, E. and Grant, K. (2006) ‘Advanced Marksmanship Training: Extending the Tactical Reach of the Section’, *Canadian Army Journal*, 9:1, 134-144.

Briquemont declares that “[the] military cannot take the place of humanitarian organisations”.⁴² However, it is also “infeasible to rule out military involvement in relief”.⁴³ Yet many NGOs have argued that the military’s capacity to conduct direct assistance tasks is questionable. Ogata believes that military services are most useful in CHE, but where they engage in direct assistance the effectiveness of humanitarian agencies can be undermined and the population potentially exposed to security risks. He suggests “the military can support but should not substitute agencies with humanitarian mandates”.⁴⁴

Many NGOs believe that these military activities cause “a general blurring of the distinctions between ‘military’ and ‘humanitarian’ activities”.⁴⁵ Slim⁴⁶ posits that this blurring renders the belligerent incapable of distinguishing the NGO from the military, thus endangering the former. Ericsson⁴⁷ and Winslow⁴⁸ argue against military participation in these activities because of the failure to adhere to the humanitarian principles, the creation of an inappropriate and unsustainable assistance, and the brevity of military tours. Parry maintains that “impartiality, neutrality and even independence are often sacrificed in favour of short-lived benefits that are little more Phyrrie [sic] victories” and that “where they are absent, humanitarian action is self-serving, hollow and illegitimate”.⁴⁹

Despite the raft of arguments supporting the anti-military discourse, most organisations accept that there are occasions when the military may participate in humanitarian activities. A number of guidelines have been produced by both NGOs and International Organisations, which assist the coordination of military humanitarian activities within a CHE. The most significant of these are the *Oslo Guidelines*.⁶ These suggest that militaries should only conduct humanitarian activities when the capacities of civil organisations are insufficient and that when operating in UN peacekeeping missions they should be under civilian control.⁵⁰ Although the guidelines maintain that humanitarian assistance must be compliant with humanitarian principles, many would argue that it is impossible for militaries to be acquiescent with these principles. They posit that military humanitarian activities are “a misnomer of almost oxymoronic proportions”.⁵⁰

International Good Governance

The *White Paper* conveys the government’s aspirations regarding the provision of foreign aid. It recognises the need to respond in a holistic fashion to crises around the globe. In general, the paper appears to subsume the provision of aid within the concepts of Ireland’s

42 Briquemont cited Studen, M. (2001) ‘The ICRC and civil-military relations in armed conflict’ *International Committee of the Red Cross* 83:842, 367-392.

43 Pugh, M. (2001) ‘Civil-Military Relations in Peace Support Operations: Hegemony or Emancipation?’, seminar on aid and politics, Overseas Development Institute, 1 February, London.

44 Ogata, S. (1999) ‘Opening Statement by United Nations High commissioner for Refugees’ paper presented at the Fiftieth Session of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, 04 October, Geneva, Switzerland.

45 Gordon, S. (2001) ‘Understanding the priorities for civil-military co-operation’ *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, 068, (on line) (cited 29 March 2006). Available from URL:<http://www.jha.ac/articles/a068.htm>.

46 Slim, H. (2002) ‘Military Intervention as a Means of Protecting Human Rights’ *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, 084, (on line) (cited 14 June 2006). Available from <URL:<http://www.jha.ac/articles/1084.htm>.

47 Ericsson, P. (2000) ‘Civil-Military Co-ordination in Peace Support Operations – An Impossible Necessity’, *The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, 061, (online) (cited 28 March 2006). Available from URL:<http://2222.jba.ac/articles/1061.htm>.

48 Winslow, D. (2002) ‘Strange Bedfellows: NGOs and the Military in Humanitarian Crisis’ *The International Journal of Peace Studies* (on line) (cited 28 Mar 2006). Available from URL:http://www.gmu.edu/academic/iips/vol7_2/cover_7_2.htm.

49 Parry, M. (2002) ‘Phyrrie Victories and the Collapse of Humanitarian Principles’, *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, 094, (on line) (cited 12 November 2006). Available from <URL:<http://www.jha.ac/articles/a094.htm>.

50 Runge, P. (2003) ‘Armed forces as humanitarian aid workers? Scope and limits of co-operation between aid organisations and armed forces’ position paper for the Association of German Development NGO’s (VENRO), May, Germany.

foreign policy. The emphasis is therefore on a collective international assistance inferring “good governance at a global level”.² Ireland, through its bilateral relations, has indicated a desire for the provision of a “stable, inclusive and cooperative international environment”.⁵¹ Its stated strategy is to strengthen the role of the UN in the pursuit of global security, claiming that this organisation “is uniquely placed to provide this leadership in co-ordination”.

Joined-Up Government

IA and DfID espouse a commitment to the humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. They also see the enactment of international “good governance” as beyond the capability of one department, but that, in essence, it requires a joined-up government approach.⁵² DfID recognises that humanitarian operations suffer from lack of co-ordination, disjointed financial donorship, and that the “the linkages between humanitarian developmental and political action remain weak and poorly understood, limiting efforts to address the root causes of vulnerability and prevent future crises”. IA believes that proper coherence between the various governmental departments will overcome these difficulties and that “co-ordination of the response to emergencies is central to avoiding duplication and making humanitarian action effective”. The Department of Foreign Affairs is considering the establishment of a Standing Interdepartmental Committee, which will develop a policy on conflict resolution, that among other things, envisages co-ordination between the Departments of Defence and Justice in humanitarian and crisis-management operations.⁵³

DfID, however, has taken co-ordination with its military beyond this strategic level and has developed closer links at the operational and tactical levels. In Kosovo, it has deployed Civil-Military Humanitarian Advisers and Development Advisers to support and advise senior British military commanders in the field. In Afghanistan, within the British Provincial Reconstruction team “a very close working relationship existed between the military contingent and civilian members from the Foreign Office [and]... DfID”.⁵⁴

Role of DF as outlined in the White Paper

Both IA and DfID recognise that their respective national militaries can and do provide direct humanitarian assistance in that “they have obligations to ensure that the basic needs of population are met” and “in the countries and communities where they work, Irish peacekeepers often also undertake projects to contribute directly to local development. Where appropriate, we will provide financial support for these activities.”² This expresses a recognition that the DF may have a role in enhancing the local community through limited specific aid projects. The DF, in collaboration with IA, has issued guidelines to assist deployed units in determining the type of humanitarian project that may attract funding from IA. They state categorically that these projects should not have a Civil Military Co-operation (CIMIC) dimension but should be “aimed at infrastructural development which has longevity, particularly in the area of education, shelter, welfare or health ... [and] should not displace local, municipal, State or other NGO projects nor should they be in conflict with them”.⁵⁵ Therefore, the primary

51 Ireland (2005) The White Paper on Foreign Policy, Dublin Stationary Office.

52 Gordon, S. (2006) ‘The changing role of the military in assistance strategies’, *Overseas Development Institute, ODI Network HPN*, 21, 39-52.

53 Ireland (2005) The White Paper on Foreign Policy, Dublin Stationary Office.

54 O’Callaghan, T. (2006) ‘The Humanitarian Space and Hearts and Minds. An Afghan Chess Game? Provincial Reconstruction Team In Afghanistan: Exploring the Impact on Civil-Military Relationships unpublished thesis for MA (LMDS), National University of Ireland, Maynooth and Military College Curragh Camp, Ireland.

55 Department of Defence (2005) Procedures and Guidelines for Approval of Projects to be Supported by Overseas Contingent, Dublin, Defence Forces Printing Press.

purpose of these projects is not force protection or enhancement of the commander's mission, but rather the advancement and development of local disadvantaged communities while at the same time "satisfy[ing] the principles of 'Good Humanitarian Donorship' to which Ireland subscribes".⁵⁶

IA sees the provision of such assistance as "a regular and significant element of Ireland's participation in peace support operations ... [and] where appropriate ... provide[s] financial support for these activities". IA currently provides micro-project funding to supplement these activities. The DF units in Kosovo and Liberia on application, may receive this funding. However, the peacekeeper must generate additional funds to supplement any financial shortfall in these projects. In 2005, the DF in Liberia received a grant of €30,000 from IA, but spent over €85,000 on aid projects. The deficit was made up by the "fundraising efforts of the Irish troops [who] generated an additional €55,000."⁵⁷

Conclusions

The objective of the thesis was to determine the potential impact of the *White Paper on Irish Aid* on the future conduct of DF humanitarian activities within CHEs. The research contained in the original thesis demonstrated that, while militaries are inextricably linked to the resolution of these emergencies, there are conflicting opinions as to their suitability as humanitarian providers. The study also indicates that military intervention alone cannot resolve a CHE, and that in order to achieve a permanent solution the military must be subsumed into an overarching political strategy. It is the proposition of this research that, even though the White Paper recognises DF humanitarian activities and espouses continued support, it is only within the indirect activities of the Rapid Response Initiative (RRI)² that any new initiative has evolved. Within the context of provision of direct humanitarian assistance, the *White Paper* does not develop or expand the existing IA and DF relationship. This relationship in fact, through mutual agreement, appears to have culminated.

Implications

Co-ordination

The principle *raison d'être* of the DF is to ensure that Ireland has a professional, well-trained and deployable military force, with the capability to accomplish any tasks assigned by the Government. The Government deploys the DF overseas as an expression of its commitment to international stability, and in so doing prescribes foreign as well as domestic roles for its military. However, the deployment of the DF is only part of a wider governmental response to international humanitarian crises. The White Paper articulates Ireland's humanitarian response, in what it describes as a "distinctly Irish mechanism".² The research has shown that while the RRI has facilitated IA and the DF in developing a collaborative relationship, there are no plans nor does there appear to be any desire, to enhance DF capabilities in the provision of direct humanitarian assistance.

The research has shown that the current geopolitical situation has experienced a dramatic increase in the complexity of inter/intra state conflict. It has also revealed a re-emergence of Pre-Westphalian concepts, resulting in a rise in the number of peace-enforcing missions. These

⁵⁶ Ireland (2005) Defence Forces Annual Report, Dublin, Defence Forces Printing Press.

⁵⁷ Department of Defence (2005) Procedures and Guidelines for Approval of Projects to be Supported by Overseas Contingent, Dublin, Defence Forces Printing Press.

external pressures, allied to internal and additional external pressures, have forced the British to re-evaluate the relationship between DfID and the British Army. They have moved from an *ad hoc* relationship to one that is both collaborative and financially integrated, incorporating the development of a “Comprehensive Approach”.⁵⁸

Similarly, the DF has also been forced to institute change as a consequence of exposure to internal and external pressures. Its commitment to “International Security Defence and Crisis Management”²² is one such external pressure and has been a significant motivating force behind the development of an effects-based operation capability. Yet, while it has concentrated on developing a considerable kinetic potential, the non-kinetic capabilities of the DF do not seem to have received the same attention. Nevertheless, the research suggests that a commitment to UN, NATO and EU-led Peace Support Missions will require the DF to further develop its humanitarian capability. The requirement to increase this capability should cause a re-evaluation of existing DF procedures. The *ad hoc* manner in which the DF conducts humanitarian activities²⁴ indicates strong parallels with the British Army in the late 1990s. Adopting a similar evolutionary path to that of the British Army could allow the establishment of an overarching collaboration, across all government departments, thereby facilitating a harmonisation of the Irish humanitarian effort in both permissive and non-permissive environments, and ultimately leading to the development of a more synchronised and cohesive humanitarian programme.

It is, perhaps, unfortunate that the Standing Interdepartmental Committee cannot develop its remit beyond ‘conflict resolution’ and provide this required collaboration. While the research has shown that this particular committee’s agenda does not enhance direct humanitarian activities, it does, however, provide an example of how interdepartmental collaboration can occur. This example could, perhaps, be employed as a template in the integration of the Irish direct humanitarian assistance.

Finance

The research indicates that as funding levels increase co-ordination should correspondingly rise, ultimately transposing into a collaborative relationship between the parties. It also suggests that present levels of co-ordination, between IA and the DF, are commensurate with existing levels of financial assistance. Both Lenihan and Nash do not envisage an increase in funding for direct humanitarian assistance, thereby negating an obligation to increase the existing level of co-ordination.

The research identifies a certain ambiguity within the DF surrounding the use of the term CIMIC. While many of the surveyed commanders viewed that humanitarian activities as CIMIC, the sources of funding would perhaps suggest otherwise. Currently the DF have two main sources of funding: Irish Aid and self-fundraising. The research suggests that the activities funded by these two sources are directly related to non-CIMIC and charity, respectively, and that even though the enhancement of a commander’s mission maybe a residual benefit, there is an inherent difficulty in ascribing the term CIMIC to these activities. These two funding mechanisms have played, and can continue to play, a significant role in the deployment of

⁵⁸ Ministry of Defence (2006) ‘Joint Discussion Note 4/05 – The Comprehensive Approach’ Shrivenham, HMSO.

overseas units, however, in light of its international commitments and of the government's European policy of 'costs lie where they fall approach' there is a requirement for the DF to identify and establish a source that "provides [regular], significant and predictable funding"²² exclusively for CIMIC activities. This source must guarantee constant and immediate funding to overcome the dissatisfaction experienced by the surveyed commanders with regard to appropriate and timely humanitarian response.

Recommendations

It would appear, from the research that the relationship between IA and DF is based primarily on the conduct of the non-CIMIC activities. However future overseas deployments will require the DF to develop a full-spectrum approach embracing both kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities, which will include a CIMIC component.

There is therefore a requirement on the DF to:

- Develop a humanitarian doctrine, which would articulate a policy on both CIMIC and non-CIMIC humanitarian capabilities. This policy should embrace an effects-based approach in order to align the DF with the other domestic national instruments of power and with other actors of the humanitarian space, including NGOs.
- Assist in the establishment of a multi-departmental "Comprehensive Approach", similar to that of the British or Canadians. This forum could be used to establish appropriate levels of political co-ordination/collaboration both at strategic and tactical levels. The remit of this forum could be extended to include associated NGOs and thus aid in the de-blurring of the humanitarian space.
- Develop a non-kinetic capability in concert with its kinetic ones and embrace an effects-based operational capacity, in order to meet its "International Security, Defence and Crisis Management"²² commitments.
- Identify and establish suitable source(s) of funding, other than IA and self-fundraising, to support CIMIC activities.
- Deploy trained CIMIC personnel with all overseas operational units. These personnel should have immediate access to humanitarian funds.

Last Word

This research has demonstrated that in order to conduct effective and meaningful humanitarian assistance, militaries require funding, co-ordination and doctrine. There is a strong probability that the level of financial assistance and co-ordination between IA and DF has culminated. There is therefore a requirement for the DF not only to develop a humanitarian doctrine but also to identify an alternate source of funding. There must be a determined effort by the DF to resolve these issues before the next White Paper on Defence in 2010 and indeed before the DF deploy into what could be more offensively postured missions requiring a complete effects-based approach.

The Battle for the Targeting Battle Space

Comdt Richard Brennan BA LLB BL MA (LMDS)

“The struggle to make warriors obey the codes of honour is not a futile or hopeless task. Rules more honoured in the breach than in the observance are still worth having”¹

Targeting: A Meaning Perspective

Law has always responded and evolved to the tectonic shifts in warfare – the two Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions were drafted to deal with these ‘tectonic shifts’. In light of this symbiotic relationship, it is therefore essential that we monitor developments, theories and doctrines in military affairs for such developments may either “Strain or strengthen aspects of that body of law”.² This paper sets out to explore divergent interpretations as articulated within the targeting doctrines of the twenty first century. In particular, the impact these interpretations are having on the principle of distinction between civilians and combatants and civilian objects and military objectives. A critical appreciation or responsible understanding of these ‘divergent interpretations’ remains both a legal and moral imperative for both States and commanders. This is underpinned through the debate generated from recent conflicts³ which demonstrates all too clearly that the fortunes of the civilian in wartime depends “very largely on how he is perceived by the combatant and how the law works on the combatants perceptions”.⁴ This viewpoint is further amplified by Bothe who posits that the evaluation of the military advantage to be derived from an attack is not only a matter of the relevant facts, “but also a matter of value judgements”⁵ Indeed, I would proffer that the word ‘wartime’ could easily be substituted for ‘peace enforcement operations’⁶ bringing the relevance of this issue closer to the Irish Defence Forces and the Irish State, particularly, if one accepts Bothe’s view that “In a democratic system, the value judgement which matters most is that of the majority of society at large”.⁷ Moreover, for the commander, the debates surrounding these principles of modern targeting need to become more than a mere academic question of passing interest. Since, in the words of James Baker.⁸ “These are principles that we as military commanders may have to apply to our “Most solemn responsibility – the exercise of force and the taking of human life”.⁹

Distinguishing Distinction

The principle of distinction remains at the “epicentre of the law regulating the conduct of hostilities”¹⁰ in particular targeting doctrines. It is one of the pillars of the international law applicable in armed conflicts setting out the seminal principle that “there must be a clear distinction between the armed forces and civilians, or between combatants and non-

1 Ignatieff, M. (1999) *The Warriors Honour*, Great Britain, Penguin Books Ltd.

2 Schmitt, M. (2007) ‘Effects Based Operations and the Law of Aerial Warfare’ *Washington University Global Studies Law Review* 2007.

3 “Operation Cast Lead” - the IDF operation in the Gaza Strip 2009; Israeli/ Lebanon war July/August 2006.

4 Best, G. (2002) *War and Law since 1945*, New York, Oxford University Press Inc, 266.

5 Bothe, M. (2002) ‘Targeting’ in Wall A.E. (ed), *Legal and Ethical Lessons of NATO’S Kosovo Campaign* *International Law Studies*, Volume 78, Newport, Naval War College Press, pp 173-187.

6 Irish Defence Forces personnel are currently deployed in two (2) peace enforcement missions overseas.

7 *Ibid* 5.

8 The Honourable Judge James Baker served as special assistant to President Clinton and legal advisor to the National Security Council (NSC). He also served as special assistant to President G.W.Bush.

9 Baker, J. (2002) ‘When Lawyers Advise Presidents in Wartime’, *Naval War College Review* Vol LV, No 1.

10 Dinstein, Y. (2002) ‘Legitimate Military Objectives under the current *Jus in Bello*’, *Israeli Yearbook on Human Rights* Vol 31, 140-168.

combatants, and between things that might legitimately be attacked and things protected from attack”.¹¹ It is codified within Article 48 of Protocol 1¹² of 8 June 1977 Additional to the Geneva Conventions of the 12th of August 1949.¹³ In 1996 the International Court of Justice recognized the principle of distinction – between combatants and noncombatants (civilians) – as a “fundamental and intransgressible principle of customary international law”.¹⁴ Clearly any application of the principle necessitates a clear understanding by the commander as to what constitutes a civilian object and what constitutes a legitimate target of attack, since “In exposing military objectives to attack, and (as a corollary) immunizing civilian objects, the principle of distinction provides the main line of defence against methods of barbarism in warfare”.¹⁵ The corollary therefore being that the principle of distinction “is practically worthless without a definition of at least one of the categories between which the attacker has to distinguish”,¹⁶ namely what constitutes a civilian object and what constitutes a legitimate target of attack.

The Legal Nexus

Protocol 1 of 8 June 1977 Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949¹⁷ sought to redress this problem or as succinctly posited by Professor Charles Garraway, “Took the bull by the horns and came out with some definitions”¹⁸ by providing for rules on ‘military objectives’ and ‘protection of the civilian population’.

The definitions were broadly set out as follows:

Military Objectives: Article 52(2) AP1

Military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage (Art.52 (2) Protocol 1).

Civilians: Article 51(2) AP1

The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians shall not be the object of attack....

However, the problem with Article 52(2) resided in its “abstract and generic wording”¹⁹. Indeed, it was opined that the text would lend itself to “divergent interpretations in application”²⁰ where such “ambiguous language encourages abuse”.²¹

11 Rodgers, APV. (2004) *Law on the Battlefield* (2nd edn), Manchester, Manchester University Press, 8.

12 Protocol 1 introduced detailed rules on targeting. It extended the range of persons entitled to combatant status as well as the rights and guarantees afforded to civilians (The manual of the Law of Armed Conflict 2005 Pg 3 Para 1.33.1 UK Ministry of Defence).

13 Art. 48- The parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives” [hereinafter Art.48Protocol 1]

14 Advisory Opinion on Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. Reports 226-257 (July 8).

15 Ibid 10 at pages 140-168.

16 Sassoli, M. (2003) ‘Legitimate Targets of Attacks Under International Humanitarian Law’: Background Paper prepared for the Informal High-Level Expert Meeting on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law, Cambridge, January 27-29, 2003,2.

17 Hereinafter Art 52 AP 1.

18 Garraway. (2007) ‘The definition of Military Objectives’ paper presented at EAPC/PfP Roundtable on Customary International Humanitarian Law 1-2 February, Geneva.

19 Ibid 10 at page 141.

20 Ibid 10 at page 141.

21 Rosenblad.E.(1979) *International Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict*, 71

The Irish Dimension

'Attacks' are currently defined for the purposes of the law of war as "acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence".²² In legal terms it is accepted that "The definition of attack is wide enough to include a whole range of attacks, from that of a single soldier opening fire with his rifle to that of an Army Groups major offensive."²³ In other words the issue of targeting is just as relevant to the Irish Defence Forces as it is to the great military powers of the 21st century. In this regard it is apposite to remind ourselves of where the Irish Defence Forces are nested within this debate. Ireland in signing²⁴ and subsequently ratifying²⁵ Protocol 1 set out the following declaration in the accession document:

Ireland, in ratifying Protocol 1 Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 adopted at Geneva on 8 June 1977, declares its belief that the provisions of this Protocol represent the minimum level of legal and actual protection bound to be afforded to persons and civilian and cultural objects in armed conflicts.²⁶

Accordingly we retain both international and national legal obligation²⁷ to ensure that the minimum protections guaranteed by Protocol 1 are met. Indeed the 'abstract and generic wording' of Article 52(2), should give cause for Ireland to clarify what we interpret as "representing the minimum level of legal and actual protection".²⁸ This aforementioned obligation enjoys a heightened significance given our "Increasingly robust and complex peace support operations".²⁹ Particularly, in an environment where as stated by the former Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Sreenan, "The nature of all overseas missions in which Irish Troops would be involved in the future, was becoming more difficult".³⁰ Furthermore, in November 2004, in furtherance of our commitment to European Security and Defence Policy, the Minister for Defence "affirmed Ireland's support for the Battle Groups Concept".³¹

The Political Nexus

The recent Bankovic case³² in the European Court of Human Rights highlights clearly the political impact of targeting decisions. In this regard the images of the 17 Ministers of the EU members of NATO, being summoned to Strasbourg, to justify the decision to target the Serbian Radio and Television building in Belgrade, is cogent affirmation of Bothe's observations that "The military cannot and may not constitute a value system of its own, separated by waterproof walls from that of civil society".³³ The case is authority for the importance of clarity, amongst military forces operating within the multinational environment, as to the

22 Article 49 paragraph 1 of, Protocol 1 of the 8th June 1977 Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 [Hereinafter Art 49 Protocol 1].

23 Ibid 11 at page 28.

24 Ireland signed the Protocol on the 12th day of December 1977.

25 Ireland ratified the Protocol on the 19th of May 1999.

26 ICRC (1999) 'Reports and Declarations: Ratifications of the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949', International Review of the Red Cross, No 834,418 -422. Ireland signed on the 19th day of May 1999.

27 Geneva Conventions (Amendment) Act 1998.

28 Ibid 26

29 Irish Defence Forces (2005) Strategy Statement 2005-2007, DefenceForces Printing Press.

30 Lally, C. (2006) 'Army to join EU Battlegroup in 2008', The Irish Times, Dublin, 27 December 2006, page10.

31 Irish Defence Forces (2005) Annual Report 2005-2007, 22, Defence Forces Printing Press.

32 Bankovic & Others V.Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights Application No.52207/99. The Serbian families of the 16 civilian workers killed in the NATO bombing of the Serbian Radio and Television (Radio Televise Srbije, RTS) building, sought redress against the European members of NATO. They claimed that the attack on the radio station was a violation of the right to life.

33 Ibid 5 at page 184.

precise nature of their respective obligations under Article 52 AP1. It is interesting to note that during Operation Allied Force³⁴ “The French, British and Americans each took a different view of their potential exposure under the Geneva Conventions, and each instructed their aircrews to stay on the ground when missions they considered legally dubious were taking place”.³⁵ Therefore, it is essential that the Irish Defence Forces are clear regarding the nature of our obligations³⁶ under Article 52 AP1,³⁷ ensuring that we are not unwitting parties to a ‘divergent interpretation’ where innocent lives are lost.

From a lawyers’ viewpoint, Article 82 AP1 prescribes that “Parties to the conflict...shall ensure that legal advisors are available, when necessary to advise military commanders at the appropriate level on the application of the conventions”.³⁸ This has added significance given that the potential poor fit between traditional categories of military objectives and the reality of conflict in which targets fall on a continuum of judgement between military and civilian, becomes more “perilous in an age of international scrutiny where good faith differences of view can take on criminal implications”.³⁹

Therefore, it is critical that legal advisors are equipped with the necessary knowledge of this doctrine in order to advise and assist our commanders in the field so “that whatever moral or operational doubts a commander may have, he can at least be sure that he will not face legal consequences”.⁴⁰

Utilitarian V Humanitarian –Shaping the Legal Landscape

From the outset, it is important, within the context of this paper, to appreciate that the evolution of International Humanitarian Law in its entirety is “predicated on a subtle equilibrium between two diametrically opposed impulses: military necessity and humanitarian consideration”⁴¹. Dinstein states:

Every single norm of the LOIAC⁴² is moulded by a parallelogram of forces: it confronts a built in tension between the relentless demands of military necessity and humanitarian considerations, working out a compromise formula. The outlines of the compromise vary from one LOIAC norm to another.⁴³

Dinstein’s views summarise very clearly the aspirations of a body of law that has evolved over time, namely the balance between military necessity and humanitarian considerations. This balance is described by Krauss and Lacey as a ‘battle’ which:

34 NATO’s military action against Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999.

35 Ibid 1 at page 199.

36 These treaty obligations are now underpinned by Article 8 2(b) (i) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to which Ireland is a signatory party on the 29th day of May 1998.

37 Ibid 17.

38 Article 82 paragraph 1, of Protocol 1 of the 8th of June 1977 Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, -Legal advisors in the Armed Forces. [Hereinafter Art 82 Protocol 1]

39 Ibid 9.

40 Ibid 1 at page 199.

41 Dinstein, Y. (2004) *The Conduct of Hostilities Under the Law of International Armed Conflict*, United Kingdom, University Press Cambridge.17.

42 *Law of International Armed Conflict*.

43 Ibid 41 at page 17.

...pits those who must plan and fight wars against those committed to reducing the suffering caused by war; it is a battle between the utilitarians or warriors, on one side, and the humanitarians on the other.⁴⁴

It is a 'battle' that permeates throughout the 'divergent interpretations' of Art 52(2) AP1.

The St Petersburg Declaration of 1868⁴⁵ was one of the most significant treaties of the mid-nineteenth century. It sought to "To fix the technical limits at which the necessities of war ought to yield to the requirements of humanity..." (St Petersburg Declaration 1868).⁴⁶ In my view the Declaration is significant not only within the temporal framework of International Humanitarian Law on the conduct of hostilities, but for its acknowledgement that 'military necessity' and 'humanity' are two competing impulses in war and legal drafting.

In this regard the adoption of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949⁴⁷ were without doubt "one of the most significant developments in the law of armed conflict".⁴⁸ The conventions were a direct consequence of the degree of inhumanity experienced in WWII. However as "when they proved insufficient to meet the humanitarian conflicts of Vietnam, Algeria...international law responded again with the two 1977 Protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions".⁴⁹ Their significance regarding this paper are underpinned in two ways. Firstly, the conventions and the 1977 Protocols are considered by most to be "almost humanitarian in nature"⁵⁰ representing a "victory for the humanitarian school over warriors".⁵¹ More importantly was their codification of the "fundamental principle of distinction".⁵²

'Divergent Interpretations'

It is important at this point to explore these 'divergent interpretations' or dichotomies of opinions regarding the so called 'generic language' of Art 52(2) AP1 and the legal implications these may have on the principle of distinction. As stated earlier, Article 52(2) underpins the fundamental principle of distinction that "Attacks are to be directed at military targets, not at civilian objects"⁵³ Significantly, Art 52(2) sets out two cumulative conditions for an object to constitute a military objective: (A) it makes an effective contribution to military action of the enemy by virtue of its nature, location purpose or use, and (B) its capture, destruction or neutralisation provide the attacking party with a definite military advantage. Accordingly, under Article 52(2), an "object must fulfil two cumulative criteria in order to qualify as a military objective".⁵⁴

44 Krauss, E., and Lacey, K. (2002) 'Utilitarian Vs Humanitarian: The Battle Over the Law of War, Parameters, Summer, 73-84.

45 St Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosives Projectiles under 400 Grams Weight, 1868.

46 Preamble to the St Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosives Projectiles under 400 Grams Weight, 1868.

47 Geneva Convention For The Amelioration of The Condition of the Wounded in the Field; Geneva Convention For The Amelioration of The Condition Of Wounded, Sick And Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea; Geneva Convention Relative To The Treatment of Prisoners of War; Geneva Convention Relative To The Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.

48 Green, C. (2000) *The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict* (2ND edn), Manchester, Manchester University Press, 43.

49 Schmitt, M. (2004) 'Targeting And Humanitarian Law: Current Issues', 34 *Israel Yearbook On Human Rights*, 59-104.

50 *Ibid* 44 at page 77.

51 *Ibid* 44 at page 80.

52 *Ibid* 49.

53 *Ibid* 11 at page 7

54 *Ibid* 10 at page 143.

The requirement that the object “makes an effective contribution to military action...in the circumstances ruling at the time”⁵⁵ and that this contribution be linked to the nature, location purpose or use of the objective in question underpins an important nexus between the object and military action. This argues Boivin is important since “without this criterion, it becomes easy to justify that civilians and civilian objects that politically, financially or psychologically support the war machine should fall into the category of military objectives”.⁵⁶ Sassoli also observes “Without the limitation to the actual situation at hand, the principle of distinction would be void, as every object could *in abstracto* could under future developments become a military objective”.⁵⁷ In terms of the debate Boivin’s comments are instructive when one considers the utilitarian’s desire to expand the scope of the military objective.

This humanitarian interpretation of these words was not followed in the United States (US). In fact senior US legal advisors such as W. Hays Parks⁵⁸ argue that the definition is “focussed too narrowly on the definite military advantage and paying too little heed to war *sustaining capability*, including economic targets such as exports industries”.⁵⁹ Not surprisingly Article 4 of the United States Department of Defence Instruction issued April 2003⁶⁰ contains the following definition:

Military objectives are those potential targets during an armed conflict which, by their nature, location purpose or use, effectively contribute to the opposing force’s war-fighting or war-sustaining capability and whose partial destruction, capture or neutralization would constitute a military advantage to the attacker under the circumstances at the time of the attack.

Rodgers views this as giving “a clear indication of the current United States thinking on what constitutes a military objective”.⁶¹ In fact the definition, when compared to Art 52(2) AP1 definition of ‘military objectives’ defined as “those, which by their nature location purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage”, departs “from the protocol in significant respects”.⁶² Recent US joint doctrine has reinforced this approach by providing that “Economic targets (i.e. factories, workshops, plants) that make an effective contribution to adversary military capability are considered legitimate targets”.⁶³ This is a prime example of the ‘Divergent Interpretations’ referred to by Dinstein earlier.⁶⁴ Although not a signatory to AP 1, the US⁶⁵ accepts the AP1 textual definition as correct, which makes the broadening of this definition all the more significant.

55 Art 52 AP1

56 Boivin, A.(2006) ‘The legal Regime Applicable to Targeting Military Objectives in the Context of Contemporary Warfare’, Research Paper presented at the University Centre for International Humanitarian Law, Research Paper Series No2/2006, 18.

57 Sassoli,M.(2003) ‘Legitimate Targets of Attack Under International Humanitarian Law’, Background Paper prepared for the Informal High-Level Expert Meeting on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law, 27-29 January, Cambridge.

58 Hays Parks, W., the Special Assistant for Law of War Matters to the US Army Judge Advocate General.

59 Hays Parks, W. (1990) ‘Air War and the Law of War’, Air Force Law Review 32 Rev 1, 35-45.

60 United States Department of Defence Instruction No 2 dated 30 April 2003 Art 5D www.nimj.org

61 Ibid 11 at page 81.

62 Ibid 11 at page 81.

63 United States Joint Chiefs of Staff (2007), Joint Doctrine for Targeting, Joint Publication 3-60, 13 April 2007, Washington, USAFAPS, E-3.

64 Ibid 10.

65 The US position on AP1 is authoritatively set out in Memorandum for Assistant General Counsel (International), Office of the Secretary of Defense, and 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions: Customary International Law Implications 8 May 1986.

The US definition is seen as widening “considerably the range of targets that might be attacked”.⁶⁶ The effect in any targeting process would be to allow targets such as economic targets, leadership targets and propaganda targets that would be problematic under a strict interpretation of Art 52(2) API to be engaged.

However, this view is fully consistent with other proponents of a broadening concept of targeting. Charles J. Dunlap⁶⁷, at one stage when writing on the NATO Kosovo campaign of 1999, viewed the current broad definition of non-combatant as one which may not “correspond with the moral and political realities of societies in armed conflicts” in other words “sentient population should not be spared the wrath of war their government pursues”.⁶⁸ He posited that the new target set should include “Banks and financial institutions. Factories, plants, stores and shops that sell or distribute luxury products or indeed anything not absolutely indispensable to non-combatant survival...”⁶⁹ This was not unlike Best’s views, which questioned the adults who “shared in the political and psychological encouragement and support of war? He further questions whether it is “right that they should be spared all but accidental ill effects of a war for which they did not conceal their support or for which, as was usually the case their support was credibly blamed by their ruling representatives”.⁷⁰ Ultimately, Dunlap through a form of inductive reasoning appears to mirror Hanson’s thesis where “Democratic nations in arms must make the entire society of the enemy pay for the aggression of its army...”⁷¹

Dunlap himself suggested it as a “Strategy for the use of force...when facing a society whose moral compass is widely askew”⁷² Hays Parks also criticises the definition of the military objective as prescribed by Art 52 API stating, “It is intended to limit targets to objectives connected to a nation’s military effort rather than its war effort...”⁷³ Parks also is an advocate of hitting the war sustaining capability of the enemy. He justifies this by stating “...nations export material in order to pay for the purchase of weapons”.⁷⁴ Rodgers, however, holds that attacking general industrial potential may well violate Art 52(2) in that such targets “...would not make an effective contribution to military action nor would their destruction offer a definite military advantage”.⁷⁵ Again one sees the dichotomy of opinion regarding the exact nature and scope of military targets where broadly speaking humanitarian lawyers will argue that the definition of military objectives excludes the general industrial and agricultural potential of the enemy, while utilitarian lawyers would view the potential range of targets differently. I would concur with Sassoli in so far as any unqualified invocation of ‘war sustaining capability’ may mean to “abandon the limitation to military objectives, and to admit attacks on political, financial institutions”⁷⁶.

66 Ibid 11 at page 81

67 Brigadier General Charles J Dunlap is staff Judge Advocate for the US Central Command Air Forces. He was deployed in 1998 as the senior legal counsel for Operation Desert Fox’s air strikes.

68 Dunlap, J. (2000) ‘The End of Innocence: Rethinking Noncombatancy In The Post-Kosovo Era’, Strategic Review Vol 28, 9-17.

69 Ibid at page 14.

70 Ibid 4 at page 260.

71 Hanson, V.D. (1999) *The Soul of Battle: From Ancient Times to the Present Day, How Great Liberators Vanquished Tyranny*, New York And The Free Press, 33.

72 Ibid 68 at page 14.

73 Ibid 59 at page 138.

74 Ibid 67.

75 Ibid 11 at page 71.

76 Ibid 57 at page 6.

I would also affirm the view as expressed by Dinstein that such opinions⁷⁷ display the “danger of introducing the slippery slope concept of ‘war sustaining capability’”.⁷⁸

In terms of the utilitarian argument for broadening the definition of the military objective, both Best’s and Dunlap’s writings are instructive. However, it would appear that these views challenge the principal that “under the Laws of International Armed Conflict, all victims are deserving of the same protection and this is no less the case because some lend their political support to a regime that is responsible for serious human rights violations or to a regime that is dictatorial”.⁷⁹ In fact I would argue that such doctrines, which target civilians, or have as their intended effects the undermining of the civilian population, are fundamentally at variance with this often understated principle of belligerent equality. In this regard the principle espoused by Bothe is apposite where “The equality of the parties in relation to the *Jus in Bello*⁸⁰ is an essential precondition to the effective functioning of this body of law”.⁸¹ Further, I would contend that expansive interpretations (Hays Parks et al) would challenge our (Ireland’s) conceptual understanding of our obligations under API whose preamble reaffirms this principle:

The provisions of this protocol must be fully applied in all the circumstances...without any adverse distinction based on the nature or origin of the armed conflict or on the causes espoused by or attributed to the parties to the conflict”.⁸²

This contrast to the utilitarian model which calls for a “revolutionary re-thinking of ‘military objective’ so as to delink the now required nexus to a contribution to a specific military action, and whose loss weakens the nations collective will to continue the conflict”.⁸³

It is clear that divergent interpretations do exist, each very much shaped by two diametrically opposed impulses: military necessity and humanitarian considerations referred to earlier.⁸⁴

Civilians as Military Objectives-The blurring of Distinction?

Clearly one of the most significant impacts of the utilitarian view is how it shapes a legal interpretation of the principle of distinction. Since any potential for expanding the category of objects that can be targeted always brings with it an increased level of risk to civilians and civilian property. In short the genesis of legal construct that slowly blurs the principle of distinction between what is and what is not a legitimate military objective.

The utilitarian drive to expand the definition of ‘military objects’ also moves into the realm of “immaterial objectives such as civilian morale and the political will to wage war”.⁸⁵ This argument amongst many of the utilitarians has its basis firmly rooted in Clausewitzian doctrine which prescribes that “the people the government and the military formed a

77 Ibid at page 13.

78 Ibid 41 at page 87.

79 Ibid 56 at page 27

80 The Law of War.

81 Ibid 5 at page 27.

82 ICRC (1996) Protocols Additional To The Geneva Conventions Of 1 August 1949, Geneva, and ICRC Press, 3.

83 Ibid 69 at Page 15.

84 Ibid 41 at Page 14.

85 Ibid 56 at page 25.

remarkable trinity”.⁸⁶ Dunlap posits that “disassembling that trinity...results in the collapse of an opponent’s ability to continue to fight”.⁸⁷

Meyers develops this theory further writing that:

Targeting should include the morale of the people... this concept of enemy morale parallels the concept of the remarkable trinity of Clausewitz. The trinity consisting of the people, the government and the military. In the context of attacking morale, or will, one could therefore attack the morale of the people, the morale of the leadership, the morale of the military, or any combination thereof.⁸⁸

This approach views the enemy as a system, like Clausewitz’s Trinitarian concept where all actions are aimed against the mind of the enemy command or against the enemy system as a whole. Thus, as Warden states, “an attack against industry or infrastructure is not primarily conducted because of the effect it might or might not have on field forces, rather it is undertaken for its direct effect on the enemy system...”.⁸⁹ In his theory “Military forces are a means to an end. It is pointless to deal with enemy military forces if they can be bypassed by strategy or technology...”.⁹⁰ However, it is easy to see how such a concept challenges the narrow focus of ‘military objectives’ contained within Art 52 AP1. Notwithstanding, it is a doctrine that receives prescription in US Air Force doctrine to day “While physical factors are crucial in war, the national will and the leadership will are also critical components of the war”.⁹¹ Similarly Hays Parks in his seminal article ‘Air War and the law of War’ stated that the “word ‘military’⁹² has to be interpreted with enough latitude to include strategic, psychological, and political advantages and that the word ‘definite’ cannot be taken so literally as to exclude the ‘hopedfor’ when consideration is given to the fog of war and the speculative nature of many decisions made in war”.⁹³

These theories are rejected by Dinstein who states that “There is no basis in contemporary international legal thinking to the claim(...) that military operations-pre-eminently in the form of aerial bombings-can be launched, with a view to shattering the morale of the enemy civilian population and its determination to continue to prosecute the war”.⁹⁴ He challenges the view as expressed by Meyer that “even if a deliberate attack against civilians can ‘bend the will of the enemy’ – it is proscribed”.⁹⁵

⁸⁶ Clausewitz, 1873; cited by Howard and Paret

⁸⁷ Ibid 68 at page 11.

⁸⁸ Meyers, J. (2001) ‘Tearing Down The Façade: a Critical Look at the Current Law On Targeting the Will of the Enemy and Air Force Doctrine’, Air Force Law Review 3:22.

⁸⁹ Warden, J.A. (1995) ‘The Enemy as a System’, Air Power Journal, Spring.

⁹⁰ Ibid at page 9.

⁹¹ Air Force Doctrine Document 1: Air Basic Doctrine[AFDD-1]6-7(1997)

⁹² ‘Military’ as per Article 52(2) Protocol 1 Additional to the Geneva Conventions 12 August 1949

⁹³ Ibid 59 at page 142-56.

⁹⁴ Ibid 41 at page 116.

⁹⁵ Ibid 41 at page 116.

Effects Based Operations (EBO) – Reconsidered

In fact Schmitt sums the debate succinctly “What Dunlap and his supporters are calling for appears to be nothing less than a fundamental rejection of a major element of the principle of distinction by taking Effects Based Operations (EBO) to the extreme”.⁹⁶ The doctrine of EBO focuses on ‘effects’ thereby “identifying and attacking that centre of gravity likely to have the greatest, or most immediate effect on the decision maker’s cost benefit calculations. In many cases this may be other than military forces”.⁹⁷ In other words the targets are selected “Based on their effect on an enemy’s decision making process, rather than identification of targets based on the direct and immediate military advantage of their destruction”.⁹⁸

Certainly, the doctrine of EBO needs to be measured closely to both our conceptual understanding of the ‘military objective’ and the attendant effects on the status of the ‘civilian’. It could be argued that such a doctrine, unchecked, may yet present a challenge to what we perceive as constituting a ‘military objective’. Indeed this view is underpinned by the views expressed by a number of jurists in the field of International Humanitarian Law. In this regard, Professor Adam Roberts added that the “NATO approach of EBO is in tension with one underlying principle of the laws of war and the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weakening the military forces of the enemy”.⁹⁹ A tension argues Judge Baker which is “Particularly apparent where a facility or enterprise financially sustains an adversary’s regime, and therefore ultimately the regime’s military operations, but does not make a product that directly and effectively contribute to an adversary’s military operations”.¹⁰⁰ Certainly, an unfettered effects based targeting approach may as Schmitt underpins “Suggest an expansive view of the appropriate targets and target sets in conflicts”.¹⁰¹

In fact the controversial comments of the NATO Air Component Commander for Kosovo campaign 1999 - Lieutenant General Michael Short, epitomises this clearly:

I felt that on the first night the power should have gone off, and the major bridges around Belgrade should have gone into the Danube, and the water should be cut off so the next morning the leading citizens of Belgrade would have got up and asked ‘Why are we doing this’ and Milosovic the same question.¹⁰²

⁹⁶ Schmitt, M. (2005) ‘The impact of High and Low –Tech Warfare’ in Arnold, R. and Hildbrand, P.A. (eds), *International Humanitarian Law and the 21st Century’s Conflicts Changes*, Lausanne Perrin, 169-189.

⁹⁷ *Ibid* at page 178.

⁹⁸ Roberts, A. (2002) ‘The Laws of War after Kosovo in Wall, A.E. (ED), *Legal and Ethical Lessons of NATO’S Kosovo Campaign International Law Studies*, Volume 78, Newport, Naval War College Press, 418.

⁹⁹ *Ibid* at page 418.

¹⁰⁰ Baker, J. (2002) ‘When Lawyers Advise Presidents in Wartime’, *Naval War College Review* Vol LV, No 1, 9.

¹⁰¹ Schmitt, M. (2004) ‘Targeting And Humanitarian Law: Current Issues’, *34 Israel Yearbook On Human Rights*, 59-104, 65

¹⁰² Whitney, C.R. (1999) ‘The Commander: Air Wars Won’t Stay Risk-Free, General Says’, *The New York Times*, New York, June, P.A1.

Conclusion

To be respected, the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) must strive to rationally balance humanitarian concerns with military necessity. The balancing may shift along with developments in the nature of warfare, but “Must remain at the heart of international humanitarian law”.¹⁰³ The debate, as illustrated, reflects all too clearly the necessity to maintain this balance. It also epitomises, in my view, the slippery slope concept of broadening the ‘military objective’. I would agree with Baker who states “EBO and the LOAC may be on a collision course”.¹⁰⁴ In my view there cannot be any class of a quasi civilian combatant. In fact any attacks whose main purpose is to effect the morale of the civilian population is contrary to the fundamental principle of distinction, and risks sending the law “hurtling down the slippery slope toward collateral calamity”.¹⁰⁵

Notwithstanding Art 52(2) API when critically examined confronts us with what Dinstein aptly described as a “Built in tension between relentless demands of military necessity and humanitarian considerations working out a compromise formula”.¹⁰⁶ The success of that ‘compromise’ shapes somewhat the legal construct on the principle of distinction and the targeting doctrine that informs the commander. It would appear that there exists a dichotomy of opinion between both the humanitarians and the utilitarians. The question of who is winning the battle may be judged on recent conflicts. In terms of the Irish Defence Forces there is, I would posit, a fundamental requirement for introspection regarding what we construe to be the ‘minimum level of legal protection’ for the civilian within the ever shifting targeting debate. In other words, it is important that we elect to re-affirm our own value line. Moreover, the fundamental principle of distinction needs to be understood against subtle nuances of legal casuistry or ‘divergent interpretations’.

Finally, I would repeat the observations of Bothe in that “The military...cannot constitute a value system of its own separated from that of civil society”.¹⁰⁷ Accordingly, it is important to be aware that as soldiers an understanding and application of the principle of distinction, commensurate with our values remains a moral imperative. These ‘values’ temper the diametrically opposed impulses of humanitarian considerations and military necessity. Moreover, these values shape the very principle that we, one day, may have to apply to our most solemn responsibility “*the exercise of force and the taking of human life*”.

103 Schmitt, M. (2006) ‘Fault Lines in the Law of Attack’ in Breau, S. and Agnieszka J.N. (eds), *Testing the Boundaries of International Humanitarian Law*, London, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 466.

104 Ibid 100 at page 9.

105 Ibid 100 at page 22.

106 Ibid 41 at page 17.

107 Ibid 5 at page 184.

Operational Art: And its Application to the Cromwellian Campaign in Ireland

Comdt Ian Byrne DSM

'The point where the logician draws the line, where the premises resulting from perceptions end and where judgement starts, is the point where art begins'.¹

- Clausewitz

Introduction

Who would initially believe that modern Irish nationalism could have a mutual association with a Cromwellian concept, when nothing epitomises the British colonial policy in Ireland more than Cromwell's campaign? Yet his model of governance involves a belief that laws are made by conquerors and just as the revolutionaries appealed to Anglo-Saxon rights so too do Irish nationalists appeal to Gaelic ones – the Gaels having invaded Ireland originally between 500 and 300 BC.² As a policy of governance military doctrine is undergoing a radical transformation in most western countries in response to the changing nature of the art of operations. This is occurring as a result of the increasing emphasis on the emergence of asymmetry as the new challenge facing military organisations throughout the world. The battlefield is more complex involving a mix of hostile terrain, terrorism and an enemy without a uniform. It is becoming more difficult to establish exactly who the enemy is and this poses particular dilemmas at all levels of war. If the motives for war are ambiguous then not only is it difficult to identify who the enemy is but also why war is necessary in the first place and how to achieve a decisive result.

Rationale

The interface between the desired strategic end-state and military success is thus becoming more difficult to define and to manage. 'War will be driven from its natural course, the political object will be more and more at variance with the aim of ideal war, and the conflict will seem increasingly political in character.'³ Operational art, accredited as an amalgam of German and Soviet thinking, has been developed to provide this necessary linkage. 'Tactical creativity is governed by operational art'.⁴ It is the means to convert the political object into tactical actions with a view to seeking a decisive result through the employment of all available military activities. This dynamic between strategic aims, political objectives and military actions, albeit with a contemporary change in its approach to war, may have occurred as far back as the 17th Century – predating the evolution of the concept of operational art. The evolution of operational art shows the truths and contradictions in the history of any theory but I hope to demonstrate that 'concepts are based on ideas, and ideas over time can be picked up, dropped off and reborn or refashioned to suit fresh circumstances and changed situations'.⁵ Notwithstanding the tactical success of the campaign in Ireland Cromwell left behind a legacy

1 von Clausewitz, C., *On War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p.99.

2 Boyce, D.G., *Nationalism in Ireland*, 3rd edn. (London: Routledge, 1995), p.25.

3 von Clausewitz, op.cit., p.29.

4 Svechin, A.A., *Strategy* (Minnesota: East View Information Services, 1992), p.68.

5 Menning, B. W. 'Operational Art's Origins', *Military Review*, No.76, Vol. 5, 1997, p.46.

not solely to be forgotten but to become legendary. The boundaries of sectarian politics, which were often blurred and confused up to the 17th Century, were marked out. It is possible that operational art in another form potentially set the seeds for the paradigm of contemporary nationalism in Ireland.

Classical work such as *The Prince* and *Wealth of Nations* are often used as a foundation for academics and professionals to examine current philosophies and demonstrate the pre-eminence of theory. This is due to ‘the underlying logic of human nature, and by extension of political action’.⁶ If this is true and human nature is unchanging then in parallel it implies that current philosophies can be useful as a reflective tool to review the actions of historic professionals.

Operational Art

The conduct of operations forms an integral part of military strategy and as the conduct of operations evolved so too did the need for new paradigms. The Jominian view of the importance of the single-point strategy was no longer sufficient. Svechin believed that combat operations were not self-contained and there was no reliance on *the* single battle to achieve the ultimate goal. It was about visualising the theatre ‘in response to the shifting content of strategy, the changing nature of operations and the evolving nature of military structures’.⁷ This begins with the three levels of war, strategic, operational and tactical, each of which must be considered separately in order to demonstrate the effect of the linkages between each level of war in relation to the central theme of operational art.

The strategic level of war concerns all the resources of the state aimed to achieve a political end-state. Although the military instrument is but one of choice Clausewitz states that although strategy, and hence the strategic level, deals only with ‘the use of engagements for the object of war’,⁸ the theory of strategy must ‘consider its chief means of execution, the fighting forces’.⁹ Clausewitz’s posited that strategic supervision ‘forms the plan of war, maps out the proposed course of the different campaigns which compose the war, and regulates the battles to be fought in each’.¹⁰ This is refined by Basil Liddell Hart to exclude the military from what he perceives as the sole responsibility of government. The government devise the strategy within which the military conducts the war. There are many ways and means to achieve the end as decided within the domain of policy but solely from a military perspective the challenges at the strategic level that Cromwell faced in the 17th Century remain present in today’s complex environment – ultimately that of ‘developing, deploying, sustaining, recovering and redeploying military forces for the attainment of political objectives’.¹¹

It is at the tactical level where forces are deployed, and where ‘battles and engagements are planned and executed’¹² to achieve the success of a campaign. Tactics refers to the use of armed forces primarily, though not exclusively, in combat. ‘In essence, tactics are about how

6 Handel, M.I., *Masters of War*, 3rd edn. (Oxon: Routledge, 2007), p.1.

7 Menning, *op.cit.*, p.46.

8 von Clausewitz, *op.cit.*, p.74.

9 *ibid.*, p.133.

10 Liddell Hart, B.H., *Strategy*, 2nd edn. (London: Faber & Faber Ltd, 1967), p.319.

11 Joint Warfare Publication 0-01 (JWP 0-01), ‘*British Dfence Doctrine*, (Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, 2004), p.2-1.

12 *ibid.*

to fight, about military behaviour itself.’¹³ So if government plans a strategy and the military conduct the tactics the functional Venn union between these reflects a level of war in which military operations are planned and conducted in line with government policy.

The operational level of war concerns ‘the use of armed forces in campaigns to achieve political and military results in a distinctive geographical theatre’.¹⁴ The necessary linkage is the legitimacy of each level of war demonstrating that the military strategic authority allocates the objectives, the operational commander matches the forces to the objectives while the tactical commander achieves them. This relationship will adapt to the nature of the conflict hence the importance and necessity of understanding operational art within a campaign is no less important than the understanding of strategy and tactics. Throughout the Cromwellian conquest of Ireland this understanding was subsumed into the power of one man and it is credible to believe that the overwhelming success was attributable to a certain amount of genius in the form of operational art.

Scope

Operational art remains central to the operational level of war. It is defined as ‘the orchestration of all military activities involved in converting strategic objectives into tactical actions with a view to seeking a decisive result’.¹⁵ It therefore requires a skill in manoeuvring forces to achieve tactical superiority within the context of an operation. The term ‘operation’ is a concept from the seventeenth century concerning the actions of armies, and in Cromwell’s time ‘generals and kings raised professional armies to fight limited wars for the dynastic state’s limited objectives’.¹⁶ But operational art involves more. It refers ‘to the ability to know when to accept or decline combat, with a view to advancing campaign-wide goals’.¹⁷ Influence that encourages the enemy to decline battle is critical in operational art as it can use ‘the threat and the actuality of battle to win a campaign’.¹⁸ ‘To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.’¹⁹ These actions depend on an awareness of the complete problem and ‘only from the operational perspective is the view wide enough for commanders’.²⁰ The many nuances involved in operational art show it is not intangible and it requires ‘creative and innovative thought’,²¹ but in his theory on the dichotomy between the art of war and the science of war Clausewitz ascertains that ‘of course all thought is art’.²² In short, according to British Defence Doctrine, operational art ‘determines where, when and for what purpose forces will conduct operations’.²³ Perhaps operational art is more than just an art since its composition seems to require a degree of scientific consciousness in conjunction with divine inspiration but regardless of these, when successful, the genius of its application is still apparent.

13 Gray, C.S., *War, Peace and International Relations* (London: Routledge, 2008), p.40.

14 Gray, C.S., *Modern Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.20

15 Joint Doctrine Publication 01 (JDP 01), ‘*Joint Operations*’, (Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, 2004), p.3-10.

16 Menning, op.cit., p.33.

17 Gray, C.S., *War, Peace and International Relations*, op.cit., p.40.

18 *ibid.*

19 Sun Tsu, *The Art of War* (Boston: Shambhala, 1988), p.77.

20 Newell, Lt Col C.R., ‘What is Operational Art?’, *Military Review*, September 1990, p.8.

21 Joint Warfare Publication 5-00 (JWP 5-00), ‘*Joint Operations Planning*’, (Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, 2004), p.2-6.

22 Sun Tsu, op.cit., p.99.

23 JWP 5-00, p.2-5.

The Role of the Commander

Operational art focuses on the role of the commander, his staff and his forces within the planning and execution of any campaign. The principal moral elements according to Clausewitz are the commander's skill in conjunction with the experience, courage and patriotism of his soldiers. The importance of Cromwell as the leader was essential to the New Model Army as it identified a centre of gravity, 'the characteristic or capability...from which a nation [or]...a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight'.²⁴ But in order to accept that Cromwell applied a form of operational art in his Irish campaign it is worth providing a supporting argument from the Preston Campaign of 1648. This campaign brought the interaction of strategic and political objectives with military success through the defeat of the Scottish and thus the cause of Charles I. This was the beginning of 'a dynamic in which a very conventional military organism underwent a profound change in its approach to war'.²⁵ The first decentralisation of power to key commanders, followed by a relative superiority in relation to the enemy's combat cohesion and a rethink from the positional approach based on attrition transformed the concept of modern warfare. As a strategic commander with operations on his direction, Cromwell should never have encountered the Irish nor witnessed the friction of war. As an operational commander he interacted with and ordered all forces employed to achieve an overarching integration of tactical successes. The operational level of war is the highest level of operations where the pure military instrument is applied. Cromwell's leadership can be compared to Gustavus Adolphus as a hero in battle because of his decisions and resulting actions. 'He was careful in his deliberations, prompt in his decisions, undaunted in heart and spirit, strong of arm, ready to both command and fight.'²⁶ Cromwell as tactical commander faced the same enemy as his soldiers and with unity of effort he utilised different military actions in order to achieve a specific military objective. Although Cromwell was answerable to parliament in theory, seldom refused and seen as a potential future leader of the state, he remained in overall military strategic, operational and tactical command.

On Decentralised Command

The growing importance of Cromwell's pre-battle council of war improved overall command and control while highlighting his belief in mission command. Each subordinate was required to understand his role in the commander's plan and their particular responsibilities as 'without this, control can cripple the development of flexibility and creativity at the point of contact'.²⁷ To demonstrate this vision for his subordinate officers and reflecting the actuality that quality officers were not readily available Cromwell wrote 'I had rather have a plain russet-coated captain that knows what he fights for, and lives what he knows, than that which you call a gentleman and is nothing else'.²⁸ This subordination and decentralisation to men of like mind was highlighted by Michael Jones's campaign on 2nd August 1646 at Baggotrath in Rathmines in the defeat of Ormonde with a loss of five thousand enemy soldiers. This decentralisation became critical not only to the immediate tactical battle but also to the entire operation. The result was Ormonde no longer being able to bring together an army sufficiently large enough to face Cromwell in the field. 'An astonishing mercy', wrote Cromwell, 'so great and

24 JWP 5-00, NATO Definition, p.2-6.

25 Moore, J.R., 'Oliver Cromwell and the English Experience of Manoeuvre Warfare 1645-1651, Part II', *British Army Review*, No. 102, December 1992, p.12.

26 Delbruck, H., *The Dawn of Modern Warfare* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985), p.180.

27 Moore, J.R., 'Oliver Cromwell and the English Experience of Manoeuvre Warfare 1645-1651, Part I', *British Army Review*, No. 99, December 1991, p.26.

28 *ibid.*

reasonable that we like to them that dreamed.’²⁹ The engagement between Jones and Ormonde at Baggotrath allowed Cromwell prosecute his campaign effectively in the manner that it evolved. Under the leadership of Jones and with Cromwell’s subordinate trust the Dublin garrison surprised Ormonde giving little time for the Irish Royalist army to exploit their numerical superiority while Jones had time ‘to gather forces strong enough to launch a major counter-attack to reclaim the strategic initiative in Ireland’.³⁰

On Unified Belief

‘War in all of its dimensions is permeated by non-rational influences ... spiritual forces.’³¹ All soldiers require a leader and the character of Cromwell, the Puritan, was fit for purpose in the Irish Campaign. It is valuable to outline a spiritual context of this Cromwellian army to provide an insight into the operational mind of the commander. The New Model Ordinance passed in 1645 put into effect ‘an instrument of total victory’³² and when raising his regiments Cromwell carefully selected men of like value where possible, men ‘who had ’’the fear of God before them, and made some conscience of what they did’’’.³³ But Cromwell was not looking just for pious personnel, he also wanted warriors with rational minds who not only think but fight. The entire army needed to consist of men with whom Cromwell shared an ideology. ‘For if any are scandalous, idle, without restraint, without religion, fugitives from their fathers’ rule, blasphemers, gamblers, in every part badly raised, they are those who want to be in the military.’³⁴ This Machiavellian ideal of an army was not that of Oliver Cromwell. He trained his New Model Army hard and insisted on a very strict code of discipline. Cromwell generated his regiment showing great energy and practical sense but ‘did not want heathens, rabble-rousers or Roman Catholics, but otherwise all were welcome’.³⁵ In Bristol prior to his embarkation he told his men that they resembled the Israelites about to ‘extirpate the idolatrous inhabitants at Canaan’.³⁶ In seeming to promote Cromwell as a benefactor it is important to provide some balance. He led through fear and imposed a strict discipline ordered through heavy punishments. Among these were ‘riding the wooden horse for minor offences, boring through the tongue with a red-hot iron for blasphemy, and running the gauntlet for theft’.³⁷ On the road to Drogheda he hanged two of his soldiers for plundering from locals and purchasing as was previously ordered. His view of the Catholic religion was evident and his army became a Puritan instrument whenever the need arose. ‘A Cromwellian army, backed by an incensed Protestant public was in no mood to distinguish between one kind of Catholic or another, or between those innocent of massacre and those who were guilty.’³⁸

On Leadership

In the doctrine of the twenty-first century the role of the strategic commander is to guarantee the operational commander the time and space to plan and execute the campaign effectively. This modern practicality involving the synthesis between the strategic and operational levels of war was not a possibility for Cromwell. The reality of being the commander at all levels

29 Firth, C.H., *Cromwell*, 7th edn. (London: Black and White Library Edition, 1935), p.259.

30 Murphy, Rev D., *Cromwell in Ireland* (Dublin: M.H. Gill and Son, 1883), p.62.

31 Handel, op.cit., p.81.

32 Woolrych, A., *Battles of the English Civil War* (London: B.T. Batsford Limited, 1961), p.96.

33 Kitson, F., *Old Ironsides* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2004), p.49.

34 Machiavelli, N., *The Art of War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), p.21.

35 Kitson, op.cit., p.50.

36 Fraser, A., *Cromwell: Our Chief of Men* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973), p.327.

37 Gillingham, J., *Cromwell: Portrait of a Soldier* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976), p.41

38 Boyce, op.cit., p.83.

imposed a phenomenal pressure on his ability to lead. Having planned the Irish campaign with great detail he remained firmly rooted at the tactical level and never so evident as in the siege and capture of Drogheda commencing on 10th September 1649. At first, quarter was given to the people of Drogheda but while the final assaults were taking place Cromwell changed his mind and the fateful command was obeyed to offer no quarter thus invoking a slaughter. 'If the country where you order [your soldiers] is armed and disunited... as soon as anyone is offended, he recurs to the head of his party who, to keep up reputation, encourages him to vengeance, not to peace.'³⁹ The leadership of Cromwell was evident in thought and action and he possessed a legendary spirit over the moral forces.

On Maritime

The first of any formal doctrine primarily relating to the British Royal Navy was issued as an original edition in 1672 and called the *Fighting Instructions*. The doctrine today still promulgated in *The Fighting Instructions*⁴⁰ deals with the fighting power and concerns the overlap of the conceptual, moral and physical components of that fighting power. Within this triangular relationship the moral element is interested more in the people than in the weapon systems employed. It is not a matter of what equipment one has but how it is used. This concept was not lost on Oliver Cromwell and a new title of General at Sea was bestowed upon First Sea Lord Blake, whom in 1649 Cromwell asked to become his Major General of Foot for the campaign in Ireland.⁴¹ In February of the same year 'some well-affected naval and merchant officers called for close liaison henceforth between the army and navy, urging that there may be always be some of the land officers at sea, and some of the sea officers at land'.⁴² Cromwell appears to be a proponent of this idea of transferable capabilities and joint operations with an awareness of the potential affect that one has over the other. The siege of Wexford in 1649 used such an interchange and the navy employed for the artillery barrage of the port were also deployed in the littoral and used for operations ashore.⁴³

The Grammar of the Irish

Ireland's countryside was difficult terrain, wild and not very populated. 'There were plenty of wolves but too few people.'⁴⁴ Cromwell's greatest obstacles were assessed to be 'the nature of Ireland itself, where conditions were terrible and the climate even wetter than in England and plague and influenza proved more devastating to Cromwell's men than Irish arms'.⁴⁵ The roads were few and far between and the country, suited to guerrilla warfare, was studded with many castles and fortified strongholds. This was a land that was easily planted by the English with whom the Irish had an uneasy relationship over centuries of repression and poverty.

Positional warfare was dominant in the 17th Century and Cromwell understood the functions of his forces after the tactical successes during the First Civil War. Cromwell primarily restricted combat to that based on the methods of his predecessor Gustavus Adolphus in meeting the enemy head on with an emphasis on supremacy of numbers. 'The art of generalship was to bring one's forces to the battle in the most advantageous conditions and let the troops do

³⁹ Machiavelli, op.cit., p.31.

⁴⁰ British Maritime Doctrine (BR1806) 3rd edn. (London: Ministry of Defence, 2004), p.1.

⁴¹ Capp, B., *Cromwell's Navy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p.54.

⁴² *ibid.*

⁴³ *ibid.*

⁴⁴ Gillingham, op.cit., p.110.

⁴⁵ Briguglio, Jr., B.P., *Irish Confederate Wars: Oliver Cromwell's Conquest of Ireland*, [online]. Available from: http://www.historynet.com/wars_conflicts/17_18_century/3026656.html, [Accessed 01 December 2007], pp.5-6.

the rest.⁴⁶ This provided the environment for a war of attrition in which the outcome was seldom decisive. Cromwell knew the unlikelihood that the Catholic Confederates would risk meeting his forces in an open battle after his successes in England. Their method of warfare although historically based on guerrilla tactics, became urbanised, which was highlighted by Cromwell's concept of operations focussing not on open battle but on besiegement. Owen Roe O'Neill, 'the heir of the ancient chieftains of his race, immediately upon his arrival... was accepted by the whole population of Ulster as its natural leader',⁴⁷ and along with many other leaders returned from campaigns in Europe with new ways of warfare. They knew it was futile to rely on victory through mere numerical superiority.

The primary tactics of the Irish was to delay the campaign from behind fortresses long enough to make a decisive victory untenable through famine and disease as a result of the harsh Irish weather. Indeed 'the violations in the Irish campaign stemmed from siege warfare producing [the] greater opportunities'.⁴⁸ For Cromwell 'Ireland was to know that resistance meant ruin'⁴⁹ and if the enemy were unable to campaign in field warfare, then the strongest fortresses were identified as his main objectives. The acme of success became not just the ability to destroy the enemy's forces in battle but the means to hold ones own logistical support and to seize those resources that sustained the enemy. The increase in Cromwell's army to the largest number ever to deploy to Ireland was in keeping with that which was 'necessitated by the vast number of men required to starve out a town defended by the trace italienne'.⁵⁰ Cromwell could ill afford to allow the Irish remain behind their fortifications at the outset of the campaign and for this reason he brought artillery in quantities as was never seen before by the Catholic Confederate Army. For Cromwell 'the operational level has both a material and cognitive element, the material being the changing physical conditions of warfare that made it necessary and the cognitive being the conscious recognition of this fact'.⁵¹

Ends and Means

Liddell Hart claims that military strategy depends on 'the art of the general'⁵² and this art manifests itself through ends and means. 'Strategy depends for success, first and most, on a sound calculation and co-ordination of the end and the means'.⁵³ To turn this into a winning concept the means must be appropriate to the ends and the ends must be an achievable sum of the total means. There is a continuous and relative comparison between these elements and 'this relativity is inherent because, however far our knowledge of the science of war be extended, it will depend on art for its application'.⁵⁴ It is operational art that brings the means nearer to the ends.

The essential point of joint operations is a holistic approach in order to maximise the operational effect. Although operational art is considered as a linkage between the strategic and tactical it must be extended to include an awareness of events that may impact upon this operational

46 Moore, Part I, op.cit., p.22.

47 Gardiner, S.R. (ed.), *History of the Great Civil War 1642-1649, 4 vols.* (London: The Windrush Press, 1987), p.114.

48 Mitchell, N.J., *Agents of Atrocity* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p.144.

49 Drinkwater, J., *Cromwell: A Character Study* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, n.d.), p.202.

50 Kingra, M.S., 'The Trace Italienne and the Military Revolution during the Eighty Years' War, 1567-1648', *The Journal of Military History*, Vol.57, No.3, July 1993, p.433.

51 Griffin, S., *Joint Operations: A Short History* (MOD Publication, 2005), p.12.

52 Liddell Hart, B.H., *Strategy*, 2nd edn. (London: Faber & Faber Ltd, 1967), p.322.

53 *ibid.*

54 *ibid.*, p.323.

effect both from higher and lower intents. It is not sufficient surely to maintain a focus on only one level of war where in fact the levels have a tendency to intersect. In this Cromwell was capable of both the meticulous planning in and execution of manoeuvre. Manoeuvre requires the art of the possible in support of movement and strategy only overcomes natural resistance through the exploitation of the element of movement. This 'lies in the physical sphere, and depends on the calculation of the conditions of time, topography, and transport capacity'.⁵⁵ The element of surprise is far more difficult and in this the ideal war remains one where you suffer less casualties for less effort. 'Surprise lies in the psychological sphere and depends on a calculation, far more difficult than in the physical sphere, of the manifold conditions, varying in each case, which are likely to effect the will of the opponent.'⁵⁶

It is arguable that the operational level of war, and hence operational art, has been present since classical warfare. Alexander the Great's campaigns through Persia and Afghanistan 'are sometimes cited as illustrative of his exceptional abilities not only as a military strategist but as an exponent of the operational art'.⁵⁷ Similarly Pyrrhus was considered by Hannibal as one of the greatest generals in history but forfeited his name as a pejorative term due to the devastating losses he sustained to his own forces. Although in today's doctrine the land component commander should not attempt to plan the conduct of the land campaign in detail it was Cromwell alone who planned the series of tactical battles between 1649-51 while Lord Lieutenant of Ireland culminating in setting the conditions for operational success.

'If there is one single thing that characterizes the conduct of war from the operational perspective, it is probably maneuver [sic].'⁵⁸ Cromwell himself planned the strategic campaign and the movement of his New Model Army into and out of the different theatres, comprising of both England and Ireland. Furthermore he himself, as leader and commander on the ground integrated both the tactical manoeuvre of his forces and the supporting firepower within each specific area of influence. However, Menning contends that 'neither strategic deployments nor tactical movements ...equate to the maneuver [sic] of forces within the theatre of operations'.⁵⁹

The strategic theatre of war consisted of simultaneous engagement in two theatres of operations, one in Scotland and the other in Ireland, both clearly separated by the geographical terrain. It could be viewed that Cromwell's conduct of war using an operational lens was focused on campaigns within the Irish theatre of operations. As operational commander, Cromwell manoeuvred all land and sea forces at his disposal into the positions required to conduct and support operations, effectively a 17th Century joint operations where 'activities, operations and organisations in which elements of at least two services participate'⁶⁰, albeit without the NATO organisations of today's environment. The maintenance of superiority in relative mobility was essential for manoeuvre war and the logistic train to meet such a demand for troops at that time must have been considerable. The conduct of the 'New Model Army which for the past two years had been marching around England destroying property and living on

55 *ibid.*

56 Liddell Hart, *op.cit.*, p.323.

57 Griffin, S., *Joint Operations: A Short History* (MOD Publication, 2005), p.10.

58 Newell, *op.cit.*, p.14.

59 Newell, *op.cit.*, p.14.

60 Allied Army Publication, AAP-6, *NATO Glossary of Terms* (NATO Publication, 2006), p.2-J-8.

free quarter' was not an appropriate means to win favour of the Irish'.⁶¹ From the operational perspective of war, logistics governs both what can and cannot be done. Cromwell knew this instinctively and saw that a dependency of supplies from England would employ too many resources while extending his logistic train on the march and the conduct of plundering from locals would alienate the population.

Cromwell was never seeking that illusive single decisive battle with the Irish and focused his campaign on a series of carefully selected tactical engagements. This tactical creativity is evident in the awareness of force ratio and consequently he alone maintained a personal hold on one of the chief means to secure the end, the commitment of the reserve. At the operational level a commander uses his reserves 'to make a decisive contribution to an operation or to respond to unexpected developments by the enemy'.⁶² Cromwell utilised his reserves with caution and only when the need arose for the final assault. This tactical and operational manoeuvre of the reserves, perfected from the wars in England and especially at Naseby, had proven results in Ireland apart from the campaign in Clonmel. The reserves were committed to seize the initiative and to exploit the success of a breach, both essential elements in operational art. These land reserves were heretofore uncommitted resources and Cromwell showed an instinct in their deployment supporting the doctrinal efficacy that 'when and how to commit the reserve is likely to be one of the commander's most important decisions'.⁶³

The Ideal War

'A successful attack on the enemy's moral equilibrium in battle is a powerful force multiplier' and it could be said that 'Cromwell's victory at Drogheda altered the strategic situation in Ireland'.⁶⁴ It facilitated operations to the north into Ulster, it provided access to one of the major ports on the coast but more importantly it became the significant feature of the campaign – and remains so throughout history. 'Under the rules of war at the time, to take by storm after the defenders had refused to surrender meant that the attackers could refuse quarter.'⁶⁵ Quarter was refused in Drogheda with almost 6,000 parliamentary troops inside the town and a cavalry screen to the north in order to prevent retreat. With such overwhelming numbers 'thus a body of 3,000 men was totally destroyed and massacred.'⁶⁶ 'The massacre continued for five whole days in succession...and [the army] put every man that belonged to the garrison, and all the citizens who were Irish, man, woman, and child, to the sword.'⁶⁷

Cromwell offers an explanation of "the heat of action"⁶⁸ for the controlled slaughter on 17th September 1649 in Drogheda while recognising the strategic efficiency of it afterwards. It is the judgement of fate 'upon these barbarous wretches, who have imbrued their hands in so much innocent blood; and that it will tend to prevent the effusion of blood for the future, which are satisfactory grounds for such actions'.⁶⁹ This innocent blood again refers to the 1641 Rebellion of the Catholics against Protestant settlers for which became ironically equally as

61 Ashley, M., *The English Civil War* (London: Thames and Hudson Limited, 1974), p.137.

62 JWP 5-00, op.cit., p.3-27.

63 *ibid.*, p.3-28.

64 Handel, op.cit., p.86.

65 Mitchell, op.cit., p.155.

66 Murphy, op.cit., p.98.

67 Murphy, op.cit., p.109.

68 Frasier cited in Mitchell, op.cit., p.156.

69 Ashley, *England in the Seventeenth Century*, op.cit., p.92.

legendary for its inflation of atrocities in England as Cromwell's Campaign in Ireland. He wanted 'his reputation alone to breach the city's walls, and to some extent this happened'.⁷⁰ There was no further effusion of blood at least for three weeks and the strategy appeared to be successful. The Royalists abandoned the garrisons at Trim and Dundalk and Ross opened its gates as soon as a breach was made in its walls. It was now accepted that resistance against Cromwell would be met with little mercy and probably end in massacre.

During the period 1641-48 neither Drogheda nor Wexford had ever been successfully captured. This victory was to impact on the psychological will of the Irish and it became instrumental in changing the allegiance of many strategic garrisons in the south especially in Cork who then declared for Parliament. With his inherent ability to command and control, the sieges were placed in a strategic context with an emphasis on the will and cohesion of the Irish rather than on the achievement of any one single critical terrain. Cromwell was very aware that when dealing with any enemy, 'the defeat and destruction of his fighting force remains the best way to begin, and in every case will be a very significant feature of the campaign.'⁷¹ It could be said that the Irish campaign had been a war of sieges, not of battles, and Oliver Cromwell's 'experience of siege warfare in a hostile environment was now unparalleled.'⁷²

The Political Influence

In the 17th Century Machiavelli believed that there could be but one power and that council was critical for one who desires war even in times of peace. Ireland was never considered a despotic campaign of atrocity but it was external factors that ultimately impacted on policy toward Ireland. It is worth considering that 'instead of an internal adherence to combat morality and attention to the management of violence, some argue that external factors are all that restrain violence'.⁷³ Although sectarian politics were now rife it appears this higher political objective to retain Ireland as a strategic outpost of a Puritan and republican England superseded any personal desire of Cromwell to rid the country of rebels.

'Cromwell's appearance in Ireland was not arbitrary, but the beginning of the final stage of a twelve year war between the Catholic Confederation of Kilkenny and the English/Welsh regimes and the Kingdom of Scotland.'⁷⁴ Ironically perhaps, the most crucial battle within the Cromwellian conquest was not conducted by Cromwell himself but by one of his subordinate commanders Michael Jones on 2nd August 1649 in Baginbun, which paved the way for Cromwell and his forces to land in the centre of gravity itself – Dublin. Despite this, Cromwell's campaign in conquering Ireland and the tactical objectives to achieve it, before and after his arrival, were horizontally nested within the overall strategic objective of a Puritan Republic. 'Cromwell's campaign was organised as if it were taking place in a distant foreign land.'⁷⁵ It was not an amorphous concept but tangible, achievable and clearly defined, which provided guidance to the national element of power. There is always a suggestion, especially by the Irish, that it also facilitated Cromwell's objective to eradicate Popery within the peasant Irish but as stated above this subtext did not dominate the campaign. There are really only two general categories of objectives – strategic objectives which advance national goals,

⁷⁰ Mitchell, op.cit., p.157.

⁷¹ von Clausewitz, op.cit., p.242.

⁷² Gregg, P., *Oliver Cromwell* (London: J.N. Dent and Sons, 1988), p.186.

⁷³ Mitchell, op.cit., p.146.

⁷⁴ Bennett, M., Review of '*Cromwell in Ireland*' by James Scott Wheeler, H-Albion Publishers, August 2000, p.1.

⁷⁵ Ashley, M., *Oliver Cromwell The Conservative Dictator* (London: Jonathan Cape Limited, 1937), p.164.

and tactical objectives which provide the stepping-stones to achieve the strategic objectives. The conduct of the campaign in the when, *whether* and how it is executed is fundamental to operational art and Cromwell commanded this operation in line with *his* translation of *his own* strategic objectives into *his own* tactical objectives. 'Often the military operations were directed with a political, rather than a strategical [sic] object, though those for the most part coalesced, as indeed they usually do.'⁷⁶ In line with his objectives Cromwell retained a clear picture of both his intent and concept of operations for the campaign and ones not necessarily in line with current practice of that time in Europe.

With an awareness of the political support necessary Cromwell was always cognisant of the cost of the campaign in monetary terms. The expenditure on ammunition due to the breaches of Dundalk and Wexford was considerable but the cost in lives was fewer than through famine and disease were he to rely solely on the etiquette of pure siege-warfare. Cromwell knew this would appeal to Parliament and wrote 'those towns that are to be reduced, especially one or two of them, if we should proceed by rules of other states, would cost you more money than this army hath since we came over'.⁷⁷ The English had never committed such resources to the pacification of Ireland as they did during the nine months of Cromwell's reign. The task required an administrator as well as a soldier, and Parliament thus made him both civil and military chief. Cromwell was capable of identifying the measures necessary to successfully prosecute the campaign in Ireland due to his military acme. 'That he was able to take them arose at least in part from the strength of his political position after the execution of the King, since it was this that ensured that he got the necessary degree of priority.'⁷⁸

'His achievement was transient and in the short and medium term negative'. His legacy throughout England and Ireland remains a suspicion of both religious fervour and of soldiers involved in politics. Although he escalated the long-term instability of Ireland he did champion the principle of the accountability of rulers to their people.⁷⁹ But this principle was fundamentally flawed in its bias. It became a 'dogma of the elder liberalism that violence can never achieve anything, and that persecution, so far from killing a thing, must inevitably nourish it'.⁸⁰ Clausewitz contends that the decision for war is a social act and the decision for such does not lie solely within the military line of operation, but in fact beyond war itself. 'That remains true even if the decision is influenced, or wholly determined, by the military leadership, for in that case the soldiers share in, or assume, political authority'.⁸¹ Ultimately, Cromwell assumed this political authority.

Conclusion

First and foremost operational art revolves around the commander whose leadership and direction must translate strategic objectives into the tactical actions necessary to achieve the strategic end-state. A leader requires a mandate to lead and this mandate is built on trust and the confidence of either or both parties that the leader 'will deliver what they perceive as their respective needs'.⁸² Operational art also depends upon an understanding of the complete

⁷⁶ Baldock, Lt Col T.S., *Cromwell as a Soldier* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Company Limited, 1899), p.419.

⁷⁷ Gillingham, op.cit., p.111.

⁷⁸ Kitson, op.cit., p.186.

⁷⁹ Morrill, J., *Oliver Cromwell*, [online]. Available from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/civil_war_revolution/cromwell_06.shtml, [Accessed 15 December 2007], p.4-5.

⁸⁰ Buchan, J., *Oliver Cromwell*, 5th edn. (London: Hodder and Stoughton Limited, 1934), p.355.

⁸¹ Paret, P., *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1986, p209.

⁸² Defence Leadership Centre, *Leadership in Defence* (DSDC(L), 2004), p.18.

problem involving a comprehensive insight into both the adversary itself and the effect of specific tactical actions upon the adversary.⁸³ Cromwell was aware that the immediate conquest of Ireland was desperately important to his future plans and that it had to involve dealing with the Irish, ‘a lower race, something beneath the level of mankind...indocible and averse from all civility’.⁸⁴

Operational art must further involve an awareness of risk in how the commander visualises the battle and makes decisions accordingly. ‘It requires the commander to visualise end-states in an almost intuitive way, to define the causal means to effect them, and to decide on actions to accomplish those ends’.⁸⁵ A military strategy requires the successful balance between the identification of a clear and unambiguous objective, a plan to achieve that objective with an appropriate emphasis on manoeuvre and attrition supported with the necessary means at the commander’s disposal. In military parlance this is known as ends, ways and means. In addition a certain degree of influence activity, an essential ingredient in operational art, is aimed at the will and cohesion of the opposing forces. This manoeuvrist approach seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion and will to fight rather than destroy his material, focusing on the mental rather than the physical aspects of gaining victory.⁸⁶ ‘War is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument’⁸⁷ and the inter-relationship between the military and the political entities must be understood, even outside of a Clausewitzian paradoxical trinity. Cromwell’s rise to political prominence arose as a result of his military endeavours, which provides a unique symbiosis between policy and operational art. Finally, the implications of Cromwell’s campaign for contemporary operations will follow the doctrinal framework of shape, attack, protect and exploit providing evidence to justify or otherwise the application of operational art in a reflective examination of the Cromwellian conquest of Ireland.

Implications

It is evident that Cromwell maintained above all a clear focus on success, perhaps at any cost, but he provided a balance between courage and decisive action with the limitations, freedoms and constraints of the campaign in Ireland. How do these fundamental building blocks in the current doctrinal operational level framework retrofit the Cromwellian Campaign in Ireland? Cromwell *shaped the operational environment* through the erosion of the will and cohesion of the Irish in conjunction with other operational and strategic decisions thus making the enemy more vulnerable to attack. The Irish were in no doubt that to continue in battle against Cromwell was to have significant consequences. The legitimacy and justification of his actions was conveyed and reinforced from the political authority emanating from both he as Lord Lieutenant of Ireland and from the English Parliament itself. In his *attack of the will and cohesion of the adversary* Cromwell maintained the initiative in all his tactical actions and avoided fighting the enemy where possible through the use of treaties for surrender. His reliance on siege warfare using artillery avoided the confrontation the Irish might initially have preferred, thus keeping them away from their guerrilla warfare while making knowledge of terrain irrelevant. Cromwell ensured his own cohesion through manoeuvre, firepower and superior command and control. His tempo of battle and movement onto new objectives was without doubt a logistical feat given the nature of the terrain. The Irish hope of prolonging

83 Joint Warfare Publication 5-00 (JWP 5-00), ‘Joint Operations Planning’, (Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, 2004), p.2-6.

84 Buchan, op.cit., p.339.

85 Meigs, M.C., Operational Art in the New Century, [online]. Available from: <http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G1-73000537.html>, [Accessed 01 December 2007].

86 Joint Warfare Publication 0-01 (JWP 0-01), ‘British Defence Doctrine’, (Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, 2004), p.3-8.

87 von Clausewitz, p.29.

the war to weaken Cromwell's resolve and inflict casualties through disease and famine proved futile as Cromwell had already considered the manner in which their defeat would be achieved. His speed, security of force and deception were key factors in attack degrading the effect of any Irish action or reaction. To *protect the cohesion of his own force* through strong leadership provided the adhesive for such successes. The maintenance of his soldier's morale through consideration and discipline and above all unity of purpose retained a harmony of operations and a willingness to obey. Cromwell was capable of adaptability and prepared to *exploit the situation by direct or indirect means* in order to prevail. His use of manoeuvre and offensive action was fundamental to the belief in decentralised command that proved fortuitous. Each of these aspects are the basis of the operational framework⁸⁸ in use today and their relevance is seen to extend through the ages. Perhaps they are more formalised now than in Cromwell's time but the instinctive knowledge of these principles of operations, the relationship he retained between tactical engagements and the overall operational success of the campaign has ensured Cromwell a place in history.

There is continual rational justification for military and strategic history as a basis for contemporary military education. The studies of previous battles and strategic thinkers that support current doctrine provide a degree of comfort to the ageless principles of war. Unless current theorists and strategists are so conceited to think that it is only a one-way process then there is also justification for a reflective use of contemporary doctrine as a basis for the study of military and strategic history. Perhaps Menning is right and the origins of operational art provide refreshing views on the nature of future war, but so too can operational art provide a stimulating perspective of historic wars and the ability of their leaders. 'Indeed the term's potential for retaining future significance argues that theorists should seek to expand and refine the limits of operational art.'⁸⁹ The recent development of this concept is a dynamic process since its appearance early in the 20th century. There was recognition that tactical operations formed an integral part of strategy, a loss of relevance of the single point attack, extended ranges and battlefields with unlimited command and control. Soviet thinkers such as Svechin provided a focus along with the necessary linkage to higher-level planning, resource orchestration and the relationship between strategic and tactical objectives. Shimon Naveh⁹⁰ claims that unless one knows what operational art is then one cannot apply it but the principles of operational art, which developed from the historical analysis of former thinkers and strategists, must have been applied formerly but just under a different guise. Cromwell succeeded to re-aggregate the diverse effects of forces both simultaneously and sequentially, he mobilised and orchestrated their effects and achieved a catastrophic disintegration of the Irish defence system.⁹¹ In further support of Cromwell's application of a form of operational art in line with that of the Soviets they require the practitioner to identify strategic objectives within theatre, to visualise the theatre in many dimensions and then to determine how to bring about these objectives. Perhaps it is easy to apply textual support to the historic conduct of operations but with the continual development of operational art itself, especially in logistics and sustainment, it may simply mean that we now have a better understanding of the all-encompassing conduct of operations. This continuous development and perhaps reflective analysis is essential to the vitality and growth of strategy and doctrine.

88 JWP 5-00, op.cit. p.2.1-2.5.

89 Menning, op.cit., p.11.

90 Naveh, S., *In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of the Operational Art* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1997), p.23.

91 Menning, op.cit., pp.13-15.

Reflection

‘Operational art is a distinct and essential part of the structure of war’⁹² past, present and future but cannot be separated from the broader perspective of war. As an element of the operational level of war it is central to success at both the strategic and tactical levels. It is not a panacea and without a clear and unambiguous strategy, and a tactical proficiency, ‘the most beautifully executed operational art will, in the long run, be merely an exercise in futility’.⁹³ The Cromwellian Campaign in Ireland within the context of the overall strategic Puritan Revolution was an operational success that did not lead to a strategic victory. The revolution failed, the King was restored and Puritanism was not installed as the political activity of governance. Yet ‘it would be astonishing if all the political experiments, all the philosophical thinking, all the religious exuberance ... contributed nothing to the moulding of later society.’⁹⁴ When viewed through his own epistemology Cromwell was a man of his time and indeed a great man of his time especially ‘with regard to his brutality and how the war linked into the politics of Charles I’s three kingdoms’.⁹⁵ But in today’s military strategic environment he clearly failed to achieve his objective. ‘He tried and failed to make of Puritanism a political instrument. He was forced to acquiesce in an attempt, which failed, to impose upon England the Puritan pattern of social behaviour.’⁹⁶ This use of religion as an instrument of the state has consistently faltered through time as a means to achieve clear and unambiguous strategic objectives either within a national domain or the international system. Perhaps the long-term destiny of England for which Cromwell could not foresee shaped that nation for its forthcoming military glory but alas, in Ireland Cromwell and the Irish Campaign bore the origins of bitter struggle.

92 Newell, op.cit., p.16.

93 Newell, op.cit., p.16.

94 Ashley, M., *Oliver Cromwell and the Puritan Revolution* (London: English Universities Press, 1958), p.173.

95 Bennett, M., op.cit., p.2.

96 Marlowe, J., ‘The Puritan Tradition in English Life’, in Ashley, *Oliver Cromwell and the Puritan Revolution*, op.cit., p.173.

United Nations Security Resolution 1325: Just Add Women and Stir - A Recipe for Gender Stereotyping in Peacekeeping Operations?

Comdt Maureen O'Brien

They say to choose a hare
You pick them up by the ears,
There are telling signs to compare:
In air the male will kick and strike,
While females stare with bleary eyes.
But if both are set to the ground,
And left to bounce in a flee,
Who will be so wise as to observe,
That the hare is a he or a she?¹

(Peniston-Bird, 2000: 336)

Introduction

United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 (2000) *Women, Peace and Security*, is generally regarded as the most important commitment to date made by the global community to incorporate a gender perspective in the maintenance of peace and security. For the first time the Security Council formally recognised the different impacts of armed conflict on women and men and expressed its concern that women and children represented the vast majority of those who are adversely affected by conflict.

The resolution creates an obligation under international law for the UN, UN member states and all involved actors, to incorporate a gender perspective into their work in conflict areas around the world. It links gender equality to global security and espouses 'gender mainstreaming' as a mechanism to achieve gender equality.

UNSCR 1325 spells out actions needed by all actors, including Governments and the UN, to ensure the participation of women in peace processes and improve the protection of women in conflict zones.

Significantly, it urges the Secretary General, inter alia:

To seek to expand the role and contribution of women in the United Nations field based operations, and especially among military observers, civilian police, human rights and humanitarian personnel.²

When the resolution and its related documents and policies are critically analysed, the assumptions made by the UN regarding gender, peace and security are exposed. Could

¹ Peniston-Bird, C. (2000), 'Delilah Shaves Her Hair: Women, the Military and Hollywood', in DeGroot, G.J. and Peniston-Bird, C. (eds), *A Soldier and a Woman, Sexual Integration in the Military*, Harlow, Pearson Education Ltd., pages 320 – 336.

² UN (2000), *Security Council Resolution: Women, Peace, Security 2000*, New York, UN

the UN's assumptions made in respect of female peacekeepers lead to the positioning of female peacekeepers into gender-stereotypical roles? The Defence Forces is committed to the principles of equal opportunities in all its employment policies, procedures and regulations and ensures that the principles of employment equality are implemented in recruitment, promotion, training and work experience.³ It is therefore in the best interests of the Defence Forces to be aware of the implications of full compliance with UNSCR 1325 and to be prepared to take all necessary steps to avoid any potential gender stereotyping of its military personnel.

Definitions

At the outset it is worthwhile to clarify some of the terminology, which appears in the resolution and related literature. For gender related terms, the definitions are provided by the UN Gender Resource Package for Peacekeeping Operations, produced by the Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).

Sex and Gender

The term 'sex' refers to the biological differences between men and women. The sex of a person is biologically defined, determined by birth, and universal. The term is relational in the sense that one cannot define or discuss femininity without having an idea of masculinity and vice versa. When discussing gender perspectives the term ideally should include the perspectives of both men and women.⁴ It therefore refers not only to women or men, but also to the relationship between them and the way this is socially constructed. A person's gender is learned through socialisation and is heavily influenced by the culture of the society concerned. It changes over time and results in different roles, responsibilities, opportunities, needs and constraints for women, men, girls and boys. The roles that women and men have in a particular society have less to do with their biological differences and more to do with the 'gender roles' ascribed to them.

Unfortunately most discussions about gender very often become a discussion only about 'women'. The perception is that 'gender issues' refer to women only and is exacerbated by the fact that most people working in the area of gender are women.

Gender Equality, Gender Mainstreaming and Gender Balance

Gender equality means equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities of women, men and girls and boys. Equality does not mean that women and men will become the same, but that women's and men's rights, responsibilities and opportunities will not depend on whether they are born male or female. Gender equality implies that the interests, needs and priorities of both women and men are taken into consideration.

Gender Mainstreaming is a strategy endorsed by the UN to achieve gender equality and refers to:

The process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes in all areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making the concerns and experiences of women and men an integral dimension of

³ DCOS (Sp), (2006), *Defence Forces Equality and Equal Status Policies*, Human Resource Management Section, Defence Force Headquarters.

⁴ Olsson, L. and Tryggestad T. (2001), *Women and International Peacekeeping*, London, Frank Cass Publications.

design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality.⁵

It is important to note from this definition that gender mainstreaming does not focus solely on women but women usually are the targets and beneficiaries of mainstreaming due to, what is considered to be, their disadvantaged positions in many societies.⁶

The term gender balance refers to the equal representation of women and men at all levels of employment. Although gender balance is directly related to and supports gender equality, simply increasing the numbers of women (or men) does not ensure that there is equality because changes in organisational structures, procedures and cultures may be required to create organisational environments which are conducive to the promotion of gender equality.

Overview of UNSCR 1325

Resolution 1325 calls upon the Security Council, the UN Secretary General, UN member states and all other parties to take action in four inter-related areas:

- *Participation of women in decision-making process.* There are two parts to this theme: The first is to increase the number of women in international institutions and field operations and the second relates to consulting and including women's groups in actual peace processes.
- *Gender perspective and training in peacekeeping.* Member states should be provided with training guidelines and material on the protection, rights, and needs of women, and the importance of involving women in peacekeeping missions.
- *The protection of women.* All actors in negotiations and peace processes should adopt a gender perspective that includes measures to protect and respect the human rights of women.
- *Gender Mainstreaming in UN reporting systems and implementation mechanisms.* The Security Council put the primary responsibility for the implementation of the resolution on the Secretary General who reports to the Council on the development of gender mainstreaming in this field.

Towards 1325

The adoption of UN Resolution 1325 on 31 October 2000, was the culmination of a growing commitment to gender equality within the UN. The journey began with the foundation of the UN in 1945 and was followed by the creation of a number of UN bodies, documents and resolutions ensuring a female inclusive perspective.

On the whole though, these documents and earlier resolutions produced a view of women as victims who must be protected, as being vulnerable, as being different. Women are seen as providing 'unique contributions' to peace processes and gender is understood in terms of

⁵ UN 1997, *Agreed Conclusions of the Economic and Social Council, 1997/A/52/3*, New York, UN.

⁶ Valenius, J. (2007), 'Gender Mainstreaming in ESDP Missions', *Chaillot Paper*, No. 101.

women's differences.⁷ This approach is characteristic of radical feminist views where "women reject the male symbolic order in the name of difference and glorify femininity".⁸ From this standpoint, war and all systematic violence is inherent in patriarchy as a social system. Radical feminists believe that male-based authority and power structures are responsible for oppression and inequality, and that as long as the system and its values are in place, society will not be able to reform in any significant way.

Women as Victims Discourse

The resolution was born in a particular historical situation where violence against women in Yugoslavia and Rwanda was receiving worldwide attention. These wars clearly showed the gender-related effects of armed conflict. The peace negotiations and the post conflict reconstruction around this time did not include women and their specific needs were not addressed. Against this background it may be understandable why UN Resolution 1325 concentrates on the special needs of women and children. Even the title of the document '*Women, Peace and Security*' gives us a fair indication from which perspective the resolution is approached.

Of course boys and men are victims of war and conflict too. As adults, men are likely to be targeted in armed conflict. Along with teenage boys who are assumed to be potential fighters, they are often singled out for execution. Men are also victims of sexual violence but it is not talked about or is hidden, partly because it is often labelled as 'torture'.⁹

By largely excluding men however, I believe that UNSCR 1325 lost an opportunity to promote gender mainstreaming as being really about gender and not only about women.

Women as Different Discourse

There is a vast amount of literature available through UN sources surrounding the issue of the 'unique contributions' and 'difference' women make in peace and security matters. A study carried out in 1995 by the Division for the Advancement of Women (DAW) highlights ways in which women can make a difference in peace operations. The study claims that when a critical mass of women is present on peacekeeping missions they make a unique contribution. They are successful at diffusing violence, are perceived to be compassionate and are willing to listen.¹⁰

In June 1999, the Secretary General's Special Advisor on Gender Issues, Angela King, reported that analysis of case studies concluded that:

Local women are more likely to confide in female peacekeepers; women negotiators understand the implications of peace processes for women better than men do; and if at least 30 percent of the mission personnel are female, local women will be more likely to join peace committees, which then are less hierarchical and tend to be more responsive to women's concerns.¹¹

7 Whitworth, S. (2004), *Men, Militarism and UN Peacekeeping, A Gendered Analysis*, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.

8 Ryan, A. B. (2001), *Feminist Ways of Knowing: Towards Theorising The Person for Radical Adult Education*, Leicester, NIACE.

9 Valenius, J. (2007), 'Gender Mainstreaming in ESDP Missions', *Chaillot Paper*, No. 101.

10 Whitworth, S. (2004), *Men, Militarism and UN Peacekeeping, A Gendered Analysis*, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.

11 Carey, H. F. (2001), 'Women and Peace and Security: The Politics of Implementing Gender Sensitivity Norms in Peacekeeping' in Olsson, L. and Tryggstad, T.L. (eds), *Women and International Peacekeeping*, London, Frank Cass Publications, pages 50-68.

The report pointed out that while it might not be possible to demonstrate that women's contribution to peacekeeping is unique, the interviews and case studies clearly showed that the presence of women does make a positive difference:

Women's presence improves access and support for local women; it makes men peacekeepers more reflective and responsible; and it broadens the repertoire of skills and styles available within the mission, often with the effect of reducing conflict and confrontation. Gender mainstreaming then, is not just fair, it is beneficial.¹²

In March 2006, UN DPKO convened a policy dialogue with troop and police contributing countries, in New York. Keynote speakers, including Rachel Mayanja, the then Special Advisor to the Secretary General on Gender Issues and the Advancement of Women, who impressed upon the audience the necessity for female peacekeepers in UN missions:

Female peacekeepers contribute to the operational effectiveness of peacekeeping operations, especially in the areas of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), elections and police activities.¹³

HE Carmen Maria Gallardo Hernandez, the Permanent Representative of El Salvador to the UN, who co-chaired the meeting, concluded that the deployment of female peacekeepers had become not just desirable, but an operational imperative.

When recommending that more female military personnel be sent on UN peacekeeping missions, the UN assumes that all female military personnel possess the same special qualities and can make a unique contribution to the mission.

The results of 'adding women and stirring' are mainly cosmetic and sometimes even counter productive – it essentialises¹⁴ and totalises gender and women's experience, as if biological womanhood were enough to define women's experiences. Consequently, differences between women's political goals based on economic, social, regional and ethnic factors are missed.¹⁵

Discourses Surrounding Females in the Military

The literature surrounding female military personnel and use of force again exposes essentialist approaches to gender. The gender stereotypical perspective of peaceful, nurturing women, common to almost all cultures, has traditionally limited the participation of women in the military and in combat.¹⁶ This is the view held by radical feminists who equate the use of military force with patriarchy, and see no legitimate role for armed struggle.¹⁷

¹² UN (2006b), *Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Operations*, New York, UN, page 4.

¹³ UN, (2006), *Policy Dialogue to Review Strategies for Enhancing Gender Balance among Uniformed Personnel in Peacekeeping Missions*, New York, UN, page 8.

¹⁴ Essentialism: In philosophy essentialism is the view that, for any specific kind of entity, there is a set of characteristics or properties, all of which any entity of that kind must have.

¹⁵ Valenius, J. (2007), 'Gender Mainstreaming in ESDP Missions', *Chaillot Paper*, No. 101.

¹⁶ Olsson, L. and Tryggestad T. (2001), *Women and International Peacekeeping*, London, Frank Cass Publications.

¹⁷ Stevenson, M. and Howes, R. H. (1993), 'Overview', in Howes, R. H. and Stevenson, M. R. (eds), *Women and the Use of Military Force*, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., pages 1-8.

In her book *Women and Labour*, Schreiner argued that the mothers of the race have a special responsibility as well as a special power to oppose combat. In her view, men and women put a different value on human life. She sees that there is an incompatibility between being a mother and militarism. Again, this radical feminist view seems to imply that women have greater sensitivity to human life and that this means a moral superiority.¹⁸

Cock's analysis of the literature surrounding the role of women in militarisation indicates that there are two competing perspectives – sexism and feminism. Both analyses exclude women from war on the grounds that they are the bearers of 'special qualities'. Sexism excludes women from the ranks of the military on the grounds that they are physically inferior and unsuitable for fighting. As the weaker sex, women must be 'protected' and 'defended'. One form of feminism excludes women on opposite grounds - their innate nurturing qualities, their creativity and pacifism.¹⁹

There is however, increasing evidence and recognition that women are actively involved in fighting during conflict. As civilians, women also support warfare by broadcasting hate speeches and instilling hatred against enemy groups in new generations "and thus contributing to the militarization of men and society".²⁰

In fact, since the abandonment of conscription in most western armies the number of female military personnel has increased. Whether employed in a combat or support role, they have been trained to kill, if required, in the course of their duty.

From a military perspective, the UN is promoting the employment of females in gender stereotypical roles, ones in which they may use their perceived uniqueness to best advantage. The same gender stereotypes which previously acted as a barrier to female participation in some aspects of war, are now actually increasing the potential for women in the military of today albeit in stereotypical roles.²¹

If contributing countries comply with UNSCR 1325 requirements, because of limited numbers, female personnel may be withdrawn from other peacekeeping roles into those where they have more direct contact with the host country civilian population, for example in the growing area of Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC).²² For those females restricted to support roles this may increase their opportunity for service with the UN, but for those who are not restricted, this would channel them into roles which are restrictive and gender stereotyped.

As part of their *National Action Plan on Resolution 1325*, the Dutch Ministry of Defence aims to increase the numbers of females in their armed forces from nine per cent to twelve per cent by 2012. They see females playing an important role in an environment where CIMIC and a nuanced diplomatic approach have become more essential than large-scale use of force.²³

18 Schreiner, 1911; cited by Cock 1992: 4). Cock, J. (1992) 'Feminism and Militarism, Some Questions Raised by the Gulf War', *South African Defence Review*, Issue No. 6, pages 1-10.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid (Page 9)

21 DeGroot, G. J. (2001), 'A Few Good Women: Gender Stereotypes, the Military and Peacekeeping' in Olsson, L. and Tryggestad, T.L. (eds), *Women and International Peacekeeping*, London, Frank Cass Publications, pages 23-37.

22 The UN Definition of CIMIC is as follows: "UN Civil-Military Coordination is the system of interaction, involving exchange of information, negotiation, de-confliction, mutual support, and planning at all levels between military elements and humanitarian organizations, or the local civilian population, to achieve respective objectives" (UN, 2002:2).

23 Policy Dept DSI/SB (2007), Dutch National Action Plan on Resolution 1325, Taking a Stand for Women, Peace and Security, The Hague, OBT bv.

Of course, for every stereotypical assumption made about women's value as peacekeepers, there is an equal, and usually opposite, stereotypical assumption about male peacekeepers, which in my view are equally invalid

The Problems with Essentialist Discourse

The literature surrounding women in UNSCR 1325, women in the military and the use of force espouses an essentialist approach to gender. Smith believes that as a basis of political strategies for peace, justice and equality, essentialism is unreliable as it is characterised by exaggerated claims of the unchanging essence of individual and social identities and their meaning. In contrast "the creation of peace out of conflict, or of justice out of unjust situations, or of equality where there was inequality, depends on people changing".²⁴ But there are men who are not aggressive and who are uncomfortable with war and these 'exceptions' make the essentialist approach to gender difficult to sustain.²⁵

Constructivism presents an alternative view arguing that the way people are, is not given by nature but is constructed through social, economic and historical factors. It "views people as always changeable, if not actually always changing";²⁶ it points to a multiplicity of individual and social identities we bear.

The reality is that people do change and that women and men are complex and interesting and not the one-dimensional people essentialism would have us believe.

Research Objectives and Methodology

The review of literature highlighted that UNSCR 1325 almost entirely focuses on women; women as different from men, both in terms of the particular vulnerabilities they face in situations of armed conflict and in terms of their potential contribution to peacekeeping efforts. It espouses an essentialist approach to gender.

Bearing in mind that UNSCR 1325 specifically relates to the relationship between female peacekeepers and the female population of the host country, my research was conducted using a CIMIC lens. That is, I examined whether female military personnel feel that they have unique or special qualities which could be used in peacekeeping, whether they would consider themselves gender stereotyped if they were placed in CIMIC type appointments and whether or not females feel that their restriction to so called 'softer' appointments would have implications for their promotion and advancement within the Defence Forces.

I determined that a post-positivist approach to my research was most appropriate as it allowed for a deep understanding of the complexity of life experiences. As a researcher, this approach required me to consider my own epistemology and recognise its possible effects during the research process. Having decided on case study methodology, I sampled and segmented my research participants to allow for analysis of different focus group perspectives. As a female interviewer eliciting the views of female participants, I was conscious of my ethical and moral obligation to ensure that the information given to me would not be used to undermine the participants or be manipulated to produce unintended consequences.

24 Smith, D. (2001) 'The Problem of Essentialism', in Skjelsbaek, I. and Smith, D. (eds), *Gender, Peace & Conflict*, London, Sage Publications, pages 32 – 46.

25 Whitworth, S. (2004), *Men, Militarism and UN Peacekeeping, A gendered Analysis*, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.

26 Smith, D. (2001) 'The Problem of Essentialism', in Skjelsbaek, I. and Smith, D. (eds), *Gender, Peace & Conflict*, London, Sage Publications, page 34.

The Findings

Throughout the focus group discussions there were two consistent concerns or threads: the first was the importance of equality which ensures that female military personnel have the same opportunity to perform the same work as their male colleagues and the second was the necessity for training to improve their skill sets and to validate their group membership.

From the moment female personnel join the Defence Forces they are in competition with their male colleagues and with each other for promotion and for appointments at home and abroad. Equality Legislation provides built-in safeguards to ensure that every person has the opportunity to develop their careers. For my research participants, advancement is considered fair when viewed in terms of acquired skills. It is viewed as unfair if other subjective considerations are introduced.

UNSCR 1325 introduces the notion that females are considered suitable for CIMIC type roles, precisely because they are female. It introduces an essentialist approach which the focus group participants consider to be subjective. The participants believe that each person has their own characteristics and qualities. They rely on the assessment of their skills as an objective method of assessing their suitability for an appointment. This is perceived as fair.

The participants believed that they did not possess special qualities for peacekeeping; they understood that this perception might be held by the host country population and could be used to a military advantage, however, they *would* consider themselves gender stereotyped if they were posted to CIMIC type appointments and Officers considered that these postings would have negative implications for their career. They believed that the resolution essentialises women and emphasises their difference from men.

Implications

There are obvious implications for the Defence Forces and particularly for female members of the Defence Forces in terms of compliance with UNSCR 1325. Without recognising the potential for gender stereotyping implicit in the resolution, the Defence Forces might inadvertently create an unequal working environment, which, in my opinion, may have implications for the retention of military personnel, especially females.

Through my research and findings a more significant question has emerged: after twenty-nine years of the inclusion of women into the Defence Forces, can it be said that gender is mainstreamed in the Defence Forces? Are there routine assessments made of the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programmes in all areas and at all levels?

If gender was mainstreamed in the Defence Forces I would be happy that the implications of compliance with UNSCR 1325 for women and men would be assessed; I would be happy that there was an understanding that in order to promote gender equality, the interests, needs and priorities of both women and men had been taken into consideration. There would be a realisation that without organisational structures, procedures and a culture which promotes an environment of gender equality, simply increasing the number of women would be ineffective in promoting gender equality. In other words, if gender were mainstreamed in the Defence

Forces there would be an understanding that UNSCR 1325 espoused an essentialist view of women and that compliance with the Resolution was not just a matter of ‘adding women and stirring’.

I am not convinced that gender is mainstreamed in the Defence Forces and my research supports this. There is equality under the law, there is equality of opportunity but it is arguable as to whether there is equality of voice, that is, the ability to contribute and to influence. Some argue that men’s needs are already well integrated into most policies and programmes while others believe that ‘man’ is falsely universalised in Western literature.²⁷ Ultimately the experiences of women or men, experienced specifically because they are women and men, are not heard.

The Defence Forces has comprehensive policies, practices and procedures in place to prevent discrimination and to promote equality. The Defence Forces Equality, Diversity and Equal Status Policies tells us that “We are all responsible, as soldiers, for ensuring equality happens”²⁸ and that difference or a gender perspective is encouraged. However, my concern is that, other than through our complaints procedures, there is no formal medium for Defence Forces personnel, female or male, to routinely communicate their gender perspective, their interests, needs, priorities, concerns and experiences gained specifically as a result of being a woman or a man in the Defence Forces. If women’s experience is different to men’s it is important to understand why. This is the type of knowledge that should be integrated into Defence Forces policies and procedures and which should ultimately contribute to the culture, ethos and values of the Defence Forces.

Those who create policy do not hear about specific experiences of women or men. It is vital that they do hear because according to how we perceive women and men to be different, we behave, think and design policies that reflect that point of view.²⁹

Concluding Reflections

I am optimistic that an environment and mechanism can be found in which gender can be mainstreamed in the Defence Forces. A gender mainstreaming programme might include formal training of the Equality Officers at Defence Force Headquarters (DFHQ) and Brigade level, in gender studies; the inclusion of gender, feminist and masculinity studies in all career courses and the modification of existing equality strategies to allow for the easy transfer of knowledge and feedback. With a greater understanding of the significance of gender, all Defence Forces policies, plans, programmes and actions could be designed and subsequently reviewed to ensure that the implications for women and men have been considered.

Further research is required in order to identify how the Defence Forces should comply with the resolution. It may also be worthwhile to examine how other militaries have complied with UNSCR 1325 and create a tailored strategy for compliance which does not expose our personnel, female or male, to essentialist and reductionist policies.

²⁷ Hicks Stiehm, J. (2001), ‘Women, Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: Gender Balance and Mainstreaming’, in Olsson, L. and Tryggestad, T.L. (eds), *Women and International Peacekeeping*, London, Frank Cass Publications, pages 39-48.

²⁸ DCOS (Sp), (2007), *Defence Forces Equality, Diversity and Equal Status Policies*, Human Resource Management Section, Defence Force Headquarters, page 8.

²⁹ Smith, D. (2001) ‘The Problem of Essentialism’, in Skjelsbaek, I. And Smith, D. (eds), *Gender, Peace & Conflict*, London, Sage Publications, pages 32-46.

The Cork City Bridge Guard of 1915

CQMS Gerry White & Lt Col Brendan O'Shea

The National Volunteers came into existence at the end of September 1914 when the Irish Volunteer Movement divided in the aftermath of John Redmond's call for its members to take part in the First World War. Eighteen months later the organisation had disappeared completely in the aftermath of the Easter Rising. This paper examines the formation of the Cork City Regiment of National Volunteers and their provision of an armed guard on two strategically located city railway bridges in January 1915. Although short lived, the Cork City Bridge Guard was the only meaningful security operation ever undertaken by the National Volunteers during their brief existence and the only occasion they were actually able to undertake a 'defensive' and 'protective' duty as envisaged in the original Volunteer Manifesto.



"The First Cork City Bridge Guard - 10 January 1915"

- Seated:** Sgt. T. Foley, Sgt. C.P. Murphy, Colour-Sgt C. Creedon, Capt. H.P.F. Donegan, Lt-Adj. W. T. Daunt, Colour-Sgt J. Long (instructor), C. Curtain.
- Middle Row:** Sgt G. Murphy, P. Keane, P. Donovan, D. Connor, D. Barry, J. O'Keeffe, T. Walsh.
- Back Row:** T. Burke, C. O'Brien, J. Coyle, J. Cantillon, D. O'Brien, E. Irwin, E. Dwyer

The Irish Volunteers were formed in Dublin on 25 November 1913 in the midst of the Home Rule crisis and in response to the establishment of the Ulster Volunteer Force.¹ Support for the new movement soon spread throughout the country and on the night of 14 December the Cork Corps of Irish Volunteers was formed at a public meeting in the City Hall.² This unit was governed by a local Provisional Committee which comprised all shades of Nationalist and Republican opinion but in reality was dominated by separatists such as James J. Walsh, Tomás MacCurtain, Terence MacSwiney and Seán O’Hegarty.

However, none of these individuals had the experience necessary to successfully command and train a military unit. That problem was solved in May 1915 when a former Royal Artillery officer, Captain Maurice Talbot-Crosbie, a businessman from Ardfert, Co. Kerry and supporter of John Redmond and the Irish Parliamentary Party, joined the corps and was immediately elected commanding officer. When John Redmond took control of the Irish Volunteers the following month by forcing the Dublin leadership to accept the addition of twenty-five of his nominees on the national Provisional Committee, the leadership of the Cork Corps resigned in order to clarify their mandate.³

When the elections results were announced it transpired that virtually all of the outgoing officers had been re-elected to a new Executive Committee leaving Redmond and his supporters incensed and threatening to set up their own organisation. However, a compromise was reached and five prominent supporters of the Irish Parliamentary Party - Captain Talbot-Crosbie, Patrick Ahern, Thomas Byrne, George Crosbie and J. F. O’Riordan - were eventually added to the committee.

An uneasy peace then settled within the leadership of the Cork Corps, but this was destined to be shattered on 4 August 1914 Britain declared war on Germany. When the original Volunteer Manifesto was adopted in Dublin it stated that the objective of the movement was to ‘secure and maintain the rights and liberties common to all the people of Ireland’ and that its duties would be ‘defensive and protective’. This was subsequently confirmed by John Redmond as late as 3 August when he stood in the House of Commons at Westminster and declared... ‘I say that the coast of Ireland will be defended by foreign invasion by her armed sons, and for this purpose armed nationalist Catholics in the South will be only too glad to join arms with the armed Protestants Ulstermen in the North’.⁴

But not all Volunteers supported this position and following the declaration of war Talbot-Crosbie sent a telegram to the Secretary of State for War offering him the services of the Cork Corps. While the Secretary declined this offer, Talbot-Crosbie’s action led to a serious rift between himself and the separatist majority on the Executive Committee⁵ and a public dispute

1 The Irish Volunteers were governed nationally by a body known as the Provisional Committee - so called because it was meant to remain in existence until such time as an election could be held by units throughout the country to form an Executive. While all shades of nationalist opinion were represented it was dominated by militant republicans such as Pádraig Pearse, Seán MacDermott, Éamon Kent and Bulmer Hobson.

2 White & O’Shea, *Baptised in Blood*, Mercier Press, 2006, p 21

3 John Redmond, initially viewed the advent of the Volunteers with suspicion, but when thousands of new recruits rushed to join the movement in the wake of the incident known as the ‘Curragh Mutiny’ and the successful unloading of 35,000 rifles destined for the Ulster Volunteers at Larne, he decided the time had come to take control of the movement. When he failed to reach an agreement during negotiations with Eoin MacNeill, the Chairman of the Irish Volunteers, he issued an ultimatum threatening to order his supporters within the movement to set up a separate organisation unless he was permitted to add twenty-five of his supporters to the Provisional Committee in Dublin, which was the governing body of the movement. Rather than split the movement, on 16 June the members of the Provisional Committee reluctantly agreed to Redmond’s ultimatum

4 White & O’Shea, *Baptised in Blood*, Mercier Press, 2006, pp 46-47

5 *Ibid* pp 48-61

then erupted with both sides publishing letters in the newspapers to outline their respective positions.

On 6 August the *Cork Constitution* published a letter from Talbot-Crosbie declaring that in his view:

a vital point has been reached in the existence of the Irish Volunteers, and it is absolutely necessary to decide whether we are prepared to stand by the British Empire and come forward for the defence of Ireland against foreign aggression, or are not prepared to do so.⁶

The following day a letter from Tomás MacCurtain was published in which he stated:

I am directed by the Executive Committee to say that recent references which have appeared in the local press with regard to matters of policy affecting the Cork Corps were unauthorised and should therefore, be disregarded.⁷

Matters finally came to a head on 29 August when the Executive Committee suspended Talbot-Crosbie from the Corps but the following day over 1000 Volunteers paraded at the Cornmarket in Cork to hear both he and his opponents put forward their respective positions. Liam de Róiste, a founding member of the corps later described the scene as one where ... 'there was much excitement, strong language [and] recriminations. At times it looked as if a dangerous situation would arise [as] some of the men were armed with revolvers.'⁸ And in his account of the event J.J. Walsh, the Chairman of the Executive Committee, was of the view that ... 'discipline existed only in name.'⁹

After a long and heated debate, the following question was put to Talbot-Crosbie by Thomas Byrne:

Does Captain Crosbie want to commit the Cork City Corps to offer their services to fight in any part of the world that Great Britain sends them to or does he stand by the offer made by Mr. John Redmond that you are prepared to defend the shores of Ireland against all comers?¹⁰

Talbot Crosbie replied:

I answer emphatically that I will not commit the Cork City Corps beyond what Mr. Redmond has committed them to.¹¹

This reply was received with loud and prolonged cheering in the ranks, with some of the Volunteers singing, "for he's a jolly good fellow". But the atmosphere was far from cheerful and J.J. Walsh later recalled that:

⁶ The *Cork Constitution*, 6 August 1914.

⁷ The *Cork Examiner* & The *Cork Constitution*, 8 August 1914.

⁸ DeRoiste, Liam, 'Mar Is Cuimin Liom' Part 28, in the *Evening Echo* on November 20th, 1954

⁹ Walsh, J. J. *Recollections of a Rebel*, The Kerryman, Ltd., Tralee, pp 28

¹⁰ The *Cork Examiner*, August 31st, 1914

¹¹ Ibid

The Redmondites were ready for anything and whole companies moved towards the platform, brandishing their deadly weapons. Without any doubt, the weak elements standing for Sinn Fein on the platform and elsewhere would have been cut to pieces were it not for the timely intervention of Captain Crosbie.¹²

In an attempt to regain control of the situation, the Executive Committee then asked those 'who stood for Ireland' to step forward and in the event only seventy Volunteers stood firm in support of the Executive's position.¹³ The overwhelming majority had rallied behind Talbot-Crosbie and when he gave the order to dismiss the parade his supporters shouldered him around the Cornmarket. Following this display of solidarity he then formed the men into their respective companies and marched them through the city to the Corps Headquarters at Fisher's Street where they were finally dismissed.

In the days which followed both sides of the debate remained entrenched in their positions but with neither group willing to precipitate a split. Then, on 18 September 1914, the Third Home Rule Bill was placed on the Statue Book but suspended for one year or until the end of the war. Returning home to Aghavannagh two days later John Redmond came upon a gathering of Volunteers at Woodenbridge in Co Wicklow¹⁴ and in the course of an impromptu speech declared:

The interests of Ireland, of the whole of Ireland are at stake in this war. This war is undertaken in defence of the highest interests of religion and morality and right, and it would be a disgrace for ever to our country, a reproach to her manhood, and a denial of the lessons of her history if young Ireland confined their efforts to remaining at home to defend the shores of Ireland from an unlikely invasion, and shrinking from the duty of proving on the field of battle that gallantry and courage which have distinguished their race all through its history. I say to you therefore, your duty is twofold. I am glad to see such magnificent material for soldiers around me, and I say to you, go on drilling and make yourselves efficient for the work, and then account yourselves as men not only in Ireland itself, but wherever the firing line extends, in defence of right, of freedom and religion in this war.¹⁵

From Redmond's perspective he had now secured Home Rule; he knew precisely what was happening in Belgium because his niece was a nun in the convent in Ypres and had been relocated to Ireland because of the fighting;¹⁶ and he was firmly of the view that Ireland had obligations to stand shoulder to shoulder with Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Britain. The Jesuit Timothy Corcoran had already made contact with the Volunteers proposing the creation of an Irish Expeditionary Force for deployment in Belgium¹⁷ and the fact that a

¹² Walsh, J. J. *Recollections of a Rebel*, The Kerryman, Ltd Tralee, pp 28

¹³ DeRoiste in '*Mar Is Cúimín Liom*' Part 28 states that the figure was 'between seventy or eighty' while O'Donoghue in his biography of MacCurtain states that, 'between fifty and sixty men, including all of the officers, with the exception of Talbot Crosbie supported the executive.'

¹⁴ *The Freeman's Journal*, 21 September 1914

¹⁵ White & O'Shea, *Baptised in Blood*, Mercier Press, 2006, p 59 & the *Cork Constitution* 21 September 1914.

¹⁶ Maume Patrick, *The Long Gestation*, Gill and Macmillan, 1999, p 148.

¹⁷ Horgan JJ, *Parnell to Pearse*, Dublin, 1948, pp 264-5

decisive Allied victory had just been won at the Battle of the Marne¹⁸ may have influenced his thinking.

Unfortunately Redmond's call for participation in the war led to a nationwide split within the Volunteer movement. The overwhelming majority, some 170,000 members, willingly supported Redmond's position and became known as the 'National Volunteers', while the more militant and separatist minority, approximately 12,000, rejected the call to arms but retained the title 'Irish Volunteers'.¹⁹

In Cork the majority of rank and file Volunteers also supported Redmond but the greater part of the Executive Committee remained loyal to the Provisional Committee in Dublin. On Sunday, 4 October 1914 the Redmondite members of the Executive Committee held a parade at the Cornmarket in order to elect a new leadership for the National Volunteers in Cork and George Crosbie was appointed Temporary Chairman Addressing the huge gathering Crosbie stated:

The Volunteers have been brought into existence in order to train, equip, and arm a volunteer force for the defence of Ireland, the advancement and preservation of Irish rights, and the maintenance of Irish national self-government.²⁰

He then declared his belief that this meant that no man who joined the ranks of the National Volunteers would under any circumstances be called upon to fight outside the shores of Ireland. However, if an Irish Brigade was formed, which was separate from the Volunteers, while no member of the organisation would be asked to join it, if any chose to do so their wishes would be respected and the Volunteers would wish them well. Crosbie went on to say that Ireland had pledged for two generations that when she got the right of nationhood she would then be prepared to take up her position as one of the members of the British Empire. He concluded by saying that while this had not yet come to pass he nevertheless believed that the current political situation represented, 'as much of a treaty between two countries as was the treaty made in 1839 that guaranteed Belgian neutrality'.²¹

Crosbie's speech was greeted with loud cheers and thunderous applause, and he was followed to the podium by Captain John J. Horgan²² who proposed the following resolution:

We, the members of the Cork Corps of the Irish National Volunteers, assembled here on parade in pursuance of notice, condemn the action of the dissenting minority of the Dublin Provisional Committee seeking to bring about the dissolution of the Volunteer movement. We recognise the authority of the National Committee now formed under the presidency of John Redmond, the leader of the Irish Party, and we thoroughly endorse his policy.²³

¹⁸ The First Battle of the Marne took place between 5-12 September 1914

¹⁹ White & O'Shea, *Baptised in Blood*, Mercier Press, 2006, p 59 & *The Cork Constitution* 21 September 1914.

²⁰ *The Cork Examiner*, 5 October 1914

²¹ *Ibid*

²² John J. Horgan (1881-1967) was a Cork born solicitor, author, Irish language enthusiast and supporter of the Irish Parliamentary Party. He later appointed coroner and sat at the Kinsale inquest for the victims of the *Lusitania*.

²³ *The Cork Constitution*, 5 October 1914

Horgan next turned his attention to Sinn Fein and claimed that:

Small coteries of Sinn Feiners who did nothing to forward the Home Rule cause, and who seemed to have a happy knack of attracting all the cranks in the community, have sought to dominate the Volunteer movement, to control its funds and to give no real representation to any other real body of Nationalists. This condition of things can not continue and we have come there today to terminate it decisively. The Volunteer movement is a democratic movement and must be controlled by the majority of the Volunteers.²⁴

After Horgan's resolution was adopted unanimously Harry Donegan,²⁵ the commanding officer of A Company, proposed a second one dealing with the issue of command and control:

That in consequence of the action of the Cork Executive Committee in siding with the minority of the Provisional Committee in Dublin and declaring their opposition to the policy of Mr. Redmond, we declare them unsuitable to hold office, and, as empowered by the resolution of the National Committee, we now proceed to elect officers and a committee to control the affairs of the Cork Corps under the direction of the National Committee. Before taking office or assuming duty, every officer and member of the committee and each divisional company and sectional commander shall sign a declaration that he recognises the authority of the National Committee.²⁶

Donegan's motion was seconded by J. F. O'Riordan and carried unanimously. Having chaired the meeting to a successful conclusion, George Crosbie stepped down as chairman and Thomas Byrne was elected in his place. From now on this unit became known as the Cork City Regiment and went from strength to strength. Within a short time it managed to acquire new uniforms - similar in design to the one worn by the British Army - and a supply of arms, ammunition and equipment was obtained which enabled the unit to complete various programmes of training. They were also able to draw on the support of a youth movement known as 'The Hibernian Boys Brigade' which also trained in the Cornmarket, and on Thursday, 15 October the organisation's official journal, *The National Volunteer*, made its first appearance priced at 6d.

Then, on the weekend of 21-22 November the National Volunteers in Cork received a considerable boost to morale when Colonel Maurice Moore, the organisation's commanding officer, and William Redmond, a leading member of the force and the Irish Party MP for Clare, visited the city to carry out an inspection and present new colours. The unit was now commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Smith-Sheehan who had succeeded Talbot-Crosbie when he rejoined the British army to fight in the war.

When Moore and Redmond arrived at the Great Southern and Western Railway Station on the Lower Glanmire Road that Saturday night they were met by a Guard of Honour drawn

²⁴ Ibid

²⁵ Harry Donegan was a Cork born solicitor and prominent supporter of John Redmond and the Irish Parliamentary Party

²⁶ *The Cork Examiner*, 5 October 1914

from B Company of the Cork City Regiment and a huge crowd of prominent nationalists escorted them to the Victoria Hotel. The following morning National Volunteers from all over city and county assembled in the Cornmarket. Together with 400 members of the Hibernian Boys Brigade the Volunteers then formed up behind the Barrack Street No. 1 Brass and Reed Band and at one o'clock the parade marched off to the Mardyke where a lavish ceremony commenced at 1.30 pm. New colours were presented to William Redmond by the wife of Captain John J. Horgan. Father John Russell from the North Cathedral then stepped forward and blessed the flags after which two junior officers, Lieutenants Hill and McGrath, marched forward, received them from Redmond, and the assembled massed bands struck up '*A Nation Once Again*'.²⁷

Colonel Moore then stepped forward and took his place on the podium as each company in turn marched passed their commanding officer in line. In his address to the troops Moore informed them that when he arrived in the city the previous night he had never expected to see the vast crowd that awaited him at the railway station and on the way to the hotel. Redmond also congratulated all present on a splendid display and then went clarify their future role in the context of the war effort:

Men are not joining the Volunteers out of any threat or menace to the people of Great Britain. They are joining to guard the new liberty of Ireland and the Irish Parliament. No man will be compelled to join any other force outside of the Irish National Volunteers and if the day comes when the honour of Ireland requires her sons to go abroad, I will not beat around the bush. I will say, those of you who are willing to go abroad, follow me and I will go with you.²⁸

One week later, on Sunday 28 November, the National Volunteers had yet another occasion to display their strength on the occasion of the annual Manchester Martyr parade which commemorated the deaths of the three Fenians - William Phillip Allen, Michael Larkin, Michael O'Brien - who were hanged at Salford Prison on 23 November, 1867. The parade formed up outside the North Cathedral after 12 o'clock Mass and four companies of the National Volunteers were joined by their rivals from the separatist Irish Volunteers and other nationalist organisations and bands. The parade got underway at one p.m. but after crossing Parnell Bridge the National Volunteers, the Boys Brigade and the nationalist bands broke away and marched off to the Cornmarket, while the Irish Volunteers and their band and supporters continued to the City Hall to be addressed by Major John MacBride.

While a large crowd gathered outside City Hall in support of the Irish Volunteers, the local press was fulsome in its praise of the National Volunteers. The *Cork Examiner* reported that:

The most remarkable feature in this years procession was the attendance of several hundred Irish Volunteers in equipment and for the first time since the memorable 23rd November - when Allen, Larkin and O'Brien gave up their lives at Manchester - did a body of Irish Nationalists march in broad daylight in an anniversary procession in Cork carrying

²⁷ Ibid

²⁸ White & O'Shea, *Baptised in Blood*, Mercier Press, 2006 p 50-51 & *The Cork Examiner*, 23 November 1914.

military accoutrements and trained as military men. The attendance of four companies of National Volunteers (under the presidency of Mr. J. E. Redmond) with rifles on their shoulders must serve as a reminder of the difference in the Ireland of today and the Ireland of '67.²⁹

Then, on Sunday, 20 December, two companies from the Cork City Regiment under Captains Donegan and Horgan travelled to the Market Place in Limerick where they joined with other units from Munster to be reviewed by John Redmond.³⁰ A total of 15,000 National Volunteers formed up on parade that day to be told by Redmond that at that very moment in excess of 150,000 men of Irish birth were serving in the British armed forces and that 'the power of the National Organisation must be maintained until the assembling of the Irish Parliament'.³¹

While public parades were all very well, and certainly contributed to high morale and a general sense of well-being, there was also a requirement for the Volunteers to undertake security duties in order to give them a clear sense of purpose. Harry Donegan was acutely aware of this, and in December 1914 he approached the British authorities in the city and offered to provide a night guard of armed National Volunteers in order to protect the two bascule railway bridges which spanned the channels of the River Lee. These bridges were of strategic importance because they connected the naval base in Bantry Bay with the rest of the national railway system, and at that time they were being guarded daily by armed members of the R.I.C.³²

Donegan's offer was accepted and, on the night of Friday, 1 January 1915, the first National Volunteer Bridge Guard took up their duties. Consisting of 12 men, two NCOs, and an officer of the guard, the headquarters of the Regiment at the Cornmarket was to be used as the guardroom. Sentries would be posted according to military procedure standing guard for two hours and resting for the next four. The 9 January issue of the *National Volunteer* provided this account of what was an historic occasion:

The Volunteers mustered at the Cornmarket headquarters, and the twelve men forming the guard were paraded and inspected. The four men who were to do the first period of duty were told off and ammunition served out. The orders were then given out by the officer of the guard, Captain Donegan, and the sentries were posted in their positions, the members of the constabulary who were on duty up to then withdrawing. The Volunteers will guard the bridges between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. in watches of two hours each. They will be relieved at 6 a.m. by the R.I.C. The guard will be armed with rifles and fixed bayonets. They are well prepared for bad weather being provided with frieze great coats, similar to those worn by the R.I.C., but with Volunteer buttons. The guard who were briefly addressed by Captain Roberts, were warmly applauded by a crowd of some hundreds, who accompanied them to the bridge.³³

²⁹ The *Cork Examiner*, 29 November 1914.

³⁰ The *Cork Examiner*, 21 December 1914

³¹ Mac Giolla Choille Brendan, *Intelligence Notes 1913-1916*, Dublin, 1966, pp 110-111 records that at December 1914 there were 6,712 National Volunteers and 822 Irish Volunteers in Cork city and county. The National Volunteers possessed 256 assorted firearms and the Irish Volunteers 161.

³² Horgan JJ, *Parnell to Pearse*, Dublin, 1948, p 192

³³ The *Irish Volunteer*, 9 January 1915.

When he had finished mounting the guard and posting the first group of sentries Harry Donegan sent the following telegram to John Redmond at his home at Aughavanagh, County Wicklow:

Cork City Regiment I.N.V. on mounting first guard to-night send you assurances of loyal adhesion to your policy and leadership. First National Guard mounted in Ireland since the days of Grattan's Volunteers.

Donegan,
Captain in Charge of the Guard.³⁴

On receipt of the telegram Redmond immediately replied:

Hearty congratulations to Cork Volunteers on mounting guard. Trust War Office will now utilise forces generally for defence purposes everywhere.
REDMOND³⁵

Donegan had also sent a telegram to Colonel Maurice Moore and on the morning after the completion of the first duty Moore sent the following reply which was also printed in the *National Volunteer*:

7 Holland Road
Kensington,
London,
January 2nd, 1915

Dear Captain Donegan,

I have read your letter with great pleasure. I am quite sure that in taking over the defences of the bridges and other posts in the city by the Cork City Regiment of the National Volunteers a service of a very greatest importance has been performed. It is not a matter of mere local interest but of national importance.

I have anxiously looked forward to the time when the National Volunteers would take over the defence of the country, and I see in what the Cork City Regiment has done the first step towards this great accomplishment. Soon after the Irish Volunteer movement was established, now more than a year ago, I wrote an article for the first number of our paper, in which I stated that one of our main objects was the defence of the country against foreign invaders. To Nationalists of the old school, to which I belong – to Grattan, O'Connell, Smith O'Brien, John Martin or Parnell – this might seem a truism; but all my efforts in this direction – and I made many – were met with obstruction and misrepresentation by certain modernists who seem to me more serious than wise. It is, therefore, with a feeling of great approbation that I greet your efforts and hope that the example of Cork will be followed in Limerick, Dublin, Belfast, Derry, and other places.

I remain,
Yours truly,
MAURICE MOORE.³⁶

³⁴ The *Freeman's Journal*, 2 January 1915.

³⁵ Telegram; Redmond to Donegan, 2 January 1915.

³⁶ The *Irish Volunteer*, 9 January 1915.

Donegan also received a message from the officer commanding the Limerick Brigade congratulating the members of the Cork City Regiment and requesting further information about the guard duty - and many of the employers of the men involved in guarding the bridges offered them some time off on the day following their duty to enable them get sufficient rest before resuming work.

Captain John J. Horgan later recalled the euphoria that surrounded the advent of the bridge guard:

No Irish National force had been entrusted with such duties since the days of Grattan's Volunteers and I believe we were the only body of National Volunteers who were given an opportunity of doing so. As our men marched to their posts for the first time the watching crowds cheered. Our relations with the local military authorities were excellent and I remember on one occasion when a company of Volunteers under my command were route marching near Cork the guard near Ballincollig cavalry barracks turned out to salute us.³⁷

The British military leadership in Cork was also very pleased with this initiative shown by the National Volunteers. Shortly after the bridge guard operation commenced, the General Officer Commanding Cork District sent a message to the officers of the Cork City Regiment congratulating them on the manner in which their men were performing their duties. He also stated that he would be willing to send officers to inspect the guard at any time and inquired if the Volunteers would be willing to 'discharge picket and guard duty in the neighbourhood of Cork in the event of a German raid'. The officers of the regiment replied that they would be glad to co-operate with the military authorities in any way in their power and invited the general to send an officer to inspect the guard whenever he desired.³⁸

However, not everyone in Cork was overjoyed at these developments, and in a statement published in the *Cork Free Press* on 6 January, 1915 William O'Brien, leader of the rival nationalist All For Ireland League and MP for Cork, described the National Volunteers as 'undisciplined partisans' who were controlled by the heads of a 'secret society' and he accused the War Office of surrendering to Redmond's demands for their recognition.

In response to this attack, John J. Horgan persuaded his father-in-law, Sir Bertram C. A. Windle, President of Queens College, Cork, to write to the prime minister on 9 January in support of the National Volunteers. Having dismissed O'Brien's statement as both 'mischievous' and 'misleading' Windle referred to the National Volunteers as 'a fine body of men' and went on to say that:

Nothing would do more harm or act more effectively against the growing sense that Ireland is part of the Empire than to tell them in so many words that they are not trusted even to look after a few bridges in the city in which they live. I do venture to press this point on you with all the power I possess and to express the hope that nothing may

³⁷ Horgan JJ, *Parnell to Pearse*, Dublin, 1948, p 194

³⁸ White & O'Shea, *The Bridge Guard Soldiers of 1915*, The Holly Bough, 2007

be done to discourage, but rather everything possible to encourage a movement fraught, as I am convinced that it is, with so great promise for the improvement of the discipline and order of the young men of the country.

But O'Brien's criticism had no impact on the men of the Regiment and, pleased with the success of their operation, the first bridge guard sat for a group photograph at the Cornmarket on Sunday, 10 January. Afterwards the entire Regiment practised a variety of drill movements under arms watched by a number of officers from the Munster Fusiliers who commented very favourably on their soldierly appearance.

While clearly committed to their primary task of providing the bridge guard, the officers of the Regiment were also determined to continue training their men in the full spectrum of military skills. On Monday 04 January a special study class for officers and NCOs commenced and Captain Horgan delivered a lecture entitled, 'Military Terms'. He was followed by Captain Donegan who instructed on map reading, and the following week Horgan spoke about 'Tactics and the Landscape' in preparation for a major infantry exercise which was being planned for the following weekend.

On Sunday 18 January, the men of the regiment who were not detailed for guard duty moved into the neighbourhood of Frankfield with one group 'attacking' Belvedere House and another tasked with to 'defending' it. Among the British military spectators present on this occasion was Major Sir Francis Vane of the Munster Fusiliers who had travelled from Kilworth Camp to witness the event. In introducing Vane to the Volunteers Harry Donegan launched into a verbal assault on William O'Brien claiming that O'Brien's newspaper had stated that the National Volunteers could be called out at any time and converted into members of the British Army whether they liked it or not. Donegan also stated that Sir Francis Vane came from old Irish stock and was a nationalist 'by condition and instinct' would tell them that there was 'not an item of truth in these allegations'.³⁹

Vane then addressed the gathering and praised the National Volunteers for having been entrusted by the government with 'an important duty of defence'. He said that they had finally been recognised, as they should have been recognised much earlier, as a loyal and enthusiastic force in defence of the country which they all held dear to their hearts and they had come at an important time to join the Imperial forces, when every member of the Empire acknowledged the cause for which they were fighting.

He then went on to address allegations made in newspapers that Volunteers would be 'subjected to visits by recruiting officers who on reviewing their ranks would pick a likely man and post him at once to France or Belgium for immediate duty' - and described such stories as 'absurd and worthy of Alice in Wonderland'. He told the men that he was a recruiting officer and that if they were in danger from anyone they were in danger from him but that he was someone who from the beginning had advocated the formation of a corps such as theirs for defence only. Vane's remarks were met with sustained applause and the Volunteers commenced their march back to the Cornmarket in very high spirits.⁴⁰

³⁹ *The Cork Examiner* 19 January 1915

⁴⁰ *Ibid*

The following evening study classes resumed with Captain Horgan delivering a lecture on infantry tactics entitled 'The Advance Guard', and the bridge guard continued to attract widespread attention. On the evening of Thursday 21 January, Captain Harold-Barry, the Inspecting Officer for Cork County visited the city to inspect the guard. He was accompanied by Captain Holland and Lieutenant McMahon from the Limerick Regiment who came to obtain the details of how the duties were carried out. The city Volunteers paraded at the Cornmarket to be inspected by Captain Harold-Barry who praised the men for their smart appearance and the way they carried out their drill. He also stated that the Cork City Regiment had given the lead to all of Ireland by undertaking the bridge guard. Captain Holland was also fulsome in his praise of the Volunteers and said that he hoped that the Volunteers in Limerick would be able to follow their example. However none of those present that night realised that the British authorities were about to make a huge miscalculation and in spite of the success of the bridge guard the entire operation was actually on the verge of being terminated.

At the end January the War Office in London, possibly prompted by concerns raised by William O'Brien, ordered the military authorities in Cork to cease using the National Volunteers for military duties. On 4 February Brigadier-General Cecil Hill, the Officer Commanding South Irish Coast Defence wrote the following letter to RIC County Inspector Howe from his headquarters in Queenstown:

Dear Mr. Howe,

The G.O.C. in Ireland has had under consideration the question of the guarding of the railway bridges over the River Lee by an armed guard of the National Volunteers and requests that you will be so good as to inform them as follows. While fully acknowledging the patriotic spirit which has lead them to offer their services and thanking them for services already rendered, he finds it impossible to continue their employment as an armed guard. If they are willing to continue to give their services as an unarmed guard in the nature of special constables he will gladly accept their offer to guard the bridges which they have been guarding, and in any other capacity in which the garrison commander should require their services. I am directed to add that it is not considered possible to allow citizens who do not belong to the armed forces of the Crown to bear arms in the defence of the realm.⁴¹

Howe forwarded this letter to Captain Donegan who sent the following reply on 6 February:

Dear Mr. Howe

I have yours of 6th enclosing General Hill's letter from which I note that the G.O.C. in Ireland directs the discontinuance of the armed guard furnished by the Cork City Regiment of the Irish National Volunteers since 1st January last, and that if the men are willing to give their services as an unarmed guard in the nature of special constables he will gladly accept their offer to guard the bridges which they have been guarding, or

⁴¹ Letter: Brig Gen Hill to RIC County Inspector Howe, 4 February 1915 & White & O'Shea, *Baptised in Blood*, Mercier Press, 2006, pp 78-79.

in any other capacity in which the Garrison Commander shall require. I desire to say that while guarding the bridges at night without any arms is out of the question as far as our men are concerned, they are nevertheless anxious and willing to be of practical use to the military authorities., The same spirit which animated them when we offered to guard the bridges originally still prevails and whatever duties they are called on by the Garrison Commander will be done willingly and effectively. I am much obliged for your kind references to the way our men discharged their duty from which we are now relieved and would ask you when communicating with General Hill to kindly convey to him our thanks for his courtesy.

From the British perspective this move was a huge mistake and it failed completely to comprehend the role of the National Volunteers or envisage their long term future. Nevertheless, on Easter Sunday, 4 April 1915, over 1,000 Cork men led by their new commanding officer, Lt Col Donegan, marched to the Fifteen Acres in Dublin's Phoenix Park to take part in a Grand Review of the force by John Redmond and Colonel Maurice Moore.⁴² Over 25,000 National Volunteers attended the ceremony and after being inspected by Redmond and Moore they marched down the city quays to the Parnell Monument where Redmond took the salute.⁴³

While the Review itself was considered a great success the unwillingness of the British authorities to allow the National Volunteers operate in an armed security role effectively robbed them of their *raison d'etre* - to carry out 'protective' and 'defensive' duties. Deployment of armed guards on Cork's two railway bridges had represented the operational high point for the Cork City Regiment, and indeed for the organisation as a whole. Denied even the prospect of defending Ireland, and with most of its more talented and effective organisers now serving or about to enlist in the British army, the National Volunteers entered a period of terminal decline.⁴⁴ Morale, efficiency and administration all rapidly deteriorated and those who remained behind soon began to lose interest as the rival and separatist Irish Volunteers began a climb into the ascendancy.

Had the British authorities understood the real value of the military asset at their disposal and permitted the National Volunteers to expand their military operations, and given them a meaningful local defence role, thousands of British soldiers tied up in Ireland could have been redeployed to the Western Front. This could well have made an operational difference during the early stages of the war and it would certainly have altered the military balance in Ireland. With Irishmen guarding key installations throughout the country it is almost inconceivable that the Military Council of the IRB would have committed the Irish Volunteers in combat against their former comrades at Easter 1916 for the simple reason that this would have amounted to a full-scale civil war.

Had the Britain kept faith with the National Volunteers the course of Irish history might have been altogether different and the Easter Rising might never have happened. But it was not to be. Britain did not keep faith, and Lloyd George later condemned this ineptitude as 'a series

⁴² The *National Volunteer*, 10 April 1915.

⁴³ The *Freeman's Journal*, 5 April 1915.

⁴⁴ Horgan JJ, *Parnell to Pearse*, Dublin, 1948, p 266. Over 27,000 members of the National Volunteers enlisted in the British Army during the first year of the war alone

of stupidities that sometimes looked like malignancy'.⁴⁵ The National Volunteers were fatally undermined when ironically they had most to contribute - and from the British and Irish Nationalist perspectives a unique opportunity was lost.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Ibid

⁴⁶ White & O'Shea, *The Bridge Guard Soldiers of 1915, The Holly Bough*, 2007

Origins of 2 Field Artillery Regiment: 1943 – 1948

Comdt W. Donnelly

This is a transcript of a history of 2 Field Artillery Regiment, compiled by Lt Col W.G. Donnelly, Commanding Officer of the Regiment from 1950 – 957. It is to be found, in manuscript form in the Headquarters of 2 Fd Artillery Regiment, McKee Barracks, Dublin 7. Its importance lies in the chronology of events and the inclusion of the names of the various officers associated with the institution of the unit. It is not meant to be either a social or operational history and its inclusion here is warranted in order that the information might not be lost. Many others have added to this history over years and no doubt, in the fullness of time, the complete and definitive history of the unit may be chronicled.

– Editor

The II F. A. Regiment was formed in 1943. In order to appreciate the events leading up to its formation, it has been found necessary to go back some years – to 1934, to be exact. In the spring of this year, on foot of a Government decision shortly before, the Volunteer Force came into being. The Organisation of the Artillery Corps at the time of the decision to raise the Volunteer Force was as follows:

Artillery Corps		
a.	Office of Director of Artillery	
b.	1 st Field Artillery Brigade	Comprising the 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd Field Batteries (18 Pdr) and the 4 th Field Battery (4.5 How)
c.	1 st Anti-Aircraft Battery	
d.	1 st Light Battery	
e.	The Artillery School	
f.	Depot Detachment Artillery Corps	
g.	Cadres for non-permanent Force Units	
Note	The 4 th Field Battery (4.5 How) and the 1 st Light Battery (3.7 How) were “A” Reserve Units. For the Organisation, see DFR A9 – 40/34	

Figure 1.

The initial training of the Volunteer Force Batteries was undertaken in Kildare Barracks by the Regular Batteries. The scheme was as follows:

- a. 1st Field Battery was responsible for training the volunteers from the Southern Command. Capt C. Trodden I/C.
- b. 2nd Field Battery was responsible for training the volunteers from the Eastern command. Capt B.S.C. Thompsn I/C.

- c. 3rd Field Battery was responsible for training the volunteers from the Western Command. Lt W. Donnelly I/C.

The first drafts of Volunteers arrived from the Commands on 17th April 1934. The period of training was for 28 days. At the end of this period, Potential NCO material was selected and proceeded for a further three months of training as NCOs. Again, at the end of the NCO period of training, candidates were selected for Potential Officer Courses. Thus, by the Spring of 1935, each Volunteer Battery had a number of Officers and NCOs trained.

The Regular Batteries continued this training of Volunteers at Kildare Barracks until September 1934, and then proceeded to the Commands as shown above, training Volunteers initially and carrying out Weekend Camps and Nightly Drills. These, They remained there until October 1935 and returned to Kildare Barracks leaving behind small Cadres to continue the training of Volunteers.

This Organisation and Training of Volunteers continued up to April 1939 with the exception that all Volunteer Light Batteries were converted to 81mm Mortar Batteries in 1938. By April 1939, World affairs, particularly in Europe, seemed to be drifting towards another world war. The position of the Artillery Corps at that time was:

Artillery Corps	
a.	Office of Director of Artillery, GHQ
b.	1 Field Artillery Brigade at Plunkett Barracks, Curragh Camp
c.	1 st Anti-Aircraft Battery stationed at McKee Barracks, Dublin
d.	The Coastal Defence Artillery with HQ at Spike Island, and all the forts in Cobh Harbour, Barehaven (sic) and Donegal fully manned
e.	Field Artillery Cadres functioning in each Command Area
f.	The Depot and School Artillery Corps stationed at Plunkett Barracks, Curragh Camp, during the building of the new Barracks in Kildare.

Figure 2.

At this time, April 1939, Capt R. Callanan, with Capt W. Donnelly was posted to Dublin to organise the II Field Artillery Brigade and to push on training with all possible speed. As a result of representations made by Comdt Callanan, OC., the following Units were organised and were being trained.

a.	5 th Field Battery (Regular Cadre) Capt D. Cody OC Lt J. Griffin Lt P. O'Neill
----	--

- | | |
|----|--|
| b. | 6 th Field Battery (Volunteer Force [V.F.] Bray)
Lt. J. S. Nolan |
| c. | 7 th Field Battery (V.F. Dublin)
Lt J. Murray |
| d. | 8 th Field Battery (V.F. Drogheda)
Lt R. Carew |
| e. | 2 nd Mortar Battery (V.F. Monaghan)
Capt W. Donnelly |

Figure 3.

Prior to the outbreak of War on 3rd September 1939, in addition to training large numbers of Volunteers, the process of mechanising the guns and trailers of the II Field Artillery Brigade went on with all possible speed. A number of sets of Martin Parry Adapter Equipment was received from abroad (which embraced dropped axles and pneumatic tyres). The work of fitting this equipment was undertaken by the Great Southern Railway Works at Inchicore. And proved to be completely successful. Prior to this work being carried out, the situation was somewhat Gilbertian, for the reason that, when guns had to be moved, special ramps were required to load the with their wooden wheels on to lorries. It was hard work and time-devouring and the cause of frequent minor injuries, no matter how carefully the loading and unloading was carried out.

Due to the foresight of the Directive and Planning Section at GHQ, it can be seen from the foregoing, that a reasonable number of trained Officers, NCOs and Volunteers (approximately 3 officers, up to 10 NCOs and 50 Volunteers were available in most batteries) were ready on the outbreak of war. These Volunteers formed the bulk of the Field Artillery. It would be very unfair in writing this history of the Regiment, to let the opportunity pass without offering the greatest possible praise for the manner in which they flocked to the colours on being called up. Without them, the Field Artillery would have been in a very bad way. They, and the Regular Cadres deserve the highest possible credit.

II F.A. Brigade proceeded to its War Station, Mullingar Barracks, on the outbreak of World War 2 on 3rd September, 1939. The Units were accommodated under canvas on the green portion of the Barracks Square (where now stands the Dining facility – Ed.) A small party was left behind in McKee Barracks to complete the mobilisation and forward the troops in drafts to Mullingar. This work was completed in seven days – the delay resulting from the fact that quite a number of Volunteers were in England and found great difficulty in getting back.

The 5th Field Battery and 2nd Motor Bty took over Knockdrin Castle, Mullingar in October 1939 from the 11th Inf Bn. Capt D. Cody was Camp Commandant and OC 5th Bty; the other Battalion remained in Mullingar.

The Artillery position at this time in Mullingar was that the Volunteers of the western Command Artillery were amalgamated with the II F.A. Battalion (with the exception of the 15th V.F. Battery, Letterkenny, which was allotted to the Northern Forts at Dunree and Lenan).

2 Field Artillery Brigade		
	Unit	Officers
	II F.A. Brigade	OC Comdt R. Callanan Adjnt Lt C. Mattimoe NO QM – Btys were self-contained
a	5 th Field Battery (Regular Cadre)	Capt D. Cody OC Lt J. Griffin Lt P. O’Neill Lt M. Buckley (R.O.) Lt C O’Sullivan (Mullingar V.F.)
b.	6 th Field Battery (Volunteer Force [V.F.] Bray)	Lt. J. S. Nolan (Later Comdt F. Aherne Lt W. Reeves (Mullingar V.F.) Lt M. Touhy (Castlebar V.F.) Lt J. McDermott (Mullingar V.F.)
c.	7 th Field Battery (V.F. Dublin)	Lt J. Murray, Bty Comd (BC) Lt J. Nolan (Dublin V.F.) Lt Halloran (Mullingar V.F.) Lt J. Kane
d.	8 th Field Battery (V.F. Drogheda)	Lt R. Carew BC Lt J McEvoy (Ballinasloe V.F.) Lt J. Sweeney (Ballinasloe V.F.) Lt M Monaghan(Ballinasloe V.F.) Lt Byrne (Drogheda V.F.) Lt T. Walsh
e.	2 nd Mortar Battery (V.F. Monaghan)	Capt W. Donnelly BC Lt V. Smith Lt F. Mulligan (Monaghan V.F.) Lt T. Lyons (Monaghan V.F.) Lt S Gibbons (Castlebar V.F.)

Figure 4.

Artillery organisation again underwent a change in June 1940. The II F.A. Brigade was changed into two Field Artillery Battalions. The Mortar Organisation also changed and the mortars were sent to Infantry Battalions. When this reorganisation was completed, the following position pertained:

2 Field Artillery Brigade		
	Unit	Officers
II F.A. Battalion		

a.	II F.A. Battalion HQ	OC Comdt R. Callanan Adj t Lt Dempsey (from OTC) QM Lt Smithwick (from OTC) I.O. Lt Sheridan, M. (from OTC)
b.	6 th Field Battery (attached to 2 Inf Bn Ballsbridge)	BC Lt. J. S. Nolan GPO Lt Byrne (Drogheda V.F.) Sec Offr Lt Barry-Landers (OTC) Sec Offr Lt Tierney (OTC) Attached Lt Deasy Attached Lt Farell M. (transferred from Kerry Bty V.F.)
c.	10 th Field Battery (attached to 11 th Inf Bn, Gormanston)	BC Capt W. Donnelly GPO Lt J.J. Nolan (Dublin V.F.) Sec Offr Lt M.T. Duggan (Dublin V.F.) Lt Grogan (OTC)
d.	11 th Field Battery (This was a new unit formed and training at McKee Barracks)	BC Lt C. Mattimoe GPO Lt T Quirke (OTC) Sec Offr Lt Slattery (OTC) Sec Offr Lt Lennon (Emergency Officer)
IV F.A. Battalion (Mullingar)		
e.	IV F.A. Battalion HQ	OC Comdt D. Cody Adj t Lt R. Carew QM Lt M. Monaghan(Ballinasloe V.F.) TO Lt T. Tallon (Emergency Offr)
f.	5 th Field Battery	BC Lt V. Smyth (Monaghan V.F) GPO Lt C. Sullivan (Mullingar V.F.) Sec Offr Lt P. McLynn (Emergency V. F.) Sec Offr Lt McDermott (Mullingar V. F.)
g.	7 th Field Battery	BC Lt J. Griffin GPO Lt J. McEvoy (Ballinasloe V.F.) Sec Offr Lt J. Murray, Bty Comd (BC) Lt M. Greaney (Ballinasloe V.F.) Sec Offr Lt j. McDonnell (Emergency Offr)
h.	8 th Field Battery	BC Lt J. Kane GPO Lt T. Walsh Sec Offr Lt Halloran (Mullingar V.F.) Sec Offr Lt J. Sweeney (Ballinasloe V.F.)

Figure 5.

On this re-organisation, all the officers with the Mortar Units proceeded to Infantry Battalions and became the Bn Mortar Officers.

In or around June 1941, the organisation again changed, and the II and IV Battalions merged into the II F.A. Battalion with its HQ at McKee Barracks.

2 Field Artillery Battalion		
	Headquarters McKee Barracks	OC Comdt R. Callanan 2I/C Capt W. Donnelly Adjt Capt R. Carew QM Capt M. Monaghan A/QM Lt Smithwick TO Lt T. Tallon
a.	5 th Field Battery	Mullingar
b.	6 th Field Battery	Ballsbridge
c.	7 th Field Battery	McKee Barracks
d.	8 th Field Battery	Longford
e.	10 th Field Battery	Gormanston
f.	11 th Field Battery	McKee Barracks

Figure 6.

With the exception of the 7th and 11th Btys, all the others were attached to Infantry Battalions. In July 1941, the Battalion was transferred to Collins Barracks and assumed responsibility for the Barracks I every respect.

During the reorganisation and merging of the Battalion in 1941, Comdt Callanan was promoted Major and appointed Adjt of 2 Inf Div. He took with him, as his assistant Lt T. Walsh. During 1941 and 1942, two more batteries, the 14th and 19th, were established and in early 1943, the 20th Battery was formed.

Just to show that the planners were alive and active, the organisation again changed in March 1943, and out of the II Field Artillery Battalion was formed the II, IV and VI Field Regiments, consisting of three field batteries and one anti-tank battery to each regiment, and, thank goodness, this organisation remained static until the end of the Emergency.

The II and VI Regiments moved to Hibernian Schools, Phoenix Park (now St. Mary's Chest Hospital). A portion of the Barracks had been used and continued to be used until the end of the Emergency as St. Mobies Military Hospital.

Collins Barracks vacated and both Regiments moved to Hibernian Schools on 8th October, 1943. As the IV Regiment was with 6th Bde, OC VI Regiment was appointed OC Hibernian Schools. The Organisation of II Field Artillery Regiment was then as follows:

2 Field Artillery Battalion		
	Headquarters	OC Comdt W. Donnelly Adj t Capt J. O'Brien QM Capt M. Monaghan CPO M. Sheridan TO Lt W. Atkins
a.	10 th Field Battery Armament: 75mm Guns	BC Capt P. Griffin GPO Lt Kellegher Sec Offr Lt J. Kerr Sec Offr Lt Mason
b.	14 th Field Battery Armament: 75mm Guns	BC Capt T. Walsh GPO Lt N Farrell Sec Offr Lt H. Shortall Sec Offr Lt. C. Smyth
c.	19 th Field Battery Armament: 4.5" Hows.	BC Capt R. Carew GPO Lt G. Byrne Sec Offr Lt N. Boyle Sec Offr Lt G. Kiernan
d.	2 nd Anti-Tank Bty Armament: 2 Pdr Anti-Tank Guns	BC Capt E. Dineen Sec Offr Lt P. McDonald

Figure 7.

All during the Emergency period, the II F.A. Regt proceeded with the Brigade on all exercises which were carried out from Dublin to the Border. GHQ inspections were carried out annually. Tests for the Regimental Trophy, Battery Shield and Single Gun were carried out each year also, generally culminating in shooting test in Glen Imaal and while the Regiment never won any of the competitions, it placing at 3rd or 4th was satisfactory considering the participation of seven Regiments.

Another interesting pint was that all through the Emergency, the ammunition for the guns was stored in Ballsbridge, Portobello (now Cathal Brugha) Barracks and Hibernian Schools. This was necessary in case it was required to be made available quickly in the event that our neutrality was not respected. Indeed, there were a few scares in 1944-45, but nothing came of them. Interesting too was the fact that all units had to cut and save turf during the emergency period, so that sufficient fuel would be available for heating and cooking purposes and II F.A. Regiment's bog was in the vicinity of Allenwood, on Allenwood Bog.

During the Emergency 1939-1945, a very high standard of training was attained and from the end of 1943 onwards, any job of work given to the Regiments presented no difficulties – it was automatic. This was more noticeable on Field Exercises, particularly in the areas of feeding, moving bivouac areas, marching, physical fitness and gunnery which was of the highest standard. This included a Divisional Artillery demonstration in Glen Imaal in 1944, when seventy-two guns were let loose on targets. This was Artillery's biggest and finest hour.

Another very good feature of this Emergency Period was the cooperation and liaison between supported units and artillery. Brigade and Battalion Commanders, up to this period, looked on artillery as another source of trouble and worry. However, it did not take very long to prove that they were a very necessary part of the organisation of Brigades and eventually all won all hands over to become very Artillery-minded. As a matter of fact, Commanders would not think of any exercise without being accompanied and advised by their artillery Commanders. The day of “Artillery Black Magic” was over – and a good thing for all concerned.

Due to the rapid expansion of Artillery Units during 1929-45 period, the training of large numbers of officers and NCOs had to be undertaken. Taking a broad view of the situation at the time, our Depot and School at Kildare has done a magnificent job of work and turned out a splendid material. It only need some field experience to turn these officers and NCOs in the majority of cases into really fine leaders. It can be said in all earnestness that the Depot and School came up to Artillery’s best expectation and deserve the highest credit.

In October 1945, Volunteer and Emergency Officers were boarded by higher authority, with a view to permanent commissions in the Army. The numbers accepted would be very small (Regular Army – 4, Reserve – 9, Discharge – 7). Quotas were also fixed at this time for demobilisation on a monthly basis. As an example, twenty-three men was the figure fixed for November 1945.

In November 1945, the Director of Artillery discussed with OC’s II and VI Regiments the question of amalgamation of the two units into the II Field Artillery Regiments. Instructions were issued for the work to be completed by January 1946. A board of three officers consisting of Majors McNally, Coffey and Cody interviewed NCOs – both Regular and Emergency – to be retained in the Regular Army and Reserve. At the same time, recruiting for the regular army was reopened. The response was very poor.

The order of amalgamation was:

2 Field Artillery Battalion		
	Sub-units	New amalgamated Sub-units
a.	Headquarters, Anti-tank Bty and 5 th Field Battery	10 th Field Battery
b.	6 th Battery	19 th Field Battery
c.	11 th Bty	14 th Field Battery

Figure 8.

All this work was completed and officers, NCOs and Men were taken on the strength of the II F.A. Regt in Orders on 17/1/46 (see Appendix A). Surplus transport was handed over to 2 Field Company Supply & Transport Corps in Collins Barracks for sale. All officers were required to undergo an MT Course from 01 March to 30 April 1946 at Hibernian Schools. The purpose of this was twofold. It afforded officers a good working knowledge of motor transport and also employed Volunteer and Emergency Officer until such time as the board reported on who would be retained in the regular army. On 1st June 1946, Officers not accepted for service Regular Army, proceeded on pre-discharge leave.

During September and October 1946, all available NCOs and Men were turned out on harvest saving. This was due to the extremely bad weather during the summer and autumn. On 16th November, the Peace Establishment was received and put into operation. An order was received from Brigade that the Hibernian Schools was to be vacated and handed back to the Board of Works and the regiment to move to McKee Barracks. This move was to be completed by 18th December. This was duly carried out. The regiment had been stationed in Hibernian Schools for Three years and three months.

The officers comprising the Regiment on 18th December, 1946, on the move of the unit to McKee Barracks was as follows:

2 Field Artillery Battalion	
Officer Commanding	Comdt W. Donelly
Second-in-Command	Comdt J. Nolan
Adjutant	Capt T. O'Brien
Quartermaster	Capt P. Griffin
Command Post Officer (CPO)	Capt D. Murphy
Transport Officer (TO)	Lt M. Purfield
OC 2 A/Tk	Capt J. O'Sullivan
Section Officer 2 A/Tk	Lt G Byrne
OC 10 th Bty	Capt I. Noone
Gun Position Offr (GPO) 10 th Bty	Lt P. McGonagle
Section Officer (SO) 10 th Bty	Lt C Smith
OC 14 th Bty	Capt R. Crew
Gun Position Offr (GPO) 14 th Bty	Lt L. McCormack
Section Officer (SO) 14 th Bty	Lt J. Donoghue
Section Officer (SO) 14 th Bty	Lt P. McDonald
Attached	Comdt O'Herlihy
Attached	Lt M. Duggan
Attached	Lt S. Timmons

Figure 9.

1 JANUARY 1946

AMALGAMATION OF UNITS
POSTINGS

Authority is sought for the posting of the undermentioned personnel of the VI F.A. Regiment to the II F.A. Regiment.

(Signature) R. Carew (Rank) Comdt.

Date 5th January, 1946.

O.C. – VI Field Artillery Regiment.

Number	Rank	Surname	Christian Name
(a) REGULAR PERSONNEL			
83391	Gunner	Burns	John.
205735	Gunner	Burrows	Charles.
71885	T/Sergt	Bryne	Patrick.
85236	Gunner	Carbery	Patrick, Joseph.
107508	Sergt	Carolan	Leonard.
71286	T/Coy. Sgt.	Clancy	Thomas.
438100	Gunner	Conway	Timothy.
65655	Coy-Sergt.	Copley	Timothy.
76092	T/Sergt	Corcoran	Patrick.
70923	Coy-Sergt	Daffy	Patrick.
56261	Sergt	Donnellan	Andrew.
75651	Gunner	Donohue	William.
1123	T/Sergt	Dunne	Patrick.
76545	T/Sergt	Fitzpatrick	Thomas, Kevin.
74194	Corpl	Gaughran	John, Thomas.
67385	Gunner	Kennedy	William.
200206	Gunner	Kinsella	William.
83209	T/Sergt	Lahiff	William.
72547	T/CQMS	Mooney	John.
6381	T/BQMS	McLaughlin	Michael.
84758	Gunner	Nolan	Patrick.
67614	Sergt	Nolan	Richard.
438306	Gunner	O'Keeffe	James.
72570	CQMS	O'Toole	Thomas.
76097	Gunner	Purcell	Michael.
47134	T/S. M.	Redmond	James.
85062	Gunner	Reilly	James.
85073	Gunner	Walpole	Thomas.
409715	Gunner	Walsh	Patrick

(b) RESERVE OF MEN – 1ST LINE			
R.407574	Gunner	Cullen	Edward.
R.408584	Gunner	Downes	Martin.
R.205266	Gunner	Farrell	John.
R.423083	Corpl.	Hughes	Denis.
R.405241	Gunner	Kiernan	James.
R.200469	Sergt	O'Brien	Joseph Murrough
R.104903	Gunner	Roche	John

(C) RESERVE OF MEN – CLASS 'A'			
A/83389	Gunner	Blount	James.
A/76569	Gunner	Brett	John.
A/83394	Gunner	Carolan	Michael.
A/85091	Gunner	Costelloe	Michael.
A/83866	T/Corpl.	Cunningham	Domnic.
A/83400	Gunner	Douglas	John.
A/104385	Gunner	Fowler	John.
A/74014	Gunner	Geraghty	Patrick.
A/83894	T/Sergt	Harbison	Liam.
A/77065	Gunner	Keane	Patrick.
A/83952	Gunner	Kelly	Christoper.
A/72624	Gunner	Kelly	James.
A/102874	Gunner	Lynch	Thomas.
A/24535	Sergt	Mack	Denis.
A/84079	Gunner	Mukearn	James.
A/65338	Gunner	Murphy	James.
A/9687	Gunner	McCormack	James
A/83960	Gunner	McCoy	Edward.
A/79137	Gunner	McDonald	Hugh.
A/76972	Gunner	McNamara	John.
A/83918	Gunner	O'Kelly	Martin.
A/74398	Gunner	Sheehan	Frank.
A/7247	Gunner	Swan	Barnard.
A/54041	T/Sergt	Vickery	Charles.
A/85060	Gunner	Whelan	Martin, Noel.

(d) VOLUNTEER FORCE			
V/205199	Gunner	Blake	John.
V/200313	T/Cpl	Byrne	James.
V/208189	Gunner	D'Arcy	Denis
V/200475	Gunner	English	Michael.
V/204975	Gunner	Fahy	Francis.
V/200339	T/Sergt	Gannon	Owen.
V/205075	Gunner	Healy	James.
V/200338	Gunner	Kelly	Joseph
V/205149	Gunner	Merrigan	Peter.
V/208765	Gunner	Moore	Dermot.
V/205059	Gunner	Murphy	John, Joseph.
V/200300	Gunner	Murphy	Patrick.
V/200315	Gunner	McCoy	Charles.
V/204980	Gunner	Russell	James.
V/206908	Gunner	Scully	Joseph.
V/20370	T/Sergt	Tobin	Daniel

(e) DURATIONISTS			
E/407796	Gunner	Anderson	Francis.
E/409925	Gunner	Anderson	John.
E/409246	Gunner	Brennan	William.
E/408588	Gunner	Buckley	John.
E/408513	Gunner	Bushe	Charles.
E/409744	Gunner	Byrne	Joseph.
E/407545	Gunner	Byrne	Michael
E/409737	Gunner	Byrne	William.
E/407844	Gunner	Campbell	Eamon.
E/438120	Gunner	Carew	William.
E/438101	Gunner	Carroll	Peter, Michael.
E/407813	Gunner	Comiskey	Patrick.
E/407816	Gunner	Dillon	Peter.
E/438112	Gunner	Donohue	Matthew, Thomas.
E/407816	Gunner	Dunne	Thomas.
E/438123	Gunner	Dwyer	Michael.
E/405682	Gunner	Evans	James.
E/405288	Gunner	Fairbrother	William
E/407491	Gunner	Finlay	James.
E/423074	Gunner	Foley	Martin.

E/406951	Gunner	Gara	Cormac.
E/407474	Gunner	Gaynor	James.
E/402252	Gunner	Graham	James.
E/438125	Gunner	Greene	John.
E/409743	T/Cpl	Griffin	Arthur
E/405658	Gunner	Guinan	Joseph.
E/438116	Gunner	Harman	Patrick.
E/438207	Gunner	Haughey	Joseph.
E/437502	Gunner	Hayes	Michael.
E/404291	T/CQMS	Healy	Patrick.
E/409718	Gunner	Heavey	Joseph.
E/406054	Gunner	Houlihan	Cornelius.
E/437523	Gunner	Keddy	Patrick.
E/438124	Gunner	Kelly	Peter.
E/400646	Gunner	Lougheed	Frank.
E/409927	Gunner	Lyons	Eamon.
E/407535	Gunner	Maguire	Philip.
E/407845	Gunner	Malone	Laurance.
E/437512	Gunner	Manley	Anthony.
E/409865	Gunner	Mockler	John.
E/437525	Gunner	Morris	John, Aloysius
E/40527	Gunner	Mulligan	Thomas.
E/404563	Gunner	Murray	Eugene.
E/409738	Gunner	McCabe	Owen.
E/424148	Gunner	McDermott	John.
E/404558	Gunner	McGuinness	Seamus.
E/438188	Gunner	Nolan	Andrew.
E/401233	Gunner	Nugent	James, John.
E/438265	Gunner	Power	Patrick.
E/408683	Gunner	Quilty	Patrick.
E/348282	Gunner	Quinn	Kevin.
E/405763	Gunner	Rafferty	Joseph.
E/438187	Gunner	Reid	John, Oliver.
E/409722	Gunner	Richardson	Robert.
E/409997	Gunner	Ryan	Christopher.

I recommend the posting of above personnel WEF 17th inst.

All postings approved

WEF 17 JAN 1946
Signature (R. J. Callanan)
Rank Major

ABSTRACTS OF 63RD COMMAND AND STAFF COURSE

The EU Security Strategy Statement

Does it reflect the EU's need to change course and assume the larger role of "Great Power" status?

Colonel Con McNamara

ABSTRACT

The European Union (EU) and United States (US) share a transatlantic link with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). On the question of power, the efficacy of power, the desirability of power and the morality of power their perspectives are diverging. US military power has produced a propensity to use that power, while the EU seems to be moving beyond military power as a solution to conflict resolution, into a world of transnational negotiation and cooperation underpinned by international law. It is this conflict of attitudes to power between the EU and the US that forms the basis of this study.

This thesis reflects, through an examination of the European Security Strategy (ESS) adopted by the Member States (MS) in 2003, how this power phenomenon is manifested in the EU's approach to addressing both security and defence issues. Salient themes are explored in respect of power, types of power and great power status and comparisons between EU, US and NATO are made in that context.

The resultant findings and analysis, viewed through the experience of the EU and the US, highlight the divergence of attitude in relation to the value of hard power and soft power. The thesis reveals the consequences of the application of hard power in reaching the desired political end state in a theatre of conflict. It concludes, by demonstrating that the EU needs to engage with the growing political dimension of the US dominance, in order for it to remain the relevant institution in the transatlantic partnership. A stronger EU/US partnership with a shared global vision will arguably be all the more vital in balancing both the influence and impact of US hard power status.

The thesis will give an appreciation and understanding of why the EU has no atavistic tendencies to become the great military power of former centuries, but rather it believes that soft power will become the dominant power in reaching greater world power status in the future.

Network Centric Warfare: A Panacea for Future Military Capability?

Comdt C.J. Cullen

ABSTRACT

In the last few years the Internet and the information revolution have transformed the way business operates. Military theorists examined this transformation in business capability to see if the lessons learnt were applicable to the military domain. As a result of this examination the theory of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) emerged in the late 1990s. The theory asserts that robustly networking shooters, sensors and decision makers will yield dramatically increased military capability. The NCW concept originated in the US and has since come to forefront of Western military thought.

The NCW concept presents huge opportunities to enhance military capabilities yet it also presents huge challenges. This thesis has focused on the examination of these challenges. The theorists universally agree that the best way to implement NCW is with a decentralized command structure with maximum freedom of action given to junior commanders. Yet the robust communications systems available with NCW allow senior commanders to interfere in tactical level matters as never before. The challenge is to get the balance right between necessary centralized direction and the use of initiative by junior level commanders.

By conceptualizing military entities in terms of sensors, shooters and decision makers a focus is automatically put on the acquisition and destruction of targets. The roles that militaries will have to carry out in the twenty-first century are far more complex than the mere destruction of targets. The challenge will be to implement NCW so that an excessive focus on targeting will be avoided.

There will be challenges for the Irish Defence Forces if it is to adapt a concept developed for the US and utilise it to attain a maximum enhancement of capability in the context of a relatively small defence expenditure base. NCW depends for its effectiveness on the rapid sharing of information across a network. Yet individual counties guard classified information jealously. If NCW is to be used effectively in a multinational context this reluctance to share information must be overcome. In the light of the challenges outlined above, this thesis investigates whether or not NCW will be a panacea for future military capability and examines the implications of NCW for the Irish Defence Forces.

Is Modern Ireland Ready to Embrace the Memory of the Royal Irish Constabulary ?

Comdt Sean M. Dunne B Comm

ABSTRACT

Until 1922, policing in Ireland was the primary responsibility of the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC). This was an armed and quasi-military police force.

Throughout its existence, the membership of the RIC was predominantly Catholic, many of whom were of a broadly nationalist persuasion.

Joining the RIC for Catholics was an acceptable and sought after occupation. The RIC were popular with the people and were a *community* police force. However, this would change in the aftermath of the 1916 Rising.

The British Government failed to realise that the insurgency in Ireland required a multi-faceted response and not just a police one. Consequently, the RIC were tasked initially with countering the insurgency, a role for which they were not prepared. The augmentation of the police with British recruits ultimately exacerbated the situation.

Since its disbandment in 1922, the RIC has been badly served by collective memory in Ireland. The memory and reputation of the force has suffered due to its association with the “Black and Tans”, the Auxiliaries and to some extent the RUC. This thesis reappraises the role played by the RIC in Irish society and examines the way in which the force is remembered in contemporary Ireland. Analysis of the core research question will show that modern Ireland is not *yet* ready to embrace the memory of the RIC.

This thesis demonstrates how the RIC changed from being an acceptable police force, to an unacceptable one. It illustrates how negative memory discourses concerning the RIC have formulated and examines the present position regarding collective memory and the RIC. The thesis also draws some analogies with the contemporary Defence Forces and outlines the lessons that the Defence Forces can learn from the study of collective memory and the RIC.

“First Do No Harm”

Is Critical Incident Stress Management an Appropriate Primary Crisis Intervention Paradigm for the Permanent Defence Forces?

Comdt Gary Gartland

ABSTRACT

A critical incident is any event that overwhelms a person’s ability to cope or produces unusually strong emotional, cognitive or behavioural reactions. The Irish Defence Forces (DF), by its nature, places personnel at risk of experiencing critical incidents both at home and on overseas service. Employers see psychological debriefing as the optimal response to managing critical incident stress. Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) refers to a number of techniques designed to provide early intervention and supportive services to recipients and has been utilised by the DF since 1989. While it appears to meet the duty of care of employers and is a response to the needs of the individual and the organisation, there are opposing views on its efficacy. Proponents are convinced of the success and importance of early and proactive debriefing, while critics claim that debriefing is ineffective and may actually cause harm.

The purpose of the thesis is to explore the CISM model through a case study of the Defence Forces, in order to ascertain if it is an appropriate intervention. The research is a qualitative analysis and utilises an examination of available academic works relating to the discourses on psychological intervention in the wider context and a number of semi-structured interviews with subject matter experts. The research attempts to identify the factors, influences and attitudes that impact on the use of CISM in Military Forces internationally.

The findings indicate the absence of a structured, holistic approach to mental health for the Defence Forces. A proactive policy on mental health care is required to address all of the psychological needs of DF personnel. If the DF continues to provide CISM as the single primary crisis intervention method for the prevention and management of PTSD then further evaluation of the system is necessary to provide the organisation with results on its benefits and limitations. The findings of this study highlight current procedures for crisis intervention in the Defence Forces and may serve to initiate debate on required policy and strategy. They also identify significant issues that may warrant further study.

Securing Societal Support: A Case-study of Public Relations Practice in the Defence Forces

Comdt Daniel C. Harvey BComm MA

ABSTRACT

Today the public have a very high level of expectation on information and the Defence Forces can only operate with the fully informed consent of the people. Nationally the Defence Forces relies almost exclusively on the Irish media to mould and shape public opinion. The military-media relationship is strained however by a direct conflict between the public's right to know and the military's right to security. While the media may not tell you what to think, it does tell you what to think about - it sets the news agenda and decides which issues to characterise, the prominence they receive, how they are portrayed and for how long.

This thesis explores public relations policy in the Defence Forces. The research methodology encompasses qualitative inquiry using a case study approach. Data sources include written materials including the Irish Defence Forces military college course syllabi, observations of Defence Forces public relations practice and interviews with public relations practitioners both within and outside the Defence Forces. Multiple sources of data and multiple voices (of serving and retired members of the Defence Forces and independent professional public relations consultants) are used to triangulate the data, from which the findings of this research are recorded.

This study demonstrates that the national experience has been that of a publicity-shy Defence Forces, largely unheeded by the media and therefore not understood by the public. The findings point to obstacles to the military's marketability which include:

- a deficit of clearly defined Irish defence policy which renders defence unfashionable;
- that the media chases what's fashionable in a competitive (news) market;
- and most importantly that the Defence Forces itself has not and still does not differentiate between press and public relations.

In conclusion this thesis' investigation of current Defence Forces Communications suggests the need for the future development and professionalisation of a Defence Forces public relations strategy in order to secure and sustain societal support.

Would Greater Emphasis on Whole Person Development Benefit the Defence Forces?

Lt Cdr Anthony Heery (N.S.)BBS

ABSTRACT

This thesis is concerned with the development and motivation of human resources within the Defence Forces. It examined current trends and experiences in human resource management in civilian organizations and assessed the relevance or otherwise of these trends and experiences to the Defence Forces.

These experiences constitute what some commentators describe as a crisis in management, range from an inability to fully engage workers to substantial numbers of workers having negative and destructive work-life experiences resulting in sub-optimal organizational performance. These experiences persist despite management efforts to implement modern and up to date strategies intended to counter them. This has resulted in a fundamental questioning of the meaning and purpose of work and a questioning of why workers are so little motivated, as opposed to how to motivate workers. Questioning in this way is leading researchers and practitioners into previously uncharted waters around spirituality, a spirituality of work and a recognition that workers are seeking to satisfy needs in these areas through work. This thesis explored this emerging phenomenon and its relevance or otherwise to the Defence Forces.

The findings confirmed that significant change, debate and analysis is ongoing within the wider spectrum of human resource management. It confirmed that engaging the human spirit and a spirituality of work is a central component of this debate. The relevance of these developments to the Defence Forces was not fully established within the limits of this thesis.

The Irish Defence Forces and Humanitarian Agencies: Initial Themes for Working Together Towards Better Practice

Comdt Paul Keyes

ABSTRACT

This study explores Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC), the military term applied to the interface between military and civilian actors in an operational environment. The central focus of this thesis is an exploration of the effectiveness of Irish Defence Forces CIMIC doctrine in contributing towards a mutually beneficial relationship with the humanitarian community.

The study distinguishes between the dominant *doctrine* of CIMIC, as currently understood on the international stage, and the *concept* of CIMIC, facilitating a development of understanding more suited to the ‘softer’ identity of the Irish Defence Forces.

The findings point to a divergence of CIMIC doctrine from the experience and values of the Irish Defence Forces and caution on the inherent dangers of adopting foreign doctrine without having thoroughly examined its underlying philosophy and potential consequences. The findings also highlight the significant communicative barriers that exist within the humanitarian-military relationship, and explore an avenue that may potentially lead towards the reduction of those barriers.

The study also reveals the identity and experience of the researcher as it reflects on the nature of the humanitarian-military relationship, exploring the implications of difference, the perception of power, and the significance of language, meaning, and understanding.

The study recommends that the Irish Defence Forces develop its own distinctive CIMIC doctrine, adopting an inclusive and holistic approach towards the humanitarian community. It further recommends that the Irish Defence Forces examine its own experience and cultural identity in order to develop an awareness of potential obstacles that it may contribute towards the humanitarian-military relationship.

The significance of this study resides in its revealing of potential for developing the dynamic interaction between the military and humanitarian community that now forms an integral part of the international response mechanism to complex emergencies. As the Irish Defence Forces continue to contribute towards peace support operations in international theatres, it needs to seriously engage with the concept of CIMIC. The initial steps towards a re-invigorating engagement have been taken in this study.

The Influence of Private Military Companies in Contemporary Theatre of Operations Case Study Afghanistan

Comdt Garry F. McKeon

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the influence of Private Military Companies (PMCs) in the contemporary theatre of operations. A case study on Afghanistan was selected through personnel experience.

The thesis considers three key questions concerning the emergence of and consequential influence of commercial PMCs. It critically examines the emerging literature on PMCs, critiquing the two competing views that have emerged. The first argues that PMCs represent a new phenomenon; more particularly a new “organisational methodology of warfare” (Wallenstein, cited by Singer, 2003:102) while the second contends that PMCs are simply a reconfiguration of the older mercenaries ‘incorporated’ view.

Therefore the first aim of the thesis is to critically evaluate the relative merits of these respective viewpoints. It identifies from the theoretical and empirical literature, the effects and implications of the use of PMCs on militaries associated within the specific context of a weak nation state, in this case Afghanistan. Arising from this analysis, the second aim conducts a specific case study, namely Afghanistan, as the empirical study site, in which to analyse a number of the implications of the PMCs from the examination of the literature identified above. The third aim draws a number of conclusions, informed by the existing literature, but critically evaluated in the light of the (empirical) evidence drawn from the case study of Afghanistan.

The main conclusions identified a number of significant and important findings that include

- the significant impact the PMCs had on the Afghan election process.
- Identifying the shift away from western employed personnel to locals.
- Acknowledging the dependency of NATO and others on PMCs to be service providers.
- Establishing legitimacy for operators in theatre.
- Finally outlining how a nation can be rebuilt employing PMCs and identifiable timeframes.

“PMC industry will continue to play a significant and increasing role in international security in the next decades” (Singer, 2003:230).

“Breaking News”
The Transformation of Strategic Affairs in the Middle East
Through the Manipulation of the “New Media”

A Case Study on Hizbollah

Comdt Harry O’ Connor, BA Phys Ed

ABSTRACT

Over the past few decades the nature of conflict has changed from war predominately conducted between states, to war between non-state actors. In parallel with this a revolution in media and communications technology has occurred. The confluence of information technology, globalisation and terrorism, has enabled the evolution of more adaptive and networked asymmetric players. Increasingly, insurgent and terrorist groups are embracing new communications technologies to further their military and political goals and mould their target audiences. New technologies provide instantaneous and unrestricted access. In this modern battlespace winning the hearts and minds of the public is crucial, for both the military and their adversaries.

The primary question examines the extent to which strategic affairs in the Middle East have been transformed by the manipulation of “New Media”. “New Media” involves the employment of the internet and satellite communications technology. This study assesses why insurgent groups utilize “New Media” technologies and the likely impact on military operations. The case study chosen looks specifically at Hizbollah, in Lebanon, and examines its innovative use of “New Media”. In addressing the primary research question, semi-structured interviews were conducted with international subject matter experts. These were drawn from Israeli academia, the pro Hizbollah Al-Manar broadcasting network and a senior UN political advisor.

The findings show, that the use of internet and satellite technologies is now the norm for the insurgent and their employment in theatre is having a significant impact, on both the military commander and on external events, at the strategic level. “New Media” is being employed as a strategic enabler. The study identifies the need for the military to put in place suitably qualified staff to address this development in a co-ordinated manner. It recommends further studies to examine the development of a multi-agency approach drawing on all available state instruments.

The Irish Defence Forces Is Ireland's Traditional Policy of Neutrality Diluted by European Security and Defence Policy?

Comdt Cyril Whelan BA, MMII (Grad)

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the question, Is Ireland's traditional policy of neutrality diluted by European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)? It will analyse Irish neutrality under two criteria. The first criterion reviews Irish neutrality within the context of Irish foreign policy development since the beginning of World War Two. The second, my main research area, deals with Ireland's foreign policy and its effects on Irish neutrality vis-à-vis its EU Treaty obligations.

The 1990s post Cold War, is I posit where the credibility of Irish neutrality has been stretched to breaking point: firstly, with the development of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP); and secondly, with the launching of the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF), which is the military instrument of ESDP and the teeth of EU foreign policy. International Relations have many competing paradigms, but two, Realism and Liberalism are relevant to Ireland's neutrality and its foreign affairs policy. My research is qualitative in nature using primary and secondary sources to direct the development of my research question.

My research findings indicate that the Amsterdam Treaty was the most important Treaty for the EU as the 'Peterberg Tasks' gave European security policy a direction towards humanitarian and Crises Management Operations. Neutrality has been used on occasion as a bargaining tool in the Irish political system; it is pragmatic, not ideological. It is difficult to define Irish neutrality because interested parties interpret it differently. The future role of Irish neutrality, within ESDP requires a public debate.

Areas for further research are, one, a comparative study on how EU neutrals are reacting to ongoing developments within ESDP; two, maturation of Anglo Irish relations and its effect on Irish neutrality.

My goal is to present this thesis in a style and content that is easily understood by the reader.

Stepping Forward Together

The Volunteer Reservist and the Reserve Defence Force

Identifying the Motivational Functions of Reserve Defence Force Volunteers and Matching their Expectations with the Reserve Defence Force

Lt Cdr Timothy O’Keeffe, N.S.

ABSTRACT

Volunteering, being proactive rather than reactive behaviour, involves the motivation of the volunteer in taking that step forward. Volunteering is described as any activity in which time is freely given to benefit another person, group or organisation and forms the core of all vibrant and inclusive societies. In a time of great change in our country, organisations must work hard to protect and enhance the spirit of voluntary participation.

Although the Reserve Defence Force (RDF) is described as a “volunteer and part-time organisation” with participation by reservists on a voluntary basis, it is not a traditional volunteering or nonprofit organisation. Volunteering in terms of the RDF is not defined, and because of the availability of occasional remuneration, initial difficulties were encountered in providing a definition. A lack of research was evident.

In common with many voluntary organisations, the RDF is experiencing increasing difficulty in recruiting new members and retaining trained personnel. The examination of volunteering with emphasis on the motivations of ‘why reservists volunteer for the RDF’ served to inform the primary research question. Implications for best practice in the management of reservists spurred my interest into taking the research a step further- an investigation of the relationship (in volunteering terms) between the expectations of the RDF volunteers and the RDF organisation, hence “Stepping Forward Together”.

The literature review highlighted the identification of motivational functions of existing volunteers as a means to proceed with the research. Two focus groups (one of new reservists and another of long-term reservists) and three individual interviews with key personnel provided qualitative data.

The findings identify the prioritised six motivational functions of volunteering for new and long-term reservists. The three key functions were career enhancement, social and values. The importance of values for both the volunteer reservist and the RDF was confirmed. Secondary findings highlighted the search by dedicated reservists for a work-life balance due to over commitment. Also highlighted was the case for part-time employee status for the volunteer reservists by its representative association. The findings of the thesis have implications for the recruitment and retention of reservists in addition to best management practice. The findings may assist similar organisations that manage volunteers and identify further study.

NATO and EU - Partners or Competitors in Capabilities Development?

Capt Lachezar Kuzmanov (Bulgarian Armed Forces)

ABSTRACT

NATO and the European Union were established after the Second World War and both have been transforming themselves since their inception. NATO responsibilities for the security and defence in Europe have differed from the EU's economic and social agenda. The fall of the 'iron curtain' altered the international security environment. It has created multi-directional and unpredictable threats to our increasingly interlinked, interdependent society. These threats require the application of a combination of 'soft' and 'hard' power capabilities in operations. To adapt to this new situation, both organisations transformed their approach to security by accepting new members, identifying new security tasks and building new capability architectures.

At the beginning of 21st century both, NATO and EU have twenty-one common member states, similar security tasks and are facing the same kaleidoscope of threats. These commonalities are a reasonable basis for cooperation in the area of capabilities development. However there is also the potential duplication of effort. This has implications for member states and particularly their national Capability Development Process.

The CDP is an integral element of the iterative process of organisational transformation. It is a coherent method for producing effective solutions to meet the new security challenges. The correlation between organisational interests, tasks, capability architectures and economic strength breaks CDP into three interlinked dimensions: political, military and economic.

This thesis analyses the extent of NATO-EU CDP cooperation and finds that although they are frequently competing the basis for future cooperation has been firmly established. Both organisations have financial imperatives to make best use of resources, however, for newly acceding states such as Bulgaria who have limited resources available for capability development it will be essential that cooperation triumphs over competition.

The Battle for the Targeting Battle Space

Comdt Richard J. Brennan BA, LLB, BL

ABSTRACT

The Principle of Distinction is regarded as one of the pillars of the law applicable in armed conflicts. It sets out that there must be a clear distinction between combatants and civilians. Accordingly, it shapes for the military commander his targeting landscape, in other words objects that might be legitimately attacked and objects protected from attack. In war it is viewed as trying to achieve the balance between the military necessity of the commander and humanitarian considerations. The principle is underpinned by two key granularities, which are codified in International Law, the civilian and the military objective. How the commander interprets both of these, is key to maintaining this difficult compromise between military necessity and humanitarian considerations. A failure to maintain this balance may lead to a blurring of a fundamental axiom of the law of armed conflict, distinction between combatant and civilian, or that which may be attacked and that which may not.

Unfortunately, the codification of both ‘civilian’ and ‘military objective’ were vague. This has caused divergent interpretations. These interpretations, when applied in the targeting battle space, have serious connotations on the civilian, in particular where the term ‘military objective’ had been accorded broad scope.

This thesis sets out to explore the nature of these divergent interpretations, as articulated in targeting doctrines of the twenty first century. Moreover, to understand the values and philosophies that underpin these interpretations. This thesis will try to ground these within the reality of war.

In the final analysis, this thesis will hope to examine Ireland’s position within this debate. It is important that we have a responsible understanding of our commitments to the principle of distinction, particularly, as we move towards greater participation within the multinational framework, in more robust challenging environments.

Developing Strategic Leadership Within the Defence Forces An Exploration of the Road Ahead

Comdt Anthony Cudmore BA MA

ABSTRACT

Preparing the Defence Forces for future service to the state is a responsibility of the military leadership working in close cooperation with other actors within the national security environment. In many organisations worldwide, this responsibility has been described as providing strategic vision. The significant role of strategic leaders in creating vision and developing organisations has been the subject of a considerable array of literature. Although military organisations worldwide have addressed the subject of strategic leadership, consensus has not been reached on suitable development models. This thesis explores aspects of strategic leadership development with the intention of highlighting challenges and possible responses within the Irish context.

The research commenced with analysis of the relevance of leadership literature and charted the different approaches to strategic leadership development within the military forces of the USA and the UK. Following from this, discussions were held with a number of leadership academics before interviews were conducted with representatives from within the national security apparatus, namely the Defence Forces, Garda Síochána and Department of Foreign Affairs.

The findings indicated that strategic leadership development is recognised as a necessary requirement across the security apparatus of the state, but that essential linkage between the three organisations has not been considered in the development of formal courses to meet this requirement. Furthermore it became apparent that the unique requirements of the Defence Forces would not be met by utilising any single nation's military model of development.

The findings provide an understanding of issues relating to the development of strategic leadership that may support the evolution of policy and practice relating to senior officer development within the Defence Forces.

An Examination of the Influence of Civil Society on the Irish Defence Forces

Comdt Eugene Friel

ABSTRACT

The ratio of civilian to combatant casualties as a result of conflict is continually increasing. To address the particular problem of post-conflict civilian casualties a worldwide prohibition of a conventional weapon was brought into effect in 1999. This was the Ottawa Treaty and the weapon was the anti-personnel. As a consequence, the Defence Forces amended their mine-warfare policy. This treaty was unusual in that it was both initiated, and heavily influenced throughout the negotiations by civil society. The military were now reactive and civil society proactive on the issue of specific conventional military weapons regulation. The entire debate on problematic weapons is pivoted with the military utility argument on one side, whilst counter-balanced by the humanitarian futility argument on the other.

This thesis explores the influence of civil society within the military sphere by questioning both military and Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) personnel, in order to ascertain the extent to which they perceive civil society should be involved in military related matters. It then examines the consequential effects on the Defence Forces operational capabilities, as a result of the Irish Governments position in relation to cluster munitions, and the current international campaign seeking their prohibition.

The findings of the thesis demonstrate that reservations occur within both the military and NGO spheres regarding the extent of formal coordination that should be undertaken, to minimise civilian casualties of conflict. Furthermore, the military have concerns regarding NGO influence at governmental level that could limit its ability to achieve a key objective outlined in the *White Paper on Defence*.

This study is important because the current campaign to prohibit cluster munitions has also been initiated and is heavily influenced by civil society. The level of success of this campaign will indicate whether a new norm of humanitarian prioritisation for conventional weapons control has been firmly established, external to the internationally recognised forum existing at present. It will dictate future governmental and, as a direct consequence, Defence Forces policy on conventional weapons. Both the military and civil society wish to minimise post-conflict civilian casualties, but as yet, they do not necessarily agree on the most suitable methodology to achieve it.

Distance Education in the Changing Training and Learning Environment for the RDF

Comdt Patrick Graham

ABSTRACT

The proposed integration of the Reserve Defence Forces (RDF) with the Permanent Defence Forces (PDF) requires an increased level of commitment and skill from the reservist. The challenge is to provide training that will enable raising the standard of RDF training towards that of the PDF, so that they may be to some degree at least interoperable.

The main objective of this thesis is to consider whether the use of distance learning technology can support the essential learning cycle that provides a basic model for learning. In the RDF training context, the real challenge is to provide support for learning in situations where there are too many learners and too few tutors, where tutors and learners cannot meet face-to-face, or where learners simply cannot adequately access the resources for learning.

The study critically examines and validates the DF's current learning practices and compares and contrasts these with best national and international distance education theories and practices.

Research was conducted by interviewing a variety of participants ranging from policy formers, through course designers to instructors and students. This gave a broad range of experience and opinion as to the utility of Distance Education (DE) in the RDF.

The key lessons drawn from this study include:

- The present day soldier, especially the younger technically comfortable man or woman, accepts and expects the use of Distance Learning.
- Current theories of education are accurately reflected in DF educational practice and in the RDFTA (RDF Training Authority) Distance Education training packages.
- DE is a valid method of training the part-time soldier and is cost and time effective.
- The pilot scheme of the RDF Training Authority has been accepted as very successful and may serve as a criterion for RDF and PDF education in future courses.

The relevance to this thesis is that a reliable, acceptable, efficient, method of training in Distance Learning is available in the Defence Forces and proved in practice in DDFT/RDFTA approved courses.

Towards and Understanding of Energy Security

Comdt Mark Hearn BA, MA(IR)

ABSTRACT

The Russian – Ukrainian gas dispute has led to increasing global concern over energy security. Energy politics have played a role in conflicts in the Middle East, the Caucasus, Central Asia and Africa, but this role has underlined the growing importance of Russia as an energy supplier and literally shocked energy-importing states into a re-examination of energy policy.

This thesis conducts a case study into the dispute and establishes that energy security, linked with economic security, is a relative concept depending on the actor and context. The supply of energy must be considered in conjunction with a complex array of political, economic and increasingly, environmental factors to develop accurate concepts and of appropriate strategies to improve energy security. Notwithstanding its significant energy reserves, Russia is dependent on Western investment both to upgrade current infrastructure and to access those substantial but isolated resources.

The study suggests that Europe and Ireland should seek to develop relations emphasising this interdependence and avoiding the paternalistic attitudes that have characterised relations with Russia since the end of the Cold War. At the same time, Ireland and Europe must develop more diverse sources for energy, better interconnectivity between energy networks, more energy production from sustainable sources and factor in climate change considerations in pursuit of improved energy security. The creation of a decentralised system of energy networks could enhance energy security in the coming century. Such a move would require strong political leadership to allocate appropriate funding and to challenge the vested monopoly interests. Military analysts cannot afford to ignore energy issues as they underpin many contemporary conflicts and impact on both domestic and collective security. Irish military education should include energy security issues on career courses, such as the Command and Staff Course, to develop understanding of the diverse nature of security.

United States Strategic Airpower; An Examination of the Coherence of Airpower Theory and Doctrine in War

Comdt Kevin O’Ceallaigh

ABSTRACT

The United States of America commands the most powerful air force on the planet. It provides the US Administration with the capability to strike anywhere in the world, at any time, in order to guarantee US security interests.

The conduct of strategic air operations evolved from the writings of theorists such as Giulio Douhet, General William ‘Billy’ Mitchell, and General Sir Hugh Trenchard. These theories advocated the establishment of an air force independent of the army and navy, and focused on the ability of strategic airpower to influence the morale of the opposing civilian population to achieve victory. However, following World War Two, the requirement to provide a strategic nuclear deterrent caused a hiatus in the development in non-nuclear, strategic airpower theory.

The writings of two theorists influenced the use of strategic airpower in the post-Cold War era; Col John Boyd, and particularly Col John Warden. Warden posited that the enemy society could be targeted systematically to produce collapse. He introduced the concept of effects-based operations, which focused on the effect to be achieved rather than the destruction to be inflicted. Warden’s theory has been integrated into US Air Force doctrine.

This thesis examines the theoretical and doctrinal basis for US Air Force strategic attack operations. It reveals that the US Air Force has a substantial body of literature to guide the use of strategic airpower. It shows that there is a coherent link from airpower theory, through US Air Force doctrine, to the conduct of an air campaign. It illustrates that the requirement for the US Air Force to operate as part of a joint force, enshrined in the 1986 *Goldwater-Nichols Act*, has created difficulties. It analyses *Operation Enduring Freedom* in Afghanistan as a case study to show that joint doctrine and US Air Force doctrine contradict each other, with consequent problems in the areas of centralised command and de-centralised execution, unity of command, and targeting.

This thesis provides guidance for Irish Defence Forces doctrine writers. It demonstrates how multiple joint and service doctrines, combined with differing ideological methods of operating during combat, can lead to potential loss of life and mission failure. It also demonstrates that operating as part of a joint force must continue to be the basis for future military missions.

Irish Aid and the Defence Forces: A Synthesis of Humanitarian Forces or an Incompatible Union?

Comdt Kevin McCarthy

ABSTRACT

An Taoiseach Bertie Ahern launched the White Paper on Irish Aid on 14 September 2006. This paper embraces the third phase of Irish foreign policy, termed ‘active neutrality’, and expresses its commitment to providing aid and assistance to developing countries. The Defence Forces is recognised by the White Paper as an active participant within the humanitarian space and Irish Aid has continually supported its humanitarian activities through specific project funding.

This thesis reviews the impact of the White Paper on the future conduct of the humanitarian activities of the Defence Forces within Complex Humanitarian Emergencies. This research is important, as little or no academic analysis has been conducted on the White Paper and should therefore prove beneficial not only to the Defence Forces but also to the Department of Foreign Affairs and the wider humanitarian community.

An extensive literature review and primary research accumulated the requisite data for analysis. The primary research included both semi-structured interviews and a survey. The interviews conducted with the strategic decision makers of both Irish Aid and the Defence Forces, Minister Conor Lenihan and Major General Patrick Nash, provided invaluable information and proved extremely beneficial in gaining an understanding of the intentions of both organisations.

In assessing the future conduct of DF humanitarian activities, it was necessary to consider the present, and in particular how the Defence Force’s existing procedures and relationships may be forced to change as a consequence of current internal and external pressures, the most significant of which is its commitment to “International Security, Defence and Crisis Management” (Gannon, 2007). The demands placed on the Defence Forces, through its commitment to the United Nations Standby Arrangements, Partnership for Peace, and the European Security Defence Policy, will present new challenges within the realm of humanitarian assistance. It is essential that if the Defence Forces is to meet these international commitments then its non-kinetic capabilities must be developed in concert with its kinetic ones and both should be embraced in a full-spectrum effects-based approach. Allied to this, the Defence Forces must identify and establish suitable source(s) of funding, other than Irish Aid and self-fundraising, to support these CIMIC activities. New commitments also necessitate a review of current procedures, leading ultimately to the development of a humanitarian doctrine. This doctrine should enable the Defence Forces to create a ‘Comprehensive Approach’ that will coordinate military humanitarian activities with all of the “neighbours of the humanitarian space” (O’Shea, 2007). It may also determine whether the humanitarian activities of the Defence Forces should continue within the current tripartite blur of CIMIC, non-CIMIC and charity-based projects.

A Stitch In Time Saves Nine An Examination of Specific Factors That May Lead to the Commission of a Tortuous Act

Comdt Sean Murphy B.Sc, BCL, LLB, BL

ABSTRACT

Torture remains a significant issue. Despite universal abhorrence and legislative intent it continues to manifest itself whenever the opportunity presents. Events such as the mistreatment of detainees in Iraq at Abu Gharib prison have shown that the consequences for the military, when found wanting, are catastrophic. A public debate has reopened issues concerning the maltreatment of detainees to such an extent that isolated actions have the capacity now to unravel military gains. The strategic consequences reinforce the need for vigilance to prevent an occurrence in the first instance.

This study seeks to contextualize torture. As a phenomenon it is difficult to define. Those definitions that do exist are often vague and contradictory adding to the difficulties experienced by those who seek to eradicate it. This thesis initially endeavors to understand this lack of clarity. The implications are then highlighted.

The thesis develops by examining a number of factors, intrinsic and extrinsic, which may facilitate or lead to the commission of a torturous act. The factors selected were the individual propensity to commit the act, the societal effect, which may shape the propensity, and the military environment, that may either facilitate or occasion the act.

The qualitative methodology fused military experiences with professional knowledge from the fields of sociology, psychology and psychiatry. These were then applied to a case study of a real-life event. The real-event in question was the deployment of the Canadian Airborne Regiment to Somalia and the subsequent atrocities it became implicated in.

The findings suggest that our focus on Human Rights abuse prevention may not be achieving its aim. The absence of an understanding or contingency to cater for the factors, as explored in this thesis, may well serve to undermine our efforts to date.

Too Little Command, Too Much Control? To What Extent is the Irish Military Leadership Function Aligned to the Demands of Asymmetric Conflict?

Comdt Rory Sheerin BSc

ABSTRACT

Modern conflicts are increasingly fought amongst the people, in a contest for popular support and by adversaries who differ in size, composition or methods. Conflict marked by these asymmetries is not a new innovation. The growing predominance of this form of warfare, and its emergence as a core concern for military forces are, however, recent trends.

These developments pose new challenges for military leaders, all the more keenly felt at the lower leadership levels, because of the dispersed nature of asymmetric war. It behoves military organisations to consider the implications of these challenges.

This thesis reflects on the military leadership challenges associated with asymmetric conflict using a leadership competencies framework. This construct focuses on leadership skills, knowledge and behaviour at the individual or organisational levels. From a review of literature on asymmetric conflict, the competencies of initiative, adaptability and innovation emerge as salient leadership themes. The extent to which these are actualised in the Irish Defence Forces is further explored through qualitative primary research using interviews and the examination of literature.

The research findings underscore the necessity to develop and support initiative, adaptability and innovation in military leaders. They also reveal a pre-requirement for a leadership philosophy supportive of these competencies. Although the Irish Defence Forces aspire to a leadership possessing these capabilities, cultural and structural impediments currently exist. Military terminology uses the ‘command and control’ dualism to define leadership arrangements. These terms reflect the latitude for, and the restrictions on innovative leadership. It is concluded that a leadership culture reflecting the pre-eminence of command over control is of fundamental importance in asymmetric conflict.

This thesis is intended to enable a better understanding of the leadership challenges currently facing military organisations, particularly the Irish Defence Forces, and through this, the need for a balanced leadership philosophy.

The Battle Over the Law of War: Exploring the Role of Law in Twenty-First Century Conflict

Lt Cdr Joseph P. Burke (NS) B.C.L. LL.M. B.L.

ABSTRACT

Twenty-first century conflict confronts us with unparalleled lethality; precision-guided munitions, extensive weapon reach and incessant instantaneous media coverage are juxtaposed against terrorism, unconventional warfare, and weapons of mass destruction.

In the midst of this maelstrom the modern commander faces unprecedented post-action scrutiny with the ever-increasing prospect of personal criminal liability should the use of military force be deemed excessive. Compliance with the law of war has become an essential consideration resulting in the recent evolution of the legal adviser as a specialist component of the modern commander's military decision-making process.

This study explores the role of law in modern conflict and focuses in particular on the evolving relationship between the commander and legal adviser by reviewing it against the struggle between the humanitarian and utilitarian theories that challenge for the future of the law of war. Commentators claim that the law of war is outdated for the complex, unique nature of modern unconventional conflict and the global war on terror, and attempts have already been made to suspend the humanitarian values inherent in the law of war in the interests of expediency. The nature of the balance between law and war is explored while the role of the legal adviser in upholding the edifice that is the law is also developed.

The central focus of this thesis resides in exploring whether the law of war can be maintained as a principled, moral device for restraint in twenty-first century conflict. An important area emerging from the research is the utility of the law of war as a weapon for protagonists to use as propaganda to condemn their opponent's use of force. Similarly, the appropriation and inconsistent use of the language of the traditional Just War Theory to provide a technical mechanism for justifying the use of military force has emerged as a key area from my research. The principal theme emerging from the exploration is the complex nature of the balance within the law of war itself. Recommendations are made for future research in the use of national caveats to restrict mission specific rules of engagement and on the application of the European Convention on Human Rights to Defence Force's personnel while deployed on peace enforcement operations. The study also recommends the further development of training in the law of armed conflict at all levels within the Defence Forces.

Media as a Force Multiplier – How can Commanders Employ the Media From Start to Finish

Maj Lisa M. Bartel BBA

ABSTRACT

This thesis attempts to examine the ways that the media's capabilities can be used by the military in support of both campaign planning and execution. The relationship between the media and the military is not one without debate. There are areas of misunderstanding, which are exacerbated by the lack of appreciation of each other's ways of doing business. Through the examination of Strategic Enablers one gains an appreciation of the different ways the media can support a campaign plan. The comparison of case studies allows for reflection on how the media was used in the past and how the lessons from those conflicts can provide guidance for future use of the media's capabilities.

The research methods utilise a combination of data collection methods underpinned by the theory of qualitative research. Textual analysis lays the foundation for the research, while semi-structured interviews fill gaps identified during the review of literature. The case study comparison allows more detailed review of relevant concepts which are timeless in their application.

The resultant findings and analysis support the complexity of the relationship between the military and the media. There are a myriad of ways the military can use the media's capabilities to support a campaign from planning through mission execution. Understanding the level of support that can be provided by the media under various headings is paramount at the operational level of command. The importance of understanding each other's epistemology can help to mitigate the friction of the media/military relationship. This common understanding will help to build a better relationship for coverage and support of future conflicts.

Through reading this thesis, it is hoped that you may gain an appreciation for the complexity of the relationship between the media and the military and understand the relevance of the media as a force multiplier.

ABSTRACTS OF 64TH COMMAND AND STAFF COURSE

Exploring the Tensions in the Implementation of Integrated Mission in the UN

Comdt Barry Carey

ABSTRACT

Over recent years the face of UN lead peacekeeping has altered radically. The UN are now involved in the largest number of UN missions ever; they also have the largest population of peacekeepers operating in its sixty-year history. Peacekeeping is not the only UN role. The UN provides a full spectrum of services on behalf of the international community including humanitarian aid, developmental reconstruction, peacekeeping and peace support, policing and rule of law and governance to countries or regions in crisis.

The UN stated aim the delivery of a country or region in crisis from one of conflict to one of lasting sustainable peace. To manage this increasingly complex working environment the UN has reorganised its efforts so that greater coordination and cohesion can be achieved. All UN agencies operating in various missions globally (includes all various UN Departments, Programmes, Funds and Specialised Agencies) have now been drawn together under one overarching political leadership centrally controlled with the aim of achieving that greater coherence. These missions are described by the UN as Integrated Missions.

This study explores the make up of these new missions and examines the inherent tensions that are present following this change from the traditional UN mission design. The central focus of this thesis examines the role of the Deputy Special Representative Secretary General, Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (D SRSG RC/HC) within this new structure by adopting a post positivist approach and looking qualitatively at how the role is managed and how the inherent tensions are dealt with.

The D SRSG RC/HC is central to the success or otherwise of the new approach adopted by the UN as they oversee two vital supporting pillars in the transition from crisis to sustainable stability, the humanitarian pillar and the developmental pillar.

That multiplicity of functions makes the D SRSG RC/HC an interesting and also controversial role. The new structure has received widespread criticism from the international aid organisation and numerous NGOs. They claim that by including the UN humanitarian agencies under this new structure, the humanitarian principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence are corrupted.

My findings reveal that the combination of the D SRSG, the humanitarian coordinator and the resident coordinator into a single appointment has led to confusion and blurred the lines between the humanitarian and development pillars of the UN effort. The findings also suggest that the separation of these two roles would result in greater clarity and improved coherence. The findings also suggest that the concept of integration has improved the UN capacity and coherence and while issues still remain unresolved the general thrust of its introduction has been successful.

Defence Forces Strategy of Peace Support Operations

Comdt Ronan Corcoran

ABSTRACT

Peace Support Operations are the most exciting, demanding and rewarding work carried out by the Irish Defence Forces. The planning that is done prior to an Irish boot stepping on foreign soil is immense, and starts far from Dublin. In order to transfer the wishes of the international community into tactical peacekeeping, a strategy must be in place. Peacekeeping plays an important role in the maintenance and re-establishment of stable and secure environments around the world. It is an actor in international relations. This thesis analyses contemporary international thought on the role of Peace Support Operations and explores how this role is considered in the construction of an Irish military strategy of PSOs. It does so in order to inform members of the Defence Forces how the strategy of missions is moved from concept to plan and of recent developments in the strategy of Irish Defence Forces peacekeeping.

A qualitative methodology is undertaken which incorporates the expert opinions of military officers serving at the strategic level. This is supported by a textual analysis of relevant literature. The thesis finds that a 'strategic triangle' of close co-operation is in place between the Defence Forces, the Department of Defence and the Department of Foreign Affairs. It finds that there is a growing importance attached to strategic intelligence in order to better provide force protection, and that the development of National Intelligence Cells significantly improve Defence Forces strategic situational awareness.

The thesis concludes by recommending the establishment of a dedicated 'lessons learned' unit to secure the institutional memory, and the inclusion of cultural experts within the National Intelligence Cells.

The Psychology of Learning to Kill in Combat: Are the Defence Forces Soldiers Fully Prepared?

Comdt Robert Duggan

ABSTRACT

The Irish Defence Forces finds itself in a period of transition from traditional peacekeeping roles in relatively benign environments to more robust peace support operations where the probability of combat soldiers having to engage opponents with deadly force in hostile environments has greatly increased. The changed operational environment prompts the need for the Irish Defence Forces to examine how it trains its personnel to meet this increased threat effectively. From a review of literature the presence of an innate aversion to killing among humans has been identified. From the field of behavioural psychology, operant conditioning emerges as the key enabler permitting the soldier to overcome the natural instinct to avoid the taking of life. The extents to which these issues are acknowledged in the Irish Defence Forces emerge through qualitative primary research.

The study explores the discourses surrounding the socialisation of civilians into the military culture and considers the challenges a soldier faces in the current operational environment.

This thesis endeavours to raise awareness of the psychological conditioning process present in the training of combat soldiers in the Irish Defence Forces and to encourage the vested interest group to reflect in greater depth on its application in enabling soldiers to survive in combat.

The findings suggest that there is a lack of in-depth reflection on traditional practices within the organisation and the absence of a clear enemy may explain why an analysis of our systems of training is largely superficial. The Defence Forces has tended to absorb psychological conditioning processes unconsciously from other armies without due attention to the reasoning behind such methods. The findings of this study highlight an ambiguity of the Defence Forces role and may serve to initiate debate on the development of organisational doctrine. They also identify significant issues that deserve further study.

Workplace Drug Testing: An Examination of the Irish Defence Forces Approach to the Prevention of Drug Abuse

Comdt John McCarthy BComm

ABSTRACT

“The unlawful possession, supply, or use, of a controlled drug is incompatible with membership of the Defence Forces. All necessary measures will be taken to maintain a drug free society within the Defence Forces”. This is an extract from the Defence Forces Policy on Drug Abuse. The problem of drug-related crime, drug abuse and misuse, addiction, treatment and prevention has increased significantly in recent years. The Defence Forces introduced Compulsory Random Drug Testing in 2002 as a means of addressing the issue.

The aim of this thesis is to examine the Defence Forces approach to the prevention of drug abuse and to consider if it can be further developed to better address drug abuse in the workplace. It also explores a number of related sub-questions on policy and procedures, education, rehabilitation and reintegration and duty of care. In researching these questions the author considers how compulsory random drug testing evolved within the Defence Forces, examines the Defence Forces drug testing policy and compares the Defence Forces approach with that of other militaries, the author also analyses academic works related to substance abuse and the resistance to organisational change. This analysis forms the basis for a series of semi-structured interviews with diverse subject matter experts.

The findings indicate that there is no universal approach to drug testing, that each organisation must examine a number of approaches, policies and procedures and design one appropriate to their organisational needs. The findings further indicate the need for the Defence Forces to update or change its policy and in doing so consider additional forms of testing and the introduction of alcohol testing. Managing this change could prove a challenge to the DF particularly as the findings reveal conflicting arguments on a number of issues. The issue of rehabilitation and reintegration was found to be contentious and is identified as a subject that may warrant further study. The importance of drug awareness education for all employees is stressed; this is particularly relevant for managers in identifying the symptoms of drug and alcohol abuse. Duty of care to society emerged as a priority for all interested parties, at all times and in all decisions relating to the use or abuse of illegal substances this is particularly true given the safety-sensitive nature of military service.

Disarmament Disengagement Rehabilitation and Reintegration Of a Child Soldier, - Does it Work?

Comdt Paul Kennedy BA

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the state of rehabilitation and reintegration of former child soldiers in Africa and where appropriate emphasises the personal experience of the author through his service with the United Nations in Liberia. Paradoxically, the study also highlights the fact that former child soldiers do not appear to be the only victims in this process.

This thesis utilised qualitative research and documentary analysis methods, to elucidate pertinent knowledge in this rather newly emerging problem area in peace and conflict research. During interviews, IO personnel highlighted the numerous problems associated with DDDR. These included, the lack of timely and independent funding, appropriate programmes to deal with the gender issue and the need for support measures such as psychosocial counselling. The findings further expose the reader to the phenomenon of child soldiers, what they have experienced as children and why it is often difficult for them to reintegrate back into society, post conflict.

In order to pinpoint the challenge of reintegration, the underlying causes are presented to chart out the reason why children find themselves involved in armed conflict. While the need for a DDDR process to reintegrate them back into society is highlighted. After placing the programmes that have been developed to address the problems of reintegrating former child soldiers, in context, this thesis analyses the effectiveness of the various approaches. The roles of internal and external actors and donors are examined. While in conclusion, recommendations are proposed to show how DDDR policies and programmes could be improved in the future.

Knowledge in the area of DDDR for child soldiers still remains elementary, and requires serious research work as part of post-conflict peace building and stabilisation. As the Irish Defence Forces continue to contribute towards peace support operations, both through EU led missions and in the international theatre with the United Nations, it needs to engage with and understand the concept of DDDR. The initial steps towards helping the Irish Defence Forces develop an understanding of this concept have been taken in this thesis.

Darfur – Into the Gloomy Circle of Some Inferno

Comdt Bernard Markey BA LLB MA

ABSTRACT

Since early 2003 there has been a brutal conflict in Darfur, Sudan that has resulted in an estimated 200 000 deaths and the displacement of up to 2 million people. The conflict is a direct consequence of the actions of the Sudanese Government, who have pursued a tactic of ethnic cleansing to clear indigenous Africans from their villages into Camps for Internally Displaced and Refugee camps. Central to the Sudanese Government tactics has been the arming, training and mobilising of ruthless Arab paramilitaries who have carried out appalling atrocities against their African countrymen.

This thesis examines the nature of this conflict through the eyes of the author who spent eleven months in the region from August 2004 until July 2005 as a Military Observer attached to the African Union (AU). The thrust of this thesis is to establish through an autobiographical narrative methodological approach, whether the literature of the conflict gives an accurate impression of the reality on the ground. The thesis is radical in that it uses the 'self' as a research tool and concentrates on trying to interpret the meaning behind the events witnessed by the author.

Anecdotes and stories are used to attempt to paint a picture of the social and physical landscape that is Darfur. It is through these stories that the reader gains an impression of Darfur and its people, both indigenous and expatriate. The author has endeavoured to provide as wide a view as possible and deals with a variety of different topics and subject matter in an effort to give a comprehensive picture of life in one of Sudan's most beautiful and dangerous regions.

Finally the thesis considers the implications of the conflict in Darfur for the region known as the Sahal and concludes with an optimistic but cautionary note.

The Irish Defence Forces 'Terrorism' A Problem of Definition

Comdt Raymond Martin BSc

ABSTRACT

'Terrorism' is everywhere today. At least it seems as if the word 'terrorism' cannot be avoided in daily life. For a word in such common use, it is remarkably ill defined. Indeed, its meaning has changed substantially since it entered parlance some two hundred years ago. In spite of the best efforts of the League of Nations and the United Nations, a single, acceptable definition has been elusive. This study asks whether there is a common understanding of what is meant by 'terrorism', and by doing so, seeks to identify possible obstacles to an agreed definition.

The thesis initially considers the need for, and approaches to defining the term and attempts to discover points of agreement and disagreement about elements, which are believed to be important within definitions. The research uses a mixed method approach with the emphasis on a number of case studies based on individuals who were affected by the Northern Ireland conflict. A small survey was also performed assessing Irish military officers' attitudes to the term.

The research findings suggest that, although nationalists and unionists described events in similar terms, their interpretation of those events and application of the word 'terrorism' were quite different. The research indicates that a perception of a campaign focused on security force personnel, shielded the IRA from censure by the nationalist community. It was found that an intent to cause widespread terror was fundamental to whether interviewees regarded acts as 'terrorism'. It was also found that random targeting of civilians may be a critical characteristic in defining the concept.

Can Motivation Theory Explain Why Shortages of Commandant Volunteers for Overseas Service Occur?

A Case Study Of The Defence Forces 2005-2007

Comdt Anthony P. McKenna B COMM, MBS

ABSTRACT

The Irish Defence Forces will celebrate fifty years of troop commitment to the United Nations this year. Since 1958, over 56,000 individual tours of duty had been completed by Irish soldiers in the service of the United Nations or with Forces mandated by the United Nations Security Council. These figures underline Ireland's commitment and support for the multilateral system of collective security represented by the United Nations and the Security Council. This commitment is a central tenet of Irish Foreign Policy and by extension Irish Defence Policy. Accordingly the commitment of the Defence Forces to overseas service is defined by the White Paper on Defence published in 2000. This policy lays down the requirement for the Defence Forces not only to modernise, but also to develop increased responsiveness, including the provision of services internationally. These services include a standing commitment to provide up to 850 personnel to peacekeeping duties. The maintenance of this amount of personnel overseas has traditionally relied on a spirit of voluntarism.

Notwithstanding this, the Defence Amendment Acts of 1960 and 1993 provide for the mandatory selection of personnel for peacekeeping and peace-enforcing duties respectively. Support to the deployment of Irish Forces to Liberia in 2005 saw the multiple use of mandatory selection provisions for the first time in response to a specific shortage of Commandants for overseas service. While this thesis restricts itself to a case study for the period 2005-2007, the shortage of Commandant volunteers for overseas service persists to this day.

The aim of this thesis is to examine whether motivation theory can explain this shortage of Commandant volunteers. The research question is in turn set against a range of theoretical perspectives on motivation in order to establish a conceptual framework for the research process.

The findings inform us that aspects of motivation theory are evident in this case study, particularly the importance of promotion as a motivator. However by itself it does not adequately explain the persistent nature of volunteer shortages at this rank. Instead a number of structural issues are identified, which contribute significantly to the problem.

The Good, The Bad and the Ugly: Ethical Decision-Making in the Military

Comdt Neil Nolan B Comm, MA

ABSTRACT

The contemporary operating environment in which the Irish Defence Forces is engaged is increasingly complex and multi-faceted. Such challenges demand of soldiers a substantial degree of analytical sophistication with regard to ethical decision-making and behaviour.

Although the Irish Defence Forces has not suffered serious ethical transgressions by its members, this thesis asks whether the organisation should act pre-emptively and introduce a formalised ethics strategy. The factors which influence ethical decision-making are examined in the context of the complex ethical culture of the military. Theory is drawn from the fields of philosophy, sociology and psychology in order to examine the interaction between individual propensity and contextual factors; that is, organisational and situational moderators.

A qualitative methodology is undertaken which incorporates the expert opinions of military and civilian academics from Ireland, the UK, Canada and the US. This is supported by a case study of the Canadian Defence Ethics Programme and a textual analysis of relevant publications. The findings suggest that moral reasoning and judgement can be developed in soldiers, regardless of intellect, but that other influences such as empathy and group dynamics pose dilemmas for military organisations. Leadership has a crucial role to play in the establishment and maintenance of a healthy ethical climate, and comprehensively formulated and embedded organisational values are an important foundation of an ethical system.

The implications of this research for the Irish Defence Forces suggest that it is timely for the organisation to institute a formal, pervasive ethics strategy. This strategy should incorporate relevant doctrine and education, and be underpinned by appropriately formulated and embedded espoused values.

A Life Less Ordinary – What Motivates Defence Forces Personnel to Volunteer for Overseas Service?

Cft Páraic Ó Gallchóir B Comm.

ABSTRACT

Up to 850 members of the Defence Forces are on overseas duty at any one time. They endure months of separation from family and friends and at times find themselves in very demanding and dangerous situations. The aim of this thesis is to investigate the principal reasons why Irish soldiers volunteer for such overseas service.

To get to the core of the matter this exploratory research project commences with an analysis of the theories and literature relating to motivation. The author also reviews nine previous military sociology studies into the motivation of soldiers from other armies to serve on overseas missions. From this analysis the author identifies the major factors and influences that may have a bearing on Irish soldiers' motivations for volunteering for overseas service. Having gained an understanding of motivation, the author explores the topic using information gathered through the use of a focus group discussion, eight semi-structured interviews and forty questionnaires.

Seventeen themes emerge from the information collected by the author. The thesis analyses and evaluates the 17 themes in terms of motivators and ranks the motivators in order of importance as revealed in the study.

The author identifies the key reasons that prompt Irish soldiers to volunteer for overseas service. He presents his findings of what motivates members of the Defence Forces to volunteer for overseas service and compares these findings with the conclusions of the other military sociology studies of this topic. His findings indicate that financial reward is the primary motivator for volunteering for overseas service followed closely by a desire for personal improvement.

The thesis highlights areas that the Defence Forces management can concentrate on in the task to motivate soldiers to volunteer for overseas service and it proposes four incentives that could be used to encourage more soldiers to volunteer for missions abroad.

United Nations Security Resolution 1325: Just Add Women And Stir – A Recipe for Gender Stereotyping in Peacekeeping Operations?

Comdt Maureen O'Brien BSc HDipEd HDipCompSc

ABSTRACT

United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 (2000) Women, Peace and Security, is generally regarded as the most important commitment to date made by the global community to incorporate a gender perspective in the maintenance of peace and security. The Security Council formally recognised the different impacts of armed conflict on women and men. One of its aims is to seek to expand the role and contribution of women in United Nations (UN) field based operations.

This thesis critically evaluates UNSCR 1325 and its related documents and policies in order to expose the assumptions made by the UN regarding gender, peace and security. Specifically, the author explores the assumptions made in respect of female peacekeepers and examines whether these assumptions might in fact lead to the positioning of female peacekeepers into gender-stereotypical roles. The questions posed are whether female members of the Irish Defence Forces feel that they have special qualities which could be used in peacekeeping, whether they would consider themselves gender stereotyped if they were placed in CIMIC1 type appointments and whether or not females feel that their restriction to so called 'softer' appointments would have implications for their promotion and advancement within the Defence Forces.

The review of literature highlights that UNSCR 1325 almost entirely focuses on women; women as different from men, both in terms of the particular vulnerabilities they face in situations of armed conflict and in terms of their potential contribution to peacekeeping efforts. It espouses an essentialist approach to gender. A post-positivist, qualitative research methodology is employed because the author wants to know not just whether the research participants think that compliance with UNSCR 1325 would lead to gender-stereotyping, but more specifically she wants to know why the participants think what they think and how their knowledge is created.

The findings indicate that the participants do not feel that they have special qualities for peacekeeping; they understand that this perception might be held by the host country population and could be used to military advantage. If posted to CIMIC type appointments the participants would consider themselves gender stereotyped and Officers in particular, believed that these postings would have negative implications for their careers. The research also opens up a bigger question regarding the integration of a gender perspective within the Defence Forces. Although the Defence Forces possesses robust Equality, Diversity and Equal Status Policies, the research finds an absence of equality of voice, that is, the ability to contribute and to influence. Recommendations are made as to how this situation can be improved and suggestions are made for further research.

The Irish Defence Forces Security Sector Reform: Issues and Challenges for the Defence Forces

Comdt Sean White B.Sc H.Dip IT

ABSTRACT

In recent years, Security Sector Reform (SSR) has become an important aspect of the security and development discourse. At the heart of SSR is the well-documented link between security and development. The overall justification for SSR is to create the conditions necessary for development, the reduction of poverty, good governance and ultimately the growth of democracy in developing nations. In line with Ireland's increasing development aid budget, the White Paper on Irish Aid 2006 identified SSR as an important issue that requires comprehensive efforts to ensure lasting peace in countries affected by war. The White Paper recognised that a joint government approach was needed to maintain a coherent development perspective across relevant government departments and an Inter-Departmental Committee on Development was established.

This thesis examines how SSR is understood by key policy makers in the Defence Organisation (Defence Forces and Department of Defence), the Department of Foreign Affairs and the NGO community, with the aim of determining how their views might influence the formulation of a joint approach to SSR in an Irish context. The thesis initially outlines the historical evolution of SSR then considers its evolution within the development discourse. Thereafter key theoretical aspects are discussed along with, areas for engagement, stakeholders and obstacles. Finally, the thesis discusses the possible involvement of the Defence Forces in SSR policy formulation in a joint manner with the relevant Irish agencies. To date such joint SSR approaches have not occurred in an Irish context. The main finding from the analysis is that SSR is relatively well understood by all departments and agencies and that there is potential for further engagement among the policy makers. Accordingly aligning Ireland's security and development policies within specified guidelines is the greatest challenge and needs to be addressed in the formation of an Irish SSR policy.

Should a Formal Mentoring Scheme be Introduced by the Defence Forces in Support of its Human Resource Management Strategy?

Lt Cdr Marin Counihan (N.S.)

ABSTRACT

Mentoring is one of the fastest growing concepts in Human Resource Management (HRM), yet the Defence Forces have at this time chosen to exclude it from their first HRM strategy document. The purpose of this thesis was to investigate if a formal mentoring scheme should now be introduced by the Defence Forces in support of its current HRM strategy. At present, the Defence Forces faces many environmental challenges, which directly impact on the recruitment, training, development and retention of personnel. The number of younger people entering the workforce is decreasing, while their value systems do not promote self-discipline or a culture that values teamwork, leadership or flexibility. This is the environmental context within which the current strategy sits.

The research for this thesis consists of a review of literature that pertains to mentoring and a review of the Defence Forces HRM Strategy document. The benefits of mentoring, the critical success factors necessary to achieve those benefits and an alternative view of mentoring are researched. The critical success factors include: Purpose and Scope of Mentoring Scheme, Matching, Selection of Mentor / Mentee, Education and Training and Culture. The thesis uses the methodology of a semi structured interview model to assist in answering the research question. The sources of this qualitative research were interviews with experienced military and civilian professionals who have a practical knowledge of both mentoring and HRM.

The principle findings of this study are that mentoring can provide substantial benefits to both the organisation and those participating in the mentoring scheme. Benefits for the mentor and mentee include improved motivation, commitment and performance.

The organisation benefits from improved retention, communications and the availability of feedback from mentors. Mentoring is suited to a military organisation, is cost effective and considered a 'best practice' HRM activity. The research also indicates that the mentoring of newly commissioned officers for a period of one year would be most beneficial to the Defence Forces. Mentoring should be introduced by the Defence Forces in support of its HRM strategy. The timing of its introduction will require further research on the detailed practicalities of resourcing.

Exploring Aspects of the Entry of Women Into the Federal Armed Forces in Germany

Lt Col (DEU) Holger Offenhausen

ABSTRACT

This thesis is intended to enable a better understanding of the new concept of female soldiers currently entering military organisations in Western Europe, particularly the German Bundeswehr, and the need for an ongoing discussion of this subject. Women have always been more or less involved in military affairs. In Germany they are allowed to join all services and arms in the Federal Armed Forces (the Bundeswehr) following a decision of the European Court in 2001.

Despite the fact that officials in Germany stressed the importance and success of the entry of female soldiers in the aftermath of this decision and announced as early as 2002 that the mission had “been accomplished”, it seems to be obvious that such a huge undertaking will have a long-lasting impact on an organisation like the Bundeswehr with its 248,000 soldiers today. So the author in his overall research question doubts this ‘early success’ and explores aspects that ultimately question the accomplishment of the integration process of women into the Federal Armed Forces in Germany (Bundeswehr). Notwithstanding legal barriers, there are still social, psychological and sociological issues that have to be addressed.

The impact of the integration of women into a male-dominated system is examined and the shaping of society’s perception during the process by the media is illuminated. Furthermore, the author focuses on the themes of masculinity, femininity and military in a western society and in the current transition phase of the Bundeswehr. The aforementioned themes are explored through qualitative primary research using interviews and an examination of literature relating to the area of women and the military. The research findings underscore the assumption that the integration has still not been accomplished and that it is necessary to change mindsets not only in the military, but also in society, in order to ‘naturalise’ and ‘ease’ the process. The research also reveals a requirement for a leadership philosophy supportive of these issues. Although the Bundeswehr aspires to a policy and a leadership embracing these issues, cultural and moral impediments currently exist. For example, military terminology uses the ‘integration of women’ instead of ‘equalisation of women’. This might reflect the issue that female entrants have to adapt to the male environment instead of aiming for a change in the institutional framework.

It is concluded that overall the entry of female soldiers into the Bundeswehr, especially among the younger generation of soldiers, is proceeding but not accomplished. Without a broad discussion in society about this theme, the integration will not be an entire success, but remain artificial because public perception and support are crucial for both male and female soldiers’ identities.

The Importance of Cultural Awareness for the Training and Education of Regular Forces Participating in Asymmetric Warfare: Afghanistan a Case Study

Maj Ghulam Muhammad, Pakistan Army MSc (Art and Science of Warfare)

ABSTRACT

On 7 October 2001, the US-led coalition forces (referred to as regular forces in the thesis) commenced Operation Enduring Freedom against the Taliban in Afghanistan. Due to their overwhelming technological ascendancy and conventional superiority, these forces succeeded in defeating the Taliban in a matter of days. During this phase of the war, the Taliban fought in a conventional manner, thus could not withstand the overbearing military power of the coalition forces. However, this success could not last long and the Taliban were back in the spring of 2002, this time as insurgents.

With this development the operation entered into a counterinsurgency phase. Contrary to the initial phase, the coalition forces have so far achieved limited success during this phase of the war. Consequently seven years later, Afghanistan is still in the grip of a vicious cycle of instability and violence. To find an answer to what could possibly have contributed to the poor performance of the regular forces in this counterinsurgency campaign, the researcher explores two important factors: cultural awareness and asymmetric warfare. The thesis focuses on ascertaining the importance of cultural awareness for the training and education of regular forces participating in asymmetric warfare, using Afghanistan as a case study.

The thesis follows four themes: examining the importance of cultural awareness, exploring asymmetric warfare, understanding the Afghan environment, and the training and education of regular forces for operations in Afghanistan. To achieve this, a subcategory of qualitative research known as interpretive research is used. The techniques employed are interviews and the examination of literature and documents.

The resultant findings and analysis highlight the importance of cultural awareness, challenges posed by asymmetric warfare and the complexity of the Afghan environment. They also give an insight into the efficacy and validity of the existing counterinsurgency doctrines and training modules. The study also identifies a number of areas for further research in this field.

The Relationship of Logistics Doctrine to US Army Tactical Logistics Operations

Maj Steven E. Putthoff MSc Logistics Management

ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the relationship of US joint logistics doctrine to US Army tactical logistics operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The study intends to discover if the situation being experienced by logisticians on the ground in Iraq is the true reality of the logistics situation there and if so how does it relate to doctrine.

The research centres on four questions.

- Does US Army logistics doctrine support joint logistics doctrine?
- Are the issues and problems faced by units working with the US Marine Corps specific to their situation or did other Army units experience similar problems?
- Is there a lack of common, integrated, joint logistics systems and procedures and, if so, to what extent does this impact joint logistics operations at the tactical level?
- With joint logistics being conducted at the tactical level are logisticians of all services aware of the issues associated with it and prepared to operate in this environment?

An analysis of US Army and joint capstone logistics documents, Joint Publication (JP) 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations and Field Manual (FM) 4-0, Combat Service Support, forms the basis of the doctrine review. The principles, functions, and concepts that are used to sustain the military as a whole or the Army, specifically, in all operations are presented as the foundation for logistics operations. The influencing factors, both internal and external to the military, are examined providing insight to the development process. An examination of the situation in Iraq puts the topic into context and gives the study a personal feel. This is rounded out with a review of relevant conversations around the topic adding insight into how the broader logistics community views doctrine and the situation in Iraq.

The themes of information, integration across services and levels of war, agility, and distribution fall out of the literature and are used as common threads to provide a connection between joint and Army doctrine and the logistics situation in OIF. These themes form the structural basis from which the findings are examined. The findings are based on the experiences of logisticians who have served in various appointments at various levels in the US Army.

Through a combination of their experiences and insight, doctrine analysis, and review of other relevant literature two conclusion on the relationship of tactical logistics operations to doctrine are formed. First, joint logistics is occurring at the tactical level but joint and Army doctrine, while acknowledging it exists, does not provide the procedures to direct it. Second, the military's attempt to achieve 'harmony' between joint and the services' logistics doctrines is showing progress, although at a slower pace than required.

The Cypriot Security and Defence Policy With the Advent of the Twenty First Century Promises and Challenges

Maj Demetris A. Amaxaris Republic of Cyprus/National Guard Force

ABSTRACT

On May 1 2004 the Republic of Cyprus joined the EU with its political issue still unresolved. As a result, an international problem, considered one of the most protracted ethnic conflicts in human history, became a significant European issue. Cypriot accession to the EU has influenced the geopolitical context inside which Cyprus interacts with other agents of the international system and, as a result, the ESDP has become an important foreign policy instrument for the Republic of Cyprus as well as a significant driving force in the further development and modernisation of the Cypriot National Guard.

The thesis, taking into consideration the active participation of Cyprus in the ESDP, and in the light of a potential solution to the Cyprus problem, explores the security and defence policy that Cyprus should implement in order to strengthen its National power in the ‘anarchic system of states’, solve its ‘security dilemma’ and increase its ‘utility’ as an EU member state. Furthermore, during the study of the security threats that have so far emerged in the twenty-first century, the Irish and European ‘paradigms’ are demonstrated as successful models which Greek and Turkish Cypriots should use in order to develop common defence and security structures if they truly wish to co-exist in a unified country and are willing to reduce their security dependence upon foreign powers.

Given the nature of the topic, the present study constitutes a case study and the theoretical ideas of Neo-Realism and Systems Thinking have been selected to provide the theoretical framework for the aforesaid research. The analysis of the findings of the study demonstrates the political significance of the ESDP for Cyprus.

The conclusions derived from the research suggest that Cyprus needs to develop a White Paper, and its concepts must be based on clear strategic political objectives. The nature of the policies adopted in the aforementioned paper must take into account the nature of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkey’s internal political situation, the evolving asymmetrical security environment, and the necessity for peaceful co-existence between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. Furthermore, the present thesis concludes that Cyprus should join the PFP in order to enhance its military capabilities and pave the way for its future accession to NATO once its political dispute with Turkey has been settled.

In this respect, and in view of the fact that the post-Annan period has impacted negatively upon the morale and motivation for change in the Cypriot National Guard, the author concludes his research by emphasising that the European dimension is not only a promise and a challenge, but also the only vision for the Cypriot Defence Forces of the future.

Exploring The Introduction of Continuing Professional Development Into the Naval Service

Lt Cdr Robert A. O'Leary (NS)

ABSTRACT

This study explores the benefits of introducing Continuing Professional Development (CPD) into the Naval Service. It also investigates who initiates the CPD process, and whether (as some of the literature suggests) CPD is actually driven by the professionals and the institutes, who obviously benefit from it.

Research was carried out using semi-structured interviews with the HR or Training and Development managers in four companies, and with the Director of the Corps Of Engineers. All of these companies were early achievers of Engineers Ireland accreditation as CPD providers.

The findings indicate, that the implementation of a CPD policy in the studied companies was in almost all cases the result of top management initiative. In most cases a CPD policy would probably exist in spite of the efforts of professionals and their institutes. While top management initiated the CPD policy there is variation in the degree to which they control course selection. Some companies drive people onto courses using training needs analysis that is ultimately connected to business unit and corporate strategy. In other cases it seems to be more of a free for all with more than a hint of CPD being used to reward individuals.

Although these organisations are the initiators of their CPD policies, it is less clear that they control and manage it in their best interests. There are definitely cases where CPD is used to incentivise or reward. It is seen as a recruitment and retention tool. The main tangible benefit that was common to all the organisations seems to be reduced staff turnover costs due to improved recruitment and retention.

Variation in the control of CPD policies make it less clear that the economic benefits to being 'learning organisations' is being realised. Manufacturing organisations, especially in the high technology area believed that they could not survive in the long term without a significant CPD programme. CPD is a necessity to maintain the freshness and creativity of thinking needed for innovation. Innovation is essential to stay with or to outperform the competition.

On the basis of the findings the following recommendation is made, that the Naval Service Engineering section embark on CPD as a tool for attaining, retaining and sustaining a motivated, effective and disciplined body of Engineers to meet the present and future demands of the Naval Service from an engineering perspective.

EU Energy Security (Oil And Gas): A Way to Find a Constant Supply

Lt Colonel Sadek Belmessous Algerian Army

ABSTRACT

Global energy demand has risen more sharply in the past decade than any previous decade in the last century. This is largely linked to the evolution of newly industrialising states, primarily China and India, and secondly to the growth of military technology and the scarcity of oil and gas due to conflicts in the main areas where sources of energy are located, that is the Middle East (Iraq conflict) and Africa.

The lack of reliable and sustainable access to energy is a clear threat to European Union energy security. The reliance of the EU on Russia as a single supplier of its oil and gas needs has led the latter to exert political influence on the EU by using its energy as a tool of power. The Russia-Ukraine dispute in January 2006, and again in 2008, demonstrated the vulnerability of the EU's efforts to maintain an uninterrupted supply of energy.

This thesis conducts a case study on the Ukraine–Russia dispute and the impact of the event on subsequent energy trade and security. Another factor investigated in this thesis is the possible negative impact upon the constant flow of energy to EU states posed by potential terrorist attacks on energy-critical infrastructure, and this threat became a reality after the 11 September 2001 attack on the World Trade Centre in the US.

The thesis follows three themes: using energy as an instrument of power, security of the energy flow, relationship between consumers and producers. To achieve this, a subcategory of qualitative research known as interpretive research is used. The techniques employed are interviews and the examination of literature. The resultant findings and analysis highlight the use of energy as an element of soft power, challenges posed to security of critical energy infrastructure and the role of NATO in protection of the infrastructure. The study also identifies a number of areas for further research in this field.

The Performance Appraisal Process and Objective Setting for Officers in the Permanent Defence Forces

Comdt Kevin J. M. T. Higgins BE, MProjM

ABSTRACT

Performance management is a strategic and integrated approach to delivering sustained success to an organisation by improving the performance of individuals and by developing the capabilities of teams and individuals. A critical feature in military performance management is the continuous development of transparent and consistent measures of performance. The Irish Defence Forces career management and performance appraisal process is currently being enhanced to ensure that Defence Force Strategy related objectives and performance measures are more clearly linked to the individual appraisal system.

The purpose of this study is to examine the role that objective setting plays in the performance management process. The research question of whether shared objectives can enhance the performance appraisal system of officers in the Irish Defence Forces encapsulates the specific aim of this thesis.

The methodology selected for the research was collective case study utilising instrumental cases from the Irish Defence Forces, the US army and the British army. To establish validity in the research, methodological triangulation using semi-structured interviews and documentary analysis was used.

The findings indicate that incorporating objectives as part of the performance appraisal system of officers in the Irish Defence Forces has utility. Objective setting would provide officers with a focus for their energy, effort and persistence. However, the concept of 'shared' objectives setting, where both parties in the appraisal process must accept the objectives, was treated with suspicion and scepticism.

The value of using leadership and behavioural objectives as part of the performance appraisal system was questioned by participants, as these traits are assumed to be inherent in an officer and may limit their flexibility in certain environments. The research uncovered a number of contextual constraints that exist in the Irish Defence Forces to objective setting. The main constraint identified was the nexus that exists between performance appraisal and promotion. This alliance has contributed to the clandestine practice of coding narratives within appraisal reports, a culture of non-confrontation, unrecorded developmental issues of officers and inconsistencies in performance ratings.

On the basis of the findings, the following recommendation is made: if the overemphasis between promotion and performance appraisal can be addressed, then shared objectives could enhance the performance appraisal system of officers in the Irish Defence Forces.

Traditional Chinese Culture and China's Military Modernization

Maj Chunlei Ye China Army

ABSTRACT

Chinese civilization is different to other civilizations. China is the sole large country that managed ancient civilization to survive to the present day in the world. But it has hard experiences in the 19th and the early 20th century. Traditional Chinese culture is conservative and defensive. Traditional Chinese basic ideals as follow:

- Chinese Worldviews of nature and society as a whole and the Way following the way things are,
- Political values of humaneness,
- Economic policy of harmony
- Development of the lives' level,
- Foreign principle of below greatness,
- and defensive nature of national defence policy.

Thus, although China prevailed over for more than 3000 years, she was inclined to exploit all the influences of civil culture and virtue to build a peaceful and harmonious internal and external environment.

China's defence policies are defensive in nature. It pursuits three-step strategic development and realizes its military modernization. China is endeavouring to modernize its armed forces to ensure that what happened in the 19th century and the early 20th century will not happen again. This modernization is defensive in nature. China's national defence policies reflect the defensive nature of its military modernization, including the drivers and intentions of China's military modernization reflect not desire and need to become a global power but its self-defensive demands; China's military doctrine reflects the defensive nature of its military modernization programme and this is reflected in its capabilities development programme; the transparent of China's military expenditure reflects the defensive nature of its military modernization programme.

Traditional Chinese culture still influences Chinese military modernization. Traditional Chinese culture demands comprehensive analysis of world situation and Perception of security threat. Traditional Chinese culture reflects in Chinese military modernization's role in all-round modernization. Traditional Chinese's culture demands that military power should win whole. Traditional Chinese culture reflects modern doctrine that is defensive in nature. Traditional Chinese culture reflects the relations between the Chinese military modernization and economic development. Traditional Chinese culture reflects the aims that Chinese military modernization endeavours to build a harmonious world of enduring peace and common prosperity.

SHORT BIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT

1. **Comdt Kevin MacDonald** enlisted in the Defence Forces in 1983 and served in the 29th Inf Bn before serving in the ARW in between 1985 and 1990 when he was appointed Trg Sgt in 5 Cav Sqn. On being commissioned in 1992 he served in the 6th Inf Bn, 1 Cn Cois, 28 Inf Bn and is currently SO Trg HQ 4 W Bde. His overseas service includes 56, 73 and 79 Inf Bn's and UNTSO from 2005 to 2007. He has been an avid landscape archaeologist ever since completing a degree in Archaeology in NUIG in 1999. He has discovered numerous numerous Megalithic Tombs, a Bronze Age Ring Barrow and an Anglo Norman Moated Site, in Ireland. While serving with the United Nations on the Golan Heights he discovered a Late Palaeolithic hunting site comprising of flint tools and pottery and in Syria he discovered a Neolithic Megalithic Tomb.
2. **Comdt Ian Byrne DSM** has 25 years service in the Defence Forces. He holds a B Comm from the National University of Ireland (Dublin), a MA in Technical Communications from UL and a MA(LMDS) from NUIM. He is a graduate of the 62nd Senior Command and Staff Course and was posted as an Instructor to the Command and Staff School on its completion. He has recently attended the Joint Services Command and Staff College in Shrivenham where he graduated from the 11th Advanced Command and Staff Course with a MA in Defence Studies from Kings College, London.
3. **CQMS Gerry White** was born in New York City in 1957. He is currently based in Collins Barracks Cork. He lectures regularly in history and is a frequent contributor to the Irish Examiner and Evening Echo newspaper and The Holly Bough periodical. He has written extensively on the history of Victoria/Collins Barracks, Cork and is co-author with Brendan O'Shea of *The Irish Volunteer Soldier 1913 – 1916* (Osprey UK 2003), *Baptised in Blood – The Formation of the Cork Brigade of Irish Volunteers 1913 – 1916* (Mercier Press 2005), *The Burning of Cork* (Mercier Press 2006), and *Order, Counter-order and Disorder - Cork in 1916*, in *The Long Revolution* [Ed Keogh and Doherty] (Mercier Press 2006).
4. **Comdt Richard Brennan** has 20 years service in the Defence Forces, serving mostly in the Western Command/ Brigade and DFHQ. He has had two tours of duty with the Irish Battalion UNIFIL (1995/2000), and one tour with KFOR (2008) as Legal Advisor to COM, MNTF(C) during the Ireland's Framework Nation role. He holds a BA in History and Legal Science from UCG, a Bachelor in Law (LL.B.) degree in 1999. He studied at the Kings Inns in Dublin and was called to the Irish bar in 2004. He completed a Masters degree in Leadership, Management and Defence Studies (LMDS) in 2007 at NUIM. He is also a graduate of the 63rd Command and Staff Course where his dissertation on '*Targeting in the modern Battle-Space*' was awarded the '*Gradam Taighde Na bhForsai Cosanta*' – The Defence Forces Award for Excellence for thesis research for best thesis. He is currently serving as a staff officer at the Office of the Director of the Defence Forces Legal Service.
5. **Comdt Kevin McCarthy** is a serving military officer. He holds a BA in Mathematics and Social and Political Science from the National University of Ireland (Galway) and a

first class honours Masters (LMDS) from the National University of Ireland (Maynooth). He is a graduate of the 63rd Senior Command and Staff Course. He is currently serving as an instructor at the Defence Forces Command and Staff School.

6. **Comdt Rory Sheerin** is a serving officer with twenty-six years service. He holds a BSc in Chemistry and Mathematics from UCG and a first-class honours Master of Arts degree from NUIM. He is a graduate of the 63rd Senior Command and Staff Course and is currently serving as an instructor at the Command and Staff School.
7. **Comdt Maureen O'Brien** is a serving professional military officer with twenty seven years service. Prior to joining the Defence Forces she held a BSc and H. Dip. Ed from National University of Ireland (Galway). She also holds a postgraduate Diploma in Computer Science from National University of Ireland (Cork) and a Masters of Arts (LMDS) from National University of Ireland (Maynooth). As a graduate of 64th Command and Staff Course, she is the first Irish female graduate of that course and was awarded the '*Gradam Taighde Na bhForsai Cosanta*' – The Defence Forces Award for Excellence for thesis research. She is currently serving as an instructor in the United Nations Training School, Ireland (UNTSI) in the Military College and is due to travel as DCO of 100 Inf Bn to Chad.
8. **Lt Cdr (NS) Pat Burke** holds honours B.C.L. and LL.M Postgraduate Degrees in Law from U.C.C., Barrister-at-Law Degree from the Honorable Society of Kings Inns and a first class honours M.A. (LMDS) from NUI, Maynooth. He has completed courses with the Royal Navy, the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, Sanremo, and at the US Navy War College. He has served as Legat to Brigade and Formation Commanders both home-based and overseas, in the EUFOR HQ, Sarajevo, and as a Courts-Martial prosecutor. He has lectured at home and abroad on the law of armed conflict and on maritime law at U.C.C. and the National Maritime College. He was awarded the Lt.Gen. Tadhg O'Neill Award for 'Best Military Student' on the 63rd Senior Command & Staff Course 2007. He currently holds the appointment of Legal Officer, Naval Service.
9. **Lt Col Brendan O'Shea** has 33 years service in the Defence Forces, is a graduate of the Command and Staff School, The Military College, and has completed seven tours of overseas service. He holds a BA in history from UCG, a BCL from UCC, a Diploma in International Humanitarian Law from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Geneva, a PhD in European History from UCC, and lectures both at home and abroad in International Humanitarian Law, Humanitarian Intervention, and Human Rights. He is the author of *Crisis at Bihac – Bosnia's Bloody Battlefield* (Sutton Publishing UK 1998), *The Modern Yugoslav Conflict 1991 – 1995* (Frank Cass UK 2005), Editor of *In the Service of Peace – Memories of Lebanon* (Mercier Press, 2001) and co-author with Gerry White of *The Irish Volunteer Soldier 1913 – 1916* (Osprey UK 2003), *Baptised in Blood – The Formation of the Cork Brigade of Irish Volunteers 1913 – 1916* (Mercier Press 2005), *The Burning of Cork* (Mercier Press 2006), and *Order, Counter-order and Disorder -Cork in 1916*, in *The Long Revolution* [Ed Keogh and Doherty] (Mercier Press 2006). Lt Col O'Shea was instrumental in publishing the Defence Forces Review in 2003 and has served as Editor on four subsequent occasions.