
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STRENGTHEN
THE NATION

Maynooth University
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Launch of the Defence Forces Review

In Conjunction with an Academic Seminar

Preface

"To defend a land you need an army. But to defend freedom, you need education"
(Rabbi Jonathan Sacks)

Building on the success of last year's Review, 2023's Review is themed 'The Irish Defence Forces as a Joint Force.' The theme was chosen in light of the transformation of the Defence Forces into a joint force following the Commission on the Defence Forces report.

The Defence Forces Review provides a forum in which contributors can present their research and facilitate discussion on a wide range of defence-related matters for the benefit of the wider Defence Community in Ireland and beyond.

My thanks to the Editors of the Defence Forces Review for 2023, Comdt Simon Keenan and Lt Cdr Stuart Armstrong. Despite a very busy schedule working on the staff of the Command and Staff School, they shouldered this editorial burden with energy, commitment and enthusiasm.

For this year's edition, they have had the pleasure of working in academic collaboration with Maynooth University. A special word of gratitude to their fellow editor, Dr Ian Speller for his expert insights and invaluable contributions in making this collaborative effort a success. Additionally, a team of expert academics from Maynooth University contributed to the peer review process, thus enhancing the academic quality of the publication.

Again, many thanks to all our contributors without whose commitment and generosity the production and publication of this year's Review would not be possible.

Further copies of the Review are available from the Defence Forces Public Relations Branch at info@military.ie or online at https://www.military.ie/en/public-information/publications/defence-forces-review.

Eugene Cooke
Lt Col
Officer in Charge
Public Relations Branch

Editor's Notes

> *"Separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be involved in war, we will fight in all elements, with all services, as one single concentrated effort."*
>
> President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1958)

This year's Defence Forces Review examines an increasingly important concept in modern warfare and strategy, namely that of Joint Warfare or Jointness within militaries in the utilisation of force on the modern battlefield. There are numerous definitions within a broad array of Western militaries of what Jointness encompasses, but it is generally regarded as being the ability to engage in significant military activity in at least two of the domains (air, land, maritime and increasingly space and cyber). This in turn has led to what many analysts believe will be the next significant evolution of this concept of 'Jointness,' namely Multi-Domain Operations (MDO). Joint Operations is not a new concept, indeed in the history of warfare amphibious landings in the modern sense are the first clearly defined Joint Operations.

The capacity to engage in Joint Operations has been important for centuries–and the advent of airpower makes it critical to most military operations from WW1 on–but true understanding of the need for proper joint integration really emerges in the late Cold War (1980s/90s), also influenced by the advent of nuclear weapons which revolutionised warfare at the strategic level. But the elusive search to create real Jointness at the Operational Level of War remained elusive throughout the post-war period due to the ever-present frictions of inter-service rivalry. Equally, it is important not to view the debate on Jointness from a solely Western perspective. Russia and increasingly China have given much focus and intellectual rigour to the debate amongst their own militaries as indeed has the rising military power of India.

This edition of the Defence Forces Review brings together several papers that examines the modern lessons and implications from a Jointness perspective for the Irish Defence Forces (DF). This debate comes at a prescient time, witnessing the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war which is the largest conflict that Western Europe has witnessed since the Second World War which in turn has brought even more focused analysis for a nuanced modern intellectual and conceptual understanding of Jointness. The Report on the Commission of the Defence Forces was published on 9th February 2022 and later the same month Russian launched a full-scale conventional invasion of Ukraine. The report specifically namechecked Jointness in that "the Defence Forces will be a Joint Force capable of providing the people of Ireland with a safe and secure environment and enforcing and protecting Ireland's sovereignty."

The subsequent Forum on International Security Policy (June 2023) was conducted against the backdrop of the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war and indeed Jointness was embedded in one of the panel discussions.

As Colonel Thomas A. Walsh (USAF) has noted "the opportunity for the Joint Force, as it looks forward to a future still blurred by the implications of rapid change, is to balance readiness for today's warfare with preparation for the warfare of the future. The challenge for the DF will be bringing to fruition this "symphony of capabilities," whereby, "Jointness implies cross-Service combination wherein the capability of the Joint Force is understood to be synergistic, with the sum greater than its parts (the capability of individual components)" (JP1: Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States of America 2023).

This review also publishes abstracts from the research thesis completed by Irish and overseas students from the Joint Command and Staff Course, who completed an MA in Leadership, Management & Defence Studies (MALMDS), taught in partnership between Maynooth University (MU) and the Command and Staff School. It remains the case that the partnership for MU with the Military College and beyond reflects the DF investment in the development of their personnel at all levels to further enhance Professional Military Education (PME). This acts as a modus and enabler to train senior management and leadership within the DF to meet complex and often unforeseen challenges both at home, and often fraught overseas service within often wicked threat environments.

Most importantly, this academic journal would not have been possible without the commitment of all the contributors and the reflective essays that they have contributed.

Finally, the Editorial Team wish to express their sincere gratitude and thanks for the professionalism and comradeship to the members of the Defence Forces Printing Press (DFPP). Their expertise was a given as they valiantly rescued the Editorial Team on numerous occasions when lost in earth's orbit. We hope that you enjoy reading the essays as much as we did compiling them.

Míle buíochas as ucht do cineáltas agus cairdeas.

Editorial Team

Professor Ian Speller (MU)
Dr Rory Finegan (MU)
Comdt Simon Keenan
Lt Cdr Stuart Armstrong

Editor's Biographical Statements

Dr Rory Finegan is Assistant Professor in the Centre for Military History & Strategic Studies (CMHSS) at Maynooth University. He is Program Manager of the MA in Leadership Management & Defence Studies (MALMDS) in partnership with the Irish Defence Forces Military College and in delivering a range of associated Professional Military Education (PME). He previously served as an officer in the Irish Defence Forces (DF), in a diversity of portfolios including Department Head at the UN Training School (UNTSI) and four operational overseas deployments. He was Assistant Program Manager (2019-2020) of the Peace IV Legacy of Violence Project based at Glencree Peace Centre working with Victims & Survivors (V&S) Groups in Northern Ireland. Key issues of this project were captured in his role as Editor of the Academic Journal "Dealing with the Legacy of Violence through Mediation & Dialogue." He has lectured extensively in International Relations, Conflict Resolution and Terrorism Studies. His specific focus in academia is on the Northern Ireland Conflict (The Troubles). This is his fourth iteration as Joint Editor of the DF Review.

Professor Ian Speller is the Director of the Centre for Military History and Strategic Studies in the Department of History at Maynooth University. In that capacity he is responsible for coordinating Maynooth's educational partnership with the Defence Forces. His main research interests lie in the fields of maritime strategy, naval history and joint warfare and he has published extensively in these fields.

Lieutenant Commander Stuart Armstrong is an instructor in the Command and Staff School. He is a Naval Officer with over 24 years' service and a proud graduate from Munster Technical University and the International Warfare School HMS Collingwood. He has held a variety of operational, logistical, training and headquarters appointments. His most recent appointment at sea was in command of LÉ Niamh and he has served overseas with EUNAVFORMED Operation Sophia. He is a graduate of the 5th Joint Command & Staff Course where he was awarded an MA in Leadership, Management & Defence Studies from Maynooth University. He also has an MSc in Strategy and Innovation from the Business School in Maynooth University.

Commandant Simon Keenan is an instructor in the Command and Staff School, The Military College. He is an Army Officer with over 19 years' experience, and has served in a variety of command, staff, training and operations deployments during his career, including as an instructor in the Officer Training Wing. His overseas experience includes tours of duty to Lebanon and Mali at unit and force headquarter levels. He is a graduate of the 26 Advanced Command and Staff Course in the UK Defence Academy, holds an MA in Defence Studies from Kings College London and an MSc in Security and Risk Management from The University of Leicester.

Contents

Joint Operations, Multi-Domain Operations and Integrated Action: What Are They and Why Should We Care? 1
Ian Speller

Joint Irish-British Military Planning and Operations: A Historical Perspective 11
Comdt Dan Ayiotis

The Use of Aerial Assets in the Allied Campaign of Antisubmarine Warfare during the Great War As a Model for Enhancing Contemporary Irish Maritime Security 21
Cian Lynch

The Relationship Between Force Protection and Mission Success: The United States Army Experience in the Korean War (1950 – 1953) 29
Col Gareth Prendergast

Falklands War, 1982: A Case Study in Joint Operations 37
Comdt Gavin Egerton

Gagarin Space - Battlestar Gealach-Tica 47
Brendan Cruise

Exploring The Risks and Opportunities of Educational Wargaming in Irish Defence Forces Professional Military Education 57
Comdt Kenneth O'Rourke

How Does the DF Approach Pesco Projects? 65
Capt Kenneth Deegan & Ms. Sharon Breen

Black Flags and Grey Law : The Law of Armed Conflict and It's Application in Counter-Piracy Operations 73
Lt (NS) Cian Moran

Securing Ireland's Future: Advancing National Security and Defence through a Comprehensive Five-Domain National Security Strategy 85
Lt Cdr Mike Brunicardi

Learning From Jointness: A Study On The Relevance of the Joint Expeditionary Force for the Irish Defence Forces 97
Giovanni Parente

The Irish Defence Forces As a Joint Force –
Where Is it Going and What Is the Way to Get There? 105
Lt Cdr David Memery

Sharp Lessons in Jointness From the Russo-Ukraine War:
What Relevance for Ireland? 115
Dr. Brendan Flynn

Abstracts - 5th Joint Command and Staff Course 129

Contributor Biographies 154

Joint Operations, Multi-Domain Operations and Integrated Action: What are They and Why Should We Care?

Ian Speller

Abstract

This paper explores current thinking about joint operations, multi-domain operations and integrated action. It aims to introduce these concepts and to discuss their importance in the context of current military thought and action before then addressing their relevance to the Irish Defence Forces (DF). There is no space here to address these topics in great depth, but it is hoped that this chapter will provide a useful starting point for readers before they move on to engage with the other submissions in this volume, which address specific aspects of the topic in more detail[1]

What Are Joint Operations?

According to the NATO Terminology Database the adjective 'joint' refers to 'activities, operations and organisations in which elements of at least two services participate'.[2] Armed forces have traditionally been divided into different services (armies, navies and air forces) that focus primarily on operations within their own distinct environments on land, sea and in the air. Joint activities, operations and organisations are those where these different institutions work together, or at least where they try to do so. For this reason joint warfare has often been described as being 'team warfare', designed to tie together the activity of different agencies. Even the most cursory glance through history reveals that fortune favours those teams who work together well. It also suggests that proficiency in joint operations is not something that occurs by accident it must be worked at, often in the face of entrenched opposition from those who are unable to put the needs of the team ahead of their own narrow service interests.[3]

The simplicity of the definition above belies some hidden complexity. There is an annoying propensity for different militaries to define the same term in different ways and military doctrine often takes such liberties with the English language that one is reminded of Humpty Dumpty's announcement to Alice that 'When I use a word ... it means just what I chose it to mean – neither more nor less'. [4] It might be helpful, therefore, to define clearly what we are discussing, here using standard US definitions, which reflect those adopted by NATO.[5]

Joint: connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate.

Joint Force: a force composed of elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander.

1 For a fuller discussion see Ian Speller, 'Joint Warfare' in David Jordan, James Kiras, David Lonsdale, Ian Speller, Christopher Tuck & Dale Walton, Understanding Modern Warfare, 3rd ed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2024). Note that elements of this paper are built on the discussion in that chapter.
2 NATO, The NATO Terminology Database, https://nso.nato.int/natoterm/content/nato/pages/home.html?lg=en [24 Nov 2023]
3 See Roger Beaumont, Joint Military Operations: a short history, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993) and Stuart Griffin, Joint Operations. A Short History, (London: Ministry of Defence, 2005).
4 Lewis Caroll, Through the Looking Glass, (1871) chapter VI.
5 See US Department of Defense, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Nov, 2021).

Joint Operations: military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces employed in specified command relationships with each other, which of themselves, do not establish joint forces.

It is important to note that the definition of 'Joint Forces' here is limited to those forces under a specific type of arrangement, where there is a dedicated Joint Force Commander authorised to command. This reflects a command approach evolved by Anglo-American forces during the Second World War and as is the preferred command structure adopted by NATO but it is important to remember that most joint operations in the past did not adopt this approach and that many in future may not do so. In reality, an operation or a force does not cease to be joint simply because a sub-optimal command structure is employed. It is also worth noting that many of the challenges facing a Joint Force may also be evident in single-service operations that cross environmental boundaries. Thus, for example, a situation where naval ships and aircraft provide support for a naval landing party would not fit a standard understanding of 'Joint Operations', as all belong to the same service, but the operation would still need to coordinate activity across multiple different environments and would throw up many of the same challenges as would occur if the participants wore different colour uniforms; the British experience during the 1982 Falklands Conflict provides a good case in point.[6]

Why Does it Matter?

It is tempting to think of joint operations as being a recent phenomena, particularly given the heavy emphasis placed on 'jointery' in western military thought and practice since the late 1980s. The opposite is true; the utility of 'team warfare' has been evident throughout history. Thus, for example, as early as the 24th century BCE Sargon of Akkad exploited strength at sea and on land to build an empire in Mesopotamia. Eight hundred years later the Egyptian Pharoah Kamose undertook joint operations in his campaigns against the Hyskos, using joint land and maritime forces within the Nile Delta. Joint operations were central to success and failure during the Peloponnesian War in the 4th century BCE, they figured prominently in the wars between Rome and Carthage and featured amongst the successes of the great Byzantine generals Belisarious and Narses. Joint operations were key to Viking successes in the Dark Ages and remained an important feature of war in Europe, and elsewhere, in the centuries that followed. Note, for example, the importance of joint operations in conflicts as diverse as the Japanese Genpei Civil War (1180-85), the Chinese invasion of Sri Lanka (1411), the Seven Years War (1756-1763), the US Civil War (1861-65) and the War of the Pacific (1879-1883) and in both the First and Second World Wars (1914-18, 1939-45).

An Irish audience should note the importance of joint operations to the military history of this state, a phenomena that predates the arrival of the Anglo-Normans in the 12th century

6 Note the disagreements that arose between the land, amphibious and carrier group commanders (all from the naval service). Ian Speller, 'Command and Control in Amphibious Operations: the lessons from history', in Revista Da Escola De Guerra Navale (Journal of the Brazilian Naval War College). 25 (3) 2019. pp. 561-586

or of Vikings three centuries earlier. Adversaries and allies have arrived by sea, and used the seas and rivers as a means of supply, transport and attack in ways that have profoundly shaped the history of this island. Even campaigns that were primarily land oriented have been impacted significantly by the ability of one side, and the inability of the other, to make effective use of maritime communications. Indeed, one of the most impressive military achievements by forces of the Irish state was the successful conduct of a series of joint operations in 1922, landing troops from the sea to seize key rebel held areas during the Irish Civil War (1922-23).[7] The interest shown by Michael Collins in the established of an Irish air arm suggests that he was well aware of the need to take a three-dimensional approach to national defence; sadly this was not well reflected in the defence policy of the new state in the decades that followed.[8]

Prior to the twentieth century, joint operations revolved around the integration of land and maritime capabilities and there is an historical corelation between proficiency in such operations and success in war that should be hard to ignore.[9] Of course, there have been times and places where this has not mattered all that much. Joint operations were not central to the expansion of the Mongol empire in the thirteenth century and it was proficiency on land that won the wars of German unification in the 1860s and 1870s, but note that later Mongol and German failures in the field of joint warfare twice cost the former the chance to subdue Japan and, in the Second World War, doomed the latter to defeat at the hands of adversaries able to overcome their own initial weakness in this respect. It is significant that even an archetypal land power such as the Soviet Union found need to conduct over a hundred amphibious operations during the Second World War and their successful land offensives of 1943 to 1945 were supported by growing proficiency in the provision of support from the air.[10]

The advent of air power in the twentieth century increased dramatically the need for armed forces to think about jointery, a point that was clear to more astute observers by 1914 and to even the most obtuse by 1945. By that point it was abundantly clear that success in major land or maritime operations depended to a considerable degree on the what was happening in the air. No soldier or sailor ever looked up at skies dominated by the enemy and doubted the importance of joint cooperation. Some air forces, particularly those of Britain and America, chose to believe that they could achieve decisive strategic effect through independent (i.e. deliberately non-joint) bombing campaigns. The concept was tested at enormous cost to themselves, and to the enemy civilian population, during the Second World War and the impact of that campaign remains the subject of continued dispute.[11] What is indisputable, however, is the key role played by Allied air power in support of joint forces at the operational and tactical level. Post-war experience has

7 Padhraic O'Confhaola, The Naval Forces of the Irish 1922-1977, (Maynooth University PhD Thesis, 2009) chapter 1.
8 Micheal O'Malley, Military Aviation in Ireland, 1921-1945 (Dublin: UCD Press, 2010) chapter 3.
9 For discussion of this point see Colin Gray, The Leverage of Sea Power. The Strategic Advantage of Navies in War, (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1992)
10 Tomoyuki Ishizu, 'Amphibious Warfare: Theory and Practice'. Paper presented at (Japanese) National institute For Defence Studies, History of Joint and Combined Operations Conference, 2014. Available online at https://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/event/forum/pdf/2014/11.pdf [20 Nov 2023] .
11 For a detailed analysis of this campaign of this see Richard Overy, The Bombing War in Europe 1939-1945, (London: Allen Lane, 2013).

reinforced the importance of the latter, across the entire spectrum of war, while leaving the advocates of 'independent effect' with little to support their case. Today it is even less credible to think in terms of single-service operations, particularly given the growing importance of the space and cyber environments. If military forces are to be anything other than decorative they must be able to operate within a joint context.

Given the above, it is remarkable just how long it took jointery to become mainstream within military thinking. Perhaps inevitably, armies, navies and air forces have tended to focus primarily on their own environmentally specific concerns and have often paid little attention to the needs of their colleagues in different uniforms. Throughout history it has often been challenging to get different services to understand the needs of the other and even more difficult to get them to accept the compromises and sacrifices required to meet those needs. This can be problematic at the strategic level, where national priorities are set and where resources are allocated. It can also be a challenge at the operational and tactical levels where it can be difficult to generate the kind of joint understanding and integration required for true synergy. Even when services do try to work together, the challenges can be formidable. Assets and techniques optimised for one environment may not translate easily to another. Command and control procedures may differ. It may even be difficult for the different services to communicate effectively with each other unless they have invested the time and resources to ensure that they can do so. Effective cooperation requires a level of mutual understanding that can be hard to achieve unless it is worked at.

Often, in the past, joint cooperation was rather haphazard and depended on the temporary integration of structures and forces to meet a specific need. The importance of competence in joint operations was most frequently demonstrated by its absence and, all too often, militaries that developed expertise in this field showed a remarkable capacity to lose it very rapidly once the immediate need had past; the post-1945 experience of US forces offers a good example. Indeed, the inability of the different services to work together as a truly effective team was illustrated during the Vietnam War and then forcefully reinforced in the failure of joint action during the Mayaquez incident in 1975, Operation Eagle Claw in 1980 and the bungled operation to invade Grenada in 1983.[12] This, plus the need to enhance joint cooperation in support of the evolving doctrine of Air-Land Battle, prompted major reform, including the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, which increased American emphasis on joint operations and created new unified (joint) combatant commands with command authority over assigned forces in time of peace and war.[13]

US interest in joint operations was soon matched elsewhere, not least as potential adversaries noted the rapid defeat of the Iraqi army at the hands of the American led joint forces in the 1991 Gulf War. The Chinese People's Liberation Army took particular note, and began a process that saw the introduction of a new Joint Doctrine publication in 1991,

12 The Mayaquez incident involved a botched attempt to rescue hostages taken from the ship S.S. Mayaguez by the Khmer Rouge in May 1975. Operation Eagle Claw was an joint operation intended to rescue embassy staff held captive in Tehran in 1980. Both operations failed and caused unnecessary US casualties. The 1983 invasion of Grenada succeeded against limited opposition, but was characterised by muddle and joint misunderstanding.
13 See Beaumont, Joint Operations, p.127-184.

development of a concept for Integrated Joint Operations in the 2000s, and major military reforms in 2015 that re-structed Chinese forces into joint Theatre Commands supported by a new Strategic Support Force (SSF) responsibility for space, cyber and electronic warfare. Since then China has continued to pursue improved proficiency in jointery, and this has included the production of new doctrinal 'Guidelines on Joint Operations' in 2020.[14] Russia has also shown much interest in the conduct of joint operations , and also has a joint regional command structure (Military Districts), although the war in Ukraine has shown rather little evidence of any proficiency in this regard. A generous interpretation might be to suggest that this reflects the very real challenges of joint operations as much as it does Russian incompetence.

Growing understanding amongst European militaries of the importance of joint operations was reinforced by the end of the Cold War. As budgets dropped and numbers fell European militaries in particular were very interested in the idea that improved jointery might provide cost-cutting efficiencies that would allow for effective defence at a reduced cost. There was an associated understanding that as armed forces contracted in size, different elements would have to get better at supporting each other. The result was an explosion of interest in jointery and in the kind of structures that were needed to support joint action. Thus, for example, the British closed their service specific staff colleges and replaced them with a new joint institution, reflecting a belief in the critical importance of joint understanding and integration. The same point was reflected in the creation of a new Permanent Joint Headquarters and establishment of a Chief of Joint Operations to exercise operational command of UK forces deployed on joint and combined missions overseas. New joint institutions were established, like the Joint Helicopter Command created to coordinate training, develop doctrine and support the deployment of battlefield support helicopters from all three services. Doctrine for land, maritime, air and space power was no longer written by the individual services but became the responsibility for joint writing teams. Of course, simply applying the word 'joint' to every new institution, and scattering the word liberally through strategy, policy and doctrine publications does not necessarily mean that theory and practice truly has become joint, still less that the associated challenges have been overcome. However, it is clear that many armed forces now recognise the need to think and act jointly and have taken considerable steps to ensure that they can do so.

Where Next?

Traditional thinking about joint operations focused on inter-service cooperation, as has been discussed. Today there is a growing tendency to think less about institutional boundaries and more about the need to ensure the greatest possible integration across five military operating domains (land, sea, air, space, cyber) defined as 'spheres of activity or influence with common and distinct characteristics in which a force can conduct joint operations'.[15] One suspects that Humpty Dumpty would approve of the doctrine writers'

14 David Finkelstein, 'Deciphering the PLA's new joint doctrine', Center for International and Strategic Studies Podcast, 12 October 2021 https://www.csis.org/podcasts/chinapower/deciphering-plas-new-joint-doctrine-conversation-dr-david-finkelstein [20 Nov 2023]
15 US Air Force/ US Space Force, Air Force / Space Force Doctrine Publication 3-99. The Department of the Air Force Role in Joint All Domain Operations, (Nov, 2021).

capacity to play with words, but the new focus on 'domains' does have utility in shifting the focus away from mere institutional cooperation towards a more evolved approach that seeks to achieve genuine integration across all areas without undue reference to service identity.

Here the US Army led the way, first with the concept of Multi-Domain Battle and then Multi-Domain Operations (MDO), designed to coordinate activity across all domains in future operations against adversaries with advanced counter-intervention capabilities. These ideas are reflected in the wider US concept of Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO), defined as 'actions by the joint force in multiple domains integrated in planning and synergised in execution, at the speed and scale needed to gain advantage and accomplish the mission'.[16] The new US Joint Warfare Concept, completed in 2023, articulates the aim to create a multi-domain capable joint force that supports seamless integration of all relevant forces, without reference to traditional service boundaries, that is able to create multiple simultaneous dilemmas for adversaries.[17] Thus, for example, note ongoing experiments using Army and Navy radars to transmit data to Air Force F-22 Raptor and F-35 Lightening aircraft to be used in defence of space assets and to engage cruise missiles. Highly ambitious, if achieved this would represent a super-charged form of jointery. Making this a reality requires significant investment in the material and conceptual elements of military power, and a new approach to command and control, to create a 'convergence of effects' across multiple domains.[18]

The move to a multi-domain focus is also reflected in NATO adoption of the concept of MDO. The British focus on Muti-Domain Integration, rather than MDO, to reflect their belief that the approach is relevant at all war-fighting levels, its applicability is not limited to operations.[19] The focus here, as elsewhere, is not merely on the need to synchronise activity across all military domains but also includes an emphasis on the need to integrate the actions of the joint force into a wider network of activities that includes multiple government and international agencies. In Britain this is articulated as an Integrated Approach and is similar, in many respects, to the idea of Integrated Deterrence advanced in current US defence policy.[20] Both build on the foundations laid by NATO's Comprehensive Approach, which for many years has stressed the need for military tools to be considered within a framework that includes all others. The same point is not articulated in quite the same way elsewhere, but it is clear that other actors, including China, Russia and Iran, also self-consciously think of national strategy in a very joined up manner.[21] Joint operations

16 See James Black, Alice Lynch, Kristian Gustafson, David Blagdon, Pauline Paille and Fiona Quimbre, Multi-Domain Integration in Defence. Conceptual Approaches and Lessons from Russia, China, Iran and North Korea, (Santa Monica, Ca: RAND Corporation, 2022) and Justin Bronk and Samuel Cranny-Evans, Building the Capacity to Conduct Joint All-Domain Operations (JADO). Considerations for the UK, RUSI Occasional Paper, (Nov 2022).
17 General Mark A. Milley, 'Strategic Inflection Point. The Most Historically Significant and Fundamental Change in the Character of War is Happening Now – Whilst the Future is Clouded in Mist and Uncertainty', in Joint Force Quarterly, 3rd Quarter 2023. p.8. JP 1, Joint Warfighting (2023) xiii.
18 US Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 1. Joint Warfighting (2023)
19 UK Ministry of Defence, DCDC, Integrated Operating Concept, (2019). See 'Multi-Domain Operations in NATO explained' 5 Oct 2023 at NATO Allied Command Transformation website https://www.act.nato.int/article/mdo-in-nato-explained/ [23 Nov 2023].
20 NATO, 'A comprehensive approach to crises' April 2023. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_51633.htm [22 Aug 2023]. US Department of Defense, The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (2022). JP 1, Joint Warfighting, (2023). UK Ministry of Defence, DCDC, Integrated Operating Concept, (2019).
21 Black et al, Multi-Domain Integration, passim.

have evolved to another level, and team warfare involves far more players than were once commonly considered.

What about Ireland?

Historically Irish approaches to defence have been remarkably un-joint. From the foundation of the state the DF have been dominated by an infantry ethos and the impact of this has permeated every level of defence decision-making.[22] There is no space here to examine and explore that point in detail, it is well understood by those few commentators who write on Irish defence and the need to enhance joint thinking and joint structures was one of the key conclusions in the 2022 Report of the Commission on Defence in support of a vision to create a 'joint military force capable of providing the people of Ireland with a safe and secure environment, and enforcing and protecting Ireland's sovereignty'. [23] The Commission recommendations are reminiscent of solutions adopted decades ago by most other western militaries, including the appointment of a Chief of Defence, of three co-equal Service Chiefs, a Joint Strategic Headquarters, Joint Force Commander, Joint Logistics Command and a Joint Cyber Space Command. It remains to be seen the extent to which these recommendations will be acted upon or if the requisite adjective will simply be bolted on to organisations that are joint in name only. True jointery is likely to require a rebalancing of priorities and resources that will not suit all those in uniform.

Starting from a rather low base, the defence organisation has begun to address the challenge presented by an absence of jointery and, if the recommendations of the Commission on Defence are enacted, the DF may be on the cusp of some very significant changes. In many respects this puts Ireland where many other countries were back in the 1990s, just beginning to get to grips with the challenges and also the opportunities associated with true jointness. This is a positive development and one that can only enhance the ability of the DF to identify and meet the defence and security needs of the nation, although one could note that there is much ground to cover. In some respects the DF is like a swimmer, equipped with water wings, dipping their toe into the shallow end of the pool while most of their friends frolic in the deep end and some have left the pool entirely and are learning to cliff dive; but everyone has to start somewhere. Some progress has already been made, and predates the Commission process. Note for example the establishment, in 2018, of a new Joint Command and Staff Course to replaced the old army-dominate version.

None of the above matters to Ireland if the role of the DF is to be merely decorative, a Potemkin force irrelevant to national defence and unable to contribute meaningfully to multi-national operations where all other parties, friends and adversaries alike, are likely to think and act within a multi-domain framework. However if the DF aspire to meet the defence needs of this island state and want to continue to make a positive contribution to international peace and security it seems inevitable that they must embrace change,

22 For example see Eunan O'Halpin, Defending Ireland. The Irish State and Its Enemies Since 1922, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
23 Report of the Commission on the Defence Forces 2022, https://www.military.ie/en/public-information/publications/report-of-the-commission-on-defence-forces/report-of-the-commission-on-defence-forces.pdf [20 Nov 2023] p. (iii)

however painful for some, and develop a truly joint approach that integrates activity on land and sea, in air and space and within the cyber domain. The challenges associated with doing this should not be underestimated. One should also note that to date Ireland has been less than consistent in its ability to self-consciously tie defence policy into an integrated approach embracing all other government departments. Here publication (and regular redrafting and republication) of a national security strategy might represent a useful first step. A more joined up, integrated approach will be required if the DF and all other relevant agencies are to contribute most effectively to the provision of a safer and more secure world.

Joint Irish-British Military Planning and Operations: A Historical Perspective

Comdt Dan Ayiotis

Abstract

The participation of the Irish Defence Forces in joint planning and operations with foreign militaries has perhaps never been as topical than at the time of writing, with much attention focused on the reliance of Ireland on the UK to patrol and secure Irish waters and air space. Considering the dramatic changes in the contemporary strategic and security environment in Europe, particularly (but not exclusively) following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Ireland has been forced to seriously consider the benefits offered by military alignment and the conduct of joint planning and operations with other forces – particularly our nearest neighbours, the UK, to safeguard the backdoor to Europe at which our islands lie. This has highlighted the friction between Ireland's reputation as a staunch supporter of multilateralism with the isolationist inferences of its equivocal, multi-faceted definition of its 'policy' of neutrality.

The ensuing Commission on the Defence Forces (2020-2023) demonstrated a military unfit for purpose and needing extensive investment and redesign, while the Consultative Forum on International Security Policy (2023) revealed a wide array of informed public opinion on Irish defence policy punctuated with knowledge gaps, misinformation and agenda-pushing. Fortunately, 'there is nothing new under the Sun' and much information can be gleaned to inform and contextualise contemporary Irish defence debate and policy by reference to historical examples. Concerning Irish and UK military alignment and joint planning and operations specifically, history demonstrates that since 1922 this, while often discreet, has been the rule rather than the exception. The capacity to operate jointly with UK forces formed part of the earliest Irish defence policy, reached its height during the Second World War and extended into Operation: Sandstone during the '40s and '50s, with public awareness or acknowledgement of historical cooperation becoming dulled or even uncomfortable with the outbreak of the Troubles.

Introduction

The participation of the Irish Defence Forces (DF) in joint planning and operations with foreign militaries has perhaps never been as topical in public and political discourse. The vast majority of missions undertaken by the DF under a United Nations (UN) mandate are as part of multinational contingents. The contemporary debate, however, is centred on the potential commitment of the DF to military alliances–arrangements that could generally be understood as more proactive military cooperation in defence of the State and its broader geopolitical interests as part of Europe. As Eoin Kinsella's 2023 centenary history of the DF[1] illustrates, however, 'there is nothing new under the Sun'[2] and there is much light that can be shone on contemporary Irish defence concerns by reference to historical case studies.

1 Eoin Kinsella, The Irish Defence Forces 1922-2022: Servant of the Nation (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2023).
2 Ecclesiastes 1:9.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine, and how Ireland should most appropriately react, has highlighted an underlying friction between its reputation as 'among the staunchest supporters of multilateralism'[3] in the world and the implications of its policy of military non-alignment in the context of its nebulously defined concept of neutrality.[4] With the Chair of the recent Consultative Forum on International Security Policy,[5] Professor Louise Richardson, reporting that it is 'difficult to argue persuasively that neutrality between an aggressor and a victim is righteous,'[6] Ireland has had to ask itself to what extent and under what circumstances it is acceptable to assist or abstain should friendly nations be faced with armed aggression. Most recently, and more critically, Ireland has had to ask itself to whom it would, or should, turn for military assistance should it become necessary. Richardson described Ireland's conception of neutrality as one that 'might more accurately be described as political alignment and military non-alignment.'[7] Indeed it is the question of alignment that will be central to how and where Ireland (to paraphrase Parnell) 'fixes the boundary of its march as a nation'[8] as it negotiates its way through a new international strategic landscape.

Against the backdrop of Russian activity in Irish air space and waters, alignment has most prominently come to the fore in public discourse as numerous reliable sources have addressed the 'open secret'[9] that Irish air space is protected by the Royal Air Force (RAF) in the absence of a DF capability to do so – an arrangement which 'goes back over 70 years to the early days of the Cold War and has been updated and amended several times over the decades with the approval of Cabinet.'[10] Concerning Irish and British military alignment and joint operational planning, there is perhaps no better case study than that of the 18th Military Mission (MM) of 1940-1943.

One of several established by the British to facilitate liaison and cooperation with friendly forces during the Second World War, the stated aim of the 18th MM was to 'ensure that proper co-operation exists between British and Eire forces' in the event of German invasion,

3 "Secretary-General [António Guterres] at Global Ireland Conference, Hails Country as Leading Voice on Disarmament, Champion of Women's Involvement in Peacekeeping, Security," UN Media Coverage and Press Relations website, last modified 15th September, 2020, http://press.un.org/en/2020/sgsm20255.doc.htm

4 Some commentators maintain that 'neutrality' was a core tenet of the struggle for Irish independence, going back to Wolfe Tone, and remains a core tenet of Irish democracy. In fact, 'Irish neutrality evolved initially from fiscal necessity and lack of options in the 1920s and 1930s, to a precarious balancing act to ensure the survival of fledgling Irish independence during the 1940s, to a necessary position to maintain our stance on Irish unification with Northern Ireland following the formation of NATO and the start of the Cold War.' Daniel Ayiotis, "Irish Military Neutrality: A Historical Perspective for Modern Consideration," in The EU, Irish DF and Contemporary Security, ed. Jonathan Carroll, Matthew G. O'Neill and Mark Williams (Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2023), 407.

5 Convened by the Tánaiste, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister for Defence, Micheál Martin, the Consultative Forum took place between 23rd-27th June 2023. It was 'designed to build public understanding and generate discussions on our foreign, security, and defence policies. It focused on a wide range of issues, including Ireland's efforts to protect the rules-based international order through peacekeeping and crisis management, disarmament and non-proliferation, international humanitarian law, and conflict prevention and peacebuilding as well as allowing for a discussion on Ireland's policy of military neutrality.' www.gov.ie/en/consultation/1a35a-public-consultation-on-international-security-policy

6 Professor Dame Louise Richardson, The Consultative Forum on International Security Policy Report to An Tánaiste, 10th October 2023, accessed 3rd November 2023, http://www.gov.ie/en/publication/36bd1-consultative-forum-chairs-report/

7 Pat Leahy, "'No public appetite' to change Irish model of neutrality." The Irish Times, 17th October, 2023, accessed 3rd November 2023, https://www.irishtimes.com/politics/2023/10/17/security-report-says-prevailing-view-is-triple-lock-should-be-changed/

8 'No man has a right to fix the boundary of the march of a nation; no man has a right to say to his country—thus far shalt thou go and no further.' Charles Stewart Parnell, speech in Cork, 21st January, 1885.

9 Mark Paul, "RAF Lossiemouth: The British military airbase that protects Irish skies." The Irish Times, 2nd June 2023, accessed 3rd November 2023, http://www.irishtimes.com/world/uk/2023/06/03/raf-lossiemouth-the-british-military-airbase-that-protects-irish-skies/

10 Conor Gallagher, "Who protects Irish skies? The secret air defence deal that dates back to the Cold War." The Irish Times, 8th May 2023, accessed 3rd November 2023, http://www.irishtimes.com/ireland/2023/05/08/who-protects-irish-skies-the-secret-air-defence-deal-that-dates-back-to-the-cold-war/

with officers posted to various British and Irish headquarters.[11] The records of the Mission document in-depth joint operational planning ranging from liaison between such high level officials as Colonels Liam Archer and Dan Bryan (Irish Army Directors of Intelligence[12]), Oscar Traynor (Irish Minister for Defence), Sir John Maffey (UK Representative to Ireland) and General Hubert Huddleston (General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland), right down to operational plans for the siting and manning of defensive positions by the Irish Army to support a British Army move south and the establishment of temporary airfields to facilitate operations by the RAF.

Earlier Context

Anticipating and planning for joint operations with British forces did not begin with the 18th MM – it is a policy as old as the State. The earliest efforts of the Irish Free State at forging a defence policy were informed by obligations under the Anglo-Irish Treaty and were based on necessity.[13] Eunan O'Halpin has stated that it was implicit in the Anglo-Irish Treaty that in the formulation of defence policy 'Ireland would rely on Britain to defend the surrounding seas and skies, and that Ireland would never allow her territory to be used by a foreign country to harm Britain's defence interests.'[14] Even the anti-Treaty leader Éamon de Valera conceded this mutual defence necessity in his alternative wording to the Treaty known as 'Document No. 2.'[15]

The need for the capacity to conduct joint military operations with Britain was reflected in the 1926 report of the Army Organisation Board. Established by the Chief of Staff (Peadar MacMahon) in 1925, its task was to 'examine into, and report on, the necessary modifications in the organisation of the Defence Forces to enable them to fulfil the functions of a modern army in relation to National Defence.'[16] One of MacMahon's options to government in seeking direction on formulating a defence policy was that it should form part of the wider defence scheme of the British Empire.[17] This he presented as his mid-level course of action, with the extremes of total defensive independence or total defensive dependence on Britain, as the other two options. The Government, for its part, advocated that the Army should be capable of full coordination with British forces in the defence of Free State territory or violation of neutrality on the part of a common enemy.[18]

An examination of the records of the Army Finance Office (AFO) illustrates that the catchphrase 'follow the money' is as true in relation to identifying where priorities lay

11 "Origin and Development of Contacts with the British Army 1940-1945," c1945, (IE/MA/18MM/2), The Military Archives.
12 Archer was Director of Intelligence at the initiation of the 18th MM but was appointed Assistant Chief of Staff in 1941. He was replaced by Colonel Dan Bryan.
13 Ayiotis (2023), 395-398.
14 Eunan O'Halpin, Defending Ireland: The Irish State and its Enemies since 1922 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 15.
15 '…for purposes of common concern, Ireland shall be associated with the States of the British Commonwealth, viz: the Kingdom of Great Britain…matters of "common concern" shall include Defence, Peace and War…' Appendix 17: Proposed treaty of association between Ireland and the British Commonwealth presented by President de Valera to the secret session of An Dáil, Dáil Debates, 10th January 1922, accessed 25 October 2023, http://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/dail/1922-01-10/23/
16 "Report of the Army Organisation Board: Department of Defence Introduction," July 1926, (IE/MA/AOB), The Military Archives.
17 "Report of the Army Organisation Board," July 1926, (IE/MA/AOB), The Military Archives.
18 "Defence Policy Memorandum," 13th November 1925, (DT/ S4541), The National Archives of Ireland.

a century ago as it is today. The AFO files demonstrate the surprisingly seamless and seemingly immediate transition from enmity to cooperation with British forces, for all practical intents and purposes, from 1922. Most people with even a cursory knowledge of Irish history are familiar with the provision of 18-pounder field guns by the British to the National Army to break the siege of the Four Courts by anti-Treaty IRA at the beginning of the Civil War. However, defence cooperation was much more commonplace, sustained, practical, and even mundane, not least as cold economic realities necessitated a pragmatic, cooperative, joint approach to the defence of Irish territory.

Just months after the end of the Civil War in May 1923, the Irish Government were purchasing Rolls Royce armoured cars, Vickers machine-guns and associated equipment through the War Office in London.[19] Throughout the pre-Emergency period, cooperation was the norm between Ireland and the British Air Ministry, War Office and High Commissioner in relation to the 'purchase and delivery of warlike stores.'[20]

18th Military Mission, Plan 'W' and Irish-British Joint Planning

Moving forward to 1939 and the Emergency period,[21] Ireland's particularly biased form of neutrality has been widely documented. For example, the Army's network of 83 Look-Out Posts, manned by a Marine and Coastwatching Service[22] specifically established for this purpose at the outbreak of war, reported all air and sea movements back to Army Intelligence (G2) who in turn shared their information with their British counterparts. The numbered 'Eire' signs,[23] constructed around the Irish coast in 1943, ostensibly alerted all pilots that they were over neutral territory while in fact numbered maps were provided to US pilots as navigational aids.

'Plan W' was the name given by the British to the plan of joint military operations between the governments of Ireland and the UK to be executed in the event of an invasion of Ireland by Nazi Germany and which would see the British Army invited to enter Éire through Northern Ireland and advancing towards the South-East. Much of the high-level planning detail has been in the public domain for a long time, notably through the research and writing of Robert Fisk in In Time of War[24] or the archival records of the Department of External (Foreign) Affairs, held at the National Archives of Ireland. For a particularly Irish perspective on this era of joint Irish-British military planning, going right down to

19 "Purchase of two Rolls Royce armoured cars from British, Government payment for, 1923," (IE/MA/AFO/281), The Military Archives.
20 "Testing of .303 ammunition for hangfires. Purchase of Constantinesco control gear, 1926-1927," (IE/MA/AFO/9), The Military Archives.
21 Often misunderstood as a quaint euphemism, the term The Emergency derived from the Emergency Powers Act, 1939. For neutral Ireland it represented the penultimate planning stage before war, in the event of the country being invaded by either Allied or Axis forces.
22 The Marine and Coastwatching Service kept a 24-hour guard on Ireland's shores, giving a real time picture of the Battle of the Atlantic around Ireland. As part-time soldiers (about 800 in total) their civilian lives as sea farers and coastal farmers gave them unrivalled knowledge of the areas they guarded. It was a weather forecast on 3rd June 1944, from the Look-Out Post at Blacksod Bay, County Mayo, that convinced General Eisenhower to postpone the D-Day landings by a day, potentially averting a military disaster. For more see: Michael Kennedy, Guarding Neutral Ireland, The Coast Watching Service and Military Intelligence, 1939–1945 (Dublin: Four Courts, 2008).
23 These were constructed in 1943 to warn Allied and Axis aircrews flying over Ireland that they were over neutral territory. The numbered signs also assisted Allied pilots to navigate at they crossed the Atlantic Ocean in the lead up to D-Day as the numbered maps were covertly supplied to the Allies by the Irish government.
24 Robert Fisk, In Time of War (London: André Deutsch, 1983).

the granular level in many instances, the records of the 18th MM, while just two boxes of files, are a particularly insightful and complimentary resource.

Good Relations

On 3rd July 1940, Archer wrote to Traynor reporting on a recent meeting with a member of Maffey's staff. Archer's report demonstrates a clear, reciprocal disposition towards joint operational planning as opposed to any kind of coercion, as might be inferred by Churchill's more performative expressions–both during[25] and after[26] the war–of antagonism towards Ireland over its declaration of neutrality and refusal to allow the British to use the recently returned Treaty Ports.

> *Maffey's representative] told me that he had that day attended a Staff Conference at the Headquarters of the G.O.C.-in-Chief (General Huddleston), Northern Ireland in Belfast. The GOC explained to his staff that they must understand British Forces were not going to the help of Eire forces in the event of a German invasion of Eire unless and until such aid was requested by the Eire Government...My informant further stated that all of the members of the staff were exceedingly keen to co-operate with our forces.*[27]

The same letter reported that British forces were already on standby to move into Donegal on request, and asked that an Irish liaison officer be nominated. As part of these initial preparations, the British requested maps of Éire, which were duly provided. Directly arising from this meeting was the establishment of the 'extremely valuable' provision between G2 and Maffey's representative to report at the earliest opportunity the landing of the first German on Irish soil. The Taoiseach (de Valera) and the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs (Joseph Walshe) are also directly referenced in the letter. This demonstrates that joint Irish and British military operational planning was pursued at the highest levels of government and civil service and not just discreetly between military officers, i.e. it was Irish Government policy. This is not new information by any stretch but is stated here as it is central to the thesis of this article: that planning for joint military operations with the British has, to one extent or another, been the rule rather than the exception since the foundation of the State, and that this has been necessitated in part by the failure of the state to develop the capacity of the Irish DF to independently defend Irish territory.

Pragmatism over Idealism

However, alignment between Irish and British forces at this time did not indicate an Irish ideological position either – Ireland's defence policy during this period was very much one of expediency 'as a small nation navigating dire straits as great world powers and

25 Churchill high-handedly described Ireland's neutral position to Lord Halifax in October 1939 as 'at war but sulking.' Martin Gilbert, Finest Hour 1939-1941 (Michigan: Hillsdale College Press, 2011), 67.
26 Winston Churchill, Speech on five years of war, broadcast 13th May 1945, http://archive.org/details/WartimeBroadcastSpeechesBySirWinstonChurchill
27 "Colonel Liam Archer to Oscar Traynor," 3rd July 1940, (IE/MA/18MM/2), The Military Archives.

ideologies fought for dominance.'[28] While Archer's letter on its own paints a picture of a relationship with Britain that would honour Irish neutrality even in the event of direct German invasion, this would be a naïve assumption. As Kinsella has noted, in the early years of the war, for Ireland 'Britain remained the most likely aggressor.'[29]

On 6th July 1940, the Chief of Staff, Major General Dan McKenna, wrote to Traynor about the disposition of the DF in the event of invasion, acknowledging that 'as a neutral State we may be attacked by Germany or England.'[30] Accordingly, as part of McKenna's analysis, the records of the 18th MM demonstrate Irish anticipation of possible British invasion as well as decisions required in the event of British aggression. A memo from 1940 gives further insight into the pragmatism behind this cooperation:

> *If we deal intelligently with the British Questionnaire*[31] *it gives us the opportunity to solve the whole question of command for Operations in Ireland in a way completely satisfactory to ourselves and, at the same time, calculated to further the common military interests to the fullest extent possible.*[32]

Perhaps ironically, close military alignment with Britain was, in fact, a potential guarantor of Irish neutrality rather than a detractor. As Colonel James Flynn of the Plans and Operations Branch put it:

> *From the military point of view the removal of the possibility of British aggression, would, if it could be accomplished diplomatically, considerably strengthen our position vis-à-vis Germany and I believe materially increase our chances of having our neutrality respected.*[33]

Behind the screen of an ostensibly even-handed neutrality, this close alignment with the British proved very much to the satisfaction of the Irish General Staff. In June 1941, McKenna wrote to Brigadier General M.H. Pryce (Head of the Mission) to thank him for

> *The welcome extended to the party who visited Northern Ireland last week for the purpose of learning from your first-hand experience the difficulties of the problem of the evacuation of civilian populations...I am grateful for your personal efforts to make the visit a success.*[34]

28 Ayiotis (2023): 394.
29 Kinsella (2023), 144.
30 "Major General Dan McKenna to Oscar Traynor," 6th July 1940, (IE/MA/18MM/2), The Military Archives.
31 One commonly used method of sharing information was through a series of questionnaires sent by the British General Staff to their Irish counterparts on a wide variety of defence matters.
32 "Secret Memorandum," 9th September 1940, (IE/MA/18MM/2), The Military Archives.
33 "Notes on our position in relation to the British," 3rd January 1941 (IE/MA/18MM/1), The Military Archives.
34 "McKenna to Pryce," 10th June 1941, (IE/MA/18MM/2), The Military Archives.

How it Played out

The real value of the records of the 18th MM as a case study for joint Irish-British operational planning during this period is in the details. In one letter, British forces are documented requesting of the Irish Army that they ensure they are not hindered by the IRA should they have to cross the border, that the Army prevent

> *Roads crossing the border being blocked by civilian traffic and Ill-disposed persons being free to cross the Border and report on British concentrations, and also being free to move parallel with our columns and send out information as to their progress.*[35]

The archival records also illustrate that intelligence flowed inwards too; for example, via the 18th MM, Irish GHQ was supplied with the details of the 'Organisation of a German Parachute Regiment,'[36] something essential to accurate defensive planning. Nor was it just intelligence on the Germans that was supplied. GHQ obtained the ORBAT[37] for British forces in Northern Ireland. Another report gave details of British Special Operational Units based in Northern Ireland that would end up operating south of the border in the event of German invasion:

> *12th Commando, Lisburn. Reported to be commanded by a French Officer – Captain Enrique...Training very arduous. Spend long periods without food. Have some MT transport and motor cycles but trained to operate on foot....Very liberal issues of ammunition; discipline kept deliberately lax. Anti Irish feeling fostered.*

The records of the 18th MM contain many even more specific examples and illustrations of joint operational planning. These include: illustrated plans for refugee reception areas; plans for the provision of forward dumps and the carrying out of works to facilitate a British move south, including the survey of suitable areas for aerodromes and the construction of movable runways,[38] as well as complimentary plans to extend existing Irish fixed defences, all as part of joint operations to defend Irish territory in the event of German invasion.

New Directions and Amnesia

On 8th March 1943, McKenna wrote to Traynor informing him that he had received information from the British War Office that the 18th MM was to be abolished. Plans for military cooperation were now suspended, based primarily on the analysis that Germany was no longer in a position to invade Ireland.

Arguably, the course of history since 1945 has dulled contemporary public awareness or acknowledgement of the history of Irish-British joint defensive planning for their

35 "Maffey to Archer," 27th May 1941, (IE/MA/18MM/2), The Military Archives.
36 "Special papers relating to Jan-Jun 1941 on liaison with British," (IE/MA/18MM/1), The Military Archives.
37 An ORBAT – Order of Battle – is a military document detailing the organisation, command structure, disposition, strength, formations and equipment of an armed force in a theatre of operations.
38 "Provision of forward dumps and carrying out of certain works to facilitate the British Army's move south," c.1940, (IE/MA/18MM/3), The Military Archives.

homelands on the western periphery of Europe. The depth and details of liaison between Irish and British armed forces during the Emergency would not come to public knowledge for several more decades. In the meantime, Ireland's policy of neutrality left it out in the cold after 1945. In 1946 the League of Nations was dissolved, and Irish membership of the UN was vetoed by the Soviet Union from 1946-55. While it was claimed that this was due to its wartime neutrality, it has been suggested that it was at least partly because it considered Ireland's natural sympathies as being with the Western bloc.[39] However, Irish-British military cooperation resumed in 1948 through the vehicle of 'Operation: Sandstone,' which until 1955 saw both states' forces undertaking an aerial coastal survey of Ireland as part of a wider survey of both Britain and Ireland. Arising from a request in 1946 from the US Navy Chief of Operations to the UK Joint Intelligence Committee, in 1948 the British naval attaché in Dublin requested the survey and in October that year it was conceded to by the Chief of Staff. The survey's purpose was to identify suitable landing grounds for counter-attacking Western forces should the Soviet Union successfully invade Ireland or Britain. However, Ireland refused to join the mutual defensive pact of NATO as it was considered a tacit acceptance of the partition and British forces being based in Northern Ireland.[40]

With the beginning of DF participation in UN-mandated missions in 1958, the Irish conception of joint military operations became synonymous with peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Concurrently, the outbreak of the Troubles in Northern Ireland put a new complexion on things–The Arms Crisis[41] saw elements within the Government and the Army attempt to import arms for the IRA, and 'Exercise: Armageddon' saw the Army plan and prepare for an incursion over the border. Again, in the mid-1980s, Ireland drew up plans to send troops over the border into Northern Ireland should the Anglo-Irish Agreement fail.[42]

Conclusion

To borrow a term used by Kinsella as a chapter title in his history of the DF, Ireland is once again at an 'inflection point'[43] as the geopolitical landscape has shifted beyond expectation in recent years. Kinsella observes that the State's military capabilities have always 'largely been reactive...driven by urgent need in response to external factors.'[44] Against this backdrop, in December 2020 the Commission on the Defence Forces was established, to analyse its 'immediate requirements while also seeking to develop a longer-term vision for

39 John Gibney, Kate O'Malley, Michael Kennedy, A Voice Among the Nations (Dublin, RIA, 2019), 113.
40 Ibid., 133.
41 Events between 1969-1970 which saw elements within the Government and Army Intelligence attempt to bring arms into the country to supply to the IRA in Northern Ireland. Captain James Kelly (G2), Charles Haughey (Minister for Finance), Neil Blaney (Minister for Agriculture), John Kelly (IRA) and Albert Luyxx (Belgian businessman) subsequently went on trial in 1970, with the affair almost toppling the government.
42 "Secret memorandum on Northern Ireland," 1986, (IE/MA/1986/COS/25), The Military Archives; Ciarán D'Arcy, "Army made Northern Ireland invasion plans in 1980s," The Irish Times, 16th January 2017, accessed 3rd November 2023, www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/army-made-northern-ireland-invasion-plans-in-1980s-1.2937732
43 Kinsella (2023): 249-277.
44 Ibid.: 249.

beyond 2030.'[45] Reporting in February 2023, the Commission (unsurprisingly) identified increasingly dynamic and sophisticated demands on Irish defence capability. As the report is digested and implemented, the DF takes its next evolutionary step and transitions into a new era. As it has in the past, one of the options presented to Ireland is to enter into joint defensive planning and operations with its nearest neighbour, Great Britain, to safeguard the backdoor to Europe at which our islands lie. It is an option that will need informed and robust discussion. Public opinion will be split–desirable to some and unpalatable to others. But whatever proportion of heat and light emanates from the debate, as history shows, it is nothing new.

45 "Minutes of the first meeting of the Commission on the DF," 22nd December 2022, accessed 3rd November 2023, www.gov.ie/en/publication/039d2-commission-on-the-defence-forces-minutes-of-first-meeting/

The Use of Aerial Assets in the Allied Campaign of Antisubmarine Warfare during the Great War As a Model for Enhancing Contemporary Irish Maritime Security

Cian Lynch

Abstract

During the Great War, the waters off of Ireland's coast were likely at their most perilous. The Germany Navy's fleet of U-boats terrorised transit vessels without distinction through the use of mines, torpedoes, and shells. The Royal and US Navies combated this threat through a variety of technological and strategic means. While some of the measures employed are not applicable in the modern context, such as the use of disguised warships, others are certainly models for present day maritime security. The most noteworthy tactic that might be employed in the modern context is the use of maritime patrol aircraft in far greater quantities than are currently employed. During the Great War, while naval aviation was in its infancy, the effectiveness of patrolling aerial assets was recognised. Furthermore, the use of aerial assets deployed from patrolling naval vessels, effectively integrating the air and sea domains and enhancing the operational capability of the patrolling vessel, was also a feature of Great War-era naval tactics through the use of inflatable kite balloons.

This paper will demonstrate how these historically proven strategies are viable in contemporary Irish maritime security. In the modern context, the greatest challenge for the Naval Service is likely securing the deep-sea communications cables that are so vital to the Irish economy from being severed by rogue actors. A further challenge is that presented by semi-submersible drug transports. This paper sets out to demonstrate how the expansion of the Irish Air Corps' fleet of maritime patrol aircraft and their use in conjunction with the Naval Service fleet in line with Great War-era tactics would be a potent tool in addressing the latter's manpower shortage and greatly expanding the amount of territory that can be patrolled. The paper will also address the use of shipboard drones. In this manner, this paper seeks to demonstrate the importance of joint Air Corps and Naval Service operations.

Introduction

The sea lanes off Ireland's coast have historically been a strategic area of interest, both under the British empire and during the modern day. During the First World War shipments of food from Ireland served as a vital lifeline for the industrialised British mainland, which imported two-thirds of its food.[1] Important sea lanes between distant suppliers and Great Britain converged off of the Irish coast; through which men, materiel, and resources vital to sustaining the Allied war effort flowed.[2] The strategic importance of these waters has not diminished in the modern day, both for the Republic of Ireland and the wider world, in particular the European Union. Despite the significance of Ireland's territorial waters, securing them is proving to be a challenge for the Irish Naval Service in the face of a lack of crew, specialists, and the vastness of the territory that needs to be patrolled.[3] The Naval Service has been unable to mount sufficient patrols to secure Irish waters as greater

1 Steve Dunn, Bayly's War: The Battle for the Western Approaches in the First World War. (Barnsley: Seaforth Publishing, 2018), 26.
2 Karl Brady, "Ireland and the First Battle of the Atlantic." Chapter. In The Coastal Atlas Of Ireland, eds. R. J. N. Devoy, Val Cummins, Barry Maynard Brunt, Darius J Bartlett, and Sarah Kandrot. (Cork: Cork University Press, 2021), 515-518.
3 Sean O'Riordan. "Net being cast globally for specialist to keep Irish naval ships at sea." The Irish Examiner. July 1, 2023.

numbers of ships are tied up and an increasing number of days go by when no patrols at all can be mounted.[4] In light of these significant challenges facing the Irish Naval Service, and despite similar challenges facing the Air Corps, a shift in operational focus to less manpower intensive methods of patrolling might be an advisable means of addressing these fundamental issues. This essay seeks to demonstrate how historically proven strategies utilising aerial assets in the naval theatre might be valuable in contemporary Irish maritime security. To this end, the strategic areas of interest in the historical example will be outlined and compared with contemporaneous strategic waterways. Following this, this essay will analyse the use of fixed-wing aircraft in a patrolling role, in a rapid-response role, and the use of shipboard aerial assets during the Great War and in the modern day.

Strategic Areas of Interest

Ireland's territorial waters have been and remain strategically significant for both the island of Ireland itself and for our European partners. During the First World War, the primary importance of Ireland's waters were as sea lanes to Great Britain. It was just north and south of Ireland where the Western Approaches to Great Britain converged, as trade routes from the wider world narrowed on their final approach. These transatlantic routes brought vital trade and communication from the United States and other destinations and ran mainly south of the island in the Queenstown shipping lane.[5] Men, munition, raw materials, and vitally, food transited on merchant vessels bound for Great Britain and the European theatre. These were crucial to sustaining the British, and later Allied, war effort.[6] The issue of the provision of food was particularly important to sustaining the war effort as Britain, as a heavily industrialised nation, relied on foreign sources of food to sustain its populace. The United States was the most important supplier of food, though its shipments still generally transited through Irish waters en route to its final destination. Ireland itself served as the second most important supplier of foodstuffs to the British mainland.[7] Due to this importance, these strategically important sea lanes would come to be heavily targeted by the Great War campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare, where U-boats, or submersible raiding vessels, would seek to destroy sufficient merchant vessels in British waters through the use of mines, torpedoes, and shellfire in order to starve Britian out of the war.[8] It was in light of this potent threat, and given the woeful inability of the Royal Navy to counter the menace posed by submarine warfare that naval aviation began to play a part in Irish waters, bringing together the naval and aerial domains.[9]

In the modern day, these waters remain strategically relevant. Ireland's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is colossal, measuring roughly 437,500sq km.[10] Of greatest concern in recent times are the submarine communications cables that connect Ireland to the global internet.

4 Eoin Drea. "Ireland Is Europe's Weakest Link." Foreign Policy. November 8, 2022.
5 Dunn. (2018): 26.
6 Dunn. (2018): 13.
7 Jérôme Aan de Wiel, The Irish Factor, 1899-1919; Ireland's strategic and diplomatic importance for foreign powers. (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2008). p. 321.
8 Elmer B Potter, et al. Sea Power: A Naval History. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1981). p. 460-1.
9 Paul G Halpern, A Naval History Of World War I. (New York: Naval Institute Press, 2012). p. 342.
10 The Irish Examiner. July 1, 2023.

This critical infrastructure is a vital component in the modern Irish economy, particularly given the importance of internet connectivity to both Irish businesses and multinational corporations operating in Ireland. The digital economy is worth tens of billions of Euros to Ireland's economy and directly or indirectly employs over 100,000 people, as well as offering other unquantifiable conveniences to businesses and individuals.[11] The importance of these cables, and the inadequacy of the Naval Service's methods to protect them, has become readily apparent in recent times due to the actions of Russian vessels in the areas where these cables lie, suggesting the potential for sabotage or other interference.[12] Aside from the threat of submarine cables being interfered with, other threats in Ireland's EEZ are the threat of overfishing from foreign and domestic vessels and the threat of drugs being smuggled into Ireland through the use of narcotics-laden semi-submersibles.[13] As can be seen here, the waters off of Ireland's coast have remained of strategic interest in the modern day, as well as during the Great War.

The Use of Fixed-Wing Aircraft for Patrolling

Despite naval aviation very much being in its infancy during the First World War,[14] the deployment of US naval air assets to the European theatre in general, and Ireland's southern coast more specifically, would prove to be an effective measure in combatting the threat that German U-boats posed. Ireland would host four seaplane patrol bases; three of which would patrol Ireland's southern coast from Whiddy Island in Bantry bay, Aghada in Cork harbour, and Wexford. One patrol station in Lough Foyle would patrol Ireland's north coastline.[15] The primary purpose of these stations was to mount aerial patrols of areas where U-boats were likely to frequent, with a secondary role being aerial escort of convoys through their operational area. In this role, US naval aircraft were particularly well suited; they were capable of patrolling vast areas rapidly, achieving speeds far greater than traditional surface craft. Patrolling seaplanes were able to detect submarines if surfaced, their periscopes if submerged, or deployed naval mines. Should a threat be detected, on board wireless radio systems could be used to divert incoming merchant traffic entirely, thus greatly mitigating the threat that U-boats posed in the area.[16] Equally, in a nascent act of effective cooperation between naval aviation and surface warfare elements, the wireless radio could also be used to call in destroyers or submarine chasers to counter the threat.[17] A further example of this joint cooperation was the use of seaplanes for scouting ahead of convoys. In this role, due to their aerial view, seaplanes could detect submarines much more easily than surface vessels. If sufficiently ahead of the convoy, a signal could be given to divert the convoy around the threat entirely. This threat forced U-boats to strike from further distances and while submerged, which greatly reduced their chances of successfully torpedoing vessels in transit. The use of patrolling aircraft meant that U-boats could no

11 "Digital Economy worth €12.3bn and Irish consumers spending €850,000 per hour online". Merrionstreet.ie. May 31, 2016
12 Pat Leahy. "Ireland Likely to Join Nato Project to Protect Undersea Cables." The Irish Times. May 14, 2023.
13 Cormac O'Keefe. "Irish Naval Service at forefront in battle against 'narco' submarines." The Irish Examiner. November 12, 2020.
14 Still, William N. 2006. Crisis At Sea. Gainesville: University Press of Florida. p. 463. The first powered flight would take place only 11 years prior to the commencement of the war.
15 W. Atlee Edwards, "The U.S. Naval Air Force in Action, 1917-1918", United States Naval Institute Proceedings 48, no. 11 (1922). p. 1869.
16 Edwards. (1922): 1869-70.
17 Edwards. (1922): 1864.

longer simply lie in wait for targets, forcing them from advantageous locations in key sea lanes.[18] The impacts of aerial assets in the Atlantic theatre of WWI demonstrate the historic usefulness of aerial-naval cooperation in countering threats. It was due to this effectiveness that the US would deploy 43 seaplanes to Ireland during WWI, representing a significant investment when considering the pilots, crews, maintainers, bases, etc. that were needed to sustain such aircraft.[19] This investment can be argued to have paid off given their usefulness in mitigating the effectiveness of unrestricted submarine warfare.

For comparison, the Irish Air Corps presently maintains two aging maritime patrol aircraft. These CASA CN235-100 maritime patrol aircraft were purchased in 1994 and are due to be replaced with two newer Airbus C295 maritime surveillance aircraft.[20] These new aircraft are described as having a sophisticated maritime surveillance capability, which suggests a capability to engage in a variety of ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) missions in order to secure Irish waters.[21] Despite these aircraft being massively more sophisticated and capable than their Great War counterparts, one must acknowledge that the quantity is minuscule compared to the Great War era, especially when the threats that they are designed to counter are also more sophisticated. While modern maritime patrol aircraft should be better able to fulfil the roles of their Great War counterparts, which means that fewer are needed to patrol the same amount of territory, the model that this paper suggests requires a significant increase in numbers to achieve. During the Great War, the US Navy's 43 seaplanes allowed for a number to undergo maintenance, a number of pilots to be in training, and to still mount a significant amount of patrols across a broad area. The present figure of two aircraft, no matter how capable or sophisticated, are simply too few to meaningfully patrol 16% of European territorial waters.[22] Allowing for a number of aircraft to be undergoing vital maintenance and others being pulled away on secondary duties such as aero-medical evacuation, transport, or top cover for search and rescue operations,[23] it would be appropriate to suggest that a relatively large fleet of aircraft might be necessary to adequately patrol Ireland's waters. This would allow for a constant patrol of the relatively narrow area where roughly 75% of Northern Atlantic submarine communications lie and where the threat of interference by foreign actors is highest,[24] while also leaving additional operational aircraft to conduct fisheries protection patrols and to search for narcotics semi-submersibles deeper into the Atlantic. As can be seen, to follow the historically proven model of utilising aerial patrols to secure Irish waters in order to cover a deficit of available surface vessels, not only would the existing cooperation between the Air Corps' maritime patrol aircraft and the Naval Service need to continue, it would be necessary to greatly expand the former's numbers to address the inadequacy of the latter given its current manpower shortage.

18 R. D. Layman, Naval Aviation In The First World War. (London: Chatham Publishing, 1996). p. 79-81.
19 Edwards. (1922): 1869.
20 John Hill. "Irish Air Corps inducts two Airbus C295 maritime patrol aircraft." Naval Technology. July 10, 2023.
21 Department of Defence. "Minister for Defence welcomes the arrival of the first of two Airbus C295 Maritime Patrol Aircraft." Government of Ireland. June 29, 2023,
22 Frank Ledwidge, "Irish Airspace and Waters Remain Europe's 'Open Flank'", Royal United Services Institute. June 2, 2023.
23 Niall O'Connor, "The Irish Air Corps' new maritime patrol aircraft touches down in Dublin", The Journal. June 27th, 2023.
24 Frank Ledwidge, Royal United Services Institute. June 2, 2023.

The Role of Fixed-Wing Aircraft in a Rapid Response Role

As well as being used to generally patrol an area, the ability of fixed-wing aircraft to cover great distances at rapid speed, communicate via wireless communications, and remain aloft for a considerable amount of time in inclement weather conditions makes these assets suitable for a rapid response role. The ability of an aircraft to be swiftly guided onto a moving target by seagoing or other assets proved to be of great use during the Great War and currently presents a valuable strategy in the modern maritime domain.

During the Great War, aircraft were effectively used to suppress the threat of discovered U-boats, despite generally being unable to destroy their target without assistance from surface elements. If the presence of a U-boat was discovered, an aircraft could be signalled via wireless radio to proceed ahead of a convoy to suppress the U-boat's ability to use its armament. The seaplanes based in Ireland were armed with primitive depth charges capable of damaging, if not outright destroying, surfaced or submerging submersibles. The threat of aerial detection, which might lead to the U-boat being damaged or pursued by surface elements, was generally enough to force U-boats to remain submerged which drastically reduced their effectiveness; submerging reduced their speed and manoeuvrability, as well as greatly impeding their ability to navigate and torpedo targets.[25] When a summoned aircraft forced a U-boat to submerge where it was no longer a threat to passing convoys, it was effectively rendered impotent as a "harmless submerged submarine was often just as good as a dead one".[26] As can be seen here, the usefulness of rapidly summoning aircraft proved to be an effective measure during the First World War to counter the threat of U-boats in Irish waters.

In contemporary maritime patrolling, the ability of aircraft to reach any location within Ireland's territorial waters promptly and to remain on station above a target for hours somewhat mitigates the lessened numbers of patrolling vessels in Irish waters. Intelligence sources such as satellites, information supplied by European partners or friendly states, or Automatic Identification System (AIS) monitoring can provide targets of interest that can be further monitored or intercepted by aircraft with ISR capability. Should the target prove to be of interest, a Naval Service patrol vessel could then be tasked to intercept the vessel, thus most effectively using the few Naval Service vessels available at any one time.

While Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs or "drones") are likely going to play an important part in the future of Ireland's defensive measures, this body of research suggests that manned, fixed-wing aircraft are likely to be of greater utility in the maritime environment due primarily to their versatility in mission set. The primary factor that makes manned aircraft of greater usefulness than drones in maritime surveillance is the ability to operate in inclement weather, which can render drones unable to fly and limits the effectiveness of their sensors. Even if a maritime patrol aircraft cannot effectively use its sensors, having pilots on station means a visual link can still be established. For this reason, having manned, fixed wing aircraft in a rapid response role is advised. Other factors that make a

25 John J. Abbatiello, Anti-submarine warfare in World War I. (London: Routledge, 2011). pp. 37-8.
26 Edwards. (1922): 1864.

maritime patrol aircraft of greater utility than UAVs is their capacity to be reconfigured for use as cargo, passenger, or aeromedical aircraft.

As can be seen here, the historical example of using fixed wing aircraft to rapidly respond to threats can be used within the contemporary maritime security domain.

The Use of Shipborne Aerial Assets in Irish Maritime Security

While most drones have a limited capacity to be of use in long-range patrolling and rapid response,[27] where they be of great usefulness is in short-range, ship-borne operations. To this end, the Irish Naval Service, in conjunction with Irish academics, scientists, and entrepreneurs, are creating a homegrown, autonomous UAV capability for shipborne operations under the guise of the Guard project. The capabilities provided by this system can be seen to be akin to an improved version of Great War-era kite balloons. During the First World War, kite balloons were used effectively by Allied naval forces in anti-submarine operations. The purpose of these dirigibles was to expand the operational radius of the vessel it was tethered to, providing far more effective observation from the air than was possible from the bridge. While the necessity of aerial observation is less important in the present than it was in the pre-radar era, it still is a capability that serves as a significant force multiplier.[28]

Great War-era kite balloons allowed for surface elements to gain the advantage of aerial cover. An observer stationed in the kite balloon's observation platform was afforded an excellent vantage point, allowing the ship to detect surfaced U-boats, periscopes, incoming torpedoes, and distant vessels.[29] This information could be instantly transmitted to the ship's bridge through the use of a two-way telephone line. This was particularly important in the pre-radar era as it expanded a warship's viewing radius out to 60 nautical miles in clear weather, affording improved operational awareness and strengthening the entire convoy's defensive posture.[30] While these dirigibles could remain aloft essentially indefinitely in good weather,[31] they were however tethered to the ship and could not scout ahead of the vessel like a seaplane could.

In the contemporary maritime domain, aerial assets such as fixed-wing and multi-rotor type drones both have a role to play in improving the operational efficiency of Irish Offshore Patrol Vessels. They can fulfil a similar role to First World War-era shipboard aerial assets in that they massively expand the viewing radius of a vessel, though they are further capable of scouting ahead, especially in a fixed-wing configuration. Their smaller

27 Sebastian Sprenger. "Germany walks away from $2.5 billion purchase of US Navy's Triton spy drones." Defence News. Jan 28, 2020. While there of course exceptions to this statement such as the Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawk, and more pertinently its naval equivalent Northrop Grumman MQ-4C Triton, it is worth considering that these UAVs are available at great cost and in very few numbers. It is further worth noting that Germany recently chose to opt for a manned aircraft over these drones due to questions about their airworthiness and their expense.
28 Andy Wong. "Uncrewed Drones in Naval Warfare: A Force Multiplier?". Wavellroom.com. December 2, 2022.
29 Rossano. (2010): 261-2.
30 Layman. (1996): 118-21. A noteworthy danger with the use of these dirigibles was the likelihood of betraying the convoy's position.
31 Abbatiello. (2011): 20-1.

size, in comparison with kite balloons which were readily detectable,[32] allow for far more discrete reconnaissance, allowing for over-the-horizon observation in conjunction with radar without visually betraying the patrol vessel's position. This capability is particularly important in combatting the threat of semi-submersible smuggling vessels with a low radar cross-section that might otherwise be undetectable.[33] To meet this capacity, the Irish Naval Service has effectively employed drones from ships,[34] allowing for the use of aerial reconnaissance without necessitating the need for a helicopter.

As can be seen here, the contemporary use of shipborne UAVs can fulfil a niche once reserved for lighter-than-air, manned platforms during the Great War, but with significant improvements. This allows the Naval Service to greatly increase its operational effectiveness and suggests that greater use of and investment in these systems is warranted. The use of Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs) and Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs) are also likely to be effective force multipliers, though these are outside of the domain of this study.

Conclusion

As has been demonstrated repeatedly throughout this study, historically proven methods of securing Irish waters through the joint use of aerial assets and surface elements can and do prove effective in combatting threats to Irish maritime security. Manned, fixed-wing aerial assets provided by the Air Corps can prove useful in both a patrolling and rapid-response role, potentially alleviating the impact of the Naval Service's manpower shortage. An investment in a larger fleet of more capable maritime patrol aircraft (or failing this an investment in a "high-low" fleet of numerous, cheaper maritime patrol aircraft and a smaller number of more capable aircraft) is a potential method for better securing Irish waters in the face of drug smuggling, hostile forces interfering with submarine communication cables, and vessels engaged in illegal fishing. Shipborne aerial assets, particularly in the form of UAVs, can be used to increase the operational effectiveness of each vessel in much the same way as kite balloons were used during the Great War, helping the Naval Service to better utilise each vessel at sea. It is hoped that these joint capabilities between the Air Corps and the Naval Service, and indeed aerial assets operated by the Naval Service, will serve as robust and effective measures to better secure Ireland's maritime domain.

32 Layman. (1996): 127.
33 Florence Panoussian. "Colombia's narco-submarines–a photo essay". The Guardian. March 23, 2020.
34 Sean O'Riordan. "Navy to use more drones after catching smuggler pretending to be refugee". Irish Examiner. July 24, 2017.

The Relationship Between Force Protection and Mission Success: The United States Army Experience in the Korean War (1950 – 1953)

Col Gareth Prendergast

Introduction

Using the Korean War as a case study, I will deal with two important strategic leadership questions; what is the proportional relationship between force protection of a Joint Force, a risk adverse population and the need to achieve the overall mission? How is this relationship altered in times of a threat to national security or when the Joint Force mission is no longer or not perceived as a threat to national security?

This paper argues that force protection will always take precedence over achieving the overall mission, except when a quick and decisive victory is assured or the conflict is deemed to be of vital national importance. Strategically, the maintenance and preservation of what was often an expensively assembled Joint Force becomes more important than actually fighting a battle. To lose or seriously degrade the combat effectiveness of a country's military force, while trying to achieve a mission, will ultimately prove disastrous for a country and its political leadership.

Background

Korea, a small country numbering 30 million people in 1950, lies at the point where three great Asian [Eurasian] powers meet–Japan, China, and the former Soviet Union.[1] The overall American purpose in going to war was not to conquer North Korea, but rather to prevent it from conquering South Korea; it was a policy of Containment.[2] This containment reached its zenith in 1953, and after three bloody years of conflict, the United States and the United Nations agreed to a ceasefire re-establishing a dividing line between North and South Korea, along the 38th Parallel.

But the origins of the Korean War began long before fighting broke out at Ongjin on June 24, 1950. The roots of conflict date back to 1905, when Korea was made a protectorate by Japan. The Japanese proved to be oppressive rulers and in the 1930s, and an estimated 200,000 Koreans, suspected of being communist guerillas, were killed.[3] At the end of World War Two, the majority of Koreans were initially delighted when the Japanese were defeated and forced to withdraw from their country. However, within weeks of the war ending, the United States and the Soviet Union drew an artificial line dividing the country along the 38th parallel. This infuriated the Koreans, who feared a continuation of the oppression that they had struggled against for 40 years.[4]

After 1946, the Soviet Union sent military aid and advisers to help build up the army of Kim II Sung, the leader of North Korea. By the same token, the United States which had withdrawn its troops from the south of the peninsula in 1948-1949, also continued to provide military and economic aid to Syngman Rhee, the ruler of the Republic of Korea (ROK).[5] After the initial stand-off period, when military forces on both sides were

1 William, J. Webb, Korean War: The Outbreak, 27 June to 15 September 1950. Government Printing Office, 2000, 3.
2 Richard, J. Bernstein, "The Korean War: An Exchange", New York Review of Books, November 22, 2007.
3 Bruce , Cumings, The origins of the Korean War. Vol. 2. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990, 444-445.
4 James, Irving, Matray, and George John Mitchell, Korea Divided: 38th Parallel And The Demilitarized Zone, Chelsea House Pub, 2004.
5 Howard, S, Levie, "How it all started-and how it ended: A legal study of the Korean War." Akron L. Rev. 35 (2001): 205.

increasing in capability, on 25 June 1950, the communist North Koreans invaded South Korea. The invasion forces followed three distinct routes of advance, along the east, center and to the west, where they advanced on the ROK capital Seoul, seizing it on 29 Jun 1950. The attack caught the southern forces and their United States allies' completely off-guard.[6]

In response to this malevolent attack, the President of the United States, Harry S. Truman, secured the passage of two United Nations Resolutions, condemning North Korea for its aggression and calling on United Nations members to assist South Korea.[7] These UN Resolutions were passed in late June and early July 1950 and they allowed for the substantial build-up of a Joint UN force on the Korean peninsula. Beginning with the arrival of an understrength United States battalion, and ending with the employment of three divisions from Japan, a division from the United States, a Regimental Combat Team from Okinawa, and a Regimental Combat Team from Hawaii, the US Army completed the rapid build-up troops into South Korea. United States Air and Naval Force capabilities were also built up quickly alongside partner nations, giving the entire UN Force a very joint and multi-national composition. The initial objective of these forces was to delay, then stop, the North Korean forces in their efforts to reach the strategically vital southern port city of Pusan.[8] After Pusan was eventually secured by UN troops, a counteroffensive began on 15 Sept 1950, when UN Joint Forces made a very daring and audacious amphibious landing at Incheon (Inchon) on the west coast of the Republic of Korea, south of Seoul. North Korean forces fell back and the UN Forces pursued them across the 38th parallel.[9] In total, by late 1950, the UN deployed a significant multi-national force of nearly one million soldiers from twenty-two countries. This force consisted of soldiers, sailors and airmen from Britain, Canada, Turkey, Ethiopia, France and Australia, to name a few.[10]

On 19 Oct 1950, the North Korean capital of Pyongyang was captured by UN forces. The U.S. 8th Army, under General Walton Walker, and X Corp, under General Edward Almond alongside their UN partners drove the North Korean forces back to almost the Yalu River, which marked the border of Communist China. On 26 Nov 1950, as General Douglas MacArthur, the overall United Nations Supreme Commander, prepared for a final offensive, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of China, joined with the North Koreans to launch a successful and massive counterattack. The UN troops were forced back, and in Jan 1951, the Communists advanced into the south, recapturing Seoul, the South Korean capital.[11] After months of heavy fighting, the epicenter of the conflict returned to the 38th parallel, where it remained for the remainder of the war.

Domestically in the United States, the growing unpopularity of the war played an important role in the presidential victory of Dwight D. Eisenhower in November 1952,

6 Stanley, Sandler, The Korean War: An Interpretative History. Routledge, 2002.
7 James I, Matray, "Truman's Plan for Victory: National Self-Determination and the Thirty-Eighth Parallel Decision in Korea." The Journal of American History 66, no. 2 (1979): 314-333.
8 Um Sub Il, ed., The Korean War (Seoul: Korea Institute for Military History, 1998), 116.
9 Burton, I, Kaufman , The Korean War, McGraw-Hill Companies, 1986.
10 Gordon L, Rottman, Korean War Order of Battle: United States, United Nations, and Communist Ground, Naval, and Air Forces, 1950-1953. Praeger Publishers, 2002, 117.
11 John J, McGrath, The Korean War: Restoring the Balance, 5 January-8 July 1951. Gov Kaufman, Burton Ira. The Korean War. McGraw-Hill Companies, 1986.Government Printing Office, 1998, 3-7.

who had campaigned to end the war. Negotiations broke down four different times, but after much difficulty, an armistice agreement was signed on July 27, 1953. Throughout the conflict, the United States incurred heavy casualties in the war, with U.S. losses placed at over 54,000 dead and 103,000 wounded. Chinese and Korean casualties were at least ten times this number.[12]

Figure 1 – Map of the Korean War (1950-1953)

Analysis of the Stalemate and a Change of Focus

By the start of 1951, fighting between the United Nations forces and Communist forces to the North tapered off into a monotonous routine of patrol clashes, and bitter small-unit struggles for key outpost positions. By the end of 1951, a lull had settled over the battlefield with opposing sides, deployed along defensive lines, spanning the breadth of the peninsula.[13] This respite in fighting resulted in General Ridgeway, the newly appointed United States and United Nations Commander, changing focus and formulating the decision to halt offensive ground operations in Korea. Two major factors played a part in his decision making process; the first was the fact that any further cost in casualties of any future assaults on enemy defenses could not be justified with the American and other domestic population. Secondly, the possibility that peace might come out of the recently reopened armistice talks, ruled out the mounting of any costly large-scale offensive by either side.[14] UN operations were to be limited to those necessary for strengthening the

12 Kaufman, Burton Ira. The Korean War. McGraw-Hill Companies, 1986.
13 John Miller, Owen. J. Carroll, Margaret. E. Tackley, Korea 1951-1953, office of the Chief of Staff of Military History, Department of the Army, 205.
14 Ibid, 205.

main defensive line and for establishing an outpost line, 3,000-5,000 yards forward of the main positions.[15] Throughout the months of 1952, joint ground and air actions waned along the area of conflict, with only sporadic escalations in artillery barrages, breaking the cycle. As the year progressed, the UN forces waged a war of containment, parrying enemy thrusts.[16]

As official documentation from the time reveal, the opposing sides in the Korean conflict had concentrated so much of their efforts on the construction of defensive lines that their reduction could only be accomplished at a prohibitive cost. As a result, throughout 1952, the U.S. Eight Army conducted a vigorous defensive campaign of containment along its outpost positions in order to deny the enemy any marked advantages.[17] The U.S. military also concentrated on building up the military capabilities of the South Koreans and after much effort; the ROK forces became substantially better equipped and trained. By the start of 1953, they provided eleven of the sixteen divisions manning the United Nations defensive line.[18]

However, as the spring approached in 1953, and as the snows melted, the Chinese and North Koreans increased the intensity of their attacks, capturing a number of key terrain features and outposts throughout the UN defensive lines. Chinese and North Korean casualties were heavy with UN forces, estimating that the Chinese received over 70,000 casualties in July, 25,000 of these were killed in action.[19] The UN also received heavy casualties during the spring and summer Chinese offensives, with II Corps of the Eight Army receiving over 7,000 casualties in June 1953.[20]

As these offensives were being launched, the peace negotiations intensified and continued unabated, and on 27 July 1953, an armistice agreement was signed by both sides in order to end the conflict.[21]

Reactions on the Home Front

At the start of the Korean War, the population of the United States commended President Truman's decisive action. Between 80 to 90 percent of the American public supported the choice to intervene in Korea.[22] However in January 1951, five and half months after the war began, new polling revealed that two thirds of the American public now wanted their troops to be brought home from the Korean peninsula, and 50 percent of the population believed that President Truman had actually made a mistake when he decided to go to war in Korea.[23]

15 Ibid, 205.
16 Ibid, 210.
17 Ibid, 274.
18 Ibid, 274.
19 Ibid, 283.
20 Ibid, 282.
21 Ibid, 283.
22 Steven Casey, Selling the Korean War, (Oxford University Press: New York 2002), 35-36.
23 George Gallup, "The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971," 961.

When the initial decision to deploy U.S. forces to the Korean peninsula was being made, the domestic population in the United States expected the war to be over quickly, and for it to be an easy victory. This mindset was prevalent because the administration assured the people that the Soviet Union and China would not intervene in Korea. Evidence suggests that the policy makers in the Truman administration carefully assessed the possibility of a Soviet and Chinese intervention before they decided to send troops to the peninsula. The U.S. administration assessed that the tie between Pyongyang and Peking was "weak and superficial."[24]

When General MacArthur first recommended the deployment of U.S. Joint Forces to North Korea, he estimated that the task would only require two army divisions, plus air and naval forces. The U.S. administration concurred with this assessment. Both General MacArthur and his political masters assessed that the U.S. involvement would only last several months.[25]

However, on 26 Nov 1950, the intervention of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of China immediately dispelled the U.S. government and population of its illusion that the conflict would only last for a couple of months. Americans began to seriously rethink their involvement in Asia and after the bitter memories of World War Two; they wanted to avoid another full scale conflict on this continent. The situation was certainly not popular among the American public, especially when they had to consider both the monetary and human costs that they would have to pay. In addition, the media, which in the early part of the war brought limited news from Korea, later had the ability to send war correspondents to the peninsula, bringing home a more accurate picture of the war. An article in the 2 December 1950, edition of the New York Herald Tribune, highlighted this fact. It reported that "masses of Chinese are still pouring southward down the center of the Korean peninsula and already are closer to Seoul. ...It appeared that the supreme crisis was near."[26] News reports of this nature, directly from Korea, began to seriously influence the U.S. general public to have negative views about the country's involvement in the war and calls for the withdrawal of U.S. troops became louder.

Critical Analysis of American Participation in the Korean War

Why after the UN managed to stabilize and contain the situation, after the initial entry of the PLA into the war, did the situation become a stalemate? Why did General Matthew Bunker Ridgeway, the new United States and United Nations Joint Force Commander, formulate the decision to halt offensive ground operations in Korea in 1951? Which became more important the mission or the preservation of the Joint Force?

Feaver and Gelpi have espoused that the general public is not demanding casualty free uses of military force. But rather, it demands victory, especially in conflicts of national

24 Rosemary Foot, The Wrong War, Cornell University Press: Ithaca (1985), 55.
25 William Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War: A new diplomatic and Strategic History, Princeton University Press: Princeton (2002), 87.
26 New York Tribune Wire, "Many Chinese Closer to Seoul than Yanks," Washington Post, December 2, 1950, 1.

vital importance.[27] After the entry of China into the Korean War, a U.S. or UN victory could no longer be guaranteed. As a result, the initial popularity for the war among the U.S. population changed dramatically when the PLA crossed the Yalu River, on 26 Nov 1950. The Korean War became a period of stalemate along the 38th Parallel, when force protection took precedence over achieving the mission of unifying Korea. This stalemate was reinforced when the U.S. National Security Council Report on 15 January 1951 established that "the preservation of the combat effectiveness of our forces is the overriding consideration." They also stated that "if the situation in Korea could not be stabilized then an evacuation to Japan, if forced out of Korea was to be planned for."[28]

Offensive ground operations in Korea were halted when the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. military, in a memorandum to the U.S. Secretary of Defense endorsed that any course of action in Korea had to be cognizant of the need to delay a general war with the Soviet Union. A strategic war with Russia "had to be avoided until the United States had achieved the requisite degree of military and industrial mobilization."[29]

Thus the strategic preservation of the Joint Force can be as important as actually achieving the mission. The needless sacrificing of soldiers in achieving a next to impossible mission in Korea would have certainly undermined the overall combat effectiveness of the U.S. military and thus threaten the very existence of the United States. Though this is a very dramatic statement to make now, President Truman's letter to General MacArthur on 13 January 1951, a few weeks after the intervention of China, clearly outlined that the preservation of the U.S. forces in Korea and Asia took precedence over its effectiveness in achieving the mission. The U.S. military had to be preserved for a possible war with the Soviet Union, a war of vital national importance. This took precedence over military assistance to South Korea.

> *Further, pending the build-up of our national strength, we must set with great prudence in so far as extending the area of hostilities is concerned. Steps which might in themselves be fully justified and which might lend some assistance to the campaign in Korea would not be beneficial if they thereby involved Japan or western Europe in large-scale hostilities. ...Further in the present world situation, your forces must be preserved as an effective instrument for the defence of Japan and elsewhere. ...In reaching a final decision about Korea, I shall have to give constant thought to the main threat from the Soviet Union and to the need for a rapid expansion of our armed forces to meet this danger.*[30]
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> *Letter from President Harry S. Truman to Douglas MacArthur, January 13, 1951. President's Secretary's Files, Truman Papers.*

27 Feaver and Gelpi, Choosing Your Battles: American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force. Princeton University Press: Princeton (2004).

28 United States Action to Counter Chinese Communist Aggression, National Security Council Report 101/1, January 15, 1951. President's Secretary's Files, Truman Papers, 1.
29 Courses of Action Relative to Communist China and Korea, National Security Council Report 101, January 12, 1951. President's Secretary's Files, Truman Papers, 1.
30 Harry S. Truman to Douglas MacArthur, January 13, 1951. President's Secretary's Files, Truman Papers, 3.

The war in Korea was important, but it was not of vital national importance to the United States. Once a quick victory became untenable, the perceptions about the war among the general public changed dramatically. The preservation of the combat effectiveness of the U.S. military and the overall Joint UN force took priority over the original mission of deterring North Korean aggression, with the possibility of Korean unity.

Conclusion

The force protection of troops does take precedence over achieving the mission, especially when the conflict is not deemed to be of vital national importance. The needless sacrifice of military forces on foreign interventions is not acceptable to the political and military leadership of a country. More importantly it is not acceptable to the domestic population.

When a conflict is not deemed to be of national importance or when a quick and decisive victory cannot be guaranteed, then the balance swings in favour of force protection over achieving the mission. The Korean War was a perfect case in point. Once the PLA crossed the border and became actively involved in the conflict, the original UN Mission was no longer tenable. The once sought after quick and decisive victory, also entered the realms of fantasy, and a cold hard reality set in amongst the American and western populations. Popular opinion dramatically changed and support for the war fell drastically. This fall in support, coinciding alongside with the realities of fighting the might of China, focused the attentions of the United States politicians, military leadership and its population. The priority now became containing the war in Korea, preserving the combat effectiveness of the Joint UN force and in particular the U.S. military, in order to prepare for a possible war of national importance against the Soviet Union.

Falklands War, 1982: A Case Study in Joint Operations

Comdt Gavin Egerton

Introduction

On 2 April 1982, Argentine forces conducted an audacious seaborne invasion of the Falkland Islands, quickly overwhelming the token Royal Marines garrison. The islands were, and still are, internationally recognised as sovereign British territory, but from the Argentine perspective they are the Islas Malvinas—Argentina's property. The strategic objective was—ostensibly—to restore to Argentina what they believed was rightfully theirs. The following year would mark the 150th anniversary of the removal in 1833 of the Argentine governor of the Falklands and subsequent occupation by the Royal Navy; Argentina was determined to regain control of the islands prior to this occasion—by one means or another.[1] Moreover, the invasion was a populist move by an unpopular military junta to distract a frustrated population from a failing economy.[2] Argentina believed the British lacked the capability to recapture the islands. It was a high stakes gamble that didn't pay off.

The humiliating images of Argentine commandos standing over captured Royal Marines, spread-eagled on the main street of the capital Port Stanley, were beamed around the world, instantly galvanising the British public's resolve. The British government's reaction was both unexpected and swift: within three days of the Argentine invasion, the first elements of a hastily assembled joint task force—including two aircraft carriers—set sail from England. By the 9 April, the Royal Marines' 3 Commando Brigade (3 Cdo Bde), reinforced by the 3rd Battalion, the Parachute Regiment (3 PARA) were also sailing south, landing at Port San Carlos on East Falkland on 21 May.[3] By 14 June, after less than four weeks of land combat, the Argentine forces on the islands had surrendered and control had been returned to the U.K.[4]

The Falklands War was a conflict characterised by innovation and initiative at individual and unit level, as well as requiring a fully integrated joint approach.[5] The campaign had begun, for the British, as a largely single-service effort, but it had ended as an integrated joint force.[6] This article examines Operation Corporate, as the British campaign was known, from a joint operations perspective examining three areas which arguably presented the biggest challenges: command and control, logistics, and amphibious capability.

Prelude to Invasion

Planning for the invasion had commenced in December 1981 as a military contingency to political efforts to return the islands to Argentine control.[7] In 1965, the United Nations Security Council, as part of a global move towards decolonisation, called on the U.K.

1 Martin Middlebrook, Argentine Fight for the Falklands, (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2012), 2.
2 Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands, (New York: Norton, 1983), 60.
3 Martin Middlebrook, Operation Corporate: The Falklands War, 1982, (London: Penguin, 1985), 209-210.
4 In actual fact, Major General Jeremy Moore, Commander Land Forces arrived late for the agreed surrender timing and it was signed at 0030 hours Zulu on 15 June 1982. However, both parties agreed to pretend it was signed at the originally planned time of 2359 hours Zulu on 14 June. Middlebrook, Operation Corporate, 379.
5 F. Clifton Berry, Jr, Foreword in Military Lessons of the Falkland Islands War: Views from the United States, ed. Bruce W. Watson and Peter W. Dunn, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), x-xi.
6 Raymond E. Bell, JR, "The Falkland Island Campaign of 1982 and British Joint Forces Operations," Joint Forces Quarterly no. 67 (4th quarter 2012), 101. https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-67/JFQ-67_101-106_Bell.pdf
7 Middlebrook, Argentine Fight, 1.

and Argentina to find a "peaceful solution" and to bear in mind "the interests of the population of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)."[8] Years of failed negotiations with London over the future of the Falklands/Malvinas led to frustration in Buenos Aries, ultimately culminating with the execution of the military contingency.[9] Diplomatic tensions had been further exacerbated in March 1982 when Argentine scrap metal workers, transported by merchant mariners on a ship leased from the Argentine Navy, raised an Argentina flag on South Georgia—a dependency of the Falklands some 750 nautical miles further east.[10] Falkland Islands Governor Sir Rex Hunt mistakenly believed Argentine Navy personnel were ashore at South Georgia and was instructed by London to deploy 22 Royal Marines from Port Stanley to investigate.[11] As the situation in the South Atlantic deteriorated Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher instructed the British First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Henry Leach to prepare a task force as a deterrent.[12] Argentina, recognising their opportunity to invade was diminishing launched their fleet on 28 March to seize control of the islands.[13] Already aware of the Argentine ships approaching the Falklands, British intelligence had also intercepted orders for an Argentine submarine to conduct a beach reconnaissance for the landings and informed Hunt, who placed the Royal Marines garrison on alert.[14]

Thus, the invasion of the Falklands may have come as a shock to listeners of radio news bulletins on the morning of the 2 April, but it was not a complete surprise to the British government, nor indeed the defence staff. Preparations were already well underway for a military response in the form of a joint task force.

British Joint Task Force

British national security and defence strategy of the early 1980s was not oriented towards large expeditionary amphibious operations. Since the Suez Crisis of 1956, the U.K. had been aligning its forces with NATO strategy to counter potential Warsaw Pact aggression in Europe.[15] The Royal Navy's amphibious, expeditionary capability was allowed to gradually decline during a series of cuts throughout the 1970s. The British Armed Forces in 1982 were therefore oriented towards the Soviet threat and as such the Royal Navy was down-sizing, with procurement centred on Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capabilities.

As a result, the joint task force that sailed south was not equipped with amphibious tanks, tracked amphibious armoured personnel carriers, or armed landing craft—all of which are considered essential to amphibious operations.[16] However, the rapid deployment of the joint task force was an important show of force. Knowing the world's media was watching,

8 United Nations, Security Council Resolution 2065, 16 December 1965.
9 Middlebrook, Argentine Fight, 2.
10 Middlebrook, Operation Corporate, 37-38.
11 Middlebrook, Argentine Fight, 2.
12 Stephen Price, "British Command and Control in the Falklands Campaign." Defense & Security Analysis 18, no.4, (2002), 337. https://doi.org/10.1080/1475179022000024466.
13 Middlebrook, Argentine Fight, 20.
14 Middlebrook, 21.
15 Major General John Frost, 2 PARA Falklands: The Battalion at War, (London: Buchan & Enright, 1983), 14.
16 Julian Thompson, No Picnic: 3 Commando Brigade in the South Atlantic, 1982, (London: Leo Cooper, 1985), xvii.

the British government aimed to employ the military instrument of power as a tool in the diplomatic and informational domains, sending an important message to Buenos Aries in the hope of forcing a peaceful withdrawal.

The British fleet eventually came to number more than 100 vessels, including almost 50 civilian vessels taken up from trade.[17] The Royal Navy ships assigned to the task force included two aircraft carriers, HMS Hermes and Invincible, eight guided missile destroyers, nine frigates, five nuclear-powered submarines, and crucially, two amphibious vessels with landing craft, HMS Fearless and Intrepid.[18] The two aircraft carriers were a critical capability for the British as they could protect the fleet from air attack, but more importantly could achieve local air superiority essential for an amphibious operation. Aboard Hermes and Invincible were a joint Royal Navy and RAF Harrier force of 34 Sea Harriers and RAF Harrier GR-3s.[19] Invincible and Hermes each had nine Sea King ASW helicopters, with Hermes taking a further nine of the troop transport variants.[20] The latter variant would be used to secretly insert Special Air Service and Special Boat Squadron advance reconnaissance teams onto the island under cover of darkness.[21] Frigates and destroyers performed escort duty in a number of specialised roles such as air defence, ASW, or surface warfare but all had some capacity in each role.[22] The initial land component was based on 3 Cdo Bde (plus 2 and 3 PARA) supported by combat support and combat service support units, as well as a special forces component, totalled some 7,000 men.[23] This was later enhanced substantially when 5 Infantry Brigade (5 Inf Bde) arrived.

Interestingly the nature of the joint task force, particularly from a maritime perspective, meant it was limited in endurance. Without proper maintenance and repairs—almost impossible at sea—the fleet was fleet was expected, as Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward put it, to "be falling apart by mid-June."[24] Assuming the land campaign would take one month to complete, this maritime consideration imposed a time limit on the land component to have the Falklands recapture by the end of June, but ideally earlier.[25]

Command and Control Ambiguity

Throughout the campaign, strategic direction was provided from Prime Minister Thatcher's War Cabinet. It consisted of Thatcher, the Foreign Secretary, the Defence Secretary, and Home Secretary, and the Chairman of the Conservative Party.[26] As Operation Corporate required a journey by sea of 8,000 nautical miles, to conduct amphibious operations to recapture an archipelago, the task force was unsurprisingly Royal Navy-led. As Lawrence

17 Edward Hampshire, The Falklands Naval Campaign 1982: War in the South Atlantic, (Oxford: Osprey, 2021), 14.
18 Hampshire, The Falklands Naval Campaign, 13.
19 Jeffrey Ethell and Alfred Price, Air War South Atlantic, (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1984), 231-233.
20 Ethell and Price, Air War, 19-20.
21 Admiral Sandy Woodward, One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Group Commander, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1992), 119.
22 Lt. Col. Robert S. Krenzel Jr., U.S. Army, Retired, "A Sad and Bloody Business: Land Force Lessons from the Falklands, Forty Years On," Military Review (May-June 2023), 60.
23 Duncan Anderson, The Falklands War 1982 (Oxford: Osprey, 2002), 29.
24 Woodward, One Hundred Days, 92.
25 Woodward, One Hundred Days, 92.
26 Price, "British Command and Control," 338.

Freedman points out "the command structure was geared to naval warfare and an amphibious landing rather than preparing for subsequent operations," suggesting a lack of clarity on what might happen after a landing was to occur.[27] The overall operational commander for the joint task force was Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse, whose headquarters was at Northwood, England throughout the campaign.[28] In the haste to depart, there was some confusion as to roles and responsibility of various commanders in the joint task force headquarters. On 9 April, Fieldhouse issued a command and control directive to clarify the command structure.[29] The carrier battle group (including most of the surface fleet) was commanded by Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward, the amphibious task group of two amphibious ships was commanded by Commodore Michael Clapp, and the landing force task group was led by Brigadier Julian Thompson, 3 Cdo Bde commander.[30] Royal Marines Major General Jeremy Moore was the land forces deputy to Fieldhouse, helping with the amphibious and land operations planning. However, with the addition of 5 Inf Bde under Brigadier Tony Wilson to the task force, a division level headquarters was required. Moore was the logical choice to command this formation, arriving on the Falklands on 30 May with 5 Inf Bde, nine days after 3 Cdo Bde landed at San Carlos on East Falkland.[31] At that point, Moore replaced Thompson as the land component commander.[32]

As commanders of various groups, Woodward, Clapp, and Thompson had different roles, and all reported to Fieldhouse at Northwood directly. The structure was designed so that the task group commanders were equals.[33] However, their relationship with one another remained confused throughout the campaign.[34] Although not in command of the other groups, Woodward was empowered by Fieldhouse to arbitrate on their conflicting demands, resulting in considerable tension between himself and Clapp/Thompson.[35] The commander at sea should ideally have been a three-star appointment, removing any ambiguity and providing important decision-making authority in the joint force. However, the arrival of Moore (a two-star like Woodward) on 30 May created some balance, and many of the difficulties were resolved with command relationships became clearer.[36] Interestingly, Moore travelled south with 5 Inf Bde on the requisitioned Queen Elizabeth II luxury liner. Due to malfunctioning satellite communications equipment on the ship, he was incommunicado with Northwood for almost a week.[37] This meant Thompson had to balance commanding a reinforced brigade on the Falklands with reporting back to Northwood by satellite telephone.

27 Lawrence Freedman, "Political Impatience and Military Caution," The Journal of Strategic Studies 44, no.1 (2021): 114. https://doi-org.ucc.idm.oclc.org/10.1080/01402390.2019.1672162
28 Thompson, No Picnic, 17.
29 Michael Clapp and Ewen Southby-Tailyour, Amphibious Assault Falklands: The Battle of San Carlos Water, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996), 50.
30 Thompson, No Picnic, 17.
31 Thompson, No Picnic, 17.
32 Thompson, No Picnic, 17.
33 Clapp and Southby-Tailyour, Amphibious Assault Falklands, 50.
34 Price, "British Command and Control," 340.
35 Price, "British Command and Control," 340.
36 Hastings and Jenkins, The Battle, 270.
37 Freedman, "Political Impatience," 94.

Due to the speed with which the task force deployed, the conceptual joint planning required to translate the political goal of recapturing the Falkland Islands into a military end state was undertaken on the voyage south, mostly with strict radio silence, limiting communication with Northwood, and by extension, the War Cabinet.[38] Furthermore, engaging with subordinate commanders was a significant challenge for Thompson. On the voyage south, 3 Cdo Bde was spread over eleven ships making command and control quite difficult. Thompson had to visit his subordinate commanders on their ships, cross-decking by helicopter to brief them and to issue orders group prior to the assault.[39] However, at unit level, with battalions or commandos largely intact on their respective ships, commanders had greater access to their subordinate leaders. For example, in the case of 2 PARA, much time was allotted to rehearsing command, control, and communications procedures.[40] Thus, dissemination of orders once issued by Thompson was easier within the combat units themselves.

An interesting phenomenon prevailed throughout the conflict whereby political strategic direction would reach down through the chain of command to the operational and tactical levels of command. For example, the attack by 2 PARA on Goose Green was an apparent reaction to the sinking of two British ships on 25 May (Argentina's national day): SS Atlantic Conveyor and the Type 42 destroyer, HMS Coventry. The Atlantic Conveyor container ship was also transporting aircraft when it was sunk by two Exocet anti-ship missiles with the loss of twelve civilian sailors and ten helicopters. Thompson's staff had identified that the nearest Argentine position to the brigade's beachhead was Goose Green, some 20km to their south. This was not in the direction of the overall operational objective of Port Stanley 100km to the east. Following the loss of the Atlantic Conveyor and Coventry and over thirty British lives, Fieldhouse informed Thompson by satellite phone that an attack on Goose Green was to be conducted as "more action was required all round."[41] Thompson asked Northwood if he could instead deploy a small force to block an Argentine approach from Goose Green, allowing him to focus on moving his brigade towards Port Stanley, but this was denied.[42] Therefore, the strategic direction from the War Cabinet via Northwood resulted in a tactical action that did not necessarily contribute to achieving the defined political purpose of Operation Corporate.

Logistics

Operating by sea lines of communication only and with no friendly aerial point of debarkation meant getting the combat supplies to the Falklands was an enormous logistical challenge. Lucikly, much of the required war supplies were already palletised and ready to deploy.[43] As with most expeditionary warfare, the vast majority of equipment and supplies is moved by sea, but in this case the theatre of operations was some 8,000 nautical miles

38 Roderick Macdonald, "Managing Chaos: The Falklands Campaign 1982," RUSI Journal 167, no.1, (2022): 34.
39 Thompson, No Picnic, 47-49.
40 Frost, 2 PARA Falklands, 18.
41 Thompson, No Picnic, 81.
42 Hastings and Jenkins, The Battle, 237.
43 Kenneth L Privratsky, Logistics in the Falklands War: A Case Study in Expeditionary Warfare, (Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Military, 2014), 234.

from the U.K. However, the access to Ascension Island, mid-way in the journey or 3,700 nautical miles from the U.K., was decisive. Using an air bridge U.K British were able to pre-position stocks on Ascension and transfer them by helicopter to ships as they arrived. Some 3,500 flights carrying 30,000 tons of freight and thousands of personnel arrived on Ascension during the conflict.[44] The haste with which the task force had departed the U.K. meant it was not possible to ascertain an accurate picture as to what supplies were stored on which ship and where. Cargo belonging to a specific unit might be split over multiple ships.[45] The stop over at Ascension also allowed ships to be unpacked and repacked, marrying stores and equipment with the units they belonged to.

Due to the aforementioned cuts the Royal Navy had only a limited Royal Fleet Auxiliary logistic shipping capability in the form of six Landing Ship Logistics (LSL). They did not possess sufficient organic sea lift capacity to move all the equipment and combat supplies necessary to sustain the anticipated land battle. As early as 2 April, discrete inquiries were made to shipping companies to ascertain capacities and availability of certain ships.[46] Using a system last employed during the Suez Crisis of 1956, the British Secretary of State requisitioned and pressed into service civilian ships.[47] The ships taken up from trade underwent hasty retrofit to meet the specific military needs, including installation of naval radio communications and equipping them to be refuelled at sea.[48]

Logistics support to 3 Cdo Bde was provided by the Commando Logistics Regiment (CLR). A unique organisation at that time, it comprised marines, soldiers, and sailors in five squadrons: medical, transport, workshop, ordnance, and headquarters.[49] After the landings at San Carlos, they established a brigade support area, later expanded to a division support area with the arrival of 5 Inf Bde. However, due to inadequate logistics support within the incoming brigade, the CLR had to support eight infantry battalion-sized units and their combat support units, and split itself over two locations.[50]

The operational plan devised on the voyage south was that once a beachhead was established, men, artillery, and supplies would be ferried forward by CH-47 Chinook, and Wessex helicopters to invest the defences around Port Stanley, and once all infantry and artillery was in position, attack at division strength. However, when the Atlantic Conveyor was sunk, both troop transport and logistics distribution became heavily reliant on the physical fitness of the paratroopers and marines—it had to be carried on the man. Although some LSLs were used to ferry some of 5 Inf Bde forward, and some limited amount of helicopter transport was employed, half the men of 3 Cdo Bde made the journey east by foot. Both 3 PARA and 45 Commando marched almost 90km east across rough terrain. Were it not for their physical conditioning—the soldiers and marines could endure the hardship imposed by weather, terrain, combat load, and distance—the move to Stanley would have significantly stalled.

44 Anderson, The Falklands, 26.
45 Privratsky, Logistics in the Falklands, 40.
46 Privratsky, Logistics in the Falklands, 26.
47 Privratsky, Logistics in the Falklands, 26.
48 Privratsky, Logistics in the Falklands, 27-28.
49 Thompson, No Picnic, 6.
50 Thompson, No Picnic, 120.

Maintaining Critical Capabilities

The aforementioned cuts to the Royal Navy left the fleet with a limited amphibious capability.[51] A review of force structures in the 1970s saw the Royal Marines brigade reduce from five infantry battalion sized commandos to three.[52] Furthermore, at the time of the Argentine invasions, Britain's two remaining amphibious assault ships, HMS Fearless and Intrepid were both being considered for sale to foreign powers.[53] A government decision in 1975 had even removed their planned replacements from the Ministry of Defence's equipment development plan.[54] The overall lack of troop transport had created a capability gap big enough to steam a cruise ship through. Indeed, the luxury cruise liner, the SS Canberra, was requisitioned and used to accommodate some 3,000 personnel including four infantry units (the three Royal Marine commandos, and 3 PARA) on the voyage south.[55] This was later joined by the North Sea ferry, the MV Norland which underwent extensive conversion including the installation of two helipads, and reconfiguration to accommodate 800 paratroopers (2 PARA).[56]

The aforementioned HMS Hermes was an aircraft carrier designed specifically for amphibious operations. Its large flight deck and below-deck hangar could accommodate helicopters to provide an air assault capability, and its embarked Sea Harriers to provide combat air patrol cover for amphibious assault. Thanks to an earlier conversion, Hermes could carry and deliver 800 Royal Marines. However, Admiral Fieldhouse recognising the importance of air defence to the task force and the volume of sorties this would require, opted to use both aircraft carriers for air operations only, and not to employ Hermes in its "commando carrier" role.[57] Ideally, Fieldhouse would have had enough ships of the right capability to avoid such a dilemma.

In terms of training and preparing for the amphibious landings, only the Royal Marines had any experience in this area. The two parachute infantry battalions attached to 3 Commando Brigade for Operation Corporate had no experience of operating from boats, let alone transferring from cruise ship or ferry to landing platform, then to landing craft, and all to be done in the dark. The British 3rd Infantry Division who landed at Gold Beach in Normandy on D-Day in 1944 had begun their amphibious training eighteen months previously.[58] The case was very different for 3 Cdo Bde as they sailed south. A brief stop at Ascension Island provided an opportunity for some limited amphibious assault training. Also in high demand was helicopter training, but due to the priority of work being restowing all the badly packed supplies, all helicopters, bar one, were devoted to cross-decking. As a result, each battalion, commando, and battery got only one day of helicopter training, and one day and one night landing craft exercise.[59] In fact, 2 PARA arrived at Ascension only twelve hours prior to the

51 Hastings and Jenkins, The Battle, 11-12.
52 Ian Speller, "Neither Fish nor Foul Yet Good Red Herring: Joint Institutions, Single-Service Priorities, and Amphibious Capabilities in Postwar Britain," Naval War College Review 73, no.4, (Autumn 2020): 101.
53 Hastings and Jenkins, The Battle, 87.
54 Speller, "Neither Fish nor Foul," 101.
55 Privratsky, Logistics in the Falklands, 98-99.
56 Privratsky, Logistics in the Falklands, 30.
57 Krenzel, "A Sad and Bloody Business," 62.
58 Julian Thompson, Foreword, in Kenneth L Privratsky, Logistics in the Falklands War: A Case Study in Expeditionary Warfare, (Yorkshire: Pen & Sword Military, 2014), viii-ix.
59 Thompson, No Picnic, 21.

task force weighing anchor and sailing towards the South Atlantic. The minimal training opportunities for 2 PARA and their civilian crew on board MV Norland meant they missed H-Hour by a full hour on D-Day. In Falkland Sound, in pitch dark, the fully laden soldiers struggled to transfer from the Norland to landing craft, due to lack of practice.[60]

Disaster at Fitzroy/Bluff Cove

One event best summarises the points raised in the preceding three sections—one which demonstrates a coalescence of command and control ambiguity, limited logistics capacity, and an overall lack of amphibious capability or awareness of joint operations in general: the infamous Fitzroy/Bluff Cove attack of 8 June 1982. In early June Brigadier Tony Wilson, commander of 5 Inf Bde had made the decision to conduct a "great leap" forward—using whatever air and maritime assets he could muster—to secure a lodgement some 55km further east towards the operational objective of Port Stanley.[61] Despite protests from the officer commanding the CLR to use the already proven northern seaborne supply route, Wilson insisted on using LSLs to move along a southern route to build up his forces on East Falkland.[62] The main difference was the southern route was a much longer journey so movement by day was highly likely and thus vulnerable to observation and air attack; whereas the northern route was shorter and more secure—as well as being closer to the aircraft carriers and their Harrier air cover. Furthermore, the northern route's terminus, Teal Inlet, was overwatched by 3 Cdo Bde now in defensive positions having flown and marched forward. The southern route's terminus, Fitzroy, was observed by Argentine positions occupying nearby high ground.[63] During the move forward, due to unusually clear skies, the carrier task group had moved further east, away from the islands, limiting the time its Harriers could spend conducting combat air patrol over the Falklands.[64] Although Harriers could land and stage at the forward, temporary airstrip established at Port San Carlos, an incident on the morning of 8 June had rendered the airstrip beyond use for several hours, meaning air cover to the landing of 5 Inf Bde at Fitzroy was vastly reduced.[65] Thus, when the LSLs Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram arrived to unload men and equipment during daylight, they had no air cover and were overlooked by Argentine soldiers. Ten approaching Argentine aircraft (5x Daggers; 5x Skyhawk) had clear skies to observe and strike their targets below with devastating effect. According to Lawrence Freedman, this incident was a produce of "poor communications and a lack of an overall in theatre commander."[66] There were in fact five separate decision authorities at play: Fieldhouse at Northwood, Woodward afloat on Hermes, Moore and Clapp aboard Fearless at San Carlos, 5 Inf Bde HQ at Dawrin, and some elements of Wilson's HQ at Fitzroy/Bluff Cove.[67] The result of the bombing of Sir Galahad and Sir Tristram was fifty men killed or missing, with thirty-nine coming from the 1st Battalion, the Welsh Guards.[68] A further 115 were wounded, and much equipment lost;

60 Thompson, No Picnic, 21.
61 Lawrence Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign Vol. 2 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), 508.
62 Ivar Hellberg, "Falklands Logistics: A Reflection on an Ultimate Challenge 40 Years On," RUSI Journal 167, no. 1, (2022): 24.
63 Freedman, The Official History," 511.
64 Ethell and Price, Air War, 189.
65 Ethell and Price, Air War, 189.
66 Freedman, The Official History," 519.
67 Freedman, The Official History, 519.
68 Woodward, One Hundred Days, 319-321.

in terms of combat power, the land forces had just lost two infantry companies, a mortar platoon, an engineer platoon, and a field ambulance.[69]

Aftermath and Conclusion

The Falklands War forced some soul-searching amongst those who controlled the purse strings in the British Ministry of Defence. Many of the ongoing cuts were halted, and the importance of amphibious operations and expeditionary capability was reaffirmed. The HMS Invincible, one of the two aircraft carriers, had been earmarked to be sold to Australia, but this arrangement was cancelled. The ships that were sunk were gradually replaced with similar and more modern vessels. As a priority, the runway at Stanley airport was rebuilt and extended in order to accommodate fast jets, with the first F-4 Phantoms arriving on 17 October 1982.[70] A new airbase, RAF Mount Pleasant, was opened in 1985 and currently four Eurofighter Typhoons are based there.[71]

At the time of the Falklands War, British command structures were indeed single-service in nature. Any operations not involving NATO, were to be dealt with by whichever service appeared most appropriate.[72] But the conflict showed the importance of permanent jointness in headquarters and organisations, and a requirement to maintain amphibious capabilities through training. Certainly, 3 Cdo Bde performed well as a self-sufficient all arms brigade with joint enablers in its organization; and 2 and 3 PARA were integrated relatively smoothly due to similar robust nature. [73]

As the Irish Defence Forces moves to becoming more joint in nature, the Falklands War provides many lessons. Firstly, it stressed the need for a clear joint command structure with ranks commensurate to the level of responsibility, as was shown with the conflict between Woodward and Thompson/Clapp. Secondly, the need to integrate logistics across the joint force was proven, as the task force (eventually) leveraged the unique but complementary capabilities of each service. Thirdly, the need to maintain joint capabilities should not be overlooked, meaning time and capital need to be invested in joint structures, infrastructure, and equipment. The U.K. had neglected jointness for many years, so much so that the United States Navy had deemed a British recapture of the Falkland Islands a "military impossibility."[74] But recapture them, they did, thanks to equal measures of high quality, innovative personnel of all ranks across all services, and a good deal of luck. It was as the infamous quote goes, "a close-run thing."[75]

69 Freedman, The Official History, 519.
70 Edward Fursdon, The Falklands Aftermath: Picking Up the Pieces, (London: Leo Cooper, 1988), 51.
71 Mount Pleasant Complex, RAF, https://www.raf.mod.uk/our-organisation/stations/mount-pleasant-complex/ Accessed 22 November 2023.
72 Price, "British Command and Control," 335.
73 Bell, "The Falkland Island Campaign," 103.
74 Woodward, One Hundred Days, xvii.
75 Quote attributed to the Duke of Wellington when he spoke about his victory at Waterloo in 1815. It has been used by various Falklands War veterans to describe that conflict.

Gagarin Space - Battlestar Gealach-Tica

Brendan Cruise

Abstract

Space is no longer something that is just gazed upon in wonder and explored, thanks to technological innovations, our modern world now depends on and benefits from space-based assets for commerce, transportation, communications, and even weather modelling. Space also holds the possibility of offering a superior military advantage to a state and is becoming an increasingly contested environment although it is a fragile, inherently interconnected environment where direct and indirect threats, such as space weapons and orbital debris, have the potential to disrupt or eliminate established benefits for all nations. Recent developments have seen countries and organisations designate Space as a warfighting domain.

Currently Ireland's space activity is enabled primarily through its longstanding membership of ESA, unfortunately in terms of defence, Irelands first national space strategy is more concerned with developing an increasing presence in the international space sector as the word 'security' is used only once and this is in the context of food security.

It is clear from current trends that Space will be an important battlefield and that states are positioning themselves if such a situation arises, this paper will highlight the pathway of Space militarisation and what Ireland is doing, or can do, in order to mitigate against any potential fallout from the militarisation of Space.

Introduction

"Semper supra," is Latin for "Always Above," and in December 2019 this became the motto of America's newest branch of their military when they established the US Space Force (USSF),[1] America had just made a clear statement to the world that Space was a national security imperative.

From the moment that space exploration commenced in the late 1950's Space has always been vital regarding global security, in recent times the interest in space has seen a resurgence thanks in no small part to social media platforms like Twitter, Instagram, and YouTube that enabled space enthusiasts and millions of others to be enthralled by Astronauts such as Colonel Chris Hadfield who offered an insight into life aboard the International Space Station and also shared stunning images of the universe around us. This resurgence has resulted with National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA) launching Artemis mission which is due to land on the Moon in 2025 and with China declaring their intention that "by 2030, the Chinese people will definitely be able to set foot on the moon. That's not a problem."[2]

1 Signed into law on 12 December 2019 by the National Defense Authorization Act.
2 Wu Weiren, China to perform crewed lunar landing before 2030, CGTN 05 June 2023, https://news.cgtn.com/news2023-04-25//China-to-perform-crewed-lunar-landing-before-2030-Chief-designer-1jhGzYsnRg4/index.html.

Space has become a focus for potential military operations due to it being recognised as the fifth operational domain, now superpowers and nations are vying for the role of "Masters of Infinity".[3] Recent developments have seen Russia designate Space as a warfighting domain in its 2014 Military Doctrine.[4] China's Defence White Paper in 2015 followed suit.[5] In November 2019 NATO also designated space as a military domain[6] as did the EU in March 2022.[7] Closer to home the Report on the Commission of the Defence Forces (CODF) also acknowledged the new domain of Space.[8]

Space is no longer something that is just gazed upon in wonder, thanks to technological innovations, our modern world now depends on and benefits from space-based assets for commerce, transportation, communications, and even weather modelling.[9] Currently there are an estimated 5,465 operational satellites orbiting Earth that assist, globally, in our everyday lives, and it is estimated that the number of satellites in Low Orbit space will increase to 100,000 by the year 2030.[10] USA has the largest number of satellites estimated at 3,434 with 237 of these operating as military satellites, followed next is China with 541 then Russian with 172, added to these numbers would be the significant volume of space junk aimless floating above the planet[11] although it is hoped that a planned "Astra Carta" will see an improvement regarding space sustainability.

Now, Space is becoming an increasingly contested environment although it is a fragile, inherently interconnected environment where direct and indirect threats, such as space weapons and orbital debris, have the potential to disrupt or eliminate established benefits for all nations.[12] Space holds the possibility of offering a superior military advantage to a state and it has been used for military purposes for decades, albeit limited to the deployment of non-offensive military systems such as communications, navigation, imaging and surveillance satellites.

It is clear from current trends that Space will be an important battlefield and that states are positioning themselves if such a situation arises, this paper will highlight the pathway of Space militarisation and what Ireland and their Defence Forces (DF) is doing, or can do, in order to mitigate against any potential fallout from the militarisation of Space.

3 Senator Lyndon B Johnson, 08 January 1958, US Senate Armed Services Committee, Preparedness Subcommittee hearing.
4 Jackson, N.J., Russia's Space Security Policy (eds), Handbook of Space Security, Springer, Cham, 2020.
5 China's Military Strategy, The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, May 2015, last accessed 12 May 2023.
6 NATO's overarching Space Policy 2019 NATO, 17 Jan 2022 last accessed 12 May 2023.
7 Council of the European Union, A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence–For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security, 21 March 2022.
8 Report on the Commission on the Defence Forces, 09 February 2022 last updated 08 April 2022.
9 James Clay Moltz, The Politics of Space Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National Interests, 3rd ed., Stanford University Press, 2019, 363 pp
10 Inmarsat, Space Sustainability Report, June 2024.
11 Satellite Database, Union of Concerned Scientists last accessed 10 May 2023, https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/satellite-database.
12 The Politics of Space Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National Interests, 3rd ed., by James Clay Moltz. Stanford University Press, 2019, 363 pp

A Long Time Ago in a Galaxy……

Shortly after the end of World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union became locked in The Cold War, pitting capitalist against communism, using countries as proxies to benefit any type of advantage, all in an attempt to gain the upper hand. A significant aspect of this conflict was the critical theatre of Space, each side competed to best the other's achievements, to show off the superiority of their technology and military firepower, and to obtain strategic intergalactic dominance in what became known as the Space Race.

The USSR became the clear front runners at the start of this expensive race when, on 04 October 1957, launched off a Soviet made R-7 intercontinental ballistic missile, Earths travelling companion Sputnik became the world's first artificial satellite to be placed into the Earth's orbit. This milestone caused shockwaves throughout America, not only was the launch a complete surprise to them but more importantly this was a clear demonstration of the Soviets capability of delivering a much-feared nuclear warhead into US air space and this launch was the start of the militarisation of space.

The Space race continued at a steady pace when on 12 April 1961 the Soviet Union turned up the heat by launching the capsule-like spacecraft Vostok 1, on board was a human. The Soviet cosmonaut First Lieutenant Yuri Alekseyevich Gagarin became primus inter pares, the first person to orbit Earth, spending 1 hour and 48 minutes in space, before parachuting safely onto terra firma, two ranks higher as a Major. Twenty-three days later, US Navy Commander Alan Bartlett Shepard Jr became the first American astronaut to travel into space. His suborbital flight lasted 15 minutes reaching a height of 116 miles into the atmosphere, but it would be under a year before astronaut John Glenn became the first American to orbit Earth by circling it three times, resulting from this achievement NASA created their lunar landing project called Apollo off the back of President John F Kennedy's famous "...We choose to go to the Moon..."[13] speech.

The subsequent militarisation of Space has allowed for space-based assets to be utilised as part of a dynamic intelligence platform that offer vital and real-time information for commanders during conflicts; this first came to prominence during the 1990-1991 Gulf War conflict that some referred to as the world's first "Space War". Although the actual fighting did not take place in the upper reaches of the atmosphere, satellite-based global positioning systems (GPS) played a critical role in the US-led coalition forces displacement of Iraqi troops out of Kuwait and the subsequent rapid dismantling of Saddam Hussein's military. Without orbiting eyes in the sky coalition troops would have had a much more difficult time navigating, communicating and guiding their weapons across the hundreds of kilometres of inhospitable, windswept desert battlefields in Kuwait and Iraq.[14] During this conflict, it is estimated that 60 military and 20 commercial satellites were used to receive imagery, while dozens of applications of these systems were applied to tanks, ships, planes, and missiles allowing coalition troops gain access to a wide range of intelligence

13 President John F Kennedy. Apollo Program Moon Landing Speech. Rice University, Houston, Texas. 12 Sept 1962.
14 Sir Peter Anson Bt & Dennis Cummings, The first space war: The contribution of satellites to the gulf war, The RUSI Journal, 1991, 136:4, pp45-53.

enabling them to deny Iraqi troops any strategic or tactical advantage. As the then French Defence Minister Pierre Joxe stated after the end of the war: “This war was a great victory above all for intelligence, especially from space”.[15]

This effective use of satellites during the Gulf War resulted in a one-sided conflict and significantly signalled the turning-point by which all future conflicts would likely be 'space wars' a new intelligence era had just been heralded.

More recently, the conflict in Ukraine has raised issues such as the weaponising of commercial satellites after the Starlink satellite internet service was used to keep Ukraine online throughout the conflict. SpaceX, the company that operates Starlink, has taken some steps to prevent Ukraine's military from using the satellite internet constellation for controlling drones in the region after reports that Ukraine had made effective use of unmanned aircraft for spotting enemy positions, targeting long-range fires, and dropping bombs. SpaceX president Gwynne Shotwell said the service was "never meant to be weaponised."[16]

This new development may lead to a situation whereby an aggrieved state may use defence methods to neutralise any space-based asset resulting in a loss of services that provide for our everyday lives.

As with any battlefield where there is a means of gaining advantage then naturally there will be a counter measure developed, currently there is no definition of a space weapon but there is an acceptance that counter measures are either kinetic, requiring physical interference such as a missile, or non-kinetic, no contact via cyber-attack. China became the third country, behind US and Russia, to successfully test anti-satellite systems when it deployed its kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities in 2007, the US re-demonstrated their capability shortly after in 2008 after a 23 years’ hiatus, creating approximately 800 pieces of debris during ‘Operation Burnt Frost.’ Then in 2015 a direct-ascent ASAT missile was launched from Plesetsk cosmodrome in the northwest of Russia. Its target was Kosmos-1408, a defunct intelligence satellite that was launched in 1982 and orbited at an altitude of about 650 kilometres. The targeted satellite didn't just vanish, it exploded into hundreds of pieces of debris hurtling around the Earth at thousands of miles per hour. While the Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Kuzhugetovich Shoigu applauded the precision of the missile as “worthy of a goldsmith”[17] the US Space Command Commander General James Dickinson stated that “Russia has demonstrated a deliberate disregard for the security, safety, stability, and long-term sustainability of the space domain for all nations”[18] as the large volume of space debris now posed a threat to Astronauts on Tiangong, the Chinese space station, and the International Space Station.

15 De Selding, B, 'Joxe, France to Share Helios Images with WEU', Space News, June 10-16, 1991, p. 22.
16 Space X Curbed, 09 February 2023, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/spacex-curbed-ukraines-use-starlink-internet-drones-company-president-2023-02-09.
17 New Russian system being tested hit old satellite with "goldsmith's precision", 16 November 2021, https://tass.com/science/1362219.
18 Russian direct ascent anti-missile test creates significant, long-lasting space debris, 15 November 2021, https://www.spacecom.mil/Newsroom/News/Article-Display/Article/2842957/russian-direct-ascent-anti-satellite-missile-test-creates-significant-long-last/.

Despite statements from US officials bemoaning that space is no longer a sanctuary the reality is that space has never been a true sanctuary and satellites have always been at risk. Therefore, many of the nuclear reductions' treaties[19] between the US and the USSR included clauses warning against targeting national technical means, or intelligence-gathering satellites.

Despite various multilateral efforts to come to a definite agreement over the militarisation of space, the main benchmark remains the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) 1967 Outer Space Treaty that provides the basic framework on international space law, covering legal foundations such as the peaceful use of space, the freedom of exploration of space, and the basic responsibility and liability of state for launching space objects. While this treaty does demilitarise The Moon, it still lacks in detail and does not mention the deployment of conventional weapons in Space.[20] It should be noted that the customary international law principles that apply to the use of force and use of weapons on Earth also apply in Space. However, while these principles may prevent unprovoked or illegal military action from space, or in space, between states, they do not provide for the complete demilitarisation of space altogether as the right of self-defence[21] may apply in Space too.[22] No matter the reason or the outcome it would be difficult to see a situation whereby Ireland is not affected from any fall out from a conflict conducted in or from Space.

….Far, Far Away?

In terms of the Space Race, in the context of security, Ireland hasn't even lined up on the starting blocks. Of the current 77 national or government space agencies Ireland does not have a standalone agency nor any representative at UNOOSA but does have a significant reputation within the European Space Agency[23] (ESA) and the EU for its industry and research, although it wasn't until 2015 before Ireland published its first national space strategy. Unfortunately, in terms of defence, this strategy is concerned with developing an increasing presence in the international space sector and the word 'security' is used only once and this is in the context of food security.[24] Even in national defence policy Space is merely referenced as a domain in the setting of developments in Global and Regional Security Environment whereby "state and non-state actors may use conventional

19 1959 Antarctic Treaty, 1963 Hot Line Agreement, 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, 1967 Outer Space Treaty, 1967 Latin America Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1971 Seabed Treaty, 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty I (Interim Agreement), 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty, 1974 Vladivostok Agreement, 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, 1977 Environmental Modification Convention, 1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II, 1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, 1988 Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement, 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, 1992 Lisbon Protocol, 1993 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II, 1996 Treaty of Pelindaba, 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START).
20 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 2222 (XXI), opened for signature on 27 January 1967, entered into force on 10 October 1967.
21 Article 51 of the UN Charter, 26 June 1945, came into force 24 October 1945.
22 Patrick Butchard, International Regulation of Space, 26 January 2022, House of Commons Library, https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9432/.
23 Ireland joined the European Space Agency in 1975.
24 Project Ireland 2040, National Space Strategy for Enterprise 2019-2025. 19 June 2019 last updated 16 June 2021.

and high-end asymmetric methods concurrently across the land, sea, air, cyber and space domains."[25]

Ireland has no formal plans for the protection or to assist in the protection of satellites that aid in its everyday function, indeed Ireland it is not what is described in Space treaties as "a launching state" that being a state that actually owns or launches its own satellites, although Ireland could easily be considered as a suitable launch site due to our south-west coastal geography which offers unobstructed launch vectors that do not cross inhabited land, making it an optimal spaceport location to launch satellites for Low Earth Orbit.[26] Whilst Ireland does have plans to launch Educational Irish Research Satellite, EIRSAT-1, from French Guiana in 2023, its current lack of satellites does raise the question that if we don't have a satellite in orbit then we do need a defence strategy? This question could further be extended to the difficulty of Ireland's military neutrality if we assist in the protection of another countries space-based assets that we socially and economically benefit from? With the necessity of space-based satellites and their input into a significant portion of living it would be difficult to see how any country, neutral or not, would be able to remain on the side-lines and not get involved in some capacity if any Space war were to take place.

Several countries have followed the US in establishing space commands in their own military air forces, including the UK, France, Australia, Canada, and Iran as a means to protect their national assets. It is unlikely that Ireland will follow suit as of the €1.174 billion Defence Group budget for 2023, which has an overall capital allocation of €176 million, none was specifically allocated to Space defence. Whereas across the sea, in 2021, the British Armed Forces created a new Space Command which is expected to have a full operating capacity of approximately 650 personnel and will also see Britain spending £1.4 billion over next ten years on space defence[27] out of a British defence budget of £45.9 billion.[28] On the advanced end of space defence expenditure US Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall stated that 'this budget is driven by the threat'[29] after the nation's smallest military branch USSF, consisting of 8,600 Guardians, saw their 2024 budget increase by 15% up to $30 billion out of a colossal defence budget of $842 billion, although much of the increase in the Space Force budget is set to fund new Research, Development, Test & Evaluation.[30]

The establishment of these space commands and their significant budgets signifies that the prospect that a conflict could be waged from earth to space, space to earth or in space itself inches closer to reality and unfortunately unlike other specific geo-location wars, the impact of a space war would have consequences for all. This reality was acknowledged in the CODF, specifically Chapter 6.8 which alludes to capabilities in the Space domain and does make recommendations about the DF under Level of Ambition 1 which would see

25 White Paper on Defence Update, 12 December 2019.
26 https://suasaerospace.com last accessed 28 June 2023.
27 UK Defence Space Strategy: Operationalising the Space Domain, 01 February 2022.
28 UK MOD Departmental resources, 01 December 2022.
29 Biden's 2023 defense budget adds billions for U.S. Space Force, 28 March 2022, SpaceNews, https://spacenews.com/bidens-2023-defense-budget-adds-billions-for-u-s-space-force/.
30 US Defense Budget Overview, United States Department of Defense Fiscal year 2024 Budget request, March 2023.

the DF continue to pursue opportunities to develop space domain enablers that support its national and international obligations and Level of Ambition 2 whereby the DF would grow in its participation in space research activities for core defence and security purposes.[31] Unfortunately, the defence of the Space domain was not part of the High Level Action Plan[32] for CODF, in fact the word Space is not even referenced in this plan.

While Ireland may not have plans to defend Space it does have emergency plans in place for any specific impacts that a satellite failure may create. Each governmental department is mandated by the Strategic Emergency Management National Structure and Frameworks[33] to have plans in place for identified emergency scenarios, for instance the Department of the Environment, Climate, and Communications have strategic guidelines[34] if a communications failure took place, whereas the Department of Transport have plans in place if an Air/Maritime disaster happened[35] which would be a distinct possibility in the event of GPS failure as a result of satellite signal jamming or spoofing.

Currently Ireland's space activity is enabled primarily through its longstanding membership of ESA, with Ireland committing to contribute €125 million investment to 2027 with much of this funding going to industrial contracts to Irish companies on a "fair geographical return" basis called juste retour. Given its limited impact into space exploration then these types of partnerships are the way forward for Ireland, as a standalone national space agency or space command does not seem likely.

A significant development in space defence partnerships saw the Combined Space Operations Centre release its Combined Space Operational Vision 2031 statement highlighting its aims to share information about space operations and activities and coordinate efforts.[36] This is a multinational military space initiative organisation providing command and control of space forces consisting of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, the UK, and the US. This type of co-ordinated approach benefits smaller nations such as New Zealand who have a billion-dollar space industry to protect, that holds important international security assets.

There is a potential for Ireland to develop via the EU and ESA, in March 2023, the European Commission issued a formal statement on a European Space Strategy for Security and Defence highlighting that "the Strategy is a direct implementation of the EU Strategic Compass[37] adopted less than a year ago and which defined space, together with cyber and maritime, as contested strategic domains, the security of which must be ensured".

31 Report on the Commission on the Defence Forces, 09 February 2022.
32 High Level Action Plan of the Commission on the Defence Forces, 23 March 2023 last updated 24 March 2023.
33 Strategic Emergency Management (SEM) National Structures and Framework, 12 October 2020 last updated 25 May 2023.
34 Strategic Emergency Management, Guideline 2 Emergency Communications, 12 October 2020 last updated 25 May 2023.
35 Types of Emergencies, Office of Emergency Panning, 12 October 2020 last updated 08 June 2021, https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/d6537-types-of-emergencies/.
36 Combined Space Operations Vision 2031, Statement released–New Zealand Defence Force, 23 February 2023.
37 The Strategic Compass of the European Union, 20 March 2023.

With the recent intensification of threats to security, the EU has said it needs to take action "to protect its space assets, defend its interests, deter hostile activities in space, and strengthen its strategic posture and autonomy".[38] An appropriate level of ambition and strategic autonomy is important for Europe's ability to safeguard its security beyond its geographical borders, of which Ireland could play its part if the desire to do so is there.

Conclusion

The most widely accepted boundary of Space is the Kármán line,[39] this line 100 kilometres above the Earth was originally defined by Hungarian physicist Theodore von Kármán, it is an altitude where traditional aircraft can no longer effectively fly. Authors and storytellers have always looked up to the skies towards this imaginary line and envisaged wars taking place in amongst the stars but now as technology advances this may become a reality. The technologies we develop and knowledge we gain through Space support our wellbeing and provide services for our everyday lives, satellites increase our understanding of the universe, our own planet and offer commanders information vital to any modern-day battle.[40]

Space militarisation is where the world of science fiction and science fact collide, for Ireland the stark reality is that we are light years behind other nations in optimising this new domain for military purposes even though the security of Space has been added to traditional responsibilities of defending land, air, sea, and cyber.

Now a threat to space security is a threat to national security too.

Any disruption to the space domain could lead to significant consequences for civilian, commercial, and economic activities in Ireland, as well as potentially undermining the Defence Forces' ability to undertake many tasks.

The threat landscape has changed, and the ability to influence space-based capabilities could lead to cascading effects in Ireland, it is unrealistic to consider that our terrestrial forces would be able to perform their missions if any adversary's space-based operational support systems, especially targeting systems, are allowed to operate with impunity. With an increase in defence spending and divergence from the more traditional aspects of warfare, now would be an ideal time to invest money and personnel to look towards the stars in the interest of safeguarding our State. While some may be of the opinion that this is beyond our reach, I would subscribe to the thoughts of Commander Chris Hadfield that "to some this may look like a sunset. But it's a new dawn".[41]

38 EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence to ensure a stronger and more resilient EU, 10 March 2023.
39 Eric Betz, 'The Kármán Line: Where does space begin?', Astronomy [online], 05 March 2021, (accessed 5 June 2023).
40 UK HM Government National Space Strategy 2021, 27 September 2021 last updated 01 February 2022.
41 Hadfield, Chris (@Cmdr_Hadfield). "Spaceflight finale: to some this may look like a sunset. But it's a new dawn." Twitter, 13 May 2013. http://twitter.com/cmdr_hadfield/status/334011022815944705?s=48&t=gBvXvW7F7LKTZYmLI7sRPQ.



Exploring The Risks and Opportunities of Educational Wargaming in Irish Defence Forces Professional Military Education

Comdt Kenneth O'Rourke

Abstract

This article will explore why manual adversarial wargaming is experiencing growth in western Professional Military Education (PME) curricula. This article will further explore how this innovative practice, could enhance how western militaries train better decision makers and planners as part of a joint and interagency approach. It will explore some of the key characteristics of this engaging practice which include it's 'adversarial' nature, the presence of chance and uncertainty, the primacy of player's decision in directing learning, and the creation of a 'freedom to fail' environment.

Wargaming is often narrowly understood by military practitioners. Currently the only common form of professional wargaming in the Irish Defence Forces is doctrinal 'COA Wargaming'. This is not true wargaming but is process driven and is 'a conscious attempt by the commander and staff to visualise the flow of the operation'. (DF Land Component Handbook)

Finally, this article will discuss how this 'low-overhead' practice could be implemented effectively in Irish DF PME without the need for expensive 'command and staff trainers'. Wargaming is in fact a step away from expensive repeatable constructive simulations and complex modelling. This article will also explore how wargaming could allow the Irish DF to integrate conceptually into larger joint forces as well as exercise decision-making around our own developing capabilities from land to cyber and other domains. This is an emerging, value added practice that could present a critical opportunity for the DF in the near future.

Introduction

The recently published Detailed Implementation Plan for the report of the Commission of the Defence Forces (CoDF DIP) has emphasised the role of professional military education (PME), and Defence Forces' (DF) training institutions in inculcating jointness throughout the DF. The DIP clearly defines the transition to more joint integrated and structures but is less prescriptive on how PME can help inculcate jointness across all elements of the Defence organisation. Jointness involves more than command structures and requires a mutual understanding of roles and capabilities amongst all military branches, across all domains. The focus on jointness comes hand in glove with organisational transformation, but the question of how best to train and educate for jointness and joint operations, within new structures, is challenging.

This article considers the potential of educational wargaming at all levels of PME from the tactical to operational levels of officer education. Wargaming is defined as: 'a scenario-based warfare model in which the outcome and sequence of events affect, and are affected by, the decisions made by the players.' (UK Wargaming Handbook p.5). Wargaming author Graham Longley Brown states that wargaming is unique in its ability to explore highly complex problems while exercising repetitions of decision-making. Educational wargaming has the potential to train joint concepts and prepare leaders to operate within

a joint force. Principles associated with jointness include cooperation between services, empowering command structures and creating synergies between capabilities[1] all whilst maintaining Corp identity and cohesion. Currently the PME curricula of many European, UK and US militaries include the extensive application of bespoke educational wargames that facilitate 'sets and reps' decision-making across the full continuums of Officer and NCO PME. Wargaming is used extensively in the traditional domains of warfare but is equally effective when applied to emerging domains such as information or cyber.[2] This article will review some of the current literature and theory to understand why there has been an increase in this educational practice in many military institutions, and how it might inculcate jointness.

A Renaissance in Educational Wargaming?

The renewed interest in educational wargaming in the last ten years has focused on manual educational wargaming, after almost five decades of focus on computer-assisted 'command and staff trainers. This has been called a 'renaissance' in professional wargaming[3] and has changed how many schools teach concepts and procedures across the tactical and operational levels of war. The perceived importance of this educational tool is evidenced in the publication of several professional handbooks and guides, and highlighting of wargaming by senior defence leaders. In the US, the Marine Corps' 2019 'Commandant's Planning Guidance' states that wargaming be used more broadly to fill 'what is arguably our greatest deficiency in the training and education of leaders: practice in decision-making against a thinking enemy'.[4] In the UK, the vice Chief of Defence (CHOD) stated in 2017 that wargaming 'can deliver critical thinking, foresight, informed decision making and innovation.'[5]

What Is Manual Educational Wargaming

In its contemporary form manual educational wargaming is attributed to a Lt. Von Reisswitz who presented his 'Kriegsspiel' (Wargame) to the Prussian general staff in 1824 from where it was widely adopted and later spread to other militaries.[6] Current graduates of staff courses in the Irish Military College (Mil Col) will have completed analytical Course of action (COA) wargaming as part of Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) training. They will also have participated in staff simulations such as process focused Tactical Exercises Without Troops (TEWTs) and staff focused scenario-based Command Post Exercises (CPXs). Currently TEWTs and CPXs remain central to staff training in the Mil Col and analytical wargaming is allocated limited syllabus and is not fully mastered by students. Even in the world's largest military campuses, COA wargaming is often poorly

1 Downs, Christopher G., and NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT. "Does Service Interdependence Take Jointness Too Far?." (2008): 0027,
2 Haggman, A. (2019) "Wargaming in cyber security education and awareness training," International Journal of Information Security and Cybercrime, 8(1), pp. 35–38. Available at: https://doi.org/10.19107/ijisc.2019.01.04
3 Hirst, A. (2020) "States of play: evaluating the renaissance in US military wargaming," Critical Military Studies, 8(1), pp. 1–21. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/23337486.2019.1707497.
4 USMC Commandant's Planning Guidance, (2019 p.17-19)
5 UK MOD Wargaming handbook (2017 p.3)
6 Longley Brown (2019 p. 31-32)

taught[7] or glossed over in doctrine.[8] However, educational wargaming is not the same as analytical wargaming, and it is not synonymous with pre-scripted simulation. A 'wargame' is more dynamic because it allows for a free-thinking adversary to adjust and react to your plans, replicating the nature of real-life competition and conflict. An educational wargame is best understood as: 'simulation + people = wargame'.[9] Probably the most commonly accepted definition of a wargame is Peter Perla's definition as an event 'in which the flow of events shapes, and is shaped by, decisions made by a human player, or players, during the course of those events.[10] Unlike in CPXs or TEWTs, an educational wargaming allows for plans to be conceived and 'executed', and in doing so the potential for learning and experimentation are increased. Another fundamental difference is that plan failure is actively discussed and is not stigmatised. Planning and capabilities are stressed and pushed to failure creating insights and valuable experiences.

The Components of a Successful Educational Wargame

The UK's Wargaming Handbook defines wargaming's unique ability to explore highly complex problems while also exercising repetitions of decision-making.[11] Peter Perla states that wargaming is centred on human decisions and the consequences of those decisions. Perla is clear to state that wargaming is 'the art and science of devising, playing, and applying wargames to derive useful insights'.[12] It is useful to consider what he considers the essential characteristics of successful wargame:[13]

- Adversarial or oppositional.
- Containing chance and uncertainty.
- The primacy of player decisions.
- Freedom to fail.
- Participant engagement.
- Cheap to run.
- The presence of 'soft' or 'non-kinetic' factors.
- Control and appropriate adjudication including transparency and analysis.
- Appropriate technology.
- Simplicity.

Wargaming replicates the nature and character of conflict by placing the flow of events directly in the hands of the participants. Wargaming requires a constant re-evaluation of your competitor's actions and reactions and engaging with concepts of risk, friction, and chance. In doing so participants gain experience in dealing with uncertainty and managing deployed capability. Wargaming is described as a 'low overhead' practice

7 GETTING THE MOST OUT OF YOUR WARGAME: PRACTICAL ADVICE FOR DECISION-MAKERS
https://warontherocks.com/2019/11/getting-the-most-out-of-your-wargame-practical-advice-for-decision-makers/
8 How to master COA wargaming https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/20-06.pdf
9 Longley Brown 2019 2019, p.52.
10 Peter Perla 2016, in Graham Longley-Brown 2018, p. 44.
11 UK MOD, 2017 p.6.
12 Perla, 1990, p.283.
13 Longley-Brown 2019, p.37.

however it requires skilled facilitation by experienced instructors. To truly understand why facilitating a collaborative learning environment are important it is important to consider how learning is occurring during wargaming. [14]

'Playing' As an Adult Learner

Adult learners engage with new knowledge effectively when it is grounded in experiential learning and focused on practical application.[15] Knowles defines six crucial factors that must be considered for adults to learn. He states that adult learners must be respected as autonomous and self-directed, and that they possess a bank of prior experiences which contextualise and interconnect their ongoing learning. He states that adult learners are motivated to learn based on their social or professional roles, and that they learn best when focused on real life problems. Finally, central to adult learning is continuous reflective practice[16] based on an experiential learning approach.[17]

It is important to consider the cognitive load experienced during complex problem-solving activities. One study into the use of educational business simulations found that individuals who had formed the greatest diversity of complex mental models, from previous experiences (simulated or real), were more likely to identify key concepts in solving a new problem.[18] Wargames are a safe means to form complex mental models of joint structures in conflict situations that otherwise would be impossible, or expensive to simulate, they 'convey a vicarious understanding of some of the strategic and tactical dynamics associated with military operations.'[19] This is particularly relevant to the recommendations of the CoDF DIP which prioritises the delivery of routine joint exercising. Wargaming is a means to practically pursue the implementation of joint exercising. Wargaming rehearses staff in decision making so that when resources are concentrated for field exercises, or operational deployment, conceptual preparations have been properly completed. Wargames allow us to think about joint procedures, and gain insights that are difficult and costly, to gain solely from live simulations or deployments. There is also a synergy in that all participants and facilitators are being exposed to specialist doctrine and concepts while engaging in dynamic team-based decision-making.[20]

Challenging Military Epistemology & Parochialism

One of the reasons military staff courses are so complex is because of the need to blend accredited academic education and applied military training. During PME there is, at times, a tension between the socio-constructivist approach required for adults to learn most

14 Longley Brown 2018, p. 30-31, 57
15 Knowles, M. S. (1980 pp.44-45). The modern practice of adult education: From Pedagogy to Andragogy (2nd ed.). New York: Cambridge Books.
16 Schon, D.A. (1987) Educating the reflective practitioner: Toward a New Design for Teaching and Learning in the Professions. Jossey-Bass
17 Kolb, D. (1983) Experiential learning : Experience as the source of learning and development. Available at: http://ci.nii.ac.jp/ncid/BB1767575X.
18 Nadkarni, S. (2003) "Instructional Methods and Mental Models of Students: An Empirical investigation," Academy of Management Learning and Education, 2(4), pp. 335–351. Available at: https://doi.org/10.5465/amle.2003.11901953
19 Sabin, P. a. G. (2014) Simulating War, Bloomsbury Publishing Plc eBooks. Available at: https://doi.org/10.5040/9781474211239.
20 UK Wargaming Handbook (2017, p.82), Case study 6: Camberley Kriegsspiel: Wargaming at Unit level.

effectively, and the military requirement to ensure adherence to doctrine.[21] It is common to think of PME as comprising two separate elements. Training is for the knowns and education is for the unknowns.[22] Wargaming may assist in enhancing current approaches to decision making training and help create more innovative, collaborative decision-makers. Wargaming has proven to increase situational awareness[23] and could assist jointness by creating an appreciation of specialist, and general roles and reducing parochialism.

Understanding is defined as: 'the perception and interpretation of a particular situation in order to provide the context, insight and foresight required for effective decision-making'.[24] The resurgence in interest in educational wargaming can be considered in the context of wider shifts in western military thought. In a critical review of the strategic outcomes of the major western military interventions of this century, Beaulieu and Dufort state that MDMP and military planning requires a review of 'military epistemology'.[25] Very often staff simulations lack authenticity and focus on process over product. Educational wargaming challenges how decision-making is taught by focusing on collaboration, realism and authenticity.

Linking Analytical and Educational Wargaming

There are clear synergies between the educational and analytical practice of wargaming. The result of practice in either field means increased confidence and ability in the other. At the time of writing, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is into its second winter and the Ukrainian's ability to fight is in no small part due to the conceptual component of their fighting power. The Ukrainian general staff have made extensive use of analytical wargaming, reportedly facilitated by US and European partners, often in preparation for large operational transitions.[26] Earlier this year one such event was described as a 'multi-day wargaming event' which involved 'exercises to evaluate potential military courses of action ahead of the anticipated summer offensive'.[27] Such high-level wargames are innovative in nature and are often associated with experimentation and operational force design as new capabilities are integrated into a force.[28] In contrast, war has not 'played-out' as the Russian regime had planned, due in no small part to lack of a jointness at the tactical level, and because of ineffectual leadership across all levels. The war has seen unparalleled tactical losses, and strategically the conflict has resulted in Russian isolation through expanded NATO membership and weakened ties with traditional partners, such

21 Vygotsky, L. S. (1978). Mind in society: The development of higher psychological processes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
22 Bruce, Richard. "'Train for Certainty–Educate for Uncertainty': Personal Development in the British Army." In Human Resource Management in the British Armed Forces, pp. 67-85. Routledge, 2013.
23 Perla, Peter P., Michael Markowitz, and Christopher Weuve. Game-Based Experimentation for Research in Command and Control and Shared Situational Awareness. CNA, 2005.
24 UK MoD Doctrinal Publication (2016) Understanding and Decision-making
25 Beaulieu-B, Philippe, and Philippe Dufort. "Introduction: Revolution in military epistemology." Journal of Military and Strategic Studies 17, no. 4 (2017).
26 Schmitt, Helene Cooper, and Eric. 2023. NY Times. March 2. Accessed August 02, 2023. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/02/world/europe/ukraine-us-wargames-germany.html.
27 Stewart, Phil. 2023. Reuters. 2 March. Accessed August 2, 2023. which involve thought exercises to evaluate potential military courses of action.
28 Defence Experimentation for Force Development Handbook, Version 2, dated January 2021, is promulgated as directed by the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff and the Defence Force Development Board

as India.[29] A historic example of the pivotal role of analytical wargaming is the Western Approaches Tactical Unit (WATU) which was set-up during WW2 by the Royal Navy to develop, and disseminate, naval tactics for allied shipping convoys to counter the Nazi submarine threat.[30] Educational wargames were conducted by WATU to teach the tactics to naval officers in a practical way. This historical example of wargaming is of interest because of the processes by which knowledge was generated and shared in a collaborative manner. It is significant that WATU was unique in its diversity, even by today's standards, with over 60 Women's Royal Naval Service (WRNS) on the Unit's staff. Fundamentally more wargaming activity, whether doctrinally or educationally focused, develops the conceptual component of any force, increased awareness of force component parts and teaching decision makers to leverage the expertise withing a group.

Conclusion: Enabling Joint Educational Aims

A UN report assessed that militaries will need to be prepared to operate in environments where "surprises are frequent and significant, involving economic, societal, geopolitical, and environmental forms of stress."[31] In future, the Irish DF will undoubtedly contribute force elements to joint multi-lateral operations and will provide staff to participate at the joint-level of capability development and planning. The Irish DF could explore adopting educational wargaming practices as a means to better meet these future challenges. The DIP now offers a framework for transformation and can be seen as an opportunity to expand the DF's PME strategies. The current PME Strategy document states that the Irish DF should respond to increasing complexity with innovation in education and training[32], and likewise the DF Leadership Doctrine states that unless leaders are willing to question how things operate now, no one will ever know what can be done in future.[33] Both analytical and educational wargaming has clear application at the joint-level of education to teach geopolitical concepts and operational planning to senior officers, and NCOs. However, wargaming is not the reserve of senior officers and a coherent educational wargaming could be applied across the full PME spectrum as an effective means to inculcate jointness and increase interoperability. Wargames are engaging for students and facilitate conceptual engagement within and amongst branches to better prepare for collective joint training in a cost-effective manner.

In summary, the Irish DF must innovate in educational practices or else it may respond poorly to future challenges. Wargaming is not real, but the staff planning functions, command structures and cognitive processes used are real. Where militaries are finding less and less time for large collective training events, professional experience and education have greater importance. In the context of staff training, educational wargaming allows participants to learn each other's specialist, and general military functions across all

29 Schulz, Akriti (Vasudeva) Kalyankar Dante. (09 March 2023) . Accessed August 04, 2023. https://www.stimson.org/2023/continental-drift-india-russia-ties-after-one-year-of-war-in-ukraine/
30 https://paxsims.wordpress.com/tag/watu/
31 Williams P. (2018) The Future of Peace Operations: A Scenario Analysis, 2020-2030, Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/future-of-peacekeeping [accessed 23 APR 2023].
32 DF PME strategy, 2021
33 DF Leadership Doctrine, 2023 p.46.

domains and reduce deficits of understanding. Games generate experience that are "an opportunity for commanders to practice the intellectual skills they need to do their jobs well."[34] Fundamentally wargaming offers a feasible way, within any future National Defence Academy and joint educational establishments, to help achieve the DIP's aim of prioritising training institutions. It is an effective way to complete joint exercises and build operational capabilities for national defence and overseas operations.[35] This article has reviewed some aspects of the renaissance in this educational practice and presents wargaming as an opportunity for the Irish DF to inculcate jointness across the organisation. Educational wargaming is unlike other educational practices in that it challenges participants to think practically and creatively and engenders cross-collaboration. These are exactly the traits needed of a small integrated military force.

34 Perla 1990, p,255
35 CoDF DIP, p30 available at: https://www.military.ie/!F54TGA

How Does the DF Approach Pesco Projects?

Capt Kenneth Deegan & Ms. Sharon Breen

Abstract

This article examines the DF' (DF) approach to choosing which PESCO projects Ireland should become involved with as an observer or as a participant. It will discuss the evolution of the process, what the DF's current engagement looks like, the integral role of DoD (DoD), and how the DF and DoD respond to government policy. There are challenges in this area with regard to strategic oversight, not least the lack of joint structures and day to day project management. This paper will outline how the DF and DoD have sought to mitigate this challenge. Finally, the paper will assess the utility of PESCO projects to the DF and proposes some options of where responsibility for PESCO could sit within the future joint structure of the DF. This article ultimately seeks to address the gap in research of what DF engagement with PESCO actually looks like, the nuances of which are sometimes lost in public discourse regarding PESCO. By demonstrating the transparency of our processes and its collaborative nature, this article could help 'demystify' Ireland's engagement with PESCO and its utility to the DF.

Introduction

The White Paper on Defence 2015 sets out eleven tasks for the Permanent DF (PDF). It says that "the PDF must be able to undertake a full spectrum of military tasks that range from support in peacetime (ATCP, ATCA, fishery protection, MATS), operations overseas (international peace support operations, humanitarian operations) to warfighting (defence of the State)". Fulfilling these roles is the starting, middle and end point for Capability Development in the DF including participation in projects under Permanent Structured Cooperation (more commonly known by its acronym PESCO).

PESCO is an EU defence initiative designed to deepen cooperation between EU Member States and enable capability development that contributes to Common Security and Defence Policy Missions. When Ireland joined the initiative in 2017. The then Minister of State at the Department of Defence (DoD) Paul Kehoe argued that it would contribute to enhancing the capabilities, interoperability and deployability of the DF. Interoperability, capability and deployability. This has been the consistent rationale for Irish involvement with PESCO. At the recent Consultative Forum on International Security Policy, the Tánaiste Michael Martin argued that Ireland should not be "squeamish" about becoming move involved in PESCO. The response to his comments in some quarters illustrated that some elements of Irish society continue to fear that participation in the initiative is a threat to Ireland's long standing policy choice of military neutrality.

Debating the merits or otherwise of the Government's decision to join PESCO is not the purpose of this article, that has already been dealt with elsewhere by others. This article will provide a clear picture of what the DF engagement with PESCO projects looks like in practice, the nuances of which are sometimes lost in the political and media discourse. Specifically, the article will explain how the DF selects projects to recommend to government, and how that process has evolved since 2017. The article speaks to the theme

of this year's DF Review by illustrating how the adoption of a joint approach to PESCO Projects enabled the DF and the DoD (hereafter referred to as the Defence Organisation) to overcome some of the challenges caused by the lack of Joint Force institutions and structures. This includes a lack of standardisation, prioritisation and clear lines of command for capability development. The article argues that the Defence Organisation has become more agile in responding to the opportunities presented by PESCO projects, but that the lack of a joint civil-military capability development plan for the DF continues to bedevil a truly joint approach to capability development.

The Evolution of Ireland's Approach to PESCO: 2017-2021

Ireland's engagement in PESCO projects from 2017-2021 was modest and risk averse with participation in two projects (one of which closed in 2020) and observation on a small number of others. Whilst it might be tempting for some to suggest that this was exclusively due to political sensitivities this would be incorrect. The launch of the first wave of PESCO projects in 2017 was high on fanfare but a little lighter on detail, it was yet to be seen what EU member states' commitments to PESCO projects would look like. To put it simply, the Defence Organisation did not feel that they had a sufficient level of information available on some of the projects to make a proper judgement on the value of participation in them. Ireland has a small military with a limited budget. It neither has the resources nor can it afford to become involved in capability development projects that do not produce results.

This is one of the reasons that Ireland has favoured a two-staged approach to PESCO project engagement. The first stage is to join a project as an observer for a period and to use that period of observation to assess the added value of progressing to full participation. The DF can secure information about the project, map its development and more accurately assess if it aligns with national capability development requirements. If a project meets these criteria the DF prepare a detailed submission for the DoD, who in turn seek government and Dáil approval to move to full participant status (as a participant, member states have the opportunity to contribute to and influence the project, including that the national defence capability needs can be enshrined in the project). In 2021-2022 work began on seeking approval for Ireland to join four additional projects. Although there is no legislation underpinning Ireland's participation in PESCO projects, the current Programme for Government stipulates that any projects undertaken within PESCO will be approved by Cabinet and Dáil Éireann.

What Is Ireland's Current Level of Involvement with PESCO Projects?

As of the 31st of August 2023, Ireland is a participant in four PESCO projects and an observer on a further 20 projects which are listed in table one. The projects Ireland takes part in are 'Upgrade of Maritime Surveillance (MARSUR)', 'Maritime (semi-) Autonomous Systems for Mine Countermeasures (MAS MCM)' Deployable Military Disaster Relief Capability Package (DM-DRCP)' and 'Cyber Threats and Incident Response Information

Sharing Platform (CTISP)'. A detailed explanation of these four projects can be found on the PESCO Secretariat's website. The stated benefits of projects to the DF can be summarised as follows:

MARSUR: the aim of this project is to enhance the maritime surveillance, situational awareness and potential response effectiveness of the EU, by using the existing infrastructure, deploying assets and developing related capabilities in the future. It aims to address new and old threats and challenges (such as energy security, environmental challenges, security and defence aspects). Participation in this project enables the Naval Service capability development in maritime surveillance and situation awareness, interaction with other Navies is also extremely valuable from a lessons learned and lessons identified perspective.

MAS MCM: Aims to deliver technologies for maritime countermeasures which will supply an increased level of protection and resilience against potential threats to critical national infrastructure such as sub-sea cables, ports and renewable offshore energy.

DMDR-CP: The DF has a strong tradition of participation in humanitarian operations. Participation in the DMDR-CP project will provide the DF with increased opportunities to train alongside other nations in disaster management thereby improving the ability of the DF to respond to natural and man-made disasters such as public calamities, natural disasters and pandemics.

CTISP: is a cyber-domain project which will help the DF block the on average 60,000 hits per day which seek to penetrate it's network security devices.



Figure 1. 2022 PESCO Participation by EU Member State
Graphic obtained from https://www.pesco.europa.eu

Participation in four projects places Ireland at the bottom of the table along with Lithuania and Slovakia in terms of PESCO project engagement. However, this is an increase from participation in one project in 2021. Ireland also applied to move from observer to participant status on the Special Forces Medical Training Centre (SMTC) project led by Poland, and based on it's Military Medical Training Centre in Lódz. The comparatively low level of engagement is reflective of the size of the Irish DF and the lack of an indigenous defence industry. Whilst Irish engagement with PESCO projects is trending upwards it is highly unlikely that Ireland will ever find itself in the top half of the graph depicted above.

Table One. Projects at Observer Status

Domain	Project
Training	Special Operations Forces Medical Training Centre (SMTC)
	European Union Network of Diving Centres (EUNDC)
	EU Cyber Academia and Innovation Hub (EU CAIH)
Land	EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core (EUFOR CROC)
	Armoured Infantry Fighting Vehicle/ Amphibious Assault/ Light Armoured Vehicle
	EU Military Partnership (EU MilPart)
Maritime	European Patrol Corvette (EPC)
	Harbour & Maritime Surveillance and Protection (HARMSPRO)
	Critical Seabed Infrastructure Protection
Cyber/C4ISR	European Secure Software defined Radio (ESSOR
	Cyber and Information Domain Coordination Centre (CIDCC)
	Strategic Command and Control (C2) System for CSDP Missions and Operations (EUMILCOM)
Joint	Military Mobility
	Energy Operational Function (EOF)
Air	Counter Unmanned Aerial System (C-UAS)
	Next Generation Small RPAS (NGSR
	Medium Altitude Long Endurance Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems – MALE RPAS
	Future Medium-size Tactical Cargo (FMTC)

SPACE	EU Radio Navigation Solution (EURAS)
	Common Hub for Governmental Imagery (CoHGI)

Capability Development in the DF

DF engagement with PESCO projects is nominally based upon the agreed capability development priorities of the DF. However, the DF have no capability development plan. The White Paper on Defence 2015 Project Number 31 states that the DoD "will develop a detailed capability development plan building on the work completed as part of the white paper process".[1] This project was recognised as a priority in the 2019 White Paper Update.

The Defence Organisation does however have an Equipment Development Plan and an Infrastructure Development Plan. However, this is different from a Capability Development Plan. Equipment and Infrastructure are but two of the many aspects of capability development. They do not take account for example of how to integrate with existing capabilities, the potential need for doctrinal changes or how the new equipment relates to a specific mission or task of the DF. It is the equivalent of buying furniture for a house that has not yet been built.

At the time of writing, the Defence Organisation are creating a joint civil-military capability development branch.[2] A few key civilian appointments have already been filled and the DF is making similar appointments. This capability development branch will handle the implementation of a capability development planning process and the publication of a capability development plan by 2028. Once completed it is likely that capability development (including PESCO) initiatives will be evaluated per the capability development planning processes (CDPP) set down in future doctrine and the capability priorities established in any future capability development plan. The question now arises: What happens in the meantime?

Defence Organisation Approach to PESCO Projects

The Defence Organisation's present approach to engagement with PESCO projects was adopted in 2022 on the back of a review of the first five years of PESCO. The current approach has looked to bake in a joint approach to project choice and create plug-in points for potential future joint branches discussed in the Commission on the DF such as Capability Development and Cyber. Civil-Military collaboration is a key part of the current approach. This is in part due to the political sensitivities surrounding PESCO. It is also reflective of the substantial number of stakeholders within the Defence Organisation involved with PESCO and the limitations of the current capability development process.

1 (White Paper, 2015).
2 Ireland, Department of Defence, White Paper 2015. Available at: https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/1b0dc6-white-paper-on-defence/. Accessed: 15 Jan 2024. 68.
Editors note: The CAPDEV Unit was established in Q3 2023

The main changes from the first approach adopted in 2017 include the standardisation of reporting mechanisms for measuring project progress. The standardisation of the toolkit for analysing new projects and the increased involvement of members of the General Staff and Formation Commanders. Deputy Chief of Staff (Operations) (DCOS Ops), Deputy Chief of Staff (Support) (DCOS Sp), General Officer Commanding Air Corps (GOC AC) and Flag Officer Commanding Naval Service (FOCNS) have been named as project owners. This means that they have responsibility for engagement in ongoing projects and the evaluation of proposed projects in their respective domains. As project owners they appoint the task of Project Lead and secondary SME project support to a specific Directorate or Formation. The Project Lead's report to their project owners twice a year. They also engage on an ongoing basis with the Strategic Planning Branch in DF HQ and International Security and Defence Policy Branch of DoD. On an annual basis, usually one month after the PESCO Secretariat publishes its annual PESCO Project Progress report. Strategic Planning branch hosts a meeting of all projects SMEs and key officials from the DoD. The outcome of this meeting is a report for the General Staff and Senior Management in DoD with three key deliverables. They are as follows:

a. Recommendations on moving from observer to participation status, staying as an observer or withdrawing for each project in the current portfolio.
b. Recommend new or pre-existing projects for the DF to engage with as observers.
c. Provide an annual review of PESCO engagement.

This report forms the basis of a General Staff recommendation to the DoD on future engagement with PESCO, which in turn forms the basis of a submission for consideration by government.

Current and Future Challenges

PESCO projects are member state driven. This means that as a member state Ireland can use the framework for our own benefit, whilst also contributing to the EU capability needs and showing Ireland's commitment to CSDP. However, Ireland's participation in PESCO is not about optics, it is about value. A downside of the member state driven approach is that the levels of engagement can vary from project to project depending on national capability development priorities and the availability of national SMEs. At present there are 68 PESCO projects and successes have been limited. How these projects will deliver for the member states, how defence funding has aided in the delivery of capabilities, and how relevant those capabilities are at the time of delivery is the decisive test for PESCO in the next number of years.

Embedding PESCO projects into national planning and procurement plans is an on-going challenge for the Defence Organisation. From an organisational perspective there is a need to see some return on engagement. However, for PESCO projects to deliver for the Defence Organisation there also must be a clear understanding of what Ireland is getting from participation in these projects, as participants and as observers. In this regard the ongoing

development of a joint civil-military capability development branch is very appropriate as it will bring greater clarity and cohesion to Ireland's engagement with PESCO Projects.

Conclusion

The DF is beginning the process of transformation into the joint force envisaged in the Government's High Level Action Plan on Defence. To realise the ambitious goals contained in the plan, Ireland will need to leverage the benefits offered by existing multinational capability development initiatives like PESCO. Creating a truly joint force and overcoming the challenges associated with deployment on joint operations will require a DF with enhanced capabilities, enhanced interoperability and enhanced deployability. Capability, interoperability and deployability. This was the original rationale for engagement with PESCO projects and in the contemporary international security environment, it is more relevant now than ever before.

This article has looked to address in some part the knowledge gap on what DF engagement with PESCO Projects looks like. As discussed above, there is now a clear strategy and transparent process on how and why the Defence Organisation engages in PESCO Projects. Every move to participant level on a PESCO Project undergoes a period of analysis whereby subject matter experts evaluate how the project could contribute to or enhance capability development. It is only when there are clear national capability development benefits that the Defence Organisation will seek approval to join a PESCO Project. By showing the transparency of the DF processes and its collaborative nature, this article has sought to demystify engagement with PESCO Projects and demonstrate the opportunities presented by joint civil-military collaboration.

Black Flags and Grey Law : The Law of Armed Conflict and It's Application in Counter-Piracy Operations

Lt (NS) Cian Moran

"We must not make a scarecrow of the law,
Setting it up to fear the birds of prey."
William Shakespeare, Measure for Measure.

Abstract

International opposition to piracy has a long pedigree, with pirates being categorized as hostis humani generis, or enemies of all mankind that can be prosecuted by any nation upon the high seas. Nonetheless, pirates are rarely ideologues and were driven by necessity both historically as well as piracy in the contemporary era. Even still, their increasing sophistication and access to arms means that counter-piracy operations are frequently conducted as military, rather than law enforcement operations. Such militarization means that a key issue arises as to the applicability of international humanitarian law in relation to counter-piracy operations, particularly as counter-piracy operations have become integrated into the security policies of individual states, alliances and the international community at large. The increasing use of military force in such operations means that the law of armed conflict, particularly international humanitarian law, is of especial importance given that the distinction between piracy and terrorism is often blurred.

This article proposes to analyse the legal regime within which militaries can operates in and to determine whether international humanitarian law is applicable to pirates. Such an analysis is of vital contemporary importance given the increasing reliance on militaries to engage in counter-piracy operations, with deployments such as Operation Atalanta being conducted under UN Security Council authorisation.

Introduction

Piracy has long had a romantic hold on the Western psyche, conjuring up images of golden sands, swashbuckling buccaneers and a romanticized life on turquoise seas. However, twentieth century piracy primarily took place in the Global South meaning Westerners saw piracy as something historical and not a threat in the modern world.[1] This perception changed rapidly in the first decade of the twenty first century when a spate of high profile hijackings off the coast of Somalia forcibly thrust piracy's danger into the public eye.[2] The threat of piracy is so longstanding that a sovereignty based jurisdictional approach to piracy existed since at least the early seventeenth century.[3] However, while maritime violence (including piracy) has been a constant problem, it receives comparatively little attention, especially when its victims are from the Global South.[4] Piracy is no exception but the attacks off Somalia became so problematic that it led to a strong global response,

1 Jack Gottschalk and Brian Flanagan, Jolly Roger with an Uzi: The Rise and Threat of Modern Piracy (Naval Institute Press 2000). 22.
2 Robert Haywood and Roberta Spivak, Maritime Piracy (Routledge 2012). 1.
3 Eugene Kontorovich, 'The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction's Hollow Foundation' (2004) 45 Harvard International Law Journal. 190.
4 Ian Urbina, The Outlaw Ocean: Crime and Survival in the Last Untamed Frontier (Vintage 2020). 324.

with various states deploying naval forces to conduct counter-piracy patrols. That such operations are conducted by armed forces mean the question arises as to whether counter-piracy operations come under the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC),[5] a legal regime designed to minimise loss of life and mitigate against unnecessary suffering during armed conflict. The purpose of this article is to explore whether LOAC is applicable to such counter-piracy operations. The article will conclude that both pirates and piracy exist outside the confines of LOAC and that it is an inappropriate legal regime to apply.

Piracy in Somalia

Small-scale piracy off the Somali coast has been a longstanding issue but it was exacerbated during the 1990s when Somali vessels began attacking and ransoming vessels they insisted were engaged in illegal fishing or pollution in Somali waters.[6] Over time, such groups expanded their targets to include any vessel sailing near Somali coastal waters before extending their range to attack vessels hundreds of miles from Somalia, leading the region to become the most dangerous in the world for pirate attacks.[7] The Golden Age of Piracy in the Caribbean that is so familiar to Westerners was driven by desperate seafarers living in a region of weak governance with close proximity to lucrative maritime traffic turning to piracy.[8] Somali piracy is no different and caused by the same factors. [9]

The extent of the pirate attacks off Somalia posed a grave threat to foreign shipping as well as regional trade.[10] Consequently, several counter-piracy operations (both national and multinational) were deployed off the Horn of Africa, with the UN Security Council endorsing "all necessary means" to combat piracy and armed robbery within Somali territorial waters.[11] UNSC authorisation of states to enter Somali waters to undertake enforcement actions against pirates is notable, showing that the UNSC sees piracy as a threat to international peace and security.[12] This is especially relevant to EU states given the EU's first maritime operation was launched in 2008, with EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta being established to operate five hundred miles off the Somali coast in support of UN Security Council Resolutions 1814, 1816 and 1818.[13]

In recent years, states have attempted to respond to counter-piracy operations by integrating them into the maintenance of international peace and security, with national and multinational naval forces being deployed on counter-piracy missions such as off the coast of Somalia or in the Gulf of Aden.[14] However, the UN Security Council resolutions

5 Also known as International Humanitarian Law (IHL). The terms Law of Armed Conflict or International Humanitarian Law are interchangeable. See Emily Crawford and Alison Pert, International Humanitarian Law (Cambridge University Press 2020). xvii.
6 World Bank, The Pirates of Somalia: Ending the Threat, Rebuilding the Nation (World Bank Group 2013). 87.
7 International Expert Group on Piracy off the Somali Coast, Piracy off the Somali Coast (International Expert Group on Piracy off the Somali Coast 2008). 14.
8 Angus Konstam, Pirates: The Complete History from 1300BC to the Present Day (Lyons Press 2008). 152-153.
9 International Expert Group on Piracy off the Somali Coast (n 7). 14-15.
10 Douglas Guilfoyle, 'The Laws of War and the Fight Against Somali Piracy: Combatants or Criminals?' (2010) 11 Melbourne Journal of International Law. 142.
11 United Nations Security Council, 'United Nations Security Council Resolution 1816' (UN Doc S/Res/1816, June 2008). Art.7.
12 Donald Rothwell and Tim Stephens, The International Law of the Sea (Hart 2016). 466-467.
13 Council of the European Union, 'Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP' (November 2008). Art.1.
14 Thilo Marauhn, 'Counter-Piracy Operations and the Limits of International Humanitarian Law' in Panos Koutrakos and Achilles Skordas (eds), The Law and Practice of Piracy at Sea (Hart 2015). 67.

should not be overstated, given they merely authorize existing uses of force or extend such powers into Somali territorial waters.[15] Furthermore, such operations have the consent of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government,[16] though its influence is extremely limited, even within Somalia itself.[17]

At the time of writing, the threat of piracy off the coast of Somalia has drastically reduced, with the IMO removing the Indian Ocean's designation as an area of high-risk for piracy in 2022, after years without any pirate attacks.[18] While a welcome development, the threat of piracy off the Somali coast should be seen as reduced rather than extinguished,[19] with Somali pirates retaining both the capability and capacity to conduct attacks.[20] The threat of piracy has been noted in recent years given tension between Somalia's federal government and regional governments such as Puntland over the issuing of fishing licenses to foreign firms, in deals which are criticised for corruption.[21] This risks becoming even more problematic in 2023 given the Somali government's granting of fishing licenses to foreign companies raise Somali fears that piracy will return to the region as foreign fishing companies once again drive Somali fishermen to desperation.[22] Such a sense of injustice felt by Somalis is vital to understanding Somali piracy, given there is a high level of support among ordinary Somalis for the pirates, who are often seen as heroes protecting Somali sovereignty from rapacious foreign companies.[23]

International Law and Piracy

Under international law, the proscription against piracy is seemingly uncontroversial. Piracy has been such a longstanding problem in international peace and security that it marked the first example of a universal crime and an extraterritorial law.[24] Piracy has historically been such a universal problem that pirates were deemed hostis humani generis; enemies of all humankind and prosecutable by any nation upon the high seas,[25] with every state being mandated to suppress piracy.[26] The key legal framework relating to the suppression of piracy has been reaffirmed by the UN Security Council as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),[27] a 1982 treaty[28] widely regarded as the "authoritative maritime safety and security instrument of our time".[29] While UNCLOS permits the apprehension of pirates on the high seas (and therefore outside the waters of any state), they are tried

15 Guilfoyle, 'The Laws of War and the Fight Against Somali Piracy: Combatants or Criminals?' (n 10). 146-147.
16 Achilles Skordas, 'The Dark Side of Counter-Piracy Policies' in Panos Koutrakos and Achilles Skordas (eds), The Law and Practice of Piracy at Sea (Hart 2015). 305.
17 See World Bank (n 6). 161 and Urbina (n 4). 359.
18 Darshana M Baruah, Nitya Labh and Jessica Greely, 'Mapping the Indian Ocean Region' Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Washingon DC, June 2023). 16.
19 James Stavridis, 'East Africa's Pirates Are Forgotten But Not Gone' Washington Post (January 2023).
20 International Chamber of Commerce International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Report for the Period 1 January-31 March 2023 (2023). 20-21.
21 Urbina (n 4). 357-358. 367.
22 Mohamed Sheikh Nor, 'Somalia: New Fishing Bill Raises Fear of Lost Livelihoods, Return of Piracy' The Africa Report (20 April 2023).
23 Probal Kumar Ghosh, 'Strategies for Countering Somalian Piracy: Responding to the Evolving Threat' (2014) 70 India Quarterly. 18.
24 International Expert Group on Piracy off the Somali Coast (n 7). 13.
25 Robert C McCabe, Modern Maritime Piracy: Genesis, Evolution and Responses (Routledge 2018). 22.
26 Convention on the Law of the Sea (10 December 1982) 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. Art.100.
27 United Nations Security Council (n 11).
28 Convention on the Law of the Sea (10 December 1982) 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. (n 26).
29 RL Castaneda, C Condit and B Wilson, 'Legal Authorities for Maritime Law Enforcement, Safety, and Environmental Protection' in Michael McNicholas (ed), Maritime Security (Elsevier 2016). 436.

and convicted under national courts rather than international ones, and their crimes are punished under domestic law rather than international law.[30]

It must be noted that the term pirate has both colloquial and legal definitions. There is a legal definition of "piracy" under UNCLOS.[31] Key in this is that such piracy must involve illegal acts committed for private ends and using a private ship on the high seas. However, such a definition only applies to the high seas and does not cover maritime violence committed in territorial waters, even though this is where the majority of maritime violence takes place.[32] As such, states frequently criminalise "piracy" within their own waters, even though such acts do not count as piracy under the UNCLOS definition.[33] Such coastal state designation of piracy differs crucially from UNCLOS' legal regime, given no state other than the coastal state has jurisdiction without the coastal state's explicit permission.[34]

It must be noted that, piracy is fundamentally distinct from terrorism, with terrorists' political motivation excluding them from the definition of piracy.[35] While there has been a tendency for terrorists to adopt pirates' tactics and for pirates to espouse terrorists' ideology,[36] piracy is a mercenary endeavor and driven by profit while terrorists are motivated by ideology.[37] As such, for the purposes of this article, the term "piracy" will cover acts of maritime violence committed for private ends both on the high seas and within a state's waters. This is especially important as those who commit piracy in the high seas and territorial waters are often the same actors,[38] with the UN Security Council likewise endorsing "all necessary means" to combat piracy and armed robbery within Somali territorial waters,[39] even though such actions within territorial waters do not fall within UNCLOS' definition of piracy.

30 See Michael Passman, 'Protections Afforded to Captured Pirates under the Law of War and International Law' (2008) 33 Tulane Maritime Law Journal. 10-11.
31 Namely, piracy is defined under UNCLOS as:
"(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b)."
Convention on the Law of the Sea (10 December 1982) 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. (n 26). Art.101.
32 Adam J Young and Mark J Valencia, 'Conflation of Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Rectitude and Utility' (2003) 25 Contemporary Southeast Asia.the New York Times reported attacks on several chemical tankers in the Strait of Malacca region by assailants with automatic weapons. (1 270.
33 Passman (n 30). 13.
34 Rothwell and Stephens (n 12). 172.
35 Douglas Guilfoyle, 'Piracy and Terrorism' in Panos Koutrakos and Achilles Skordas (eds), The Law and Practice of Piracy at Sea (Hart 2015). 46-47.
36 Nong Hong and Adolf KY Ng, 'The International Legal Instruments in Addressing Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: A Critical Review' (2010) 27 Research in Transportation Economics. 51.
37 Joshua Regan, 'The Piracy Terrorism Paradigm: An Interlinking Relationship' (2019) 11 Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression. 150.
38 Passman (n 30). 5.
39 United Nations Security Council (n 11). Art.7.

LOAC and Piracy

The primary response to piracy in Somalia has been operations that are military in nature, rather than law enforcement.[40] Such a legal regime is primarily based around the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 which apply during international armed conflict, while each convention has the same Article 3 (known as Common Article 3) which provides a basic legal regime during non-international armed conflict. The Geneva Conventions have acquired universal acceptance, having been signed by more states than are members of the UN, while two additional Protocols were adopted in 1977 concerning the victims of international and non-international armed conflicts respectively but neither has achieved universal acceptance.[41] Notably, Somalia has only signed the 1949 Geneva Conventions and therefore the 1977 Additional Protocols do not apply to Somalia.

Given that the primary response to Somali piracy has been the use of military forces,[42] the question arises as to whether LOAC is applicable. This is important given that the misunderstanding exists that the use of military force results in the application of LOAC.[43] In essence, the answer is negative: such counter-piracy operations are based on law-enforcement rather than as part of armed conflict, with pirates being seen as ordinary criminals rather than combatants by the governments of all counter-piracy forces in the Gulf of Aden.[44] LOAC seeks to maintain three key aspects: that the right to use force rests with the state, that combatants can be easily distinguished from civilians and states engage in reciprocity in upholding LOAC.[45] Pirates clearly fail in all three areas, given they are non-state actors, are frequently indistinguishable from civilians (often deliberately so) and rarely reciprocate lawful treatment.[46]

While pirates are hostis humani generis, being enemies of mankind does not automatically make them combatants and LOAC only applies in armed conflict, be it international or non-international.[47] As such, the key factor for determining whether LOAC applies is whether armed conflict exists.[48] No definition of "armed conflict" exists in the Geneva Conventions but the Geneva Conventions as a whole only apply to international conflicts while non-international armed conflict will only be subject to Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, additional treaties if relevant and Additional Protocol II, if it has been signed[49] (which Somalia has not). Pirates are not state actors and therefore do not come under international armed conflict.[50]

40 Alexander Proelss, 'Piracy and the Use of Force' in Panos Koutrakos and Achilles Skordas (eds), The Law and Practice of Piracy at Sea (Hart 2015). 53-54.
41 Crawford and Pert (n 5). 14-19.
42 Ghosh (n 23). 22.
43 Marauhn (n 14). 68.
44 Guilfoyle, 'The Laws of War and the Fight Against Somali Piracy: Combatants or Criminals?' (n 10). 142-143.
45 Passman (n 30). 17-18.
46 ibid. 18.
47 Marco Sassòli, International Humanitarian Law: Rules, Controversies, and Solutions to Problems Arising in Warfare (Edward Elgar Publishing 2019). 168.
48 Marauhn (n 14). 69.
49 Crawford and Pert (n 5). 54-56
50 See International Committee of the Red Cross, 'Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field. Geneva, 12 August 1949.' (International Humanitarian Law Databases, 2016). 220-238.

It must be noted that many so-called Somali government organisations are pirates or warlord-led factions, with piracy conducted by local coast guards and groups such as the National Volunteer Guard, Somali Marines and Somali Coastal Defence Forces.[51] While state forces who commit acts of piracy for private ends during armed conflict would potentially be able to claim prisoner of war status, Somalia has not had a functioning coast guard since the early 1990s, rendering their status dubious at best.[52] Likewise, the line between Somali authorities and criminals is frequently blurred, with pirate groups frequently claiming to be security forces, rendering the distinction difficult for Somalis as well as foreigners.[53] Ultimately, pirates are not part of states armed forces or agents of a state, ensuring counter-piracy operations will not amount to an international armed conflict, placing it outside of all LOAC pertaining to international armed conflict. [54]

By contrast, non-international armed conflict involve armed conflict between governmental armed forces and one or more armed groups, requiring a minimum level of intensity and organisation.[55] While the scale of piracy off Somalia is so extensive as to require international counter-piracy operations, it is very doubtful that such an operation can be deemed an armed conflict. Highly relevant is the Tadic case from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia that noted armed conflict occurs when there is "armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State".[56] The term "protracted" should be understood to refer to the intensity of the conflict, rather the duration.[57] While piracy off Somalia has been ongoing for decades, and sometimes involved Somali pirates engaging with other states' armed forces engaged on counter-piracy operations, such encounters are sporadic, brief and low-intensity.[58] As such, it cannot be seen to fulfill the threshold of intensity required for it to be a non-international armed conflict. Likewise, among the criteria to be classified as "organised" for legal purposes, an armed group requires a command structure with disciplinary rules, a headquarters, the ability to carry out a unified military structure and be able to speak with one voice while negotiating and concluding agreements such as cease-fires.[59] Seeing as pirates are composed of numerous factions who control no territory and lack a coherent military organisation model,[60] they cannot be deemed to fulfill the criteria as an armed band under LOAC. Given Somali piracy lacks the capacity to be deemed as a "protracted armed violence", while Somali pirates fail fulfill the requirement to be deemed an organised armed group, Somali piracy cannot be deemed a non-international armed conflict, placing piracy outside LOAC.

51 Konstam (n 8). 306-308.
52 Passman (n 30). 23.
53 Urbina (n 4). 348-352.
54 Marauhn (n 14). 70.
55 International Committee of the Red Cross, 'How Is the Term "Armed Conflict" Defined in International Humanitarian Law?' (Opinion Paper, March 2008). 5.
56 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Appeals Chamber. IT-94-1-AR72., 'Prosecutor v Tadić (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction)' (October 1995). 70.
57 Alessandra Spadaro, 'International Humanitarian Law in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals and Courts' in Dražan Djukić and Niccolò Pons (eds), The Companion to International Humanitarian Law (Brill Nijhoff 2018). 139-140.
58 Guilfoyle, 'The Laws of War and the Fight Against Somali Piracy: Combatants or Criminals?' (n 10). 144.
59 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Trial Chamber I. IT-04-84-T., 'Prosecutor v Haradinaj, Balaj and Brahimaj' (April 2008). 60.
60 Guilfoyle, 'The Laws of War and the Fight Against Somali Piracy: Combatants or Criminals?' (n 10). 144-145.

Combatant Status and Piracy

Even if Somali piracy was deemed to be an armed conflict, pirates would still not have the status of combatants under LOAC. Combatant status is important: during armed conflict, only combatants are permitted to take direct part in hostilities and receive important rights under LOAC such as the entitlement to be treated as prisoners of war and immunity from prosecution for lawful belligerent acts. However, as mentioned already, Somali piracy is clearly not an international armed conflict. Even if Somali piracy came under non-international armed conflict (which as shown above, it also does not), Somali pirates would still not gain combatant status. States oppose extending combatant status to armed groups during non-international armed conflict to avoid giving legitimacy to domestic rebels and common criminals engaged in conflict with a sovereign government.[61] Therefore, while a combatant in international armed conflict will be immune from prosecution for taking part in hostilities, the same protection does not extend to non-state armed groups during non-international armed conflicts.[62]

Rather, pirates are nonstate actors who act like combatants and except in cases of mutiny, a warship cannot be a pirate ship and its crew cannot be pirates.[63] Indeed, the UK and US' wars with the Barbary States in the early nineteenth century remains an interesting example, given it involved large scale use of privateering by Barbary States corsairs, authorized by their rulers.[64] Nonetheless, the Barbary rulers' authority was unrecognized by European rulers, who viewed corsairs as pirates rather than privateers.[65] As such, when captured, corsairs were treated as common criminals rather than prisoners of war.[66] Likewise, the 1863 Lieber Code (noted by the ICRC as "the first attempt to codify the laws of war")[67] explicitly gives pirates as an example of those who are not entitled to prisoner of war status and are to be dealt with summarily.[68] While such actions predate modern LOAC, it shows that pirates were treated as common criminals rather than prisoners of war. The one possibility where potential pirates might be deemed as state forces is when states employ personnel to raid ships bearing the flag of other states. Since medieval times, states issued "letters of Marque" as licenses for pirates to attack the ships of other states with the authorisation of their own governments which was especially useful for reducing a state's expenditure on its own navy.[69] Historically, privateers generally acted on their own orders, with state control being nominal at best.[70] Nonetheless, while privateers performed the same actions as pirates (seizing merchant shipping by force), their state sanction meant they were not considered criminals or subject to universal jurisdiction,[71] except when their states' authority was not recognized by other states, as happened to Barbary corsairs. State

61 Crawford and Pert (n 5). 16.
62 Andrew Carswell and Jonathan Somer, 'Comparing Experiences: Engaging States and Non-State Armed Groups on International Humanitarian Law' in Dražan Djukić and Niccolò Pons (eds), The Companion to International Humanitarian Law (Brill Nijhoff 2018). 49-50.
63 Passman (n 30). 3-4.
64 David Cordingly, Under the Black Flag: The Romance and Reality of Life among the Pirates (Random House 2006). Xviii.
65 Konstam (n 8).76.
66 Michael H Hoffman, 'Terrorists Are Unlawful Belligerents, Not Unlawful Combatants: A Distinction with Implications for the Future of International Humanitarian Law' (2002) 34 Cleveland: Case Western Reserve University School of Law. 229.
67 International Committee of the Red Cross, 'Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (Lieber Code). 24 April 1863.' (International Committee of the Red Cross).
68 'Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (Lieber Code).' (April 1863).
69 Arthur Herman, To Rule the Waves: How the British Navy Shaped the Modern World (Hodder and Stoughton 2004). 50-51.
70 ibid. 140-141.
71 Kontorovich (n 3). 210.

sanctioned privateers operating today would not be classified as pirates under the terms of UNCLOS, given they are fighting under state policy rather than for private ends. While privateers operating under state control during wartime and fulfilling the criteria listed above could be deemed prisoners of war,[72] such a scenario does not apply to Somali piracy.

Even if pirates attempted to claim combatant status, they would fail to meet the necessary criteria. Combatant status is summarised in the Third Geneva Convention,[73] whose definition of prisoners of war encapsulates combatant status.[74] However, pirates fail to meet the criteria to be deemed combatants: they are not members of the armed forces party to a conflict, nor can they qualify as members of a recognised militia or volunteer corps under Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention.[75] While it is arguable that pirates carry arms openly as required by Article 4, they frequently hide them while closing their target and therefore do not identify themselves as armed actors. Such is the extent of this that it is difficult for counter-piracy patrols to distinguish between pirates and legitimate Somali fishermen.[76] Likewise, Article 4 requires combatants to carry a distinctive sign which is identifiable at a distance, which pirates do not do. While some pirates have been recorded as wearing uniforms, such uniforms are irrelevant if their civilian ship is not bearing a sign as required by Article 4.[77] This blurs the lines between civilians and pirates which is a major issue in the region, given legitimate Somali fisherman may carry arms to protect their catch,[78] meaning it can be very difficult to distinguish between armed fishermen and pirates, due to both being armed and pirates bearing no distinguishing features. Article 4 also requires that there be organisation, with subordinates under the command of a person responsible for them. While pirates operate with fairly high levels of organisation (particularly given links to terrorists and organised crime groups), such organisation is akin to a private company.[79] This is not equivalent to a military command structure and therefore does not meet the criteria for organisation under Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention. Overall, the Third Geneva Convention only applies to piracy in extremely limited circumstances: when pirates are members of a states' armed forces but committed piracy for private ends, or when those accused of pirates are actually a maritime levee en masse[80] that are mistaken for pirates.[81]

Furthermore, pirates cannot even avail of the protection contained in Common Article 3 under international law as common article 3 can only apply in the territory of contracting parties.[82] While pirates (in the colloquial rather than the UNCLOS sense) operating within the territorial waters of a contracting party such as Somalia would still be unable

72 See Passman (n 30).25-27.
73 'Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War' (August 1949). Art.4.
74 Malcolm N Shaw, International Law (Cambridge University Press 2017). 895.
75 'Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War' (n 73). Art.4.
76 Urbina (n 4). 354.
77 Passman (n 30). 24.
78 International Chamber of Commerce International Maritime Bureau (n 20). 21.
79 Ghosh (n 23). 20.
80 For an analysis of levee en masse, see Winston Williams and Robert Lawless, 'Levée En Masse in Twenty-First-Century Armed Conflict' in Michael N Schmitt and Christopher J Koschnitzky (eds), Prisoners of War in Contemporary Conflict (Oxford University Press 2023). 97-117.
81 Passman (n 30). 16.
82 ibid. 19.

to invoke Common Article 3 given that, as mentioned above, they are not taking part in a non-international armed conflict.

Conclusion

The conclusion can therefore be drawn that counter-piracy operations take place outside of LOAC, with pirates unable to claim its protections. Although the above demonstrates that pirates operate outside of the protection of LOAC, they do not operate in a legal vacuum, with states being required to maintain civilized norms in how they treat their captives, even when their legal status is dubious.[83] Piracy is no different and while pirates are hostis humanis generis, they are not outside the law of peace or even law generally.[84] Regardless of the location they operate in, pirates are criminals.[85] As such, most commentators see counter-piracy operations as governed by a legal regime of law enforcement, particularly human rights law with arrest and detention being especially important.[86]

A key problem in a law enforcement approach to counter-piracy is that as with most other crimes at sea, jurisdiction is based predominantly on territory and nationality: multinational operations in Somali waters rarely have the requisite jurisdiction to prosecute unless they seek to rely on universal jurisdiction which raises issues in domestic legal systems.[87] This raises difficult issues for state prosecutors in areas like evidence gathering and pre-trial detention, particularly due to human rights concerns.[88] Such law discourages states from prosecuting pirates, particularly if human rights concerns prevents them from repatriating pirates to Somalia when their sentence is complete.[89] This has been mitigated by the EU naval forces transferring suspected pirates to Kenya for detention and trial, with other prosecutions taking place in Somalia itself.[90] It is vital that such agreements ensure fair trials and fair treatment for pirates. Actions against pirates such as mistreatment, torture or unfair trials will undermine the legitimacy of those states engaging in anti-piracy operations, so it is in every state's interests that anti-piracy operations remain legal and beyond reproach to uphold international shipping.[91]

As long as desperate seafarers live in close proximity to lucrative shipping in areas of weak governance, piracy will exist. While Somali pirates' armed nature and organisation renders military based counter-piracy operations as vital, such operations should be seen as engaged in constabulary rather than combat operations. Somali pirates certainly remain a threat in the region despite being heavily suppressed and they should not be ignored. Nonetheless, they cannot be deemed to enjoy protection under LOAC, nor can their operations be seen as armed conflict in any legal sense. Rather, such operations remain

83 Hoffman (n 66). 230.
84 Marauhn (n 14). 68-69.
85 Gottschalk and Flanagan (n 1). 21.
86 Marauhn (n 14). 74-75.
87 Rothwell and Stephens (n 12). 468.
88 Douglas Guilfoyle, 'Counter-Piracy Law Enforcement and Human Rights' (2010) 59 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly. 152.
89 Skordas (n 16). 316-317.
90 Rothwell and Stephens (n 12). 468.
91 Passman (n 30). 39-40.

under the regime of law enforcement and human rights, which while more nebulous, is far more relevant. Ultimately, foreign warships can suppress incidents but cannot eradicate piracy without a multifaceted approach to tackle piracy's cause.[92] As such, a solely military approach is insufficient and efforts must be made to address the lawlessness and foreign corporate encroachment on Somali sovereignty that fuels the Somali sense of injustice. As in the Golden Age of Piracy, modern pirates will avoid areas where naval forces patrol and will either shift areas of operation or adopt more legitimate operations until the security situation permits the resumption of piracy.[93] Treating the symptoms as well as the cause of Somali piracy is therefore vital. Key in this is a coherent legal regime which prosecutes pirates while protecting fishermen from the rapaciousness of foreign countries and preventing the system which creates such pirates in the first place. This cannot be achieved by trying to apply LOAC to an area outside its remit.

92 Ghosh (n 23). 15.
93 Konstam (n 8). 305.

Securing Ireland's Future: Advancing National Security and Defence through a Comprehensive Five-Domain National Security Strategy

Lt Cdr Mike Brunicardi

Abstract

Writing in "The EU, Irish Defence Forces and Contemporary Security", Vice Admiral (Rtd) Mark Mellett, former Chief of Staff of the Defence Forces, Flag Officer Commanding the Naval Service, and current chair of the board of the Maritime Area Regulatory Authority states that "a state's sovereignty is inalienable, it is a paradox for the sovereignty and sovereign rights of a state to be upheld by another's military" (Mellett, 2023, p.32).

As an island nation, Ireland's geostrategic space is maritime. With an Exclusive economic Zone and maritime jurisdiction area approx. ten times the size of its landmass, many of the threats and challenges that face Ireland on a national and regional level can occur at or from the sea. With no National Security Strategy, defence policy in White Paper format and International Peace Support Operations as an almost "raison d'etre" (Cottey, 2018, p.157) for the Defence Forces, Ireland's sovereignty and certainly its sovereign rights are being challenged in this geostrategic space. The planned Russian exercises in February 2022 was an example of this. These exercises were not planned in the United Kingdom of Great Britain or French waters but in Irish waters, more than likely because of the lack of comprehensive deterrence as a response. Ireland struggled to provide surveillance platforms to deter and monitor these planned exercises.

MacSweeney (1988) supported Ireland taking a stance of "non-offensive defence" to protect Irish Sovereignty. In a changing geopolitical environment and as an EU Member State, Ireland has made commitments, not just to its own security and defence, but also on a regional level and with the European Union. Compromising on national security and defence or "free-riding" on commitments of others to provide a military deterrent response to threats and challenges faced by Ireland is the paradox of which Mellett (2023) posits. Security and Defence begins at a national level as the EU does not have military capability per se, this lies within the sovereignty of each Member State. Ireland has an opportunity to establish a "Maritime Turn" in its policy and strategy space.

A National Security Strategy is needed to establish the Ends, Ways, and Means for Ireland to ensure its sovereignty, protect its sovereign rights, enhance national/regional security and defence. This strategy can act as the critical component in a cross governmental approach to security and defence combined with a fit for purpose Joint Defence Forces capable of operating across all five domains to ensure "non-offensive defence" to ensure Ireland's sovereignty and national interests are protected.

Introduction:

In "Strategy: A History", Lawrence Freedman underscores the universality of the need for strategy. Leaders of armies, major corporations, and political parties have long been

expected to have strategies, but now no serious organisation could imagine being without one. He continues, having a strategy suggests the ability to look up from the short term and the trivial to view the long term and the essential, to address the causes rather than the symptoms, to see the woods from the trees.[1] Ireland currently lacks a National Security Strategy (NSS), despite the Irish Government's decision in 2019 to develop one.[2] DuMont succinctly identifies and outlines key NSS components.[3] These components are, an endorsement by Head of Government, accurate reflection of national values, clear articulation of national interests, identification of future challenges, risk and threat assessment, overview of required resources, effective timeframe, measure of effectiveness and basic implementation guide. Bard Knudsen refers to these components as essential 'building blocks' in delivering policy or strategy.[4] Tonra contends that a state's strategy for security and defence is to ensure the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state.[5] Currently, the Defence Forces are languishing in a Human Resource crisis, resulting in operations being curtailed across the organisation. This poses a strategic risk to Ireland in that both state and non-state actors can utilise Irish geostrategic space unchallenged. Due to a lack of military capability, both offensive and defensive, Vice Admiral (Rtd) Mark Mellett, former Chief of Staff, notes that if a state is unable to uphold its sovereignty and sovereign rights, it creates a paradox where it is reliant on others to protect its sovereignty, therefore it's freedom is more imaginary than real.[6] The Commission on the Defence Force identifies the need for fundamental and urgent change of the Defence Forces.[7] This is critical when you consider the importance of our geostrategic space to regional security and the economic well-being of the state. For reasons outside the scope of this paper, this is not reflected in Ireland's current approach to security and defence. Strategy is required to link ends, ways and means. An NSS is needed to establish these ends, ways, and means for Ireland to ensure its sovereignty, protect its sovereign rights, and enhance national/regional security and defence.

The Geostrategic Importance of Ireland

Ireland is an island state on the north-western edge of the European continent, a Member State (MS) of the European Union (EU), with an extensive Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The Marine Institute of Ireland (2022) highlight that the EEZ covers an area of 437,500 km2 which is more than six times larger than Ireland's land area.[8] As such, Ireland's geostrategic space is maritime. The world is dependent on the maritime domain and maritime trade, which accounts for ninety percent of the world's trade by volume and this trade is brought to and from Ireland and Europe via Sea Lines of Communication

1 Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (Oxford, 2013).
2 Department of An Taoiseach, "Public Consultation on the Development of a National Security Strategy," 5 December 2019, https://www.gov.ie/en/consultation/8b3a62-public-consultation-on-the-development-of-a-national-security-strate/, accessed 01 August 2023.
3 Malia DuMont, "Elements of National Security Strategy", Strategy Consortium (2019).
4 Bard. B. Knudsen, "Developing a National Security Policy/Strategy: A Roadmap" Security and Peace (2012) Vol. 30, No.3, pp. 135-140.
5 Ben Tonra, "Security, defence and neutrality: The Irish Dilemma. In: Irish Foreign Policy (2012). Dublin: Gill and MacMillan, pp. 221-241.
6 Mark Mellett, "Ensuring the Jungle doesn't grow back: The obligations inherent to Irish Defence Policy", in Carrol, O'Neill, Williams (Ed) The EU, Irish Defence Forces and Contemporary Security (Palgrave MacMillan, 2023) pp. 31-75.
7 Commission on the Defence Forces, Report, 9 February 2022, https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/eb4c0-report-of-the-commission-on-defence-forces/ Accessed on 11 August 2023.
8 Marine Institute, 2010. The Real Map of Ireland. [Online], Available at: https://www.marine.ie/site-area/irelands-marine-resource/real-map-ireland-0, [Accessed 10 August 2023].

(SLOCs). The maritime domain is also a critical global geostrategic space, at risk from a range of complex challenges and threats.[9] Ireland has placed a major emphasis on the maritime domain as a source of its future economic and energy security. Various national policies and strategies highlight this, such as Harnessing Our Ocean Wealth[10] and the Marine Planning Framework.[11] However, the Government of Ireland must continue to increase prioritisation of security and defence and acknowledged that to underwrite this future, a capable, joint and effective DF is required. An NSS would act to as a guardrail to ensure the security of the state by providing clear guidance on the threats and challenges that Ireland and its partners face.

Rethinking Security and Defence Strategy in a Shifting Geopolitical Landscape: The Case for Ireland

The multifaceted nature of security threats calls for a comprehensive approach, underscoring the imperative for a well-defined strategy. This is a space where Ireland needs to do some hard national thinking on security and defence.[12] In an era characterised by unprecedented interconnectedness, globalisation, technological advancements, and evolving power dynamics, the realm of security and defence strategy has assumed a paramount role in safeguarding the interests and sovereignty of nations. Ireland's neutrality and military non-alignment can act as a barrier to addressing these aspects. Irish strategic culture[13] is identified as a deep cultural factor which affects its strategic thinking, strategic orientation and strategic intentions.[14] The breadth and nature of contemporary security challenges that face Ireland and the EU, range from asymmetric warfare and cyber threats, to environmental degradation and transnational crime and terrorism, necessitates a nuanced approach that transcends traditional military paradigms. Germond notes that many threats to the EU's security originate and proliferate within the maritime peripheries of the Union.[15] A robust security and defence strategy stands as the fulcrum upon which a nation's resilience and preparedness pivots.

The Imperative of a Well-Defined Strategy

A well-crafted security and defence strategy is the foundational pillar upon which a nation fortifies itself against a spectrum of potential challenges and threats. It serves as a compass that guides policy makers and military planners through the complex and evolving corridors of the strategic landscape. A comprehensive strategy acknowledges the multidimensionality of security, extending beyond the confines of the military.[16] This multidimensionality encompasses the state's economic stability, diplomatic prowess,

9 Cdr. Pat Burke, "Global Maritime Security – Maintaining Public Order of the Oceans", Defence Forces Review (2015), pp. 65-72, DFPP, Dublin.
10 Government of Ireland, "Harnessing Our Ocean Wealth," (Dublin: Government of Ireland, 2012).
11 Government of Ireland, "Marine Planning Framework", (Dublin: Government of Ireland, 2021).
12 Prof. Andrew Cottey, interview by author, March 2023.
13 Bacia (2018, p.100) notes that "Irish neutrality is a constituent part of Irish identity, strategic culture and foreign policy".
14 Mitrega, A. and Kozub, M "The influence of strategic culture on shaping security policy", Security and Defence Policy (2019) 27(5), pp.44-56.
15 Basil Germond, "The Maritime Dimension of European Security – Seapower and the European Union", (London, Palgrave MacMillan, 2015).
16 Ibid.

technological standing, and societal resilience. In a world where information flows transcendentally, an effective strategy capitalises on the informational domain, countering misinformation and leveraging communication networks to galvanise national cohesion.[17]

A well-defined strategy provides assurance of predictability, assuaging anxieties and enhancing deterrence capabilities. By delineating clear red lines, demonstrating resolve, and articulating proactive measures, a nation like Ireland can dissuade potential aggressors or bad actors and cultivate an environment of stability. These clear lines succinctly allow countries to outline duties to enforce, guarantee and protect.[18] Strategy should also be thought of as the glue that holds together the purposeful activities of the state.[19]

Ireland's Geopolitical Predicament

Ireland presents a distinctive case study in security and defence strategy formulation. Historically marked by a policy of military neutrality, Ireland's strategic calculus has been rooted in military non-alignment and peacekeeping operations in support of Ireland's Foreign Policy and based on a threat assessment of a low threat environment from conventional means.[20] This strategic calculus fails to link Ireland with its greatest partnership, the European Union and its threat assessments. Ireland and the EU have a symbiotic relationship when it comes to security and defence. This highlights the need for cooperative relations with others in areas of shared interest.[21] During the last decade the geopolitical environment has shifted with Ireland's defence policy remaining in white paper format. The Commission on the Defence Forces[22] discusses the future security environment and links to this symbiosis of threats to the EU are interconnected to Ireland as an EU Member State.

However, the contemporary geopolitical environment poses novel challenges that necessitate a re-evaluation of Ireland's security and defence posture. Currently a Strategic Defence Review is being undertaken by the Department of Defence. The rise of hybrid threats, cyber espionage, and the potential spill over effects of conflicts from neighbouring regions underscore the vulnerability of Ireland, even with its neutrality. If Ireland truly wants the freedom to act, it needs to be capable of defending itself.[23] The United Kingdom's decision to leave the EU and the intricacies of BREXIT have vast implications for Ireland across all five domains. As an EU Member State, Ireland has made commitments to the EU through various strategies and policies such as the Common Security and Defence Policy

17 In discussing Norwegian Strategy approach, Strommen (2020) highlights that Norway's strategy is to a very large degree influenced by others "interests" in their territory. It is Norway's clear strategic ambitions and grand-strategic aims that are outlined for securing its sovereignty, territorial integrity and political freedom of action. This gives clear strategic vision and leads to this galvanisation of national cohesion.
18 Cdr Cathal Power and Michael O'Sullivan, Highway 10: Cocaine's Silk Road to Europe", Defence Forces Review (2020), pp. 64-71, DFPP, Dublin.
19 Colin S. Gray, "The Future of Strategy", Cambridge, Polity Books (2015), pp.23.
20 Department of Defence, 2015. White Paper on Defence, Dublin: Department of Defence.
21 Christian Beuger and Tim Edmunds, "Beyond Seablindness: A new agenda for maritime security", International Affairs (2017), 93(6), pp. 1293-1311.
22 Commission on the Defence Forces, Report, 9 February 2022, https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/eb4c0-report-of-the-commission-on-defence-forces/ Accessed on 11 August 2023.
23 Conor Gallagher, Is Ireland Neutral? The Many Myths of Irish Neutrality", Dublin: Gill Books (2023), pp. 269.

(CSDP), EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) and the Strategic Compass on Security and Defence (SC) subject to national caveats. The EU has shown remarkable solidarity with Ireland surrounding BREXIT.... but other EU states may expect Ireland to show similar solidarity on other issues at some future point. [such as] burden-sharing or EU foreign, security and defence policy.[24] Therefore, Ireland needs a NSS to cast a spotlight on the delicate threat environment dynamics at play while safeguarding national security and defence interests. Amid Ireland's continuing integration with EU security and defence initiatives, questions arise about aligning national and supranational strategies. Where interests coincide, others can seek to work with you as a partner for cooperation.[25]

Challenges and Risks in the Current Geopolitical Environment

The current geopolitical environment presents Ireland with a range of challenges and risks. The transnational nature of Organised Crime Groups (OCGs), cyber threats, threats to Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) including subsea infrastructure demands a technologically sophisticated response. The evolving role of non-state actors blurs the lines between domestic and internal security and defence concerns. Climate change also poses multifaceted risks and challenges, from energy and resource scarcity and mass migration to potential conflicts. Navigating these risks and challenges mandates a strategic approach that resonate with Ireland's historical values while being adaptive to emerging realities. The delicate task of strengthening security and defence measures without compromising the nation's commitment to humanitarian principles and neutrality requires a nuanced strategy. To ensure Ireland's sovereignty, a comprehensive and capable Defence Forces operating jointly across all five domains is needed.[26] This modern force will underwrite Ireland's national security interests and sovereignty while protecting and ensuring the enduring long term security of the nation in the face of both general uncertainty and well-defined threats.[27]

As the world continues to change and adapt, security and defence strategies must remain in lockstep with the evolving landscape. The case of Ireland illuminates the intricate interplay between historical identity, geopolitical exigencies, and security imperatives. Ireland must be proactive in the security and defence space and not rely on others to underwrite its sovereignty creating the paradox of which Mellett articulates.[28]A well-defined and comprehensive strategy, cognisant of the multidimensional nature of contemporary threats and challenges, is not merely a strategic document but a living framework that underpins a nation's future resilience, security and defence. In an era of increasing and

24 Prof. Andrew Cottey, "Why it's time for tough thinking on Ireland's national security". [Online]
Available at: https://www.rte.ie/brainstorm/2020/1012/1170975-ireland-national-security-defence-forces-un-security-council/ [Accessed 01 August 2023].
25 Sven Biscop, "Grand Strategy in 10 Words, A guide to Great Power Politics in the 21st Century", Bristol: Bristol University Press (2021), pp.8.
26 Outlined in the Commission on the Defence Forces (2022) Levels of Ambition. Level of Ambition 3 would see Ireland develop conventional capabilities like other EU militaries. It is important to note that the Government selected Level of Ambition2 to develop enhanced capabilities.
27 Malia DuMont, "Elements of National Security Strategy", Strategy Consortium (2019).
28 Mark Mellett, "Ensuring the Jungle doesn't grow back: The obligations inherent to Irish Defence Policy", in Carrol, O'Neill, Williams (Ed) The EU, Irish Defence Forces and Contemporary Security (Palgrave MacMillan, 2023) pp. 31-75.

prevailing uncertainty, the strength of a strategy lies not only in its formulation but in its adaptability and agility. This is an opportunity for Ireland to close this strategic gap.

Embracing the Five Domains: Unveiling the Power of a Comprehensive National Security Strategy

In an era characterised by rapid technological advancements, evolving geopolitical landscapes, and the proliferation of asymmetric threats, the conventional boundaries of security and defence strategy are undergoing a profound transformation. A paradigm shift is occurring, pushing modern defence forces to transcend the traditional notions of warfare and security by embracing a holistic approach that encompasses the intricacies of the five domains of land, air, maritime, cyber and space. This concept will require a new approach to military preparedness, where coordination across the five domains amplifies the effectiveness of a nation's defence capabilities. Ireland is no different. Currently and addressed in the White Paper on Defence 2015 and the CoDF Report, the Defence Forces needs to increase its "jointness" to enhance the organisation moving forward into the future. Currently, the Defence Forces struggles with Geoffrey Till's observation of "going joint" where competing agendas across the arms of the Defence Forces stifles the forward progression and "unity of effort". In a predominately maritime geostrategic space, the needs of the maritime and air domains need to be balanced against the land.[29] Ireland, being an island, should confirm the identity of the maritime as its geostrategic space and embrace the contribution that the Defence Forces can make to the country's use of the sea. Till posits that maritime power is increasingly joint and underlines the importance of getting the required "unity of effort" from all of the military services.[30] This will increase Ireland's ability to maximise the output of its Defence Forces to meet the challenges and threats across all domains.

The Benefits of a Multi-Domain Approach Are As Follows:

Enhanced Resilience: By diversifying capabilities across multiple domains, a modern Defence Forces can become more resilient to threats and challenges. Adversaries are forced to contend with multi-faceted defence making it difficult to exploit a single vulnerability.

Improved Situational Awareness: The integration of intelligence and information from all domains provides a comprehensive picture of the battle space. This includes synergy across all domains but also in the air, surface and subsurface. This holistic view allows for a more informed decision making capability, quicker response times to counter the required threats and challenges.

Synergistic Operations: A multi-domain approach promotes synergy between domains, enabling forces to work collaboratively and leverage each other's strengths. Such an example would be the development of a Tier 2 Special Operations Force to operate from

29 Geoffrey Till, How to Grow a Navy: The Development of Maritime Power", London: Routledge (2023).
30 Ibid.

Naval ships deployed using shipborne maritime helicopters. Such operations could then be supported from ashore using joint cyber specialists and analysts in the Permanent and Reserve Defence Force providing target acquisition and interdiction.

Adaptability and Innovation: In a rapidly changing world, adaptability is key to maintaining a competitive edge. A multi-domain strategy encourages innovation and the development of technologies that can be applied across various domains.

Deterrence: A comprehensive NSS sends a powerful message to potential aggressors, bad actors or potential adversaries wishing to exploit Ireland's Area of Operations to impact on national or regional security. It demonstrates a nation's commitment to security and defence to protect its interests and sovereignty across all domains, serving as a deterrent.

The concept of security and defence has evolved into a multi-domain paradigm. Ireland's White Paper on Defence and CoDF Report set out ambitions for the Defence Forces to increase its "jointness". Currently, the Defence Forces may be hindered in its ability to meet future obligations as it has not evolved and modernised on par with other international counterparts.[31] Embracing this approach is not merely an option but a necessity for modern militaries. Ireland needs to adapt. As outlined above the benefits of a comprehensive NSS that spans the five domains are clear. To secure and defend, nations must invest in their militaries and develop or acquire multi-domain capabilities that reflect the complex and interconnected nature of modern global and regional threats and challenges to peace and stability.

Strategic Partnerships and Alliances: Strengthening Ireland's Security and Defence:

The concept of strategic partnerships and alliances has become increasingly vital for nations seeking to safeguard their sovereignty and enhance their security and defence. It has been considered through some academic viewpoints that the Irish military suffers from political indecision.[32] Professor Andrew Cottey noted in the 2022 Defence Forces Review when discussing policy and strategy that Ireland can be seen as a good citizen that practices cautious engagement,[33] highlighting this indecision for commitment. For a neutral nation like Ireland, the strategic choices it makes regarding partnerships and alliances can significantly impact its ability to navigate complex security dynamics and safeguard its interests. In saying that, there are strategic partnerships and alliances in place (such as the EU and NATO Partnership for Peace). In this section we will examine these

31 Lt Cdr (Rtd) Paul Hegarty, Defence Engagement in Irish Foreign Policy: Time for a Joint Force Concept", Irish Studies in International Affairs (2019), Vol 30, pp.1-21.
32 Bill McSweeney, Irish Defence in the Context of Irish Foreign Policy", Studies: Irish Quarterly Review (1988), 77(305), pp.48-54.
33 Prof. Andrew Cottey, "A Celtic Zeitenwende? – Continuity and Change in Irish National Security Policy", Defence Forces Review (2022), pp. 1-9, DFPP, Dublin.

existing relationships, and explore avenues for further enhancing its defence capabilities through deepened collaborations.[34]

The Role of Strategic Partnerships and Alliances

Strategic partnerships and alliances serve as the cornerstones of contemporary security and defence strategies. The Stoltenberg Report of 2009 in Norway is a Case Study in effective adaptation and embracing strategic relationships.[35] Strategic relationships allow for nations to pool resources, share intelligence, and amplify their collective strength. For Ireland, this can be problematic and difficult as a means to access critical capabilities without compromising its core principles. But to engage in strategic partnerships and alliances, Ireland has the opportunity to contribute to regional and global security and defence while simultaneously bolstering its own defence capabilities. These partnerships also foster diplomatic ties, enables knowledge exchange, and enhance interoperability – a key factor in effective joint operations across the five domains.

Existing Partnerships and Alliances

Ireland's engagement in strategic partnerships has been extremely cautious. Its approach to security and defence enhancement is frustratingly slow. The EU stands as Ireland's main strategic partner, from which it has engaged and benefited from its membership. Through the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), Ireland collaborates with other EU MS to address regional security challenges and threats and contribute to Crisis Management Operations (CMO). The White Paper on Defence merely cites "support" of EU strategies and policies, leaving the nature of this support unclear – perhaps more of a short term commitment than a long term strategic engagement. This stance can be attributed, at least partially to Ireland's misinterpretation of neutrality. Irish neutrality reflects a divided public opinion, with a significant part of the population desiring detachment from any military involvement beyond the scope of the United Nations.[36] This paper already highlighted Cottey's thoughts on a potential expectant EU receiving increased burden sharing from Ireland and remains valid. The NATO PfP program has also been pivotal in allowing Ireland to engage in practical military cooperation, increase military interoperability and benchmark the Defence Forces against NATO standards, while maintaining its non-membership status.

As has been seen with the economic crash of 2008, at times, Ireland cannot "do it alone". In security and defence, Ireland is the worst prepared European country to meet

34 As a Case Study for Ireland to follow, Norway displays a keen interest and recognises the need to close collaboration to provide maritime security and defence with other nations, and organisations at regional and global level, but there is also collaboration at sub-regional level.
35 The Stoltenberg Report (2009) was a report which set a new agenda for Nordic co-operation and made it possible to discuss shared issues relating to security policy. The report was written by former Norwegian Minister of Defence and Foreign Affairs Thorvald Stoltenberg and commissioned by the Nordic ministers for foreign affairs and contained thirteen specific proposals to increase cooperation between Nordic countries.
36 Garret Fitzgerald, "The Origins, Development and Present Status of Irish 'Neutrality", Irish Studies in International Affairs (1998), Vol. 9 pp. 11-19.

any meaningful threat.[37] Therefore, Ireland needs to increase its engagement with its strategic partnership and investigate the potential of military alliances. This is not to have others "do it for Ireland" but for Ireland to develop the military structures, capability to defend itself and guarantee its own sovereignty because Ireland could find itself in the geopolitical front-line of conflict.[38] Countries with similar geostrategic space have utilised the opportunities provided by strategic partnerships and alliances. The Northern Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) is an example of a political and military cooperative approach.[39] Ireland has a similar opportunity with the EU and its structures such as the European Defence Agency (EDA) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). Ireland needs to overcome its reluctance and commit more fully to these partnerships.

Expanding and Deepening Partnerships

As outlined throughout this paper, Ireland faces a dynamic security and defence landscape. There is a continued opportunity for Ireland to deepen its strategic partnerships and alliances, increase its military capability across five domains with the strategic objective of ensuring Ireland's sovereignty and national interests are protected.[40] Collaborative efforts can focus on Irish strategic objectives such as maritime security, air defence and surveillance, intelligence sharing, cybersecurity and counter-terrorism. Military capability lies within Irish sovereignty and therefore is Irish responsibility to meet the threats and challenges. Leveraging its well acknowledged expertise in Peacekeeping Operations, Ireland could play a more prominent role in the international arena, contributing to global stability across the five domains while enhancing its defence reputation.

Ireland's potential engagement in cross regional partnerships such as with Nordic countries or other like-minded nations is a political decision, but it could provide avenues for shared learning and joint initiatives. Exploring these opportunities could allow Ireland to contribute to Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) efforts or capacity building and would demonstrate Ireland's commitments to global and regional security. An NSS is critical in capturing these as national strategic objectives should Ireland decide. In this interconnected world, strategic partnerships and alliances offer Ireland a way to strengthen its overall security and defence capability while maintaining its stance of neutrality. As highlighted earlier, Professor Andrew Cottey described Ireland as a "good citizen practicing cautious engagement".[41] Ireland should increase its engagement and commit fully as carefully selecting and nurturing partnerships will allow it to wield influence, contribute to security and defence and safeguard its interests in an ever-changing global

37 Eoin Drea, "Ireland is Europe's Weakest Link" Foreign Policy (2022). [Online]
Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/08/ireland-military-neutrality-russia-ocean-communication-energy-infrastructure-sabotage/, [Accessed 05 August 2023].
38 Brendan Flynn, "From hand-me-down navies to niche players? Comparing the navies of (very) small European States". In: Europe, Small Navies and Maritime Security–Balancing traditional roles and emergent threats in the 21st century. New York: Routledge, pp. 51-70.
39 NORDEFCO consists of Norway, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and Iceland and is a political and military cooperation structure aimed at "strengthening the participating nations' national defence, explore common synergies and facilitate efficient common solutions".
40 The EU provides structures which in turn help EU MS including Ireland to prioritise capability development along national requirements, but which also support regional strategic objectives.
41 Prof. Andrew Cottey, "A Celtic Zeitenwende? – Continuity and Change in Irish National Security Policy", Defence Forces Review (2022), pp. 1-9, DFPP, Dublin.

security environment. As Ireland investigates its security and defence future, a pivotal aspect will be strategic partnerships and alliances that are captured in a NSS.

Conclusion: The Crucial Role of a National Security Strategy.

Without a well-defined NSS, Ireland's security and defence efforts risk being fragmented and reactive, unable to holistically address the diverse threats its faces. The NSS serves as a roadmap that aligns government agencies, the military, intelligence services and private sector partners under a unified vision. It enables efficient resource allocation, manages security and defence structures, prioritises capability development, and guides strategic partnership that amplify Ireland's security posture at national, regional and global levels. Four years after the Government outlined its intent, we remain without an NSS. In that time, Ireland has suffered a cyber-attack on its Health Service Executive and has seen its maritime domain increasingly exploited by state actors to loiter in the vicinity of maritime CNI. This evolving geopolitical and geostrategic environment demands a strategic shift that transcends the normal traditional approach to Irish policy and strategy in security and defence. A well-structured NSS not only safeguards Ireland's sovereignty and removes the current paradox as highlighted by Mellett[42], it will also foster economic growth, energy security, societal resilience, and international influence. As Ireland moves forward, it must strive to secure its future amidst an intricate web of challenges and threats. An NSS stands as an imperative foundation upon which the nation's security and defence edifice can be fortified, creating a capable, effective, resilient Defence Forces operating across all domains ensuring Ireland's sovereignty and protecting its national interests.

42 Mark Mellett, "Ensuring the Jungle doesn't grow back: The obligations inherent to Irish Defence Policy", in Carrol, O'Neill, Williams (Ed) The EU, Irish Defence Forces and Contemporary Security (Palgrave MacMillan, 2023) pp. 31-75.

Learning From Jointness: A Study On The Relevance of the Joint Expeditionary Force for the Irish Defence Forces

Giovanni Parente

Abstract

This paper discusses the case of the United Kingdom's Joint Expeditionary Force and the lessons for the Irish Defence Forces should it wish to establish a high-readiness military contingency for overseas operations.

The Joint Expeditionary Force is a United Kingdom-led initiative to quickly deploy armed forces for conducting various operations involving land, air, naval and cyber forces simultaneously. It involves nine countries, including the United Kingdom, from European Union member states (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands and Sweden) to non-EU member states in the European Economic Area (Iceland and Norway). Their principal geographical area of interest is the Baltic Sea, where they currently conduct operations on land, in the air and at sea.

This paper aims to answer the following research question: "How could the experience of the Joint Expeditionary Force inform the jointness of the Irish Defence Forces?".

This research shows that similar initiatives are highly beneficial for small states, which can strengthen their military and strategic capabilities by operating with larger armed forces under NATO's standards. The Defence Forces could be integrated into the Joint Expeditionary Force's chain of command without any decision-making power and improve its expertise in international contexts. Furthermore, the Joint Expeditionary Force will enhance the readiness of the Irish Defence Forces by involving the three military services (Army, Air Corps and Naval Service) in the same operations. Finally, it will improve short-noticed humanitarian and disaster-relief missions, as these two categories of missions require high readiness and greater degrees of jointness.

Introduction

This paper discusses the case of the United Kingdom's (UK) Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) and the relevant lessons for the Irish Defence Forces (DF) should they wish to establish a high-readiness military contingency for overseas operations.

This paper is aimed at answering the following research question: "How could the experience of the JEF inform the jointness of the Irish DF?".

The first section will discuss the case of the JEF by focusing on its member states, main activities, and operational area of interest. Subsequently, the second section will investigate how the Irish DF could cooperate with JEF's members as an associate participant and what lessons could this military framework produce for Ireland's joint forces. Finally, the last section will present the main findings of this paper.

Joint Expeditionary Force

This section discusses the JEF, the rationale behind its establishment, the activities conducted so far and the main geographical areas of interest.

The JEF is a multinational military framework led by the UK.[1] The initial idea that led to the establishment of this framework was initially proposed by the then-Chief of the Defence Staff, General Richards, in a speech in December 2012 at the London-based Royal United Services Institute, where he argued that the JEF was going to achieve greater integration by being synergistic at sea, on the land and in the air, within and beyond the NATO structure.[2] The idea was institutionally formalised at the 2014 NATO Wales Summit, where the NATO Framework Nations Concept was officially supported and promoted the creation of various joint forces for conducting high-intensity operations.[3] This military framework was described as "a partnership of like-minded nations that provides a high readiness force of over 10,000 personnel" aimed at "supporting global and regional peace, stability and security".[4] The UK initiated establishing and operationalising the JEF, which is still the pivotal state since they possess the strongest preference in actively maintaining it.[5] The JEF was intended as an additional platform for NATO,[6] and the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) for strengthening rapid and flexible deployments of some of their members.[7] Similarly to other previous cases, the JEF was meant to provide an adjunct platform for the circumstances in which the EU and NATO cannot intervene.[8]

Its original memorandum of understanding was signed on 30 November 2015, by the UK's Minister of Defence and the respective Ministers of the six other states that decided to join the UK: Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands and Norway.[9] The signatory states became nine in 2017 when Finland and Sweden joined the JEF and ten in 2021 when the latest member, Iceland, agreed to participate.[10] Finland and Sweden were still neutral at the time of their entry into the JEF and had no plans to seek NATO membership in 2017. Considering its historical military neutrality, this aspect is crucial for Ireland, as the two countries have previously joined the JEF while maintaining their neutrality. As

1 Conrad Beckett, "Ready to Respond: What Is the JEF?–Strategic Command," https://stratcommand.blog.gov.uk/2021/05/11/ready-to-respond-what-is-the-jef/ , May 11, 2021.
2 General Sir David Richards. "Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)." GOV. UK, December 17, 2012. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/chief-of-the-defence-staff-general-sir-david-richards-speech-to-the-royal-united-services-institute-rusi-17-december-2012
3 NATO, "Wales Summit Declaration", Press release 120, September 5, 2014, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm#cap-init, paragraph 67.
4 Royal Air Force, "NATO and European Security Signalled through Joint Expeditionary Force Readiness Declaration and Baltic Air Policing Deployment," February 13, 2020, https://www.raf.mod.uk/news/articles/nato-and-european-security-signalled-through-joint-expeditionary-force-readiness-declaration-and-baltic-air-policing-deployment/
5 Marina E Henke, Constructing Allied Cooperation (Cornell University Press, 2019), 30.
6 Royal Air Force, "NATO and European Security Signalled through Joint Expeditionary Force Readiness Declaration and Baltic Air Policing Deployment".
7 Veerle Nouwens, "Ad-Hoc European Military Cooperation Outside Europe," ed. Ed Arnold, Royal United Services Institute (Royal United Services Institute and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, December 2021), pp 17-29, 25. https://static.rusi.org/311-EuropeanSecurity.pdf.
8 Brendan Flynn, "Knowing Your CJEF from Your JEF: Europe's 'Alphabet Soup' of Interstitial Military Cooperation-What Relevance for Cold War 2.0?" Defence Studies 23, no. 2 (October 26, 2022): 313–333.
9 Overheid.nl, "Foundation memorandum of understanding", November 30, 2015, https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/blg-671355.pdf, 1.
10 Gov.UK, "Sweden and Finland join UK-led response force", News story, June 30, 2017, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/sweden-and-finland-join-uk-led-response-force; Gov.UK, "Iceland becomes 10th nation to join UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force", News story, April 20, 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/iceland-becomes-10th-nation-to-join-uk-led-joint-expeditionary-force

of August 2023, there are ten total participants.[11] Seven of these members are part of the EU (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, and Sweden), two are non-EU member states part of the European Economic Area (Iceland and Norway) and the UK is neither part of the former nor the latter. With Sweden expected to join NATO by the end of the 2023 Summer, all these ten states will be part of the Alliance, however, at the time of joining neither Finland nor Sweden were NATO members and neither state had indicated a desire to join that organisation.[12] This circumstance demonstrates how, when it was designed, the JEF envisioned including non-NATO members within its institutional framework. The JEF's principal areas of operativity include collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security and assume the balanced weight of land, sea, air and cyber capabilities.[13]

As initially planned, the core of JEF's activities involved joint training, exercises and courses conducted in peacetime to improve its member states' high readiness.[14] A crucial aspect of the JEF is not being a permanent military force ready to be deployed at any time under its aegis.[15] In this vein, it should not be considered a traditional military alliance but, instead, as a highly flexible framework in which ten states cooperate whenever a threat arises.[16]

The JEF's core activities involve military exercises and training in which the signatory states cooperate. After the "full operating capability" was declared in June 2018, the inaugural deployment was the aero-naval exercise "Baltic Protector" between May and July 2019, that involved over 3,000 military personnel on seventeen vessels from the then-nine members, aimed at providing deterrence to the regional security in the Baltic Sea.[17] The first proper mission, "Operation Expone", was a joint maritime operation conducted in Estonia's territorial waters.[18] The vessels of the UK's Royal Navy and the three Baltic states and the aircraft of the Swedish Air Force were deployed in mid-March 2021 to ensure maritime security and protect the freedom of navigation in the Southern Baltic Sea.[19]

The JEF assumes that the UK hosts the operational headquarters in Northwood, England, where operational needs will be met.[20] In this light, the operational Commander remains in the British hands, and the JEF has been regarded as "a British military framework".[21] Finally, the main geographical areas of interest were identified initially in the High North,

11 James Wharton, "What is the Joint Expeditionary Force and what does it do?", Operations, July 6, 2023, Forces.net, https://www.forces.net/operations/what-joint-expeditionary-force#:~:text=But%20which%20nations%20make%20up,the%20Netherlands%2C%20Sweden%20and%20Norway.
12 NATO, "NATO member countries", June 8, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52044.htm
13 Overheid.nl, "Foundation memorandum of understanding", 5.
14 Overheid.nl, "Foundation memorandum of understanding", 8.
15 Beckett, "Ready to Respond: What Is the JEF?–Strategic Command".
16 Latvian Ministry of Defence, "Joint Expeditionary Force leaders' statement: December 19 2022", December 19, 2022, https://static.lsm.lv/documents/1o2.pdf
17 Forsvaret.dk, "The Joint Expeditionary Force 2020, Version 2.0", https://www.forsvaret.dk/globalassets/fko—-forsvaret/dokumenter/oevrige/-20191105-jef-brochure-2020-o-.pdf, page 8.
18 Gov.UK, "The Royal Navy leads an international task group of warships on a security patrol of the Baltic", News story, March 11, 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/the-royal-navy-leads-an-international-task-group-of-warships-on-a-security-patrol-of-the-baltic
19 ERR News, "Royal Navy vessels join Baltic counterparts in large-scale JEF operation", News, March 12, 2021, https://news.err.ee/1608140332/royal-navy-vessels-join-baltic-counterparts-in-large-scale-jef-operation
20 Sean Monaghan, "The Joint Expeditionary Force: Global Britain in Northern Europe?", Commentary, March 25, 2022, Center for Strategic and International Studies, https://www.csis.org/analysis/joint-expeditionary-force-global-britain-northern-europe
21 Flynn, "Knowing Your CJEF from Your JEF: Europe's 'Alphabet Soup' of Interstitial Military Cooperation-What Relevance for Cold War 2.0?", 319.

North Atlantic and Baltic Sea.[22] In practice, most exercises, deployments and training took place in the so-called "High North", considered the place of military confrontation with the Russian Federation over the last decade.[23]

The cooperation of like-minded nations, under British guidance, was planned for providing quick responses to military crises to which the JEF's signatories would have responded at political, strategic and operational levels.[24] The interventions in the High North of states, like the UK or the Netherlands, which do not belong to that region, were highlighted as the prominent asymmetry of the JEF.[25]

Ireland and the Joint Expeditionary Force

This section discusses the main lessons of the JEF for the jointness of the Irish DF. A crucial premise of this article should be made. Militarily speaking, Ireland is a neutral state in the sense that it assumes the "non-membership of military alliances or common or mutual defence arrangements".[26] Hypothetical participation in the JEF would not interfere with the policy of neutrality since the JEF should be considered as a framework for rapidly responding to crises rather than a military alliance.[27] It should be acknowledged how Ireland's JEF membership would still be controversial in Ireland in light of the British leadership, which, considering the colonial past of Ireland, poses serious concerns to the matter. In January 2023, the Irish government approved the participation of the DF in the EU Battlegroup, for the biennium 2024-2025, under the German leadership.[28] Ireland has participated three times in the Nordic Battlegroups (2008, 2011 and 2015), once in the UK-led EU Battlegroup (2016) and three times in the EU Battlegroups led by Germany (2012, 2016, 2020).[29] These seven annual participations demonstrated Ireland's interest in improving its DF and consolidating its track of participation in humanitarian and multinational missions.[30]

Politically speaking, joining the JEF would present relevant challenges in the Republic as the parties are historically confident of Ireland's need to remain militarily neutral.[31] In this light, it should be noted how the concept of military neutrality is one of the few topics in which the mainstream Irish political parties agree on for ideological reasons. Thus,

22 Royal Air Force, "NATO and European Security signalled through Joint Expeditionary Force Readiness Declaration and Baltic Air Policing deployment".
23 Andreas Østhagen, "The New Geopolitics of the Arctic: Russia, China and the EU", Policy Brief, April 2019, Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, https://euagenda.eu/upload/publications/untitled-212267-ea.pdf
24 Beckett, "Ready to Respond: What Is the JEF?–Strategic Command".
25 Flynn, "Knowing Your CJEF from Your JEF: Europe's 'Alphabet Soup' of Interstitial Military Cooperation-What Relevance for Cold War 2.0?", 315.
26 Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, "Neutrality: Ireland's policy of military neutrality" https://www.dfa.ie/our-role-policies/international-priorities/peace-and-security/neutrality/
27 Houses of the Oireachtas, "European Union: Dáil Éireann Debate, Thursday–March 23 2023", March 23, 2023, https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/question/2023-03-23/15/
28 Niall O'Connor, "Cabinet clears way for Irish Defence Forces to send 174 troops to German-led EU Battlegroup", January 12, 2023, The Journal, https://www.thejournal.ie/irish-defence-forces-battlegroup-eu-5967423-Jan2023/
29 Irish Department of Defence, "Government approves Defence Forces' participation in EU Battlegroup 2024/2025", Press release, January 16, 2023, https://www.gov.ie/en/press-release/f9cab-government-approves-defence-forces-participation-in-eu-battlegroup-20242025/#:~:text=Ireland%20has%20previously%20participated%20in,on%20a%204%20year%20cycle.
30 Houses of the Oireachtas, "European Union: Dáil Éireann Debate, Thursday–March 23 2023".
31 Karen Devine, "Irish Political Parties' Attitudes towards Neutrality and the Evolution of the EU's Foreign, Security and Defence Policies", Irish Political Studies 24, no. 4 (December 2009): 467-490.

a hypothetical contribution to the JEF could imply political cleavages with potentially disruptive effects in consideration of the 2024 EU elections and 2025 general elections. By being a neutral state, Ireland could opt to participate as a full member or join the JEF with the status of an "associate participant".[32] Ireland would neither possess any control over the JEF's governance nor control the strategic and operational components of the JEF's operations.[33] The Irish DF would have the chance to interact with the signatories of the memorandums of understanding as an external contributor. They could be integrated into the JEF's chain of command without any decision-making power and improve its expertise in international contexts. Similarly to the Irish membership of NATO's Partnership for Peace, Ireland would benefit from joining the JEF in deepening their cooperation with the UK while maintaining their historical neutrality.

Participation in initiatives like the JEF is highly beneficial for small states, which can strengthen their military and strategic capabilities by operating with larger armed forces under NATO's standards.[34] At the time of writing, Ireland is still the EU's member state spending the least on its defence forces with around 0.2% of Gross Domestic Product.[35]

The most immediate benefit of participating in similar initiatives consists of improving the profitability of existing manpower and capabilities since the UK has been providing between 80 and 90% of its resources to the JEF.[36] In contrast to the EU Battlegroup, in which Ireland will participate in 2024, participation in the JEF will be less financially detrimental to the government's spending on defence.[37] The JEF was launched to tackle the fiscal austerity that forced Western countries to reduce their military expenditures after the 2008 financial crisis.[38]

By partnering with the JEF's full members, the DF will also have the chance to overcome the manpower constraints as in similar joint forces.[39] Furthermore, it should be noted how the JEF has recently grown its importance in the UK's "Global Britain" project, which was drafted after the withdrawal from the EU. In the post-referendum quinquennium, the UK has preferred to increase its military and diplomatic leverage by investing more resources in multinational initiatives like the JEF.[40] In this vein, the DF will benefit significantly from exposure to the chain of command.

32 Overheid.nl, "Foundation memorandum of understanding", 4.
33 Overheid.nl, "Foundation memorandum of understanding", 4.
34 Håkon Lunde Saxi, "British and German initiatives for defence cooperation: the Joint Expeditionary Force and the Framework Nations Concept", Defence Studies 17, no. 2 (March 14, 2017): 171-197.
35 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "SIPRI Military Expenditure Database", https://milex.sipri.org/sipri
36 Lunde Saxi, "British and German initiatives for defence cooperation: the Joint Expeditionary Force and the Framework Nations Concept", 176-179.
37 Yf Reykers, "EU Battlegroups: High costs, no benefits", Contemporary Security Policy 38, no. 3 (2017): 457-470.
38 Tormod Heier, "Britain's Joint Expeditionary Force: A Force of Friends?". In Rob Johnson and Janne Haaland Matlary (eds.), The United Kingdom's Defence After Brexit, 189-214, 2021. Palgrave Macmillan. 194.
39 Richard Reeve, "The UK's Joint Expeditionary Force", ORG explains #10, June 2019, Oxford Research Group, https://lse-atom.arkivum.net/uploads/r/politics-economics-and-social-science-collections/1/0/8/108af5a2efcf20716a161dd6b1c51a9f4c88ec06f9f3253108a6404a4f9fbd8f/581b5afe-573c-4589-ad64-3f24a939563e-ORG_Explains__10_.55a3a64f-cffc-4ea7-acd8-a1409aaf7f31.pdf
40 Amelia Hadfield and Richard G. Whitman, "The diplomacy of 'Global Britain': settling, safeguarding and seeking status," International Politics (2023): 1-22.

Overall, the Irish DF will strengthen its rapid reaction force in multiple domains as part of this expeditionary framework. By its nature, the JEF was planned as a multi-domain framework,[41] and the latest "Policy direction" argued how the JEF possesses a "balanced range of capabilities" among maritime, land, air, space and cyber domains.[42] The JEF's historical track would inform the DF in various missions, from humanitarian assistance to deterrence.[43] This reflection suggests how the Army, Air Corps and Naval Service would have the opportunity to participate in exercises aimed at integrating the armed forces of various countries in the same operations.[44]

The Irish DF will improve their expertise and competencies in other domains where they are not active for the lack of resources, specifically submarines. In this light, the characteristic of interoperability for the Irish DF will be fostered by the experiences of the JEF members in terms of operativity in multiple scenarios.[45] The DF will achieve further knowledge in other geographical areas in which they have not been active for practical limitations, including the Baltic Sea region.[46] Moreover, in the case of Ireland, the concept of "jointness" has been linked with the competency to actively cooperate with other national armed forces in international peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.[47]

In the field of maritime affairs, crucial for an island state like Ireland and sometimes neglected,[48] the core of JEF lies in amphibious operations and naval warfare.[49] Secondary missions include disaster relief and humanitarian missions that are usually short noticed as these two categories require extremely high readiness and greater degrees of jointness and are conducted in partnership with other armed forces. Given that the Irish Naval Service participated in Operation Pontus, bilaterally with the Italian Navy, and Operation Sophia, part of the CSDP's effort, the experience of JEF's members could improve the jointness of the DF in delivering humanitarian assistance under NATO's operating standards. The positive track of the JEF could inform the jointness of the Irish DF in terms of agile and rapid deployments.[50] The participation in these two maritime security operations in the Mediterranean Sea opened a new era of military cooperation for the Naval Service, and their relevant lessons should inform the broader DF in delivering joint missions, from sea to land and air, as part of multinational operations.[51] In conclusion, the JEF was designed

41 Lorenzo Cladi, "Doing more for less? Status insecurity and the UK's contribution to European security after Brexit", International Politics, 2021, 58(6), 919-936, 928.
42 Gov.UK, "Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) – Policy direction", Policy paper, July 12, 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/joint-expeditionary-force-policy-direction-july-2021/joint-expeditionary-force-jef-policy-direction
43 Håkon Lunde Saxi, "The UK Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF)", IFS Insights, May 2018, Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies.
44 Beckett, "Ready to Respond: What Is the JEF?–Strategic Command".
45 Gov.UK, "Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) – Policy direction"
46 Tormod Heier, "Britain's Joint Expeditionary Force: A Force of Friends?".
47 Brendan Flynn, "Commission on the Defence Forces Public Consultation Response Template", September 2021, https://www.gov.ie/pdf/?file=https://assets.gov.ie/136076/df6477c8-213c-4aba-9589-84fa455c680a.pdf#page=null, 1.
48 Ian Speller, "Commission on the Defence Forces Public Consultation Response Template", https://www.gov.ie/pdf/?file=https://assets.gov.ie/136077/aa60413b-17e9-4f09-bdd8-0839ecfd0b20.pdf#page=null
49 Royal Navy, "Joint expeditionary force (Maritime)", https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/operations/mediterranean-and-black-sea/joint-expeditionary-force-maritime
50 Gov.UK, "Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) – Policy direction".
51 Andrew Cottey, "Submission to the Commission on the Defence Forces", March 19, 2021, https://www.gov.ie/pdf/?file=https://assets.gov.ie/136081/b3253378-6133-467e-a5c0-0dd0addd1ab0.pdf#page=null, 5.

to provide easily and quickly deployable military forces to the political decision-makers in similar circumstances, so it will be highly insightful for Ireland's DF to participate.[52]

A third and final reflection can be made by examining the relevance of military integration. As an associate participant, the Irish DF will enhance its readiness by cooperating with the full-status members in joint training or deployments carried out under the operational standards of NATO. As stated in the official documents, the signatory members of JEF are not obliged to participate in every single operation, but the involvement in each mission lies in the sovereign decision at the national level.[53]

Conclusion

This paper focused on the case of the UK's JEF and the implications for informing the jointness of the Irish DF in overseas operations.

The first section discussed the establishment and rationale of the JEF, its current geographical preference and the two significant trainings and exercises conducted since its operational launch in 2018.

The second section argued the potential benefits of joining the JEF for a small island state like Ireland, which remains at the bottom of the ranking of the EU's member states regarding military expenditures in GDP terms. This section asserted how the status of full or associate member of the JEF would benefit from improving the interoperability of the various branches of the DF.

By cooperating with the other signatory partners of the JEF, the Army, Air Corps and Naval Service will upgrade their multi-domain knowledge and enhance their competencies in other geographical areas in which they are not operating recently, such as the Baltic Sea.

For Ireland, participation in training and exercises with the ten full members of the JEF will provide further knowledge and expertise that, otherwise, will not be achieved. In conclusion, the possibility of participating in rapid expeditionary deployments under the standards of NATO could improve the jointness and readiness of the DF. The focus of the JEF remains the High North, a geographical area Ireland has not regarded as its primary security threat. While it is unlikely that Ireland will participate in high-intensity military activities, the ability to develop skills, operational standardisation, and training could be vital for the Irish Defence Forces. In this vein, the JEF could be crucial for improving the competencies and capability of the DF and contributing to the European defence without abandoning neutrality, joining NATO, or accepting any mutual defence commitments.

52 Lunde Saxi, "British and German initiatives for defence cooperation: the Joint Expeditionary Force and the Framework Nations Concept", 182.
53 Gov.UK, "Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) – Policy direction".

The Irish Defence Forces As a Joint Force – Where Is it Going and What Is the Way to Get There?

Lt Cdr David Memery

The success story in Desert Storm/Desert Shield was the application of jointness to the organization and conduct of operations on the battlefield – Adm. Harry Train

Abstract

Whilst studies have concluded that the Defence Forces should adopt a Joint model, research has identified that at present the Defence Forces operates within a 'Domain-Deconfliction' model. Whilst there is consensus as to the vision for a future force, there is a divergence in where members of the Defence Forces perceive the organisation is at present, and hence issues may arise in defining a cross-organisational pathway to a Joint operational model.

This paper intends to examine the challenges faced by the Defence Forces in defining the future model of Jointness to be adopted, subsequent to previous studies post the Commission on the Defence Forces, how to best navigate the organisational cultural change required, and increase the probability of success in adopting a Joint Operational model.

Introduction

Since its inception in 1924, the Irish Defence Forces (DF) has been primarily focused on the land component, primarily as a consequence of the circumstances surrounding the foundation of the state. The command culture within the DF can be traced back to the concept, that due to the size and history of the land component, the DF had to be carefully watched and controlled, necessitating a diverse division of Command & Control (C2).[1] Both the White Paper on Defence[2], and the Report of the Commission on the Future of the Defence Forces (CoDF)[3] express the intent that the DF should operate Jointly, delivering effects in operations in a coordinated and cohesive manner, centred upon a Joint Common Operational Picture with suitable C2. But such is the gravity of the journey to Jointness and the desired end-state may prove challenging.

What Is 'Jointness'

In the broadest sense 'Jointness' can be defined as the broad understanding by one service of what skills and capabilities the other services can provide within a military organisation, and more importantly, trusting them to contribute to the military endeavour, and having that reciprocated.[4] This definition is broad enough to reflect several models of Jointness, whilst encompassing one of the most important concepts, that fundamentally Jointness is about mutual understanding.

1 O'Halpin, P. E. 2016. Rethinking Irish Civil-Military Relations in the 21st Century. Defence Forces Review, p. 217.
2 Department of Defence. 2015. White Paper on Defence. Dublin: Stationary Office: pp 62
3 Commission on the Defence Forces. 2022. Report of the Commission on the Defence Forces. Report, Dublin: Stationary Office.
4 Wilkerson, L. B. 1997. What exactly is Jointness? Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer: pp. 66-68.

Within international military organisations, the definition of Joint is equally broad; the US military defines the concept of Joint as "Connot[ing] activities, operations, organisations, etc., in which elements of two or more military departments participate" and Joint Doctrine as fundamentally "principles that guide the employment of ... military forces in coordinated action toward a common objective".[5] The NATO definition aligns as "describ[ing] activities, operations, and organisations in which elements of at least two services participate".[6] The breadth of these official definitions outlines just how hard it is to accurately describe what a Joint organisation is capable of, aside from simply facilitating collaborative work across two or more military services.

Joint Concept Development

It is proposed that there are two major drivers in developing a Joint organisation, the first is the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), which uses the development of information technology to maximise synergies between military components to impart maximum effect. The second is the economic reality of shrinking defence budgets, and the requirement to 'do more with less' by increasing efficiencies and reducing administrative and logistical overheads.[7] Further, Joint organisations can be described as 'Synthetic Organisations', in that they are created for specific situational requirements and have the authority of decision-making and action within that situation.[8] In the military context, they are constructed from single services using analytical or technical constructs. One of the most pressing requirements of moving to a joint structure is the determination of the most appropriate set of such constructs that will suit both the desired end-state and the cultural dynamic within the organisation.

The experiences of both the Canadian and Australian Armed Forces have historically shown that arriving at an agreed model of Jointness is a highly complex and fraught process. In the former's case, attempts to institute a unique 'Joint' culture were to the detriment of the existing service cultures, all but condemning the process to failure from the outset. In the latter's case, a transformational framework was established outlining the transition between the various models[9], requiring a conceptual shift in the organisation's thinking in multiple dimensions simultaneously. For instance, moving from thinking about weapons systems to thinking about people, to thinking about information systems. There was also a requirement, as the organisation moved through the framework, to transition from authority models to accountability models. The final stage was codifying the new model such that working 'Jointly' was no longer considered a novel experience, but, as both routine and preferred.

5 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2019. DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Accessed February 06 2019, from https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf
6 NATO. 2018. AAP-6 NATO Glossary of Terms in English and French
7 O'Neill, J., & O'Brien, F. 2001. New Organisational Forms and their Relationship to Future Military Capabilities. Proceedings of the International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium.
8 Thompson, J. D., & Hawkes, R. 1962. Disaster community organisation and administrative process. In G. W. Baker, & D. Chapman (Eds.), Man and Society in Disaster. New York: Basic Books.
9 O'Neill, J., & O'Brien, F. 2002. Models of Jointness: Infrastructure Issues for Inter-Organisational Working. 7th International Command and Control Research Technology Symposium (ICCRTS): 'Enabling Synchronized Operations'. Quebec City, Canada. Retrieved from http://dodccrp.org/events/7th_ICCRTS/Tracks/pdf/036.PDF



Figure 1. Australian Transformational Framework[10]

The key finding in the Australian experience was that;

- The key enablers for one model became the routine infrastructure for future models.
- While the models of Jointness are viewed as evolutionary, the revolutionary components are a change in mental models, organisational focus and decision-making.
- Focussing purely upon people means that working Jointly will always be novel, and there will be a tendency to retrograde to simpler models under periods of organisational stress.

A key issue is what conceptual framework to adopt in constructing the joint organisation from potentially quite disparate services. The Australian Defence Forces made several attempts to define their conceptual framework, (Decisive Manoeuvre, Air-Land-Sea Battle, Manoeuvre Operations in the Littoral Environment and The Australian Way of Warfighting), before settling upon the Future Joint Warfighting Concept. Five differing models over eight years.[11]

10 Ibid: pp. 6
11 Ibid

Hence, it can be said; that there is no single agreed model to define the ideal joint conceptual model. O'Neill & O'Brien (2002) defined seven general models for Joint organisations;

Model	Description
Domain-Specific	Each service acts independently within their domain, or environment, as part of a common shared strategic objective, and at the strategic level. Decisions are concerned with the balance of investment across the domains
De-confliction across domains	Characterised by systems that can cross domain boundaries but employ isolated single-service planning followed by imposed de-confliction from higher headquarters.
Joint Headquarters	Characterised by top-down campaign planning, followed by single-service planning using domain-specific expertise within an overall joint plan. Achieved by co-locating domain-specific planners in a joint headquarters.
Integrated Organisation[12]	A single joint military organisation, with the single-services abolished. The organisation is naturally joint and strategic decision making is simplified as it deals with an already holistic entity.
Integrated Systems	The exploitation of network-enabled and RMA concepts to develop joint systems, organisational structures, and information management. Characterised by capability-centric thinking, but, capabilities still reside within the single services. Decision-making centred upon the novel situational aspects encountered within a routine joint campaign planning cycle.
Hierarchical Command, Networked Control	A focus upon providing the front-line combatant with sufficient situational awareness and resource knowledge to allow them to take the initiative using self-synchronisation with other assets. The synchronisation is achieved using networked capabilities without referral to a Joint Headquarters (JHQ). The JHQ remains focused on creating the resource space within the campaign plan.
Adhocracy	The military force does not own all the resources required to conduct the operations; it creates a joint organisational infrastructure to allow for control of externally provided capabilities. Decision-making within advocacy revolves around defining and deploying this infrastructure, relying upon accountability, rather than authority, within a comprehensive approach.

12 Some literature refers to this model as the Unification model.

Two schools of thought exist as to how to implement Jointness. The first approach is that of Integration, referring to improving procedures for combining the unique capabilities of the different services to enhance their combat effectiveness, as a means of reducing inter-service rivalry. The counter-approach is that of Unification, in which some capabilities are subordinated to one or more dominant capabilities, with the components blended to enable the dominant capability.[13] The former emphasises procedures to enhance organisational effectiveness, while the latter seeks a particular outcome. The selection of the optimal approach is dependent upon the desired end-state Joint model and an appreciation of the existing organisational culture(s).

Transforming to Jointness

Gompert identifies that Jointness is "relative, not absolute and the degree of Jointness is unsettled" and that "[t]he extent to which operations should be integrated rests not on the fulfilment of some utopian scheme of total seamlessness but instead on practical optimisation of when 'Jointness' is, and is not, operationally useful".[14] He identifies the limitation upon change imposed by concepts such as tradition, habit, prudence and jealousies between services. A further observation is that even if military operations are conducted under the command of a Joint Forces Commander (JFC), this does not necessarily mean that all operations are necessarily best accomplished through a Joint Operational Structure (JOS).[15]

There are four principles of Jointness which are relevant in determining the applicability of the model of Jointness to a particular military organisation[16];

- Principle of Hierarchy
- Principle of Diversity
- Principle of Necessity
- Principle of Cohesion

The Principle of Hierarchy states that the degree of Jointness within such an organisation is inversely proportional to the number of command echelons within the organisation, based upon the observation that internal communications are more efficient in a flatter organisation.

The Principle of Diversity defines the phenomenon that, within an organisation, the competition of ideas leads to more stable strategic development, as the allowing for a more coherent and effective end product. This principle is important within a deeply Joint organisation, as adherence to the doctrine can stifle the presentation of conflicting ideas.[17]

13 Owens, M. T. 1997. The use and abuse of 'Jointness'. Marine Corps Gazette, November: pp. 50-59.
14 Gompert, D. C. 2003. Preparing Military Forces for Integrated Operations in the Face of Uncertainty. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
15 Downs, C. G. 2008. Does Service Interdependance Take Jointness Too Far? Newport, RI: Naval War College.
16 Rubel, R. C. 2000-01. Principles of Jointness. Joint Forces Quarterly, Winter: pp. 45-49.
17 Owens, M. T. 1997. The use and abuse of 'Jointness'. Marine Corps Gazette, November: pp. 50-59.

The Necessity Principle is related to the fact that, at the lower echelons of a military organisation, differing units and services, will de-facto have a greater level of 'Jointness' in order to achieve the mission. However, this is mission focussed and generally short-lived, and at times can be better described under the umbrella of 'Combined Operations'.

The Principle of Cohesion is concerned with the impact Jointness has on a unit. A military unit, the concept of which forms the foundation of any military organisation, is built upon a sense of shared history and unit loyalty. An organisational change of the magnitude of the adoption of a JOS can have a significant impact on these historical bonds, as was evidenced in the context of the Canadian experience of introducing Jointness in the 1960s.[18] This principle is of particular note in the context of this Jointness in the DF as the impact of the model ultimately proposed for adoption may have a significant impact upon the unit culture and dynamic. As shall be discussed later, this can be a significant impediment to organisational change.

To examine how a military organisation can conduct organisational change while still maintaining organisational reliability and service continuity during the transition, one must analyse the organisation's structure. For example, the selection, functional integration and informational linkages between organisational components, and the variety, scale and scope of the knowledge encapsulated within those components. The latter is further composed of knowledge of the components and the overall organisational architecture that allows those components to interact.[19] Managing change requires a delicate balance between standardisation and autonomy, functional decomposition and informational interdependencies, and distributed leadership and central authority.

For organisational change to be successful it requires changes to a broad spectrum of behaviours, including, training, personnel, promotion and possibly even recruitment. As a result, a significant level of deep thought must be engaged in prior to, and during, the change process, to ensure success.[20]

> *It is not enough to write a new doctrine if the purpose is to change the way an army will fight. Ultimately, an army's behaviour in battle will almost certainly be more a reflection of its character or culture than of the contents of its doctrine manuals.*[21]

A significant portion of the debate as to the success of implementing a joint structure is attributed to the realities of the interplay of the specific service cultures that must come together within the JOS.[22] These differences are not necessarily service parochialism but are a consequence of honest intellectual debate over the competing service paradigms. Jointness, succinctly defined as the ability of an Army, Air Force, and Navy, to plan and

18 Gosselin, D. 2008. Hellyer's Ghosts: Unification of the Canadian Forces is 40 Years Old–Part Two. Canadian Military Journal, 9(3): pp. 6-16
19 Barbaroux, P. 2011. A design-orientated approach to organisation change: insights from a military case study. Journal of Organizational Change Management, 24(5): pp. 626-639.
20 Johnson, P. 2000. Doctrine is Not Enough: The Effect of Doctrine on the Behaviour of Armies. Parameters, 30(3).
21 Ibid
22 Simard, C. J. 2001. Jointness–it's a matter of attitude. Retrieved December 12, 2018, from Canadian Forces College. Accessed from https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/260/264/simard.pdf

operate in a mutually reinforcing manner, has been a matter of debate in all militaries. This should not be surprising as getting the services to work together is, at best, controversial and, at worse, problematic. While most attribute problems to one of turf battle, at a more fundamental level it stems from differing visions of war. Each of the services, shaped by its own capabilities, doctrine, institutional prisms and threat perceptions, is strongly attached to its preferred strategy for warfighting.[23,24]

Within the Canadian Armed Forces the transformation to a Joint Force, proved problematic due to the change process neglecting the impact upon the individual cultures of the Navy, Army and Air Force, resulting in a subsequent reversion back to domain-specific military components in 2011, although a Joint Command remained.[25]

Jointness within DF

Previous research on the concept of Jointness within the DF indicated a desire for the various component commanders to retain a level of autonomy, with a JTF acting as the 'one-up' command level.[26] Such a concept is at variance with the more traditional concept whereby components provide and sustain assets for employment by a JTF. This interpretation is not unique to the Irish context and has previously been practiced within the US military[27], requiring a legislative change to remove operational authority from service component commanders and vesting it into a single joint-head.

Whilst studies have concluded that the Defence Forces (DF) should adopt a Joint model[28],[29], research previously has identified that the DF operated a 'Domain Specific' model of jointness, whilst a later 2019 study showed an evolution to that of 'De-confliction across Domains' and the willingness to transition to a 'Joint Headquarters' model.[30]

To achieve such Jointness there is a requirement of increased integration, collaboration, and cohesion between the elements as a form of Jointness via Integration[31], but also, a requirement to move away from the more traditional mentality of 'cake-sharing', whereby everyone gets to partake, regardless of the requirement. Such a concept requires that each component attains the maturity to accept that they may lose out in the short-term for a more long-term gain. That is not to say that the unique elements of each component need to be lost. What is required is the mental agility to move from the protectionism of

23 Mukherjee Anit, 2017, Fighting Separately: Jointness and Civil-Military Relations in India, the Journal of Strategic Studies, 40(1-2): pp. 6-34
24 Poynow Robert, 2002, Organic versus Joint Organization, Air and Space Power Journal, 16(3): pp. 24-25
25 Gosselin, D. 2008. Hellyer's Ghosts: Unification of the Canadian Forces is 40 Years Old–Part Two. Canadian Military Journal 9 (3): pp. 6-16.
26 Memery, David. 2019. The Future Model of Jointness within the Irish Defence Forces: How do we get there? MA Thesis, Maynooth: Maynooth: pp. 32.
27 Roman, P. J., & Tarr, D. W. 1998. The Joint Chiefs of Staff: From Service Parochialism to Jointness. Political Science Quarterly, 113(1). pp. 91-111.
28 Hegarty, P. D. (2018). Joint Forces Command: The Irish Defence Forces 'horse and tank' moment? Shrivingham: Joint Services Command and Staff College.
29 McGetrick, C. B. (2014). The Irish Defence Forces and Jointness: Where do we stand?, Maynooth: National Univeristy of Ireland.
30 Memery, David. 2019. The Future Model of Jointness within the Irish Defence Forces: How do we get there? MA Thesis, Maynooth: Maynooth: pp. 51.
31 Simard, C. J. 2001. Jointness–it's a matter of attitude. Retrieved December 12, 2018, from Canadian Forces College. Accesed from https://www.cfc.forces.gc.ca/259/260/264/simard.pdf

old, to a more open approach. A core element of attaining this is the requirement for the individual components, to some extent, cede power and autonomy to a higher joint entity.

A concern with any form of organisational change is the impact it may have upon the existing culture within the organisation, and will the culture be adaptable to such change. Within a military context this is further complicated by each service component having its own distinct, culture, ethos and traditions. It can be argued that this reluctance to embrace a new culture is centred upon the perception that one's own culture, that which you are most familiar with, is the desirable culture.[32]

Historically, the DF has been described as a 'siloed' organisation, both between the three components, but also within the land components in terms of the interactions between the various Corps. DFHQ has historically adopted a very land-centric approach, with the remaining services to some extent being pushed to the periphery. The historical allegiance to service and corps can be strong, and in fact, was one of the principal issues arising from the Canadian experience of implementing Jointness.[33] A perception exists among members of the DF that due to the longevity of this siloed culture, any potential move to increase levels of cooperation or Jointness is likely to be delayed as a consequence.[34]

One of the biggest mindsets that requires movement is that of a service-centred approach, where members of the DF are predominantly focussed upon their own service, to one that is centred upon domains, e.g. land, sea and air. The core service skills are still valid, and to the fore in this context, but their impact and utility are re-focused, to one of expertise within the specific domain, and how that knowledge and experience can be integrated with the other domains within a joint construct to deliver better effects. Ultimately DFHQ could transition to a blended structure, whereby the majority of DFHQ appointments are not perceived to be held against a specific service. This approach has been adopted within the US military. However, longitudinal studies have indicated that within such a structure, appointments are ultimately allocated to portray a perception of evenness across the services, rather than appointments being allocated to the most qualified.[35]

Understanding the Change Path

In the 2019 study discussed previously interviewees were asked to outline their understanding of what was meant by the DF operating Jointly.[36] The variance in response would indicate that the respondent's interpretation was highly dependent upon their own experiences and their current role within the organisation. At the level of the General

32 Memery, David. 2019. The Future Model of Jointness within the Irish Defence Forces: How do we get there? MA Thesis, Maynooth: Maynooth: pp. 39.
33 Gosselin, D. 2008. Hellyer's Ghosts: Unification of the Canadian Forces is 40 Years Old–Part One. Canadian Military Journal, 9(2): pp. 6-15
34 Memery, David. 2019. The Future Model of Jointness within the Irish Defence Forces: How do we get there? MA Thesis, Maynooth: Maynooth: pp. 44.
35 Downs, C. G. 2008. Does Service Interdependance Take Jointness Too Far? Newport, RI: Naval War College.
36 Memery, David. 2019. The Future Model of Jointness within the Irish Defence Forces: How do we get there? MA Thesis, Maynooth: Maynooth, pp. 41.

Staff, the response was an effects-based interpretation. Meanwhile, among OF-2/OF-3[37] ranks, the response was more focused upon what would be traditionally described as collaborative operations.

Such is the scope of change envisaged within the CoDF report that failure to understand the prevailing DF cultures and sub-cultures may significantly impede organisational change management. Before engaging in any major change process, it is important to have a comprehensible and integrated picture of where the organisation stands, referring to the current situation and culture, and where the organisation wants to be, referring to its desired state.[38] A small-scale study conducted in 2022 on the current and desired cultures, as they pertain to the recommendations of the CoDF and the concept of Jointness, indicated that whilst there was some variance between ranks as to the current perceived culture, there was alignment as to the desired culture.[39] As a result, it was recommended that a cautious approach be taken in defining a change management strategy to ensure ownership and acceptance of the change. This is an important consideration as people will typically reflect upon where they used to be, and when difficulties arise will want to go back to where they were more comfortable or may exploit ambiguity to enhance personal rather than organisational standing. To overcome this, there is a need to fully educate throughout the organisation as to not only the vision but also how to act as a JOS.

Conclusion

Disagreements between the three services are inevitable whether over roles, missions, budgets or defence plans. These disagreements, some of them crucial to the future of the institution, are, in most cases, only resolved by arbitration external to the military structures. Making decisions relating to integration and resolving inter-services rivalry thus becomes one of the core functions of civil-military relations. This is especially true for jointness which requires the subordination of parochial service interests to transition to a more efficient, and effective joint effort.[40]

37 An OF-2 is an Army/Air-Corp Lieutenant or Captain, or Naval Sub-Lieutenant or Lieutenant (NS), an OF-3 is an Army/Air-Corp Commandant or a Naval Lieutenant Commander

38 Mbeba, R D. 2014. Essence of a flexible organisational culture to influence change in the 21st Century organisation. Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 5 (7): pp. 663-670.

39 Memery, David, 2022, Surfing the Wave of Organisational Cultural Change – Can the Defence Forces adapt to the Recommendations of the Commission of the Defence Forces, Defence Forces Review 2022, Dublin: pp. 87.

40 Mukherjee Anit, 2017, Fighting Separately: Jointness and Civil-Military Relations in India, the Journal of Strategic Studies, 40(1-2): pp. 6-34

Sharp Lessons in Jointness From the Russo-Ukraine War: What Relevance for Ireland?

Dr. Brendan Flynn

Abstract

What emerging lessons can be drawn from the ongoing Russo-Ukraine War about 'jointness' even for militaries like Ireland's Defence Forces for whom territorial defence is a remote contingency? While the ongoing war can be analysed at the strategic and tactical levels, each offering discrete insights, this paper gives attention to the issue of joint logistics at the operational level. However, it is firstly argued that definitional clarity is required about what 'jointness' entails and here the broader concept of Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) is useful because it draws attention for the need for militaries to operate with civilian actors and friendly states. As regards logistics, the ability to access, direct or even commandeer civilian assets while maintaining secure international supply chains emerges as a critical lesson. Jointness here is then essentially the improvisational ability to manage and leverage civil and military transport, energy and communications flows to maximise national resilience.

Have We Got Jointness Wrong-Should We Be Talking about MDO?

The invasion of Ukraine provides many useful examples of jointness, but these do not look at all like what some often assume it to be: a balanced blend of land, air and sea forces often epitomised in amphibious operations.[1] In fact for Western/NATO militaries, the jargon of jointness is increasingly being augmented by the broader concept of 'multi-domain operations' (MDO)[2] which has been pioneered by the US Army[3] to encompass cyber and space alongside the traditional land, sea and air forces. All five domains are now supposed to deliver "targeted effects in the three dimensions– physical, virtual and cognitive".[4]

Crucially MDO also recognises that many joint operations will involve close co-operation with allied or friendly forces from other states, making them 'combined and joint'

1 In fairness most definitions of jointness do not literally presume that all three services must fight together simultaneously, with NATO preferring a much lower threshold definition of joint missions being where "elements of two services participate". For an excellent discussion see Lucas, Edward R., and Thomas A. Crosbie. "Evolution of Joint Warfare." In A. Sookermany (ed.), Handbook of Military Sciences (2020): 1-11, Springer, Cham https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02866-4_21-1. In practice, many discussions of jointness become quickly a framing device about how assets, spending and responsibilities can be shared and divided up between army, air force and naval services, often against a backdrop of bitter inter-service rivalry. For an illuminating discussion of the many misunderstandings of 'jointness' in a rare 'small state' case-study of Sweden, see: Finlan, Alastair, Anna Danielsson, and Stefan Lundqvist. "Critically engaging the concept of joint operations: Origins, reflexivity and the case of Sweden." Defence Studies 21, no. 3 (2021): 356-374.
2 According to Reynolds, NATO's working definition of MDO is: "the orchestration of military activities, across all domains and environments, synchronized with non-military activities, to enable the Alliance to create converging effects at the speed of relevance". Reynolds, Jeffrey (2022) 'NATO Multi-Domain Operations-Adapting Beyond Joint Doctrine', The Three Swords-Magazine of the Joint Warfare Centre, Stavanger. December, Issue 38, pp25-29, at page 27, https://www.jwc.nato.int/application/files/5916/7085/8695/issue38lr.pdf
3 On the conceptual shift from Joint Operations to MDO and for a good primer on 'jointness' see Lucas and Crosbie, Op.Cit., p.9-10. For an excellent discussion of MDO and what it means from a European perspective see Watling, Jack, and Daniel Roper. European Allies in US Multi-Domain Operations. Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2019, https://static.rusi.org/20190923_european_allies_in_us_multi-domain_operations_web.pdf. For the original US Army led doctrinal statement of MDO see: US Army/TRADOC (2017) Multi-Domain Battle: Evolution of Combined Arms for the 21st Century 2025-2040 Version 1.0 December 2017, https://www.tradoc.army.mil/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/MDB_Evolutionfor21st.pdf.
4 Reynolds, Op.Cit., p.27-28.

endeavours in NATO jargon, but as important will be national and international civilian actors. For as Reynolds observes:

> *many critical capabilities…are not owned by militaries. The proliferation of non-military actors that contribute to military success, including commercial entities, has intensified over the past several years. These actors must be considered during the planning and execution of military operations.*[5]

Commercial satellite technology is one example of civilian assets which are key enablers to actual war fighting. The Ukrainians made significant use of Starlink terminals[6] and Russia cyber-hacked the commercial US Viasat satellite network at the outset[7] and later Starlink.[8]

Image 1, Ukrainian solider positioning a Starlink terminal, Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=124549220

5 Reynolds, Op.Cit., p.27.

6 The importance of Starlink for the Ukrainians illustrates both the utility and also the vulnerability of relying on civilian commercial providers, for while initially Space X provided thousands of terminals for free and within days of the invasion, plus subscription bandwidth worth millions of dollars, by February 2023 the Elon Musk owned company began to refuse licensing of Starlink technology on weaponized drones. As of early summer 2023 however, the Ukrainian armed forces continue to make extensive use of Starlink notwithstanding Russian jamming activities. For details see: Ray, Kaushik, and William Selvamurthy. "Starlink's Role in Ukraine." Journal of Defence Studies 17(1) (2023): 25-44, and Jayanti, Amritha, "Starlink and the Russia-Ukraine War: A Case of Commercial Technology and Public Purpose? Analysis & Opinions, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, March 9th, 2023, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/starlink-and-russia-ukraine-war-case-commercial-technology-and-public-purpose

7 Willett, Marcus (2022) 'The Cyber Dimension of the Russia–Ukraine War', Survival, 64:5, 7-26, DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2022.2126193 at page 12, 20.

8 Horton, Alex. "The Discord Leaks: Russia tests secretive weapon to target SpaceX's Starlink in Ukraine, Moscow's bid to sever Ukrainian forces' internet access is more sophisticated than previously known, leaked document shows", The Washington Post, April 18th, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/04/18/discord-leaks-starlink-ukraine/

Even for the Irish Defence Forces, cyber and space assets are already[9] critical when conducting successful peace support or aid to the civil power/authority (ATCP/ATCA) operations, a trend that will likely grow.

A much broader conceptual definition of jointness closer to MDO is therefore warranted. In the Ukraine invasion the type of jointness exhibited by both sides is far from the archetype of balanced air, land and naval forces operating in some idealised synchronicity. Indeed Ukraine's Air Force have been severely depleted.[10] Their Navy has only small coastal and riverine craft although it has improvised coastal defence/sea-denial and raiding operations based on missiles, drones and mines.

The Ukrainian military are therefore forced to experiment with a blended land force, combining very experienced special forces, well-motivated heavy mechanised infantry brigades, supported by a much lighter network of territorial defence screening forces of various tiers of readiness/capability. They have embraced joint force war-fighting concepts since the invasion in 2014 and have become a very innovative military[11], adept at blending NATO doctrines or equipment, with their organic combat experience and their many post-Soviet military legacies.

Multi-domain operations have become essential. Units are unable to deploy without ad hoc ground based air defence networks, drones widely used for ISTAR, and lots of artillery fire support, using locally developed fire control apps that can input Starlink and drone data to deliver fire missions within less than a minute.[12] These fires effectively deliver functional equivalents to Close Air Support (CAS) and Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) missions, which in NATO forces would be delivered by air assets. Russia's fraying military mostly follows this pattern, after first trying and miserably failing to execute high tempo joint manoeuvre warfare. The Russians, for now, seemingly retain a quantitative advantage in artillery, combat aircraft, and their naval forces can maintain a distant blockade of Ukrainian ports based on a few diesel electric submarines and a larger pool of land and aerial anti-ship missiles.

9 Since 2021 the Irish Defence Forces relies on the commercial firm, Marlink, to provide satellite connectivity services especially important for overseas deployments. See; https://marlink.com/marlink-to-provide-satellite-connectivity-solution-to-irish-defence-forces/

10 One source has suggested about half the pre-invasion inventory of 100-125 'fast movers' has been lost. What remains appear to be being employed as long range strike platforms using western supplied cruise missiles and/or as a floating tactical reserve. Axe, David, "The Ukrainian Air Force Formed A New Strike Squadron—By Arming Reconnaissance Bombers With British Cruise Missiles", Forbes, May 28th, 2023, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2023/05/28/the-ukrainian-air-force-formed-a-new-strike-squadron-by-arming-reconnaissance-bombers-with-british-cruise-missiles/?sh=7c5737ff45fa The respected Oryx OSINT website suggests that 62 Ukrainian combat jets were destroyed in 2022 alone, see: https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/03/list-of-aircraft-losses-during-2022.html

11 See: Gorski, Agatha, 'Fighting smarter: Ukraine's transformation into a military innovator', The Kyiv Independent, Thursday June 1st, 2023, https://kyivindependent.com/fighting-smarter-ukraines-transformation-into-military-innovator/ .For a discussion on ongoing Ukrainian "innovation under fire", see: Jones, Seth G., Riley McCabe, and Alexander Palmer. "Ukrainian Innovation in a War of Attrition." CSIS Briefs, February, 1-16 (2023) https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep47447.pdf and for a perspective which explains how Ukrainian military innovation has its roots in the 2014 invasion and subsequent never ending hostilities, see: Tom Dyson & Yuriy Pashchuk (2022) Organisational learning during the Donbas War: the development of Ukrainian Armed Forces lessons-learned processes, Defence Studies, 22:2, 141-167, DOI: 10.1080/14702436.2022.2037427

12 For a discussion of the GIS Arta app and Russian equivalents see: Zikusoka, David, 'How Ukraine's "Uber for Artillery" is Leading the Software War Against Russia', Blog Post, New America, May 25th, 2023, https://www.newamerica.org/future-frontlines/blogs/how-ukraines-uber-for-artillery-is-leading-the-software-war-against-russia/

The result is that both militaries are engaged in complex multidomain operations but they cannot deploy joint forces in a balanced way as the NATO Tier 1 militaries do. Instead the bulk of their effort falls on land forces, who are 'joined' by cyber, drone, information warfare, air defence and logistics specialists who are sometimes civilian. The Ukrainian military's improvised abilities to influence international news cycles, social media spaces, cyber networks, as well as their use of commercial satellite and OSINT approaches, all demonstrates a different way of achieving 'jointness'. This is an improvised, but functional jointness, yet one arguably much more relevant for a small state like Ireland, notwithstanding that territorial defence threats remain a remote contingency for us.

The Importance of Joint Logistics in the Russo-Ukraine War

For both Ukraine and Russia their ongoing logistic[13] effort is essential to their respective war outcomes, a fact which has already been examined by a variety of experts.[14] It has been argued that Russia's inability to achieve its initial operational aims were largely due to systematic logistics failures, notably a chronic shortage of suitable military trucks, fuel and rations, which is some cases led to instances of looting and abandoning of vehicles and weapons.

However, it is probably mistaken to assume that logistics alone was the major reason for failure.[15] More fundamentally, Putin ordered an invasion with too few troops who were

Image 2, Destroyed and captured Russian trucks in Luhansk Oblast, 7 March 2022, source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=117248833

13 The word 'sustainment' is sometimes used in older NATO and western military publications. Here I generally use the term logistics throughout.

14 For a very carefully measured analysis of Russian logistics failures in the 2022 invasion see: Skoglund, Per., Tore Listou, and Thomas Ekström, (2022) 'Russian Logistics in the Ukrainian War: Can Operational Failures be Attributed to logistics?' Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies, 5(1), pp. 99–110. DOI: https://doi. org/10.31374/sjms.158. For more general overviews see: Hugos, Michael, Edward Salo, Ryan Kuhns and Ben Hazen. 'Logistics Determine Your Destiny: What Russia's Invasion Is (Re)Teaching Us About Contested Logistics', Blog Modern War Institute, August 9th, 2022, https://mwi.usma.edu/logistics-determine-your-destiny-what-russias-invasion-is-reteaching-us-about-contested-logistics/ ; Berkowitz, Bonnie, and Artur Galocha. 2022. "Why the Russian military is bogged down by logistics in Ukraine." The Washington Post, March 30th, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/30/russia-military-logistics-supply-chain/ ; For an Australian military perspective see Gibson, Robert, 'Logistic Lessons in the Russia-Ukraine War', The Cove, March 16th, 2022. https://cove.army.gov.au/article/logistic-lessons-russia-ukraine-war ;

15 Hugos, et al. Op.Cit. See also Axe, David, "The Russian Army Is Running Out Of Trucks For Its War In Ukraine", Forbes, March 18th, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2022/03/18/as-predicted-the-russian-army-is-running-out-of-trucks-for-its-war-in-ukraine/?sh=4b77c346577c

inadequately sustained for such a large country whose military were well prepared and motivated to fight. Structurally, Russian tactical formations have traditionally suffered from a repeated logistical weakness in having many more artillery and air defence systems but fewer support vehicles than comparable western units.[16] The plethora of Russian mercenary and paramilitary forces evident in this war[17], further complicates logistics, as these units have both their own sources for sustainment but also expect resupply from the regular Russian field army, for which considerable rivalry and lack of co-operation is apparent.

In contrast, 'just in time' supplies of western military aid in Spring 2022 played an important part in Ukraine's initial success. Moreover, the salience of logistics assets, notably fuel dumps, has been reinforced by repeated targeting from both side's offensive operations. The Ukrainians have experienced significant losses of warehousing capacity, notably around Kiev and civilian HGV fleets have been disrupted by drivers becoming soldiers overnight.

For each country, logistics is also a joint endeavour: military and civilian air transport bring war supplies quickly to the borders of Ukraine, while rail cars are used for the heavy loads/tracked vehicles, augmented sometimes by shipping and barges. However, neither the Russians nor the Ukrainians can safely use military air transport much inside the battlespace because neither can effect a comprehensive or stable air superiority.[18]

At the tactical level, the final kilometres to field units typically requires specialised military trucks which can carry up to 5-10 tonnes of supplies from mobile field depots, and these preferably exhibit both good cross country capabilities (staying on roads makes for an easy artillery target) and light armour to withstand ubiquitous shelling. Unloading/turnaround has to be very rapid given the ever present risk of drones and artillery strikes, which places a premium on vehicles that have their own cranes to handle pallets. Russian trucks appear to be fewer and weaker in this aspect.[19]

There is nothing much new in this for military logisticians: pallets and protected trucks became normal in the US military from at least the 1990s and a logistic airbridge was an essential feature of US support to Israel in the 1973 war.[20] More generally what we see from the Ukrainian side somewhat fits with what Patrick Bury has argued is an emergent

16 See for a pre-invasion overview of Russian Army logistics: Vershinin, Alex, "Russian Army Logistics And The Fait Accompli", War on the Rocks, November 23, 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/11/feeding-the-bear-a-closer-look-at-russian-army-logistics/
17 For a good discussion of how the Wagner mercenary group has fared in the Ukraine invasion, see: Clarke, Colin. P, 2023. 'What Happens Next with the Wagner Group?', PolicyCommons.net, https://policycommons.net/artifacts/3834891/what-happens-next-with-the-wagner-group/4640765/ on 05 Jun 2023. CID: 20.500.12592/rsnh2q. For wider context on groups like Wagner, see: Potočňák, Adam, and Miroslav Mareš. "Russia's Private Military Enterprises as a Multipurpose Tool of Hybrid Warfare." The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 35, no. 2 (2022): 181-204.
18 This does not mean no air logistics operations have taken place by either side. Indeed the Ukrainians successfully used helicopters to resupply and evacuate Mariupol until eventually these suffered unsustainable losses. See: Leicester, John and Hanna Arhirova, 'The impossible': Ukraine's secret, deadly rescue missions', Associated Press, June 22nd, 2022. https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-rescue-missions-daa28fd48e3e03c181c404b944d391e9
19 See discussion on the following Twitter thread: https://twitter.com/trenttelenko/status/1507056013245128716
20 Giovannettone, Justin. "Airlifts in time." Air Power History 52(3) (2005): 26-35.

'revolution in military logistics'[21], in that Ukraine has adopted more decentralised, flexible and 'Just-in-Time' mode of supply. This borrows much from modern commercial logistics practices and indeed is partly based on civilian infrastructure.

Yet there is also much continuity from previous wars and the vital lesson of improvisation in logistics effort emerges once again.[22] Suggestions that this war would see the widespread introduction of cargo drones appear to be pretty wide off the mark given limited payloads and more pressing needs for such platforms[23], although one important niche appears to be the use of small drones to deliver critical medical supplies.[24] This relative unimportance of drones for moving supplies is a useful corrective to the otherwise pervasive hype that drones have single-handedly transformed land-warfare, without at the same time doubting their tactical significance especially for fire support. Yet the reality is unglamorous low-tech trucks, if properly employed, are still war-winners.

Sealift has also been operationally and strategically important. Russian vessels on the Black Sea have been essential to their logistics in the occupied south[25] although some of their auxiliary vessels have been successfully targeted.[26] Moreover, the Russian failure to capture Odesa and its port means that its efforts to achieve major territorial gains along the South were logistically stymied and remain implausible.

Ports are operational enablers with enormous strategic significance, a lesson so easily forgotten. For the Ukrainians however, their inability to have a free unimpeded use of their Black Sea ports has imposed major strategic costs denying them revenue raising exports they would otherwise have.[27] The fact that Russia grudgingly agreed to a limited Black Sea Grain Initiative, which in 2023 it only selectively allowed to proceed only a stop/go basis, merely serves to underscore this point.[28] Ireland as an island nation should take note. The

21 Bury, Patrick (2021) Conceptualising the quiet revolution: the post- Fordist revolution in western military logistics, European Security, 30:1, 112-136, DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2020.1796650

22 Improvisation was a key theme and great insight of Van Creveld, Martin. Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton. Cambridge: CUP, 2009. See discussion in Bury, Op.Cit.,115.

23 For an illuminating discussion on the limits of using civilian drones for military or humanitarian logistics in the Ukraine war, see: Jacobsen, Mark, "The Dubious Prospects For Cargo-Delivery Drones In Ukraine", War on the Rocks, May 25th, 2022, , https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/the-dubious-prospects-for-cargo-delivery-drones-in-ukraine/

24 The main example appears to involve a US charity that has purchased and donated Canadian quadcopters that can carry up to 15kg of medical supplies in a temperature controlled sleigh a distance of circa 12 miles. See https://draganfly.com/news/draganflys-first-medical-response-drone-now-deployed-in-ukraine/ and Luckenbaugh, Josh, 'Drones Modified For Medical Supply Drops in Ukraine', National Defense, August 22nd, 2022, https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2022/8/22/drones-modified-for-medical-supply-drops-in-ukraine and see also Gorski, 2023, Op.Cit.

25 Hugos, et al. Op.Cit.

26 While docked at occupied Berdiansk, in March 24th 2022, the Saratov, an Alligator class landing ship was hit by a Ukrainian missile and sunk at its moorings, but it may have been later salvaged. An auxiliary tug boat, the Vasily Bekh, employed servicing Snake Island was hit with Harpoon missiles in June 2022, making the Island's occupation untenable. See Shinkman, Paul D., 'Ukraine Destroyed Russian Vessel in Black Sea with Harpoon Missiles, U.K. Confirms', US News, June 21st,2022, https://www.usnews.com/news/world-report/articles/2022-06-21/u-k-confirms-ukraine-destroyed-russian-vessel-in-black-sea-with-harpoon-missiles

27 The Kyiv School of Economics provides an excellent overview of economic losses, see https://kse.ua/ and specifically: Neyter, Roman, Dmytro Dushko, Oleg Nivievskyi and Hryhorii Stolnykovych, Agricultural War Losses Review Ukraine, Rapid Losses Assessment Issue 2, 10th of November, 2022, https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Losses_report_issue2-1.pdf . Prior to the invasion, about 90% of Ukraine's agricultural exports were shipped via the Black Sea Ports and 70% of metals and finished exports were also routed through them. While some exports have been rerouted along river, rail and road networks the scale of lost trade has been huge. One estimate suggests for the Ukrainian agricultural sector alone in 2002, losses of over $18bn were directly related to logistics disruption, which is over half the total figure for agricultural losses of $34bn. Shipping costs rose from $30 a tonne to $200 a tonne. Neyter, et al., Op.Cit., p.4

28 Neyter, et al., note: "Given the high uncertainty regarding the functioning of the grain corridor caused by the RF's groundless claims and Ukraine's inability to export from the ports that fall outside the grain deal, we assume that a substantial increase in domestic prices in the nearest term is unlikely.", (Op.Cit., p.4).

simple, "dumb", and much taken for granted infrastructure of our sea ports remains one of the most important assets we need to secure and keep working.

Image 3, Dublin Port, which handles 2/3rds of all of Ireland's Port traffic. Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dublin_Port#/media/File:Dublin_Harbor_(14691672159).jpg

The Importance of Long Uncontested Supply Chains

Both the Russians and the Ukrainians enjoy relatively safe secure base areas from where they can first assemble matérial before shipment into the warzone. For Russia, this is the entire Russian Federation land mass with large stockpiles of weapons and munitions plus a huge military industrial complex as well as the land and sea borders enjoined to states that have agreed to supply them with weapons. Sanctions have not stopped Russia getting essential military supplies, such as semi-conductor chip sets, but they have made this process more expensive, slower and require elaborate evasion and subterfuge.

For Ukraine, its safe space for logistics begins on the Polish border and to a lesser extent the other adjoining EU/NATO states[29], but it stretches all the way back into Germany and on to the continental United States and Canada.[30] NATO plays a major role in co-ordinating the flow of supplies to the Ukrainians, notably through the International Donor Coordination Centre (IDCC) based at US Army's EUCOM HQ in Stuttgart and staffed by NATO military logisticians 24/7.[31] This is reciprocated by a Ukrainian military that has been quick to adopt NATO logistics procedures, notably NATO software.[32] Alongside this official channel for supplies it is clear there are evolving voluntary, ad hoc networks, sometimes based on 'crowdsourcing models', who will donate, collect and even purchase military equipment for Ukraine, sometimes customising and modifying it before transfer.[33]

29 Ukraine has land borders with Poland (540+km), Hungary (136+km), Slovakia (97+km), and Romania (600+km).
30 To get a flavour of what the supply chain looked like in May 2022, with three flights a day leaving for Poland from Dover Air Base, Delaware, see this piece for US National Public Radio: Bowman, Tom, "Logistics plays an important role in Ukraine getting weapons from the U.S." NPR, May 5, 2022. https://www.npr.org/2022/05/05/1096809719/logistics-plays-an-important-role-in-ukraine-getting-weapons-from-the-u-s
31 Machi, Vivienne, 'Inside the multinational logistics cell coordinating military aid for Ukraine', Defense News, Jul 21st, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/07/21/inside-the-multinational-logistics-cell-coordinating-military-aid-for-ukraine/
32 Defense Express, Ukraine Successfully Implements NATO LOGFAS Logistics System, October 21st, 2022, https://en.defence-ua.com/events/ukraine_successfully_implements_nato_logfas_logistics_system-4605.html
33 For just one set of such examples from the first month of the invasion, based in Lithuania, see Hendrix, Steve, "Inside the transfer of foreign military equipment to Ukrainian soldiers", The Washington Post, March 18th, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/18/ukraine-military-aid-shipments/

However, while both countries are thus reliant on deep uncontested supply chains, these are only as good as they can quickly get sometimes heavy and complex military supplies for forward transhipment. Military equipment from the IDCC is usually forward shipped into Ukraine within 12-24hrs and by end of July of 2022 they had co-ordinated 78,000 tons of military aid.[34] Critical here was the Polish and Ukrainian road network and a large fleet of civil and military heavy goods vehicles. Material has also been moved by train, which has remained surprisingly resilient to Russian attacks, whereas Russian invading forces seem not to have been able to make as much use of Ukrainian captured rails, even though the Russian army is more dependent on rail transport and the Ukrainian gauge is the same width as the Russian one.[35]

Without such long and deep supply chains provided at the discretion of friendly states, both the Ukrainians and the Russians would be in serious difficulties even though each of them have organic capabilities to manufacture their own weapons and munitions.

The implications are stark for Ireland, an island only sharing a land border with a non-EU state (UK), and having almost no domestic military industrial industry nor much by way of stockpiles of military materials, vehicles, equipment. In any emergency scenario where the Defence Forces might have to mobilise (even if not an actual war scenario), Ireland's security would be utterly dependent on access to international supply chains. This would require diplomatic agreements from partner nations in the EU, but also probably the UK and USA, to provide us with essential matérial, energy/fuels, medical and even food supplies.

One could take away from the Ukraine war a lazy assumption that such ad hoc international support would probably ride to the rescue of Ireland and that our EU partners would obviously help. However, Ireland's non alignment policy provides no guarantee of such. Assistance would have to be improvised and brokered, which means possibly delayed or conditional, as the Ukrainians have discovered. Moreover, the real test might come in the event of a major global emergency where all the other EU/NATO states were themselves forced to mobilise and thus they might have little spare capacity to come to Ireland's assistance.

The COVID19 pandemic and the way it so quickly disrupted global supply chains to Ireland was arguably an instructive dress rehearsal for just such a contingency. We should be mindful here that some public health experts have suggested another future global pandemic is a high probability risk event.[36] In any event, the international logistics supply chains that are at the heart of the Ukraine war should serve to underscore just how much Ireland's security is really about uncompromised and functioning ports, airports,

34 Machi, Ibid.
35 See: McCausland, Phil and Patrick Smith, "Ukraine is relying on its secret weapon in the war against Russia: Trains", NBC News, April 28, 2022https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/ukraine-war-russia-trains-rail-network-strikes-military-supply-rcna26023

36 For an overview of possible future pandemic threats read Part 3 of Ferreira Claudia Doursout Marie-Françoise J and Joselito S Balingit. 2023. 2000 Years of Pandemics : Past Present and Future. Cham Switzerland: Springer.

pipelines, electricity and data cables. However, there is only limited mention of this vital infrastructure in the Report of the Commission on Defence (2022) or indeed the now badly out of date Defence White paper 2015.

Image 4, British Army Brigadier Chris King, Chief of the EUCOM Control Center – Ukraine / International Donor Coordination Centre oversees aid supply operations on Patch Barracks, Germany, June 3, 2022. Photo source: Capt. Christina Judd, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Multinational_logistics-_EUCOM_Control_Center-Ukraine-International_Donor_Coordination_Centre_at_Patch_Barracks,_Germany_(Image_4_of_5).jpg

The Promise and Pitfalls of a Joint Logistics Command

It is surely also instructive to note that the Commission on the Defence Forces Report has advocated the creation of a new Joint Logistics Command[37] which would report to the new position of Joint Force Commander/Vice CHOD and which:

"should be responsible for the planning, coordination and delivery of military logistics, the evaluation of joint logistics capabilities and requirements, explosive ordnance, fuel services, joint movements, logistics information systems, and the defence supply chain. The Command should be responsible for the delivery of agile and adaptable logistical support for sustaining national and international operations, thereby supporting the three services in building and maintaining force capability."[38]

This arguably downplays the vital importance of international military and civilian supply chains. It is not just a question of supplies to Ireland's small military but essential logistics for an entire nation of now 5+ million. The Ukraine war reminds us that in a real emergency neat distinctions between what is purely military and civilian logistics becomes untenable.[39] Notice also the rather old fashioned approach to jointness here which ignores the vital part that space and cyber now play in logistics. If the cyber systems that control ports or air traffic control are hacked, nothing moves. Indeed European ports and shipping

37 Report of the Commission on the Defence Forces. Dublin, 2022, at section 7.3.2, p.59.
38 Report of the Commission on the Defence Forces. Dublin, 2022, p.193.
39 This does not mean the important category of strictly humanitarian cargoes is not capable of being made distinct which is important for ethical, legal and political rationales. However, in many cases the military cargo aircraft that delivers purely humanitarian aid to Ukraine using a Polish military air base on one day will return on another, laden with munitions.

software has been previously targeted and disabled this way.[40] Moreover, this aspiration to a future Joint Logistics Command leaves unmentioned the key infrastructural nodes of ports, airports, pipelines and cables themselves.

These must also be physically secured, for example from drone interference, or possibly, even active sabotage in the context of a wider confrontation which Ireland may be implicated in as part of the EU. Attacking of sabotaging Irish critical infrastructure actually has a certain signalling logic for any adversary of the EU or NATO, precisely because Ireland has chosen not to be covered by the security assistance guarantees each organisation offers. Thus any cyber or infrastructure attack on Ireland could make sense as a sub-threshold horizontal escalation against western states without risking any activation of NATO's Article 5 of the EU's Article 42 provisions.

Finally there is no specification of a need, which the Ukraine war reveals, to have easy access to, and if need be direct, civilian logistics fleets, whether HGVs or airlines, or mobile phone networks, as part of a 'whole of nation effort'. The legal basis remains opaque under which civilian logistical networks or essential utilities could be placed at the service of the Irish Defence Forces in the event of a major national emergency, although such a power surely remains as a residual option but it might require specific emergency enacting regulations, which obviously entails a delay.[41]

It should also be obvious that any Joint Logistics Command needs some of its own dedicated, purely military, high quality 'joint' assets for air, land and sea movement especially in situations where war risk insurance prohibits civilian carriers from hazardous transport. New trucks have been recently procured for the Army[42], but these appear to be rather basic cargo models, not state of the art protected logistics movers.[43] Moreover, the Air Corps has as yet no dedicated transport aircraft capable of long haul or meaningful cargo operations in austere or contested risky scenarios, although in December 2023 a single model has been apparently ordered.[44] The result has been Ireland has to rely on the goodwill of EU partners in citizen extraction operations in Kabul (2021) and Khartoum (2023) to

40 For an accessible account of how the NotPetya cyber-attack of 2017 crippled some port terminals, see McQuade, Mike, The Untold Story of NotPetya, the Most Devastating Cyberattack in History, WIRED, August 22nd, 2018. https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia-code-crashed-the-world/

41 The Defence Act 1954, as subsequently revised and amended, would appear to be an obvious first place to seek such legal powers. Section 30(1)b might be relied upon as a legal basis to commandeer vessels and Section 30(1)f grants special powers which relate to "all such other things as seem to him necessary for the efficient military defence of the State". Section 33 grants a power to compulsorily acquire land and Section 37 confers a power to impose billeting during an emergency. Yet there is no express power for the Defence Forces to otherwise take possession of, or direct, supervise or control civilian road, rail or air transport.

42 From media reports these were 120 Scania P370B 4x4 trucks, which were ordered in 2019-2020 with deliveries finishing in 2023. In 2021 a tender was issued for circa 20 larger 6x6 DROPs (Demountable Rack Offload and Pickup System) capable trucks. These orders do not represent a significant increase in Irish military logistics capability, but are rather excellent 'like for like' replacements for vehicles that were in the inventory but are now retired.

43 Optional armoured protection kits and cranes are becoming more common, although still only fitted to a minority of trucks ordered by other western armies. For the example the Dutch army plans to use a modular family of 4x4, 6x6, 8x8 wheeled Scania GYRPHUS trucks some of which will have cranes and circa 138 of which will have protected cabs. See: Dean, Sidney E. "Tactical Trucks: Cargo Vehicles for Front-Line Replenishment", European Security and Defence, 16th February, 2022, https://euro-sd.com/2022/02/articles/exclusive/25343/tactical-trucks/

44 This appears to be a single Airbus 295 cargo variant to the 'sister' Maritime Patrol 295s already delivered in 2022-23. A single cargo model is obviously a precarious level of capability following the maxim 'one is none'. One aircraft does not allow for mandatory scheduled servicing and inevitable downtime and lack of availability for other reasons. See: https://www.thejournal.ie/heavy-lift-aircraft-air-corps-5962345-Jan2023/

allow us use their dedicated military transport aircraft. This is literally Ireland hitching a "free ride" on the good will of NATO and the European Air Transport Command's air logistics ecosystem.

The Naval Service has no dedicated auxiliary or logistics vessel, although the long promised Multi-Role Vessel might have some capabilities in this regard, should it ever materialise after almost decade of planning, studies and promises. And given that Ireland is not a full member of NATO, but only a limited partner state under the PfP, access to NATO contingency arrangements for shipping[45] are not obviously available to Ireland. The EU has not (yet) developed a similar capability an interesting lacuna that Ireland together with other EU states might possibly explore? In a major global emergency/war contingency shipping assets might well be elsewhere helping those states who are not so negligent when it comes to planning and paying for national defence and security.

Conclusion

Excellent joint logistics does not guarantee victory in war: the US and its allies had superb logistical support in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. They were ultimately defeated. However, poor logistics can rapidly unhinge military operations: it is one of the reasons why the brutal Russian offensive against Ukraine stalled in March 2022. Logistical shortcomings are no stranger to Irish peacekeepers, having shaped various peace-keeping missions and were a notable limitation in Darfur or the Congo.

The COVID19 pandemic saw international supply chains rapidly shrink, slow and in some cases simply freeze. Fuel and food did not stop being imported or exported but supply chains were disrupted and key medical supplies became scare with intense competition between countries for these. Ireland managed well in part through EU co-ordination, and the Defence Forces Joint Force Fortitude played a significant role in that overall national effort. Yet the next pandemic or contingency could be much worse especially if what is in question is larger scale war, for example involving China and the USA, where global logistics chains could become upended overnight and actively disrupted. As a country, we appear not to be paying attention to these strategic 'lessons looking us in the face'. Arguably, a cavalier "optimism bias" pervades with an assumption 'that we'll improvise our way" or that good will with our EU partners will suffice.

Although some may assume that drawing lessons from a large scale war is not useful for Ireland, what stands out from the Ukraine war is the vulnerability of their sea ports, which remained essentially blockaded as of mid 2023. Conversely the resilience of their road and rail network is instructive as it allowed their land borders to connect with the large pool of informal allies willing to support, arm and supply them, which has transformed their ability as a nation to survive what is for them an existential fight.

45 See https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50104.htm and https://mcce-mil.org/sea-transport/

The Ukrainians did not assume only good things will happen having lived with the reality of Russian annexation and low-intensity warfare since 2014. Instead they carefully planned for their worst nightmare: an outright Russian invasion. When it came in 2022, albeit expectantly and illogical as it remains, they were nonetheless ready. As it unfolded, they mobilised a joint logistic effort that saw donated arms arrive and volunteers flow in, while millions of refugees poured out seeking sanctuary, including in Ireland.

The version of jointness the Ukrainian military have embraced is a deeply pragmatic one which is much closer to multi-domain operations thinking, notably by hardwiring the related domains of cyber and space into their response and by systematically leveraging civilian expertise, volunteers and assets alongside a globalised supply chain. If Ireland is to pursue jointness in a meaningful way it should arguably do so in this spirit of pragmatism and hard-headedness.

Abstracts -

5th Joint Command and Staff Course

The Maritime Community Value of a Naval Base on the East Coast of Ireland

Lt/Cdr Stuart Laurence Armstrong

The Irish Naval Service is in the process of commissioning two Lake Class Inshore Patrol Vessels which it has procured from the Royal New Zealand Navy. Accordingly, the Navy intends to station these vessels on the East Coast of Ireland and establish a Forward Operating Base there. This represents challenges but also the chance to harness the significant opportunities that the East Coast has to offer. To date the port that has received the majority of attention in this regard is Dún Laoghaire and as such this thesis focuses its research on this region.

It is recognised from the outset that the logistical and technical aspects of the establishment of the base are within the capabilities of the Defence Organisation. With this supposition this thesis aims to inform and prepare the Navy from the perspective of the Maritime Community incumbent on the East Coast centred around Dún Laoghaire. The Navy must be aware of the Social, Industrial and Governance dynamics of the region, it is critical that awareness of the needs and culture of the area are fundamentally understood before it occupies and becomes of the Community itself. Not doing so risks exasperating any current issues the community may have and devalues the opportunities that have attracted the Navy there in the first place.

This thesis engaged with expert stakeholders form Industry, Local Government and Defence. It has researched the Maritime Community of the East Coast and has provided recommendations to help the Navy and the incumbent East Coast Community create mutual value building up to and during the permanent presence of Naval Vessels in Dún Laoghaire. A framework detailing how value and sustainability can be generated for all East Coast Marine stakeholders was developed. The framework recognises three types of Maritime Community constituents; Port Users, Policy Makers and Population and maps out the forces acting on them.

The thesis started by looking at a changing Navy but discovered an East Coast Community in the process of its own transition and its community constituents not knowing how to communicate yet. The Defence Force is in a position to enter and compliment this community, presenting the opportunity for the Forward Operating Base to positively affect and become part of the incumbent East Cast Community.

Defence and Bridge Building to the Fifth Domain

Comdt Cormac Brady

As part of the Government of Irelands commitment to defence the Commission on the Defence Forces (CODF) was successfully completed in 2022 and made several recommendations that highlighted the significance of the cyber domain in relation to our national security. The Commission did not specify exactly how the Defence Forces might achieve Full Operational Capability (FOC).

The aim of the thesis is to examine how the Irish Defence Forces can further develop its cyber capabilities as we move towards multi-domain environment. The research aims to provide new considerations for the Defence Forces on how it might develop and integrate its cyber capabilities within a layered national cyber security framework. Synergy between key stakeholders is one such consideration for the enhancement of our national security. The objectives from the research included the examination of whether Ireland should have a multi-agency defined 'threat landscape' and if the Defence Forces should participate in both military and civilian cyber exercises as part of its development of capabilities and responses to cyber threats. The research examines what technological skills are required and how we might achieve these through recruitment, retention and civilian military partnerships. Consideration of the numbers of personnel required has also been examined. The complexity of bad actors within the cyber domain continues to grow. Their motivations are not always financial based. The research examines if the Defence Forces should have a preventative counterstrike capability.

The twenty-first century's immersion into the cyber domain has had consequences throughout the fabric of life and how the threat environment is perceived. Integrated multi-domain operations is required as part of our force protection measures but also can be a force multiplier. The Defence Forces must overcome the challenges from the fifth domain. At the start of this journey, Strategic Planning Branch (SPB) posed questions that required more information. This research has been shaped in order to provide some answers and new considerations on how the organisation might achieve their cyber objectives. The findings recognise the significance of the planned 'Cyber Command' and the importance of civilian military partnership in completing our mission now and into the future of our national cyber defence.

Radical Change in Female Military Training An Exploration of the Feasiblity of Segrated Basic Training of Female Enlisted Recruits to the Irish Defence Forces

Comdt Geraldine Browne

This thesis sets out to gain a better understanding of how aspects of segregated basic training for new female enlisted entrants to the Irish Defence Forces could potentially positively influence recruitment and retention. Although women have been employed in the Defence Forces for over forty years, they have failed to progress to the senior appointments within the organisation and have limited representation in appointments of power. At the heart of the matter is the fact that only seven per cent of personnel in the Irish Defence Forces are women. This is disappointing and points to an urgent requirement to take a more radical approach. Could aspects of segregated physical training for women make a career in the Defence Forces for women safer, more attainable and more attractive?

The review of literature focused on the concepts of gender, gendered organisations, and training, firstly exploring the concept of gendered organisations to better understand the concept in relation to the Irish Defence Forces. Then moved to consider the role of military masculinities and the impact of patriarchal cultures on the experiences of men and women in training. Finally, I considered how mixed training can have a negative physical impact on female bodies.

My epistemology and my ontology are shaped by my own personal lived experience of thirty-three years in the Defence Forces. I carried out this research under the paradigm of interpretivism which adopts a relativist ontology and subjective epistemology which means, my subjective opinions and viewpoints will no doubt influence how I interpreted the data collected in my research. Emerging themes confirmed a gendered organisation where attitudes towards women and the increased likelihood of injury became evident. Women spoke of loneliness and isolation.

Lost at Sea?
An Analysis of Ireland's Commitment to European Security and Defence in the Maritime Domain

Lt/Cdr Michael Brunicardi

This thesis examines Ireland's commitment to European maritime security and defence, focusing on its alignment with European Union strategy and policy in the maritime domain. Drawing on the example of Norway, this thesis explores potential approaches for Ireland to shape and adapt its future maritime security and defence policy. By investigating subsidiary questions related to EU regional policies, Irish security and defence policy, current maritime threats and challenges, and Norway's approach to security policy and defence strategy are analysed. The thesis sheds light on the need for Ireland to move beyond its current stagnation and political indecision towards proactive engagement and alignment with the EU and other collaborative partners.

The findings of the thesis emphasise the importance of Ireland's involvement with regional policies, strategies, and cooperative agreements to effectively address multifaceted threats in its maritime domain. Furthermore, the thesis underscores the significance of analysing the maritime domain within the context of the changing geopolitical and geostrategic environments, which may present complex security and defence dilemmas for both Ireland and the EU. By examining Norway's security policy and defence strategy as a case study, the research and analysis highlights potential approaches for shaping and adapting and Irish security and defence policy to fit the evolving and changing environment, given the increasing interconnectivity and significance of the maritime domain in national, regional, and global security and defence.

Lastly, this thesis offers potential solutions and recommendations that can be used to enhance and develop Ireland's maritime security and defence policy/strategy. It underscores the need for Ireland to increase its military capability, enabling a move past "cautious engagement" to greater engagement and the practice of "non-offensive defence" to uphold its sovereignty, protect territorial integrity, ensure freedom of movement, and uphold national values and interest while contributing to European and regional security and defence in the maritime domain.

Understanding Effective Strategic Human Resource Management in the Context of the Irish Defence Forces

Comdt Ronan Carberry

Key among the recommendations from 2022' Report of the Commission on the Defence Forces, was that the Defence Forces urgently need to adopt a more strategic approach to the management of its most important asset, its people.

The concept of strategic human resource management is not new in the realm of professional human resource management practices. However, due to a combination of historical and current issues, the Defence Forces has never fully succeeded in adopting a strategic approach to the management of human resources. The absence of a strategic approach to managing the Defence Forces' most valuable asset, has arguably led to a situation whereby the retention of highly skilled and trained personnel is now acknowledged as the single biggest strategic challenge in the space of Defence Forces human resource management.

The purpose of this thesis was to investigate whether the adoption of a strategic approach to the management of human resources can contribute towards resolving the retention issues currently being experienced by the Defence Forces.

This thesis has succeeded in identifying six obstacles that have and continue to present as barriers to implementing effective strategic human resource management practices within the Defence Forces. Necessity and sufficiency have meant that this study could not feasibly identify all historic and current barriers, so more internally actionable areas were focussed upon.

Framed by academic theory supporting human resource management best practice, this thesis presents mechanisms for translating the six identified barriers into potential enablers for future success in the area of Defence Forces strategic human resource management. Key amongst these enablers is the requirement to formally separate the roles and responsibilities associated with the distinct elements of strategic human resource management, human resource management and personnel management. Another key enabler that has been identified is the formulation of consolidated Defence Forces human resource management doctrine that would provide Defence Forces human resource practitioners with continuity and clarity of purpose in the routine conduct of their duties. Additionally, this thesis questions the Defence Forces current application of the concept of vertical fit within human resource management practices, and ultimately whether the concept can be of benefit to the Defence Forces.

Mental Fitness: a Desk-Based Analysis of an Appropriate, Evidence-Based, Sub-Clinical Resilience Framework for the Irish Defence Forces

Comdt Karl Connolly

Psychological resilience has come to be recognised as being as valuable to militaries as physical fitness is, leading to a number of resilience building interventions being trialled in different military settings. Resilience building interventions amongst military personnel are diverse in both methods and effects. A mixture of cognitive behavioural tools, mindfulness techniques and other methods have been utilised in programs that attempt to instil resilience. A single salient, successful method of building resilience has yet to emerge from the literature. Irish Defence Forces personnel continue to deploy on missions at home and abroad that involve both chronic stress and acute traumatic events. A scoping review of the literature is conducted here to identify an intervention that is likely to work if utilised by the Irish Defence Forces to build resilience among military personnel. Papers that evaluate military resilience building interventions were selected for data charting and thematic analysis. The findings of this study showed that interventions can be made more accessible by branding interventions as 'mental fitness' and by employing military instructors. A positive trend emerged from interventions using biofeedback tools, combined with breathwork, to control physiological markers of stress in the autonomic nervous system. A further finding is that a robust evaluation process must accompany any intervention process due to a trend of interventions having generally weak effects. This thesis has implications for the type of methods to be used in a future Irish Defence Forces resilience building program, who teaches those methods and how the methods will be branded

How Do Decision Makers and Planning Processes Account for Uncertainty When Deciding on Future Defence Capability Requirements?

Comdt Ciarán Dillon

The 2015 White Paper on Defence marks an evolution in government thinking on military capability development. It identifies the need for both capability planning and a capability development plan, defining military capability as the ability to achieve desired effects in given scenarios. The 2022 Report of the Commission on the Defence Forces develops this further and sets out its recommendations on how the Defence Forces should seek to provide military capabilities for the uncertain period beyond 2030. However, the report makes no attempt to assess the level of uncertainty the Defence Forces faces beyond 2030, nor does it provide any guidance on how the Defence Forces could conduct such an assessment.

This study focussed on filling that knowledge gap, providing an answer to how the Defence Forces can account for uncertainty when deciding on future military capability requirements. It identified the key considerations organisations have when addressing uncertainty in their strategic environment, those being boundary uncertainty and drivers of change. The study also revealed a number of approaches to decision making under uncertainty, such as strategic foresight and strategic agility.

The research was conducted from a pragmatist, qualitative research position utilising the shared-understanding model. In depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted with individuals who had experience of decision-making processes at the strategic level of the Defence Forces.

The findings indicated that the lack of national security infrastructure, in the form of a national security strategy, limited the participants' ability to define and understand the boundaries of the Defence Forces' strategic environment. This deficiency acted to increase the level of uncertainty the Defence Forces faced when making decisions related to future capability requirements. While participants reported positively on the use of strategic foresight within the decision-making process, it was apparent that little consideration was given to the true level of uncertainty inherent in the decisions that were being made, with resources such as personnel and time dictating the level of analysis conducted.

The study recommends that the state conduct an appraisal of its strategic environment with the aim of comprehensively defining the boundaries of Ireland's strategic environment and clearly identifying the state's interests within that environment. In so doing, the state will provide clarity to the Defence Forces' strategic decision-makers, reducing uncertainty around potential future Defence Forces' operating environments and aiding the development of scenarios for use in capability development planning. The study also recommends the development and maintenance of future scenarios that will both inform and challenge decisions relating to military capability development.

'Horses for Courses': an Investigation into the Importance of Person-Job Fit When Seeking to Increase Career Satisfaction and Reduce Intention to Quit Amongst Defence Forces Officers

Comdt Fergal Finn

The purpose of this research study is to investigate the importance of Person-Job Fit when seeking to increase Career Satisfaction and reduce Intention to Quit. A sample of 96 Commissioned Officers of the Defence Forces each completed a self-reporting questionnaire in one sitting lasting 8-12 minutes. The questionnaire was presented in a section-by-section basis and included a combination of closed and open questions. All data was anonymous. SPSS (Version 29) was used to analyse the quantitative data. Scales were tested for reliability using factor analysis and Cronbach's Alpha score. Pearson's Correlations were conducted to identify possible links between independent variables and dependent variables. Multiple Regression analysis was used to examine these links in further detail when considering control variables and to identify the relevant coefficients of determination to enable a Relative Weight Analysis. The study found that Career Satisfaction was positively and significantly linked to Person-Vocation Fit, Person-Organisation Fit and Person-Job Fit (Needs-Supply) and that Person-Job Fit (Needs-Supply) accounted for much more variance in Career Satisfaction than Person-Job Fit (Demands-Abilities). Similarly, the study found that Intention to Quit was negatively and significantly linked to Person-Vocation Fit, Person-Organisation Fit and Person-Job Fit (Needs-Supply) and that Person-Job Fit (Needs-Supply) accounted for much more variance in Intention to Quit than Person-Job Fit (Demands-Abilities). The quantitative data strongly suggested an appointment system taking account of officers' preferences was more worthwhile pursuing than a system taking account of an officers Knowledge, Skills and Behaviours (KSBs). Qualitative data in the form of Open Survey Responses and Elite Semi-Structured interviews supported the findings regarding Person-Job Fit (Needs Supply) but contradicted the findings regarding Person-Job Fit (Demands-Abilities) in that it did make an association between a system taking account of an officers KSBs and both Career Satisfaction and Intention to Quit. The Defence Forces will imminently create an Office of Strategic Human Resources and will likely consider creating a talent management system "that creates career structures and Human Resource processes that manage talent, take account of personal and family needs and fundamentally offer more choice" (CODF, 2022; p79). This study indicates that when devising such a system, taking account of an officer's Preference, rather than their Knowledge, Skills and Behaviours when assigning them to their next appointment has a greater impact on increasing Career Satisfaction and decreasing Intention to Quit.

'To Serve on the Spectrum' a Study of Autism and How the Irish Defence Forces Can Benefit from Enabling and Encouraging Neurodiversity within Its Ranks

Lt/Cdr David Fleming

This thesis aims to start a conversation in the Irish Defence Forces about Neurodiversity. The purpose of this study is to establish the current organisational understanding surrounding autism and other conditions, described as neurodivergent. The research aims to determine how the Irish Defence Forces can encourage, enable, and enhance individuals with neurological conditions in a progressive military force, thus removing the group think that has been created by a lack of diversity and increasing capability through inclusivity. In a world where it is estimated that 15 per cent of the population are Neurodiverse, and in an organisation that reflects the society it endeavours to protect, it is our duty to adjust.

Comprehensive research was undertaken to examine what it means to be neurodiverse, and to establish what the Irish Defence Forces understands about this naturally occurring human variation. An analysis of extant literature was conducted to establish the conditions associated with neurodiversity, and to comprehend why a neurodiverse brain processes information differently to what was considered normal. The thesis specifically focuses on autism, seeking to understand its history and the stigma under which the spectrum emerged.

A qualitative "critical realist" approach was adopted, where singular methods were utilised in the form of semi structured interviews with key personnel in the Irish Defence Organisation, to determine the level of organisational understanding and the existence of policy concerning neurodiversity in the Irish Defence Forces. The analysis identified an understanding within the force, tabulated its measure, and highlighted specific recommendations to improve. These include raising awareness of the associated conditions, providing education, strategies, and adjustments to our forces, which will enable, encourage, retain, and ultimately empower a more diverse and inclusive organisational culture.

Finally, it has been established through this research, that the Irish Defence Forces has the appetite to accept change but needs policy to support it.

The Irish Civil War – A Case Study in Counterinsurgency Theory

Comdt Joseph Gleeson

This thesis, written during the centenary of The Irish Civil War, explores some of the key theoretical aspects of counterinsurgency warfare within the context of what was ultimately a successful campaign, and how this campaign continues to provide lessons for the contemporary battlespace. It examines how the challenges that were faced by the Provisional Government and the National Army were overcome, which saw the military forces of the new state conduct joint and combined operations across both conventional and guerrilla warfare styles that successfully defeated the anti-Treaty forces.

This thesis will focus on the themes of intelligence led operations and modern counterinsurgency theory to ascertain the effectiveness of the response of the National Army and consider if there are lessons to be learned in the modern context. In order to progress the discussion on The Civil War, there is a focus on intelligence led operations, which highlights the ethical issues caused by crossing the line of acceptable norms, such as a breakdown in military discipline and the use of torture to glean information.

Though much has been written about The Irish Civil War, this study argues and demonstrates that this campaign stands as an excellent case study on the options and results of counterinsurgency practices, noting that there is a fine line to be managed by government forces. The findings of this thesis highlight a number of pertinent matters such as the need for a comprehensive and joint military and government approach to counterinsurgency, as well as the need for the military to continue to be able to conduct joint and combined operations across the spectrum of warfare. This is made clear from the operations conducted in the urban environment during The Civil War, which are all the more applicable when it is noted that the world's urban population is on the increase. The key lessons from operations conducted in the rural areas is that the need to provide security and normality to the population is paramount. Throughout all of these operations, intelligence led operations remain crucial, with a focus on structures rather than the temptation to resort to less than ethical methods.

Though the events examined took place over 100 years ago, there remains the need for military forces to understand and be able to conduct counterinsurgency operations in both the rural and urban environments, which will require robust and intelligence led actions. The Irish Civil War provides a case study for this opportunity, especially when placed in the context of modern counterinsurgency theory, as evidenced in this thesis.

Safely Navigating through the Darkened Valley, a Study of Problem-Solving and How the Irish Air Corps Can Benefit from Enabling and Empowering Its Aircrews through Greater Education of Techniques and Understanding?

Comdt Jarlath Heneghan

It is widely recognised that effective problem-solving is one of the top required skills sought after in modern successful leadership. In order to ensure that Ireland retains credible military capabilities and can meet anticipated future threats to the state's security, the Defence Force's members should be at the forefront of understanding, deductive reasoning and problem-solving, both complex and mundanely simplistic.

This thesis posits the question whether there is there a deficiency in such education in the Defence Forces and should they provide greater education in the area of problem-solving to its members. The complexity and challenges that our aircrews, sailors and soldiers face not just in Ireland, but also overseas, require a robust and broad array of skills to overcome and adapt. The research conducted went outside our own military and aviation sectors to broaden the understanding of the research. It was found that although one hundred percent of individuals received problem-solving teachings in their training, only thirty percent use this education on a daily basis. There exists a clear appetite for further teachings and learning in the field on problem-solving, not only for both use in the aviation sector but in the day to day dealings in the Defence Forces.

The conclusions set forth for the Defence Forces are the creation of an overarching policy for the Defence Forces in relation to problem-solving and decision making, paving the way for greater education and efficiency in the area of problem-solving. The creation of a new mental checklist to assist personnel not only in the aviation sector but in the day to day setting of the Defence Forces, and to provide greater access to education and materials for Defence Forces members to become unsurpassed in their decision making abilities.

Neutral, Neutered, Or Pacifist?' Can Ireland's Model of Neutrality Remain Aligned with Its Foreign Policy Ambitions Amidist the Re-Emergency of War in Europe?

Comdt Gerard Hynes

Seeking to answer whether Ireland's model of neutrality can remain aligned with its foreign policy ambitions, this thesis analyses proponent and opponent views on neutrality and explores a gap in the literature on the concept of pacifism and Irish Neutrality, where questions are being asked nationally, and internationally, of the credibility of Irish Neutrality amidst the re-emergence of War in Europe.

Adopting a critical realist perspective and utilising a phenomenological approach, elite interviews were conducted with senior civil servants involved in international security and defence policy, with participants from academia and interest groups, and with politicians across the spectrum of Ireland and the EU.

Ireland's policy of military neutrality does not align with accepted neutrality concepts in the literature. The research finds Irish Neutrality is better described as military non-alignment which is labelled "neutrality". While the status quo could continue, proponent and opponent views present challenges to Irelands policy of neutrality.

The proponent concept of neutrality is paradoxical with contradictions between a mix of moral and ideological neutrality. The research suggests Irish Neutrality has become conflated with pacifism for proponents with neutrality having become the ends rather the means.

The opponent concept of neutrality is realist but not amoral, particularly on Ukraine which speaks to Just War Theory. Amidst the realisation of the predictions of Realism, opponents argue the need for self-sufficiency in defence irrespective of the policy choice of government, neutrality, non-alignment, or an alliance. Opponents are aligned in the need for reform of the Triple Lock, which proponents are against viewing the Triple Lock as a mechanism vital to their model of neutrality.

The findings suggest a pedagogical approach which is nonbinary on neutrality is required in the recently announced consultative forum on international security policy. A successful forum should highlight the requirement for the completion of a national security strategy to direct how Ireland will protect her interests. Such a strategy could include non-alignment, however, permanent neutrality, armed or unarmed, would not align with Irelands foreign policy ambitions.

Evolving Challenge In Military Engineering. How Can Small Military Organisations Meet These Challenges?

Comdt Ronan Kavanagh

The security environment today is becoming increasingly complex. Interstate warfare has erupted in Europe for the first time in a generation, great power competition is on the rise, and instability in the developing world is growing as a result of the pressures of climate change. This thesis analyses how military engineering has adapted to these threats and what future adaptation is required to meet the challenges of tomorrow.

Military engineering represents a uniquely broad set of capabilities that are essential enablers of military operations. This thesis takes a holistic view of these capabilities, using case studies to track how operations have affected the organisation and employment of military engineers. Examining conventional warfare from Iraq to Ukraine, peace operations from the Balkans to the Sahel, and counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan, as well as humanitarian operations globally, it identifies the key lessons from these crises and the effect they have had on engineering capabilities.

Qualitative and Quantitative analysis of selected militaries, comparable to Ireland, identifies how other small nations have prioritised their capabilities. Using a Capability Development Planning Process, gaps are identified in Irish military engineering capabilities. The results demonstrate that, while Ireland has managed to balance capability requirements quiet well, there is a need for a balanced force model that ensures that the future Defence Forces have the key enabling capabilities to safely and effectively fulfil the roles and tasks assigned to it by government.

The thesis concludes by offering several methodologies for addressing capability gaps within constrained resources. Ireland is significantly out of balance with comparator nations in terms of the size of its military engineer capability and the thesis highlights several doctrinal developments that should be considered as Ireland builds its next force model. While it may be possible to prioritise or relegate some capabilities, doing so should be done with the full acceptance of the risks in terms of overall defence capability, as well as the risk to our deployed soldiers and those we protect.

Organisational Climate Surveys: How Can They Deliver Better Outcomes for the Irish Defence Forces?

Lt/Cdr David Lyons

Organisational Climate Surveys are a Human Resources (HR) tool conducted to measure and understand employee perceptions of their workplace. Individual and shared employee experiences and perceptions of their work environment directly influence employee satisfaction, motivation, and engagement. Climate surveys therefore are seen as a useful way for organisations to evaluate the effectiveness of their HR strategy and policies at a particular point in time, and to adjust as required in response to any significant survey findings.

This research examines the theory which underpins workplace climate and human behaviour, while also exploring literature relating to the conduct of climate surveys in armed forces. Finally, it assesses surveys undertaken by the Irish Defence Forces previously and seeks to identify ways in which future surveys can deliver better outcomes for the organisation.

A mixed methods research approach was used to conduct semi-structured qualitative interviews with both internal and external respondents, selected based on their experience and positionality within their organisation in relation to climate surveys. Participants were also asked to quantitatively rank a list of common workplace factors in order of perceived importance to organisational climate surveys, with a view to identifying important factors for future surveys.

The research findings identify a number of important areas that need to be considered when planning any future surveys. These include the survey format and design, trust within stakeholder relationships, agency and capacity of the organisation to action any findings, and the importance of effective communication throughout the process. Conditions of Service and Career Management / Opportunity for Advancement are identified as important factors, while Pay and Remuneration is identified as a potentially divisive factor, despite its importance.

Finally, the research proposes a number of informed recommendations aimed at delivering better outcomes from surveys for the Irish Defence Forces going forward.

An Evaluation of the Barriers to Special Operations Forces Transformation in the Irish Defence Forces

Comdt Ruarigh McDermott

This study seeks to develop an understanding of the barriers that exist, in the Irish Defence Organisation, toward the realisation of government-mandated transformation of the Army Ranger Wing, Ireland's military Special Operations Force. Having identified that an enhancement of the Army Ranger Wing was directed in the 2015 White Paper on Defence, that no meaningful change has been realised thus-far and, moreover, that there continues to be a justification for such a transformation, this paper employed a thematic framework to interrogate the separate areas of defence policy, change management theory and culture. This framework underpinned a pragmatic, qualitative research methodology in which semi-structured interviews of national and international experts were conducted. This provided rich data from which analysis and conclusions were generated to comprehend the barriers to Army Ranger Wing transformation.

The analysis identified that policy direction is a fundamental aspect to enable transformation efforts and that deficiencies exist regarding an overarching guidance policy for Ireland's Special Forces. The conclusions made support more specificity regarding policy descriptors on the roles and capabilities of the Army Ranger Wing in Defence Policy documentation. A mechanism to provide Special Operations advice to the Defence Organisation and external state agencies is also notably absent. The establishment of a permanent Special Operations Command of experienced Special Operations Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers can be considered as an appropriate mechanism to address these challenges.

The study also noted, regarding change management theory, that political direction and oversight is a key motivator for successful change efforts. It also identified the lack of a Special Forces 'change champion' at Defence Forces headquarters level to influence and promote successful transformation of the Army Ranger Wing.

This Thesis notes the importance of organisational culture during successful change programmes and that leadership, values and culture are intimately intertwined. It identified that a level of cultural scepticism is manifest within the Defence Organisation due to a unique Army Ranger Wing subculture. Furthermore, it established that roguish stereotypes and attitudes of Special Forces units can exacerbate any existing negative perceptions and undermine confidence in their abilities, ultimately degrading trust.

The findings from this research infer that obstacles do exist regarding Special Operations Forces transformation in the Irish Defence Forces and, on this basis, recommendations are suggested to overcome these barriers and enable a successful Army Ranger Wing

change programme.

Adopting Learning from the Private Sector for Building Morale in the Irish Defence Forces

Comdt James Morrin

In recent years the narrative and discussion, both within and external to the Irish Defence Forces, has been dominated by matters of poor pay and conditions, high turnover rates, and low morale (O'Driscoll, 2022). The aim of this research is to explore the extent to which the Irish Defence Forces (hereafter referred to as DF) might learn and benefit from experience in the private sector with regard to morale building. In particular, it set out to determine whether there are appropriate and achievable initiatives that the DF could introduce in order to help support and sustain its most important asset, its personnel. The research also examines possible barriers that exist to the introduction of such morale building and employee engagement frameworks, and to set out the characteristics of what might represent a viable scheme for the DF.

The research process took an interpretivist, insider perspective (Richardson, 2003). It adapts a mix-methods approach, using both qualitative and quantitative data and information to allow for exploration of inferential themes found through a comprehensive literature review. Thematic analysis and triangulation of the data gathered from a survey and through semi-structured interviews identified further themes for analysis.

The research found significant appetite amongst members of the DF for adoption and implementation of an employee engagement policy, and associated methodologies, whilst also highlighting significant, perceived, culture barriers to their implementation. The research found that an employee engagement framework could be successful if carefully introduced to increase morale, taking into account the extant organisational culture and existing work practices in the DF. The research suggests that the successful introduction of such a significant change would require unambiguous support from strategic leadership. It acknowledges that such fundamental, organisational and culture change, is not just another policy change or addition, but rather about a complete change of mindset in the Defence Forces.

Net-Zero: Achieving Irish Air Corps Carbon Emission Reduction

Comdt Thomas Nally

Reduction of carbon emissions is recognised as a key tasking by nations (Government of Ireland, 2021), militaries (NATO, 2021), and international organisations (IPCC, 2023) globally. The urgency associated with this has led to many governments legislating for sectoral targets to be achieved, with many aiming to be net-zero by 2050.

The Irish Air Corps (IAC) as a key service within the Defence Forces, is a high energy consumer and carbon emission producer as it provides the military air arm of the state. Carbon emission targets have been given to all Irish public sector bodies and despite the uncommon, and sometimes fluctuating operational, taskings, the IAC must achieve these targets. This thesis investigates the nature of such a target and feasibility of it being achieved.

The overarching research question of this thesis is how the IAC can achieve its mandated carbon emission reductions. Academic literature, national, and organisational strategies were examined to explore this topic through a mixed-method research methodology. In answering this question an analysis was undertaken of carbon emissions monitoring and reporting. From this the scope, honesty, and thoroughness of reporting of carbon emissions was explored showing gaps in many systems. Carbon emission reduction strategies of selected military air services and aviation bodies were examined, providing context and range of application. This provided realistic depth to this study, enhancing accuracy.

This thesis proposes a strategy for the IAC, focusing on considered tools and themes, to pursue towards its designated net-zero carbon emission target by 2050. Utilisation of Sustainable Aviation Fuel (SAF), Carbon Offsets, Carbon Capture, along with technological advances form the foundation of this strategy. In this, hurdles such as operational tempo and fleet expansions were factored into the framework to provide resilience. The financial cost of adopting this strategy must be considered compared to the cost of not achieving net-zero. The Air Corps through the achievement of these targets, can reach new heights by combining carbon neutrality and military flight operations.

Adventure Sports As a Tool to Teach Risk Management to Leadership in the Defence Forces. Would a Greater Emphasis on Adventure Sports Help Leadership within the Defence Forces Analyse Risk More Effectively Whilst Providing Them with Better Tools to Mitigate That Risk?

Comdt John O'Brien

This thesis aims to answer the primary research question: would a greater emphasis on adventure sports help leadership within the Defence Forces analyse risk more effectively whilst providing them with better tools to mitigate that risk? Due to the roles assigned to the DF there is a requirement on its leadership to be able to operate within dangerous working environments requiring constant risk analysis. Therefore, there is a requirement on the DF as an employer to train its leadership to be properly able to analyse and mitigate those risks to allow for overall mission success.

Adventure training within the DF is seen as a way to build the personal confidence of its membership, with little regard given to the wider benefits of adventure training. Within DFAM the instructors are referred to as Confidence Training Instructors which clearly underpins where the DF sees the benefits of adventure training. This research aims to examine broadening the scope of AT within the DF. The author has looked specifically at the area of risk and how AT could be used as a training tool. The author applied a mixed method approach to the research which has delivered a number of findings. The research indicates that limited additional investment would allow for the development of AT within the DF broadening the benefits of AT and making it a more worthwhile and structured activity.

The findings note that the current structure of AT can be improved. The research questionnaire highlighted that most people feel that AT is dying out within the DF and also that many of the instructors are in the autumn of their careers with new entry participation almost nonexistent. The thesis finds that there would be benefit to AT as a tool to teach risk management to leadership and that with minimal investment and some restructuring AT could provide more benefit to the DF than it currently does.

Star Wars – An Examination of the US-Sino Balance of Power in Peace

Comdt Paul O'Callaghan

China's continued growth has seen it emerge as at least a regional power with aspirations for a position on the global arena. Establishing a technologically sophisticated, open economy advanced its abilities to project national power and establish itself as a regional power. Through expansive foreign policies, China has sought to increase its influence beyond its own borders and region with the goal of challenging US dominance.

Since the Cold War ended, US has emerged as a hegemonic power with enormous technological and military might, much of it derived from mastering the space domain. China's rise threatens US' position of dominance with potentially far reaching consequences. One potential outcome is that as China's power begins to threaten US dominance, conflict manifests.

Space is a domain to be enabled, contested and managed like any other. It provides strategic opportunities to those with the power to grasp them but it also provides pitfalls that create new opportunities for competition among actors. This thesis considers the concepts of power and balance of power theories and the impacts of power polarity on global security. Space power, whilst a new theory can be considered as an extension of the more established maritime and air power concepts. An examination of the militarisation of space and the power derived from that domain identifies some key areas of conflict between the US and China and the legal and political challenges that stem from militarisation of the space domain. Through the application of the balance of power theories to the militarisation of space concepts, the thesis explores if China is challenging US dominance in the space domain. The Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic (DIME) model of national power provides a framework on which US and Chinese national power are assessed.

The research concludes that whilst China has emerged as a threat to US dominance, US supremacy remains but this balance of power continues to evolve and may trigger Allison's Thucydides Trap, where conflict remains a plausible outcome

Are Military Leaders Apolitical: Does Political Bias Contribute to Destructive Military Leadership?

Lt/Cdr Padraig Ó Raínne

The nature of military work is becoming increasingly political, however, there are a lack of studies that investigate political biases in this context of its contribution to destructive military leadership. The overarching aim of this study was to investigate how political emotions or biases shape the behaviours of military leaders via the lens of Affective Events Theory (AET) as a theoretical framework. The study derived its primary findings from a purposive sample of senior military officials, scholars, and politicians who provided insight into how destructive leadership is formed in the military, with political biases playing a mediating role. To answer the research question: How does political leadership or biases affect the development of destructive leadership traits in military leaders? Additionally, the researcher aims to understand how cultural dynamics within military organisations shape the expression of political biases among military leaders.

The study adopted a qualitative research strategy that was underpinned by a social constructivist epistemological framework, and semi-structured interviews were exploited to gather data from the purposive sample (n=9), which was analysed via thematic analysis. The emergent themes were: 1) Political Neutrality as Job, 2) Destructive Leadership as a Function of Military Culture, 3) Emotional Intelligence as a Buffer against Destructive Leadership, 4) Destructive Leadership as a Function of Personality and 5) Tenuous Links to Politics.

The findings of the present research confirmed the role of politics as an antecedent for specific behaviours and attitudes in the military context for some military leaders, such as going against organisational expectations of political neutrality by being assertive with regard to political issues or resigning as a result of them. In other findings, the presence of political views among leaders in the US military, compared to their European counterparts, suggests that the extent to which military leaders assert political biases is shaped by the cultural context of their respective military environments.

The research findings addressed significant gaps in the literature but did not confirm the hypothesised connection between political biases and destructive leadership as suggested in the existing literature. On the contrary, the evidence from the research did not definitively support the contention that military leaders' political beliefs lead to inappropriate or destructive leadership styles. The findings imply that military leaders who maintain professionalism and refrain from allowing their political beliefs to interfere with their job performance, coupled with a satisfactory level of emotional intelligence, tend to mitigate against adopting a robust military doctrine leadership style.

This study proposes incorporating emotional intelligence assessments and training for future commandants or equivalent ranks in the Defence Forces as part of curriculum development to mitigate against political biases and destructive military leadership.

Recruiting and Training the Defence Forces Cyber Capability

Comdt Eoin Scanlon

The cyber domain presents many challenges for all aspects of national defence and security. Cyber threats today loom persistently in the background of all systems connected to the internet, and all forecasts for the predictable future amount to the progressive increase of cyber activities 'below the threshold of war' punctuated by periodic catastrophic cyber incidents. As a key component of Ireland's national defence, the onus is on the DF to prepare itself adequately to fulfil its roles in the cyber domain, specified or otherwise.

The DF must examine ways to boost cyber recruitment, technical training and general military education in order to ensure its responses to cyber incidents – at home and overseas – are appropriate to the threat. The cyber domain is ubiquitous at this point, and its presence has been forced upon the DF without the appropriate time to prepare and adjust. The CIS Corps – the DF's de facto cyber force – does not systematically train its personnel for cyber; nor does it recruit specifically for cyber. More broadly, the DF does not systematically educate the average soldier or officer in cyber until far too late in their career.

To assess these gaps in DF cyber efforts, inferences are drawn from the cyber initiatives of the US, Canadian and British Armed Forces. Each military is unique in the context of cyber, with their various recruitment mechanisms, training pathways and Professional Military Education (PME) courses differing significantly, depending largely on the roles and functions required. In addition to providing recommendations to address the various challenges, this research puts forward a finding of significance: a DF Cyber Strategy must explicitly define the functions and outcomes expected from its cyber workforce, as there evidently does not exist such thing as a standard cyber technician or operator.

This research also demonstrates the utility of the Cyber Security Body of Knowledge (CyBOK) mapping framework – with novel adjustments uniquely applicable to the DF – as a tool to benchmark and assess cyber training and education. It is demonstrated that the current scheme of DF-sponsored postgraduate cyber education is not meeting to the desired learning outcomes of cyber security experts in the DF, introducing potential vulnerabilities and inefficiencies.

A Diminishing Advantage; How Sharp Power and Economic Warfare Are Shaping Great Power Competition

Major Tyler J. Singelton

The US is equipped to defeat a single great-power adversary in one theatre while, at best, deterring another, and is unprepared to fight on two major fronts simultaneously (Larsen, 2022). The rise of China and the resurgence of a modernised post-cold war Russia have transformed the United States (US) unipolar Great Power Competition (GPC) environment into a multi-polar global system. This dynamic has changed how the US addresses its national security and foreign relations strategies and requires the continuous evaluation of existing policy and review of current defence doctrine, spending priorities, and worldwide military alignment. Future conflicts are unlikely to be fought within the physical borders of the "great powers," but will occur worldwide within targeted spheres of influence as they seek to extend their influence and gain a competitive advantage across all domains and aspects of national power. This thesis will analyse the effects of sharp power and economic warfare, as used by the great powers, and conduct a review of employment techniques for potential areas of refinement, which is crucial to avoid the implementation of repetitive and ineffective strategies and to better understand the consequences of such policy decisions.

Various dynamics set the great powers apart, but a significant difference is the democratic foundation of the US and the unique struggles and advantages that distinction provides. This thesis demonstrates how the great powers use sharp power and economic warfare to strengthen their global standing and weaken that of their adversaries. The invasion of Ukraine by Russia has become a frontline for GPC across the competition continuum, with both the US and Russia exerting national power strategies to advance their strategic objectives while enabling the development of a targeted and coordinated approach to mitigate or assist in those objectives. At the same time, China is learning invaluable lessons they may seek to employ in Taiwan, as they are the larger and more threatening global competitor, with a history of using sharp power and economic warfare to achieve its political objectives. This highlights a need to develop a comprehensive and coordinated mitigation strategy to overcome the hurdles associated with the planning and execution challenges of a democracy and the sharp power and economic warfare activities of potential adversaries.

How Can the Defence Forces Enhance Brand Equity through a Digital Marketing Strategy That Leverages Association with it's Academic Partners-Contributors to Professional Military Education for the Organisation?

Comdt Rose-Anna White

The field of marketing has seen an evolution in the way brands communicate with consumers, how consumers communicate with brands and how consumers communicate with one another (Rogers, 2021). The Defence Forces is poised to adopt a digital culture through digital transformation, innovation, and technology, affording countless opportunities to enhance its brand and support recruitment. This thesis focuses on the wider educational benefits associated with the organisation and examines how the Defence Forces can enhance brand equity through a digital marketing strategy that leverages association with its academic partners. The research examined the literature of prominent scholars and experts in the marketing field. It was led by Kotler and Keller's Strategic Brand Management theoretical framework (2012) and supported by current digital marketing trends and insights, to guide the trajectory of the research.

The methodology chosen for this thesis took a deductive approach using mixed methods. Quantitative and qualitative data was produced from semi-structured interviews with leaders from the Defence Forces Recruitment and Public Relations Branches. A targeted market research survey was developed and distributed to guidance counsellors in a selection of Delivering Equality of Opportunity in Schools (DEIS), mixed, all-girls and all-boys post-primary schools across Ireland. The DEIS programme is the primary policy effort of the Department of Education to address educational inequality. It prioritises allocating extra resources to schools with the highest numbers of students at risk of educational disadvantage (Department of Education, 2022). The primary focus of the survey aimed to determine the level of awareness associated with the alternative pathway to third-level education offered through the Defence Forces across Ireland's post-primary schools.

Results from the survey provided several thought-provoking findings. It indicated that the alternative pathway to third-level education offered through a career in the Defence Forces is not widely associated and identified with the Defence Forces brand, along with its partnerships with third-level academic institutions in Ireland. Interestingly, 70% of the survey respondents indicated that they were unaware of the transition year work experience programme occasionally held by the Defence Forces. Post-primary schools would welcome more information with some students missing this valuable opportunity due to a lack of awareness. Further results indicate, the Defence Forces digital presence on social media platforms has limited penetration amongst post-primary schools in Ireland. Based on the findings from the analysed data and literature, the study suggests several digital marketing practices for the Defence Forces to expand its digital presence through a comprehensive omnichannel approach, thereby enhancing its brand equity.



Contributor Biographies

Commandant Daniel Ayiotis is the Officer-in-Charge of the Military Archives, where he has been based since 2015. He has written two books - The Military Archives: A History (Dublin: Eastwood, 2022) and the upcoming Moral Formations: Discipline and Religion in the Irish Army, Civil War to Eucharistic Congress (Dublin: Eastwood, 2024) - as well as having been a member of the editorial / project board for Eoin Kinsella's The Irish Defence Forces 1922-2022: Servant of the Nation (Dublin: Four Courts, 2022).

Other published work includes contributions to India, Ireland and Anti-Imperial Struggle: Remembering the Connaught Rangers Mutiny (India: Akker, 2021, Eds. O'Halpin, Atwal), The EU, Irish Defence Forces and Contemporary Security (Switzerland: Palgrave MacMillan, 2023, Eds. Carroll, O'Neill, Williams) and Irish Archives: The Journal of the Irish Society for Archives (2023). Most recently, he has written the afterword to Grief's Broken Brow, a limited-run fine press edition, designed and produced by The Salvage Press, consisting of ten poems commissioned by UCD Library, Poetry Ireland and Arts Council Northern Ireland as part of the Department of Tourism, Culture, Arts, Gaeltacht, Sport and Media's Poetry as Commemoration programme.

Cian Lynch is a PhD candidate in University College Cork's School of History. He has previously obtained an undergraduate degree with distinction in Politics and History and a master's degree in International History from Trinity College Dublin. His research focuses primarily on the societal and economic impacts of the Great War campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare and on Allied efforts to mitigate this campaign. Cian is currently a member of the Reserve Defence Forces serving in 1 Brigade Artillery Regiment and is a member of the ongoing 6th Army Reserve Potential Officers course.

Dr. Gareth Prendergast is a serving Colonel in the Irish Defence Forces with over 30 years' service. He has seven operational tours of duty overseas including the Middle East, Balkans and Mali. At home he has served in Infantry Battalions on the Irish Border during the 'Troubles', in Kilkenny and Dublin. He has also served in the Military College and Defence Force Headquarter on numerous occasions, including appointments in the Command and Staff School, OIC Military Finance Branch and Director of Logistics.

Academically he has a Masters of Military Art and Science from his year spent on the US Army Command and General Staff Course in Fort Leavenworth Kansas and he recently achieved his Doctorate (PhD) after six years study and research in the History Department of UCC.

Commandant Gavin Egerton is an infantry officer with 21 years' service in the Irish Army. He was commissioned in 2004 and commenced his career with 3 Infantry Battalion. He later served in a variety of command, staff, and training appointments in infantry units, DFHQ, and The Infantry School. Comdt Egerton has served overseas on four occasions: once each with MINURCAT in Chad and EUTM Mali, and twice with UNIFIL. He holds a Master of Arts degree in Political Communication from Dublin City University and he is currently completing a PhD with University College Cork, where his thesis title is 'The Application of Mission Command in Multinational Forces'. Comdt Egerton is a student on the current Command and General Staff Officer Course at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, USA. Upon his return, he will take up an appointment as instructor at the Command and Staff School, Military College.

Brendan Cruise is a retired Sergeant, he enlisted in the Naval Service in 1998 and later, in 2001, he became a member of the Air Corps before retiring in 2022. He completed two overseas tours deploying with the 30 IRCON ISAF in Afghanistan and later with the 113 Inf Bn in South Lebanon. Brendan holds an honours degree in Irish Law (LLB) and a MA in International Security and Conflict Studies from DCU, with a thesis titled What does it really mean to say Drones are, or are not, proportionate regarding Jus in Bello?

He has previous papers in DF Review 2017 titled Can the current International Law framework on the use of force adequately accommodate States' response to terrorism?, then in 2018 with the Necessity to evolve UN Peacekeeping operations mandates, and also in 2020 with Superman in a Blue Helmet? Interpreting UN Protection of Civilian Mandates.

Brendan is currently employed as a civil servant.

Commandant Kenneth O'Rourke is a serving Infantry Officer with 21 years' service in the Irish Defence Forces. He has served in various command, training and staff appointments both at home and overseas including as an Infantry School Chief Instructor, DCO of the Force Reserve Company in UNDOF, and as Officer Commanding 1 MIC. He completed a BA in the University of Galway, and has completed a one year exchange programme to the French Military Academy of St. Cyr. He has recently completed an MA in Teaching and Learning in SETU. His dissertation explores the practical application of educational wargaming in Professional Military Education (PME) to develop decision-making and planning skills. He is currently serving as a staff officer in Strategic Planning Branch, COS Div, DFHQ.

Capt Kenneth Deegan was the Staff Officer for International Security and Defence Policy in the Strategic Planning Branch of Defence Forces Headquarters. He has a B.A. in International Relations an MSc in Supply Chain Management and is currently studying for an M.A in International Peacebuilding, Security and Development Practice. He is a student on the 06 Land Command and Staff Course

Sharon Breen, Assistant Principal, International Security and Defence Policy Branch, Department of Defence. She has a BA (Hons) in History and English and Bachelor of Business Studies (Hons). Sharon has worked in the Department of Defence since 2006. In her current role she has responsibility for Ireland's engagement in the European Defence Agency, PESCO projects, and NATO Partnership for Peace.

Lieutenant (NS) Cian Moran holds a PhD in International Law from the University of Galway and currently serves as Operations Officer on LÉ Samuel Beckett, having been commissioned as a Naval officer in 2018. Cian holds a first class honours LLB in Law from NUI Galway, where he graduated with the highest marks in his class, and an LLM in International Law from the University of Nottingham. He also holds a first class honours diploma in the Irish language from the University of Galway and a first class honours BSc in Nautical Science from Munster Technological University. He has had several articles published in academic journals such as the European Journal of Legal Studies and Irish Studies in International Affairs.

Lieutenant Commander Mike Brunicardi has twenty-two-years' service in the Irish Defence Forces. He joined in 2001 as an Operations Branch Cadet, following his Commissioning he served his time as an Officer Under Training and completed his professional qualifications. He has served across the fleet in various appointments and his last appointment at sea was as Officer Commanding LE JAMES JOYCE. He has also served in various appointments ashore including the Naval Operations, the Officer Training School, and Naval Headquarters.

Lieutenant Commander Brunicardi is a Graduate of the National University of Ireland, Galway with an Honours Degree in Geophysics, a graduate of University College Cork with a Higher Diploma in Geographical Information Systems and a Graduate of the University of Staffordshire with an MA in International Policy and Diplomacy. He also holds a Special Purpose Award for the Senior Command Operations Course from the National Maritime College of Ireland. He has just completed the Fifth Joint Command and Staff Course as is awaiting results on an MA in Leadership, Management and Defence Studies through Maynooth University and the Military College, Defence Forces Training Centre.

Lieutenant Commander Brunicardi is from Fermoy, Co. Cork, and lives in Kinsale Co. Cork with his family

Giovanni Parente is a PhD candidate in Maynooth University and is an IRC awardee scholar.

Under the supervision of Professor Ian Speller, his doctoral research is titled "The European Union at sea: a historical and geopolitical analysis of EU maritime operations and their impact on maritime governance and security, 2008-2020".

His primary research areas include maritime security, strategic studies, and the EU's foreign policy, on which he teaches regularly at the Irish Naval Service College and the Irish Military College.

He holds an M.Sc. in International Public Management and Policy from the Erasmus University of Rotterdam, an MA in Politics from the University of Essex, and a B.Sc. in Economics from the University of Naples.

Lieutenant Commander David Memery C.Eng was commissioned into the Naval Service in 2002 as an Electrical Engineering Officer and has served overseas in KFOR and UNIFIL in staff, support and operational roles, as well as appointments within Fleet Operations, Readiness, Standards and Training (FORST), the Naval College and Naval Support Command HQ, where he is currently serving as OIC of the Maintenance Management Unit, and is a graduate of the US Navy's International Shipyard Management Course, Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickham, Hawaii.

He holds primary degrees from the University of Dublin, Trinity College in Mathematics and Electronic & Computer Engineering and an M.Sc in Computer Science from the Open University, and is currently reading for an M.Eng in the South East Technical University.

He is a graduate of the 1st Joint Command and Staff Course and holds a Master of Arts in Leadership, Management and Defence Studies from NIUM with his thesis entitled 'The Future Model of Jointness within the Irish Defence Forces: How do we get there?'. He has previously published on the theme of Organisational Cultural Change within the Defence Forces, with a particular focus on the definition and move to a Future Force model.

Dr. Brendan Flynn is an Assistant Professor and Head of the Discipline of Political Science at the School of Political Science and Sociology, NUI, Galway. His research interests include maritime security and defence and security studies more broadly. He teaches European politics and Ocean and Marine politics and has lectured at the Irish Defence Force's Joint Senior Command and Staff Course and the Land Component Staff Course . He was a co-editor of the 2018 and 2022 Irish Defence Forces Review. Recent publications include: Robert McCabe & Brendan Flynn (26 Aug 2023): Under the radar: Ireland, maritime security capacity, and the governance of subsea infrastructure, European Security, DOI: 10.1080/09662839.2023.2248001; Flynn, Brendan. "Knowing your CJEF from your JEF: Europe's "Alphabet soup" of interstitial military cooperation-what relevance for cold war 2.0?." Defence Studies (2022): 1-21. https://doi.org/10.1080/14702436.2022.2137495; Flynn, Brendan. "The coming high-tech Sino-American War at Sea? Naval Guns, Technology hybridity and the "Shock of the Old"." *Defence Studies* (2021): 1-22;

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